Prostitutes Charged With Committing Robbery In Atlantic City Hotel Suite

In State v. Rodriguez, the defendant was charged with 2nd degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and convicted of the lesser included offense of 3rd degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3), simple assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a), 4th degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d). The defendant and her co-defendant, Mayo, were acquitted of 2nd degree conspiracy to commit robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and 3rd degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d). Defendant and co-defendant, prostitutes, met 3 men in the lobby of an Atlantic City hotel and proceeded to join the men in their room. Once there both women surrounded one of the men and began touching him in an erotic manner. Shortly thereafter, the man realized his money was missing and attempted to stop the women from leaving the suite when he was sprayed in the face with pepper spray by the defendant. The defendant was sentenced to 5 years in prison with a 2 year parole disqualifier for theft by unlawful taking, a concurrent 6 month term for the simple assault charge and 1 year in prison for unlawful possession of a weapon which was to be served concurrently. Defendant was also on probation for a prior conviction of 3rd degree theft from the person at the time of the offense and pled guilty to a violation of probation (VOP) and received a concurrent 5 year sentence for the VOP. The defendant challenged her conviction based on comments during the prosecution's summation, adequacy of the jury instructions, a weapons conviction with regard to pepper spray, failure to submit lesser included offenses to the jury, cumulative error depriving the defendant of a fair trial and the sentence. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but remanded for sentencing with regard to the VOP as the trial judge failed to set forth aggravating and mitigating factors as required under N.J.C.R. 3:21-4(g) and State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 177 (1989). Robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery and the lesser included offense of theft are very serious charges that carry substantial penalties including up to 10 years in prison for each charge. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Intent To Distribute Verdict Reversed Due To Improper Prosecution Tactics

Debra Rogers and Lameen Hill were charged with third degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute cocaine (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1)), second degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute 1/2 ounce or more of cocaine (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1),b(2), conspiracy to distribute cocaine (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5) and possessoin of cocaine with intent to distribute in a school zone (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7). The State dismissed he conspiracy and school zone charges and Rogers was found guilty of second degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute and third degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute and sentenced to an extended 10 year term with a 5 year period of parole ineligibility due to a prior conviction in 1999 for distribution of CDS (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3)). In State v. Rogers the defendant appealed based on inadmissibility of the state expert's opinion as to whether items seized were for narcotics packaging and distribution, failure to charge the jury on assessment of witness credibility, multiple challenges to the warrant, lack of a fair trial and sentencing error in regard to the 5 year parole disqualifier imposed. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the conviction for simple possession but reversed the conviction for possession with intent to distribute based on the improper opinion testimony presented by one of the investigating officers. In 2009, Perth Amboy detectives were watching defendant's apartment and noted several people coming and going therefrom within a relatively short period of time. The defendant also left the premises and was arrested upon departing from a doctor's appointment outside the residence and was returned to the apartment by police who used her key to enter the apartment and arrest other adults within, including Rogers parents, due to outstanding warrants. Co-defendant, Hill, confessed to having cocaine on his person as he was about to be searched incident to arrest for warrants. The officers proceeded to search the apartment and located 1.2 ounces of cocaine, $13,000 in cash, and three digital scales. The drugs and money were located in Roger's bedroom. Sergeant Muntone of the Midddlesex County Prosecutor's Office testified, without objection by defense counsel, that the items discovered were possessed with intent to distribute. The Appellate Division referenced State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576-77(1999) which defines plain error as error possessing a "clear capacity to bring about an unjust result" and prejudices the defendant's "fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of the defense." The NJ Appellate Division found Muntone's testimony to be improper on its face and likened it to State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) wherein the prosecution elicited opinion testimony of an officer which was an unqualified expert opinion. Had Muntone been qualified as an expert under the requirements of State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65 (1989) the testimony would have been admissible. The Appellate Division considered the fact that expert testimony offered by an investigating officer bears an inherent risk of substantial prejudice (State v. Barry, 140 N.J. 280 (1995)). Additionally, the Appellate Division took issue with the manner in which the prosecution presented the opinion testimony to effectively usurp the jury's role in considering how they will utilize "such testimony in their deliberations." Odom. The jury was not guided in the manner they could consider the opinion testimony of Muntone. Lastly, when defense counsel does not object to improper opinion testimony, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to act accordingly and exclude such testimony. State v. Nesbitt, 185 N.J. 504 (2006). Based on the Appellate Division's decision to reverse the conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute they had no further need to address the resultant extended sentence and parole disqualifier. If you have been charged with possession or possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances you must obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately in order that all appropriate procedures are followed by the police and the prosecution in the prosecution of your case. There are frequently problems with consent to search, warrants, Miranda, inappropriate denial of suppression motions and improper trial procedure which may make a substantial difference in the outcome of your matter. For more information about CDS, possession, intent to distribute, prescription CDS, distribution and other drug charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Two Unlawful Weapons But Only One Extended Term For Convicted Felon

In State v. Robbins, the defendant, Sylvanus K. Robbins, was convicted of 2 counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7), possession of a stun gun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3h), possession of a sawed-off shotgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b), unlawful possession of a loaded weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(2)) and hindering his own prosecution (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(1)). Robbins appealed the conviction and the 16 year aggregate extended-term sentence with 50% parole disqualifier. Defendant was stopped for an illegal u-turn and failed to produce a license, registration or insurance card then confessed to having a suspended North Carolina driver's license. The defendant was ordered from the vehicle and secured in handcuffs for officer safety and during the detention it was discovered defendant had warrants from North Carolina for burglary, kidnapping and assault by strangulation. Defendant agreed to a search of the vehicle and based on information provided by defendant's girlfriend, the police also sought consent to search their hotel room. Upon receiving consent to search from defendant's girlfriend, police discovered a sawed-off shotgun, ammunition and a stun gun in the hotel room. Police stated that, after being Mirandized but before deciding whether to give up the right to remain silent, Defendant immediately admitted to ownership of the shotgun, advising it was for protection when riding his dirt bike in the North Carolina woods. Defendant denied admission of ownership of the gun and stated he only consented to the search as it was very cold outside and the officer had him stand outside of the car until he consented. The judge was not satisfied consent was voluntary and suppressed a fake gun found in the trunk of the car. The judge also decided the search of the hotel room was separate from the search of the vehicle and would have happened as a result of the warrants therefore, pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) the shotgun was not "fruit of the poisonous tree." The judge held that the defendant's admission to ownership of the gun did not violate Miranda or Rule 3:17(a) as it was made spontaneously and not during an investigation. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and found the 16 year extended-term not to be excessive for possession of a saw-off shotgun gun by a convicted felon pursuant to State v. Bieniek, 182 N.J. 44 (2004). The Appellate Division did remand for re-sentencing with regard to the imposition of 2 extended term sentences as N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5a(2) prohibits more than one extended term. In regard to possession of the stun gun by a convicted felon, the sentence was to be a concurrent, ordinary term. If you are facing weapons or other serious charges, it is critical for you to obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to fight the charges. Conviction and even certain negotiated pleas can result in extended term sentences which will deprive you of your freedom for a large part of your life as well as have a devastating impact on your loved ones. For more information regarding weapons possession by a convicted felon, possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes, hindering apprehension and other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Domestic Violence Offenders Subject To Electronic Monitoring In NJ

A bill, A-321, awaiting the signature of NJ Governor Chris Christie will launch a pilot program in Ocean County for the monitoring of those found guilty of domestic violence. Named Lisa's Law after Letizia Zindell, a woman murdered by her former fiancé, Frank Frisco, the day after his release from jail in 2009 for violating a restraining order for her protection. The pilot program will be tested for a period of 4 years and a report will be furnished at the end of the term whereby the program may be expanded throughout the state of New Jersey if it is deemed beneficial in saving victims of domestic violence from further harm. Upon being found guilty of domestic violence offenders could, at the judges' discretion, be required to wear a monitoring bracelet and victims could be notified if their attackers come within a certain proximity. The Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) opposed this bill due to the financial expense and what they perceive will be a drain on judicial resources as offenders have more frequent and lengthy hearings to oppose the imposition of monitoring bracelets. The AOC also cited lack of ability to estimate the number of defendants the system would have to process and monitor as well as lack of specificity in the legislation regarding which agency would bear responsibility for monitoring to ensure compliance with the program in voicing their opposition to the program. As drafted, offenders would be required to pay all or a portion of the expenses related to monitoring and notification, based on their ability to pay. There is no proposed method of ascertaining the defendant's ability to pay but, much like other programs involving inability to pay and the right to appointed counsel, monitoring is burdensome and frequently overlooked permitting those with ample resources to avoid payment and place a higher burden on the state's taxpayers to bear the defendant's legal fees. Removal of the bracelet would be a 3rd degree crime punishable by 3-5 years in prison. Victims would be permitted to, but not required to, consent to notification if the defendant enters within an area of close proximity. One must wonder what purpose the legislation would serve in the event a victim were to opt out of notification and the need for monitoring in such circumstances. Domestic violence is a very serious charge in New Jersey and the need to deter would be abusers has resulted in escalating penalties over time. If this bill passes, which is most likely to be the case, offenders will be subject to the prior penalties of fines, possible incarceration, inability to own firearms or obtain a firearms ID card as well as this new monitoring bracelet which could alert were the abuser to as much as unwittingly enter into the same restaurant or store as the victim and result in investigative detention and possible further punishment of the abuser following a hearing on the matter. If you are charged with domestic violence or seeking a final restraining order against an abuser, the increased stakes for a guilty finding will result in increased burdens of proof for both parties in proving or disproving the charges making it critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you in such matters. For more information regarding domestic violence, restraining orders, assault, battery and other criminal law issues in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juror Replacement Leads to Robbery Conviction Reverasl

In State v. Musa, Humfrey A. Musa was convicted of second degree robbery after jury deliberations. The defendant appealed the conviction based on substitution of Juror #2 after the first full day of deliberations. At the close of the first day of deliberations, the judge was provided a note from the jury including the jury's inquiry as to whether a juror could be excused. The judge indicated that, barring emergency in the form of illness or other special circumstances, jurors would not be excused. On the following day, Juror #2 failed to appear, provided no notice and the court placed telephone calls to the juror and left messages at her home requesting contact, as well as making efforts to contact her at the work number listed only to find she was not employed where claimed, but ultimately did not locate the missing juror. Defense counsel requested that the judge inquire of the remaining jurors whether Juror #2 was the one referenced in their note the previous day regarding substitution as a result of non-cooperation. The prosecution argued that the judges answer to the jurors question as to whether a substitution was permissible was adequate. By 11:00 a.m. the court determined they would move forward with an alternate juror replacing Juror #2. On the second day of deliberations, the judge recharged the jury and in only 3 hours the defendant was found guilty by the jury with the replaced member. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Court questioned the reason Juror #2 failed to return and the relatively rapid decision by the jury following the substitution of the alternate. The Appellate Court reasoned that, based the previous day's inquiry regarding dismissal of a juror and the rapid decision the following day, that Juror #2 had differences with the remaining jurors as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and that the court failed to make adequate inquiry into that matter. Although there substitutions for certain reasons are permissible, in State v. Jenkins, 182 N.J. 112, 124 (2004) the court held that substitution is specifically prohibited when requested due to difficulty with other jurors during deliberations. The trial judge made adequate efforts to contact the juror but failed to make adequate efforts to determine the basis of the initial jury inquiry relative to substitution. State v. Hightower, 146 N.J. 239, 253 (1996) established that "any conduct that could upset the process of jury deliberations, even judicial conduct such as juror substitution, must be carefully scrutinized." Based on the lack of record as to why Juror #2 did not return the second day, the there was not adequate information upon which to review the matter of the substitution and any prejudicial effect on the defendant and the Appellate Court reversed the decision and remanded for a new trial. Robbery is a very serious charge bearing heavy consequences. If you are charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to review evidence, the prosecutions case and insure the trial process is undertaken in the spirit of justice without breach of your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, burglary or other criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Limits of Doctor-Patient Privilege

The defendant in State v. Marcano was charged with uttering a forged instrument (N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1(a)(3)), attempting to obtain a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) by fraud (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:35-13) and attempting to obtain prescription legend drugs (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:35-10.5(d)). The Hudson County Superior Court trial judge limited the testimony of the State's principal witness on the theory that the physician-patient privilege, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.1 to -22.7 and N.J.R.E. 506, bars the defendant's doctor from testifying regarding the defendant's alleged criminal actions of attempting to obtain Percocet within the doctor's office. Thadeusz Majchrzak, M.D. contacted the Jersey City police to notify them Marcano presented an apparently altered prescription for Percocet at a drug store she frequently utilized and the drug store requested the doctor's verification regarding the prescription. A prescription form, including three drugs, was provided to defendant's mother and presented to the pharmacy by Marcano with a fourth item listed on it. During that same office visit, for defendant's mother's care, Marcano had asked the Majchrzak to prescribe her Percocet but he refused and referred her to pain management. The trial judge relied on the New York case of People v. Sinski, 669 N.E.2d 809 (N.Y. 1996) in limiting the doctor's testimony and found the remaining evidence insufficient to establish a criminal purpose for the requested prescription. In an effort to balance the doctor-patient privilege with the statutory duty of doctors to report forged prescriptions the judge limited the doctor's testimony to only the forgery. Finding that the truth is of ultimate import, the court, in Carchidi v. Iavicoli, 412 N.J. Super. 374, 383 (App.Div. 2010), opined that privileges simply serve to "inhibit the search for the truth." However, privileges must yield to other societal interests when necessary according to the court in State v. Schreiber, 122 N.J. 579, 583 (1991). Because the physician-patient privilege protects those "who, for the sole purpose of securing preventive, palliative or curative treatment consults a physician" pursuant to N.J.R.E. 506(a) and it is not designed to protect those attempting to commit crimes it does not apply to Marcano. The Appellate Division determined the doctor's testimony should have been admissible as to the entire series of events and reversed the decision of the trial court judge. If you are facing charges relating to drugs, whether prescription or not, it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to fight to protect your rights. If you are convicted or plead guilty to drug charges you face incarceration, loss of driving privileges, substantial fines and penalties and probation. For more information about controlled dangerous substances, prescription drug charges, CDS in a motor vehicle, driving under the influence (DUI) or other criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Civil Commitment of Sexual Violent Predators

In The Matter of the Civil Commitment of C.H. the State sought civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act(SVPA) (N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38). An Essex County Superior Court judge found C.H. not highly likely to re-offend and the prosecution contended on appeal that the judge failed to properly evaluate C.H.'s antisocial personality disorder and predisposition to re-offend a sexually violent predator. Before C.H. was dismissed from the NJ Special Treatment Unit (STU) the state appealed the Superior Court's decision. C.H. was convicted of four sexual offenses on women 17 to 36 as well as other crimes of violence, including burglary, assault, theft and drug related offenses between 1978 and 2005. Under the SVPA, an individual can face involuntary civil commitment upon completion of their sentence if he or she "suffers from an mental abnormality of personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. The court, deciding in re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 127 (2002) interpreted the statute to mean that a mental abnormality or personality disorder must distort the ability to control the person's "sexually harmful conduct". The court, in W.Z., held the state bears the burden of proving the defendant is a threat to the health and safety of others by demonstrating "the individual has serious difficulty in controlling sexually harmful behavior" making it Highly likely" they will re-offend. The state's expert psychiatrists found C.H. highly likely to re-offend sexually based on his paraphelia, a condition involving intense fantasies and urges with sexual arousal to inappropriate stimuli, polysubstance abuse and antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). The Appellate Division found the trial judge's opinion reflected a mistaken exercise of discretion based on the expert opinions provided. The judge found C.H. to be predisposed to acts of sexual violence, miscalculated the time periods between C.H.'s arrests, gave insufficient weight to unresolved substance abuse issues, concluded without evidence C.H. "aged out" of his sexually violent tendencies and failed to take into account the overall psychiatric situation of C.H. The Appellate Division determined C.H. would have his commitment reviewed periodically and, therefore, did not order a remand hearing but simply reversed the decision of the trial judge determined C.H. was to be civilly committed. If you have been charged with a sex crime, a conviction or guilty plea can result in incarceration for a term of years followed by involuntary civil commitment for life. Consequences also include registration as a sex offender and the social stigma you will face forever. It is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately if you are charged with a sex crime. For more information about rape, sexual assault, child molestation, solicitation of a minor or other sex crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sentencing In Weapons Case Must Fit The Crime

The defendants, Jaquan Lee and Tony Canty, collectively appealed their convictions of 1st degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, 2nd degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a(1), 3rd degree unlawful possession of a shotgun without a firearms purchaser ID card, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, 3rd degree unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b and 2nd degree certain persons not to possess firearms N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 arising out of 3 separate robberies occurring on July 30, 2007 in Elizabeth putting multiple victims at risk. The defendants in State v. Lee were sentenced in the Union County Superior Court to 15 year terms for each count concurrent as to multiple victims in each incident but consecutive as to each incident resulting in aggregate 45 year terms subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 which requires service of 85% of their sentence before eligible for parole. On appeal, collectively State v. Lee, the defendants challenge in court identifications and excessive sentences. Canty challenged a motion to suppress and Lee challenged the adequacy of the jury charge. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing as the court did not adequately place the reasons for imposing 3 consecutive sentences on the record. In reviewing whether the sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, the Appellate Division looked to State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 644 (1985). Yarbough sets forth factors a court may consider do make such a determination including whether (1) the crimes and objectives were predominately independent of each other; (2) the crimes involved separate acts or threats of violence; (3) whether the crimes were unified in place or time or whether they were individual acts; (4) the number of victims in each criminal act; and (5) the number of convictions for which sentences will be imposed. The Appellate Division also agreed the criminal history and rate of recidivism of the actors could be considered according to State v. Mosch, 214 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1986). If you have been accused of a crime it is imperative you obtain experienced legal counsel to begin preparing a defense, recognize and challenge violations of your rights with motions to suppress or dismiss and, if you are ultimately sentenced, challenge excessive sentences. For more information regarding weapons, drugs, robbery, assault or other serious criminal charges visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.