Warrantless Search And Seizure Results In Suppression Of Weapons And Marijuana

After losing a suppression motion based on warrantless search and seizure, Peter Samuell pled guilty to fourth-degree possession of more than 50 grams of marijuana (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3)) in exchange for the dismissal of multiple other counts of drug possession with intent to distribute and firearms offenses after losing a suppression motion. Police in Trenton received multiple calls regarding the discharge of a handgun. Officers went to the front door of a house believed to be the possible location and surrounded same. While an officer was at the front door speaking to co-defendant Crawford, several others were surrounding the fenced in rear yard. Crawford appeared on the back porch and officers asked that he come to the fence to be frisked but he refused so Officer Bledsoe scaled the fence and detained Crawford. Several officers then entered the house to secure a large number of individuals inside and discovered marijuana, weapons and ammunition in plain view. The entry by police was warrantless and the defendant appealed the constitutionality of the entry in addition to attempting to suppress the evidence obtained as “fruit of the poisonous tree”. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. ed.2d 441, 454 (1963). In State v. Samuell, the defendant appealed the warrantless search and the NJ Appellate Division reversed. The police did not have any probable cause to jump the fence onto private property in order to further their investigation of shots fired when they merely suspected criminal activity may be occurring on the property. State v. Jefferson, 413 N.J. Super. 344, 354-355 (App. Div. 2010). The NJ Appellate Division cited Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002); Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579 (1989) in holding that police must have a search warrant, consent to enter or the facts must fall under the exception to the warrant requirement as a person’s private property offers the highest degree of expectation of privacy from the intrusion of warrantless searches and seizures. The Appellate Division cited to the holding in State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204 211 (2001) that “probable cause requires a ‘well grounded’ suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed” and found that was clearly not the case here where the shots fired could have come from any location in the area with a dog house in the back yard as described by callers. The Appellate Division considered the possibility of exigent circumstances permitting entry but found that none existed in review of the holdings of State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126 (1983); State v. Penalber, 386 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2006); State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211 (2013); State v. Holland, 328 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2000) and other authoritative decisions. The Appellate Division held that it was only upon Officer Bledsoe’s unlawful entry onto the property that the police had probable cause to believe there were firearms and drugs on the property and therefore the evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree which must be suppressed. If you are facing charges and believe evidence against you was obtained in violation of your Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless search and seizure, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to fight your case. For more information about warrantless search, distribution of controlled dangerous substances (CDS), possession, CDS in a motor vehicle or other criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Officer Unqualified To Give Opinion Allows Reversal Of Drug Convictions

Wasan Brockington was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), possession with intent to distribute CDS, distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in a school zone and conspiracy. The drugs in question were cocaine and heroin. New Brunswick Police were conducting surveillance in a specific location. Sergeant Quick claimed to have witnessed several transactions wherein money was handed by third-parties to the co-defendant, Fitzpatrick, then the defendant would walk down a driveway with the third-party and they would both return within a minute and the third-party would walk off. Quick suspected these were drug transactions and even characterized each transaction as a heroin transaction or a cocaine transaction. However, he made no arrests, had no evidence to test and claimed to be at a substantial distance viewing the transactions through binoculars. At some point, officers closed in and saw Brockington throw down a newspaper with bags of suspected heroin inside and found 2 bags each of heroin and cocaine on the third-party suspected drug buyer leaving the scene. After police seized Brockington and the evidence, he advised that all of the drugs were his and that the co-defendant was innocent. In State v. Brockington, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement, to compel the disclosure of the officers’ surveillance point and other pre-trial motions but all were denied by trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County. The defendant also objected to the inclusion of Sergeant Quick’s testimony regarding drug transactions he allegedly witnessed as his testimony was elicited by the prosecutor in a manner making him appear to be an expert on the subject of drugs and drug transactions when he offered that he could discern cocaine from heroin at a great distance but the court allowed it. At the conclusion of trial, no limiting instruction to the jury was requested. Brockington was sentenced to 10 years with a 5 year parole ineligibility period. Defendant appealed and the N.J. Appellate Division looked to N.J.R.E. 701as interpreted in the similar matters of State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) and United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1154, 128 S. Ct. 1100, 169 L. Ed.2d 831 (2008) wherein it was held that “a lay opinion must be the product of reasoning processes familiar to the average person in everyday life.” The Appellate Division found the opinion of Sergeant Quick to far exceed the established boundary of lay opinion testimony. The prosecutor also bolstered Quick’s testimony as credible and accurate which further prejudiced the defendant in violation of the strictures set forth in State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J 493 (2008) and State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76 (1999). The Appellate Division then reviewed and compared a litany of cases to determine whether testimony about the other alleged transactions in which no arrests were made and from which no evidence was retrieved violated N.J.R.E. 404 (b) and determined it may be used as the probative value was not likely substantially outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. The matter was ultimately reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the likelihood of unfair prejudice toward Brockington. Penalties for drug distribution in NJ are severe and lasting, often including lengthy prison terms with significant parole ineligibility periods. If you have been charged with a drug offense an experienced criminal defense attorney can protect your rights. For more information about drug distribution, possession, possession with intent to distribute or controlled dangerous substances (CDS) visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Limit On Police Requests For Passengers To Exit Vehicle

In State v. Bacome, a pretextual motor vehicle stop led to the discovery of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a vehicle. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed that police must have a “reasonable and articulable belief that their safety is in danger” before they can order passengers to exit a motor vehicle during a traffic stop. On April 11, 2014, Tawain Bacome and another gentleman suspected of drug use and distribution were followed by Woodbridge detectives to Newark. While in Newark, the detectives lost sight of the vehicle and returned to Woodbridge to wait for the vehicle to return. Upon seeing the vehicle coming into town, the detectives also noticed the passenger was not wearing a seatbelt and conducted a stop during which the passenger was ordered from the vehicle. Upon the passenger’s exit from the vehicle, the detectives saw certain evidence of crack use in plain view and used the evidence to obtain the vehicle’s owner’s consent to search. Ultimately, 13 vials of crack were discovered in the vehicle and Bacome was charged with drug possession and intent to distribute. The NJ Superior Court, Law Division, Criminal Part of Middlesex County denied Bacome’s motion to suppress the crack cocaine and other evidence found during the stop. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Division upheld State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 637 A.2d 158 (1994) which set forth the need for police to have “reasonable and articulable belief that their safety is in danger” before they can order passengers to exit a motor vehicle during a traffic stop. Smith is more restrictive on police than the requirements set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Maryland v. Wilson, 518 U.S. 408 (1997) wherein it was established that police officers were permitted to instruct passengers to exit a motor vehicle as long as the vehicle is stopped for a lawful reason. The NJ Appellate Division found the stop to be pretextual, based not on the passenger’s failure to wear a seatbelt but rather the detectives’ interest in searching the vehicle for evidence of drug use or distribution. The Appellate Division determined that the evidence should be suppressed and Bacome allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. If you are now facing charges as a result of a warrantless search and seizure, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you against the State’s charges. For more information about traffic stops, search and seizure, warrant requirements, warrantless searches, drug possession or distribution charges or other serious criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alternatives To Jail For Driving While Suspended For Multiple DUI Charges?

Driving while suspended for a second or subsequent driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) charge in New Jersey now carries a 180 day mandatory minimum jail term. Since N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) was enacted on August 1, 2011, drivers sentenced to the mandatory minimum 180 days in jail without parole have been seeking alternative sentences. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), it is a fourth-degree crime to operate a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for a second or subsequent driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction or refusal to submit to chemical breath testing in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. In State v. French, 437 N.J. Super 333 (App. Div. 2014) , the trial court sentenced French to 180 days in jail, but allowed for up to 90 days of the sentence to be served in an inpatient treatment facility. The NJ Appellate Division held that sentences other that incarceration were not what the Legislature contemplated in enacting the statute and refused to find opportunity for flexibility in sentencing. In State v. Harris, John D. Harris, III, was sentenced to 180 days but allowed to serve his sentence on the Home Electronic Detention System (HEDS) program. The State appealed the sentence and the NJ Appellate Division upheld the courts finding in French finding that the Legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) was to protect the public from those who would continue to drive after multiple DUI convictions. Although there is likely to be further litigation regarding other alternatives to incarceration, including diversionary programs, for driving while suspended for DWI the present state of the law is that you will serve 180 days in jail for this offense. If you are facing charges of DUI, DWI or driving while suspended for these charges you are facing significant periods of license suspension and the possibility of jail. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DUI, DWI, driving while under the influence of drugs (DUID), driving while suspended for DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other serious traffic related charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Possession Conviction Reversed On Right To Remain Silent

Jamaal Shockley was indicted for third-degree possession of cocaine, a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); third-degree possession of cocaine, a CDS, with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)); and second-degree eluding police (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)) after he fled from police when they attempted to get him to stop while he was riding a dirt bike. Shockley fled and the pursuit continued until he fell off the motorcycle and was tackled by officers while attempting to run away. The defendant was patted down for weapons at the scene, his jacket was searched at the police department and his shoes and jacket were again checked prior to leaving the hospital after treatment. While being booked into the county jail, the defendant was again patted down before removing his clothes. Each of the prior searches was negative for weapons or contraband. After Shockley had removed his clothing as part of processing and was already lodged in jail, corrections officer Brooks again searched his clothing outside of his presence and discovered a bag containing 14 bags of cocaine within another small bag in the pocket of the defendant's sweatshirt. In State v. Shockley, the defendant was found guilty of possession of a CDS and eluding police. Shockley was sentenced to 8 years with 4 years of parole ineligibility for the eluding charge and a concurrent 6 year term with 3 years of parole ineligibility for the CDS charges. The defendant appealed on multiple grounds including that corrections officer Brooks testified regarding Shockley's silence when notified by Brooks that the cocaine had been discovered. Although the defendant did not object to Brooks' testimony at trial, reversal is required if it was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State v. Taffaro, 195 N. J. 442 (2008). The Appellate Division looked to State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 59 (2012) wherein the court considered the privilege against self-incrimination as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503. The court cited Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L. Ed.2d 91, 98 (1976) with regard to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the protection it offers both pre and post-arrest silence. In NJ, State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 610 (1990) affords an accused the right to remain silent while "in custody or under interrogation." The NJ Appellate Division found the testimony to be plain error as it offered no probative value and was clearly in violation of Shockley's rights to remain silent and a fair trial. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new trial. A drug related conviction in NJ can have serious and lasting consequences including prison, loss of license, substantial fines and the stigma of the conviction or plea can result in the loss of certain employment or educational opportunities. If you are facing charges of use, possession or distribution of CDS, it is critical you consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights. For more information about prescription or non-prescription drug charges for use possession or distribution, controlled dangerous substances in a motor vehicle, DUI and other criminal and serious municipal court matters visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Manslaughter, Not Self-Defense, For Killing An Unintended Victim

For the murder of Lavern Ritch, Robert Davies was charged by a grand jury with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)-(b)); aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); passion/provocation manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2)); second-degree reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1)); third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)); fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a)); and possessing a knife under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for its use (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). At the close of a trial, Davies was found guilty of second-degree reckless manslaughter, third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. Prior to sentencing, Davies motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial were denied by the court. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison subject to a mandatory extended term for manslaughter pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e), a discretionary extended term under the persistent offender statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) and a period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) but offered no clarification of the actual basis for the extended term. Additionally, the sentenced set forth on the record differs from that in the Judgment of Conviction as to whether sentences for the weapons convictions would run consecutive or concurrent to the manslaughter sentence. At trial, in State v. Davies, the defendant represented himself pro se for some time prior to requesting that stand-by counsel assume representation on his behalf. Testimony at trial indicated that Davies had just been punched by Chavez following the exchange of words the restroom of a bar shortly prior to the attack and was chasing Chavez when Ritch, running behind him along with other companions of Chavez touched the defendant on the shoulder from behind at which time the defendant turned around and stabbed Ritch. The defendant claimed to have stabbed Ritch thinking he was defending himself against another attack from Chavez’ companions. Witnesses testified that, when defendant spun around toward Ritch, Ritch put his hands up and stated he was trying to help Davies although some testimony differed from testimony offered to police previously. Witnesses testified to seeing Davies strike Ritch, although no knife was visible, and then seeing Davies immediately resume pursuit of Chavez. Witnesses immediately went to Ritch who was bleeding from his side and said he had been stabbed. His death ultimately resulted from a stab wound to the heart. Davies appealed seeking a new trial due to multiple alleged errors relating to the trial. With regard to the defendant's theory of self-defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 requires the need to protect oneself from death or serious bodily harm in order to justify the use of deadly force within certain confined areas. The events in the within matter occurred in a public area and did not give rise to a claim of self-defense in the opinion of the NJ Appellate Division. Additionally, under N.J.S.A. 2C:3-3 to 2C:3-8, even if Davies had been justified in using deadly force against Chavez, the Appellate Division determined the reckless and negligent use of deadly force against Ritche was unjustifiable. As such, the trial court did not err in failing to provide the jury with instructions regarding Davies self-defense claims. After ample consideration of Davies other multiple challenges to jury instructions and court procedures, the Appellate Division found there were no errors requiring a reversal of the conviction. The Appellate Division did find that, pursuant to State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628 (1996), merger is required of the offenses although the victim was ultimately an unintended victim. The matter was remand the matter for re-sentencing including the requirement that the trial court set forth fully its consideration under the factors of State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985) and the basis for any extended term pursuant to State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 610 (2014) and State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 170 (2006). Additionally, the trial court is directed to sentence Davies in consideration of his present lifestyle and conditions as opposed to how circumstances presented him on the date of the original sentencing pursuant to State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012). If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Aggravated Assault and Robbery Convictions Reversed Due To Comments At Trial By Detective And Prosecutor

Anthony Coles was charged with second-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and third-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)) after a physical altercation with another man outside a store in Union County, NJ wherein Coles allegedly robbed the man of several hundred dollars. Although the store had a recording system, the detective charged with obtaining the video failed to obtain the pertinent part thereof in order to bolster the State's case. Prior to the taping over of the portion of the video wherein Coles and the victim both appeared in the store, the video was viewed by officers who responded to the scene as well as the victim who identified Coles in the video as the person who beat and robbed him. Coles indicated that he knew the victim prior to the event because he had previously purchased marijuana from the victim and gave a different version of the reasons for the altercation. In State v. Coles, the detective charged with obtaining the video testified regarding the benefit the missing video would have offered the State's case as well as opinion testimony with regard to the State's case in general. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial judge permitted the testimony of the detective and inappropriate statements made by the prosecutor during the state's closing argument. Based on the cases presented, the defendant was convicted of theft from the person (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(a)(2(e)) and simple assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1)) and sentenced to an extended 9 year term in prison as a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) with a discretionary parole disqualifier of 4.5 years. The NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) and State v. Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. 229 (2003) regarding the matter of lay opinion testimony removing one function of the jury. McLean specifically sets forth that officer testimony may "include opinion…or what the officer 'believed', 'thought' or 'suspected,'…"McLean, 205 N.J. at 460. The Appellate Division determined it was error by the trial court to permit the detective's opinion testimony. Additionally, State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 474 (1994) and State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J.123, 322 (1987) lent guidance to the Appellate Division with regard to reversal of a conviction when the prosecution's closing arguments deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The Appellate Division held it impermissible for the prosecutor to use the defendant's presence at trial to discredit testimony provided by the defendant in summation as "tailored" after presentation of the state's case pursuant to State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 (2004) and felt the impropriety to have raised a strong question regarding whether the defendant's right to a fair trial was upheld. As a result of the likelihood that defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial the NJ Appellate Division remanded the matter for a new trial. Aggravated assault and assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about aggravated assault, robbery and other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Alternative To Jail For Driving While Suspended For DUI

Anthony Frezza was charged with operating a motor vehicle while suspended for multiple driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) charges pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) after being stopped on the Atlantic City Expressway in the early morning hours of February 4, 2012. Pursuant to the statute, the requisite sentence is 180 days in jail without parole with no sentencing discretion afforded to the court. After a trial in State v. Frezza at which the defendant was found guilty, the municipal court judge sentenced Frezza to 180 days in jail without parole with alternatives including house arrest. The State cross-appealed and appeal filed by Frezza challenging the sufficiency of evidence. The NJ Appellate Division relied on State v. Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. 308, 319 (App. Div. 2005) in holding that Frezza’s motor vehicle record was admissible as prima facie evidence that he was suspended for driving while intoxicated (DWI) at the time he was stopped and admitted to driving while suspended. Frezza was serving a suspension for a second DUI offense and, pursuant to State v. Cuccurullo, 228 N.J. Super. 517, 520-21 (App. Div. 1988), a driver is suspended for DUI when the sentence is imposed, even if the driver is still serving a suspension for an earlier event. In State v. French, 437 N.J. Super. 333, 335-39 (App. Div. 2014), the court clarified that a 180 day jail sentence without parole is required and no sentencing alternatives are permissible. As a result, the NJ Appellate Division reversed the sentence and remanded for sentencing in conformance with the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). DWI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges and can lead to loss of driving privileges up to 10 years as well as incarceration. Additionally, the newly created statute regarding driving while suspended for multiple DUI offenses guarantees a 6 month jail term. If you are facing charges or charges of driving while suspended for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about driving while suspended for DUI, DWI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Man Is Charged With Possession Of A Firearm After Calling 9-1-1 To Aid Another

Donald Peterson was charged with second-degree possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)) and fourth-degree possession of a machete (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a)) as a result of being a good samaritan. Peterson called the Hillsborough Police to report an unconscious male in front of his residence. Ultimately a murder investigation ensued with regard to the man discovered, based on the suspicious death of the 16 year old male. The Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office obtained a warrant to search the residence of Peterson for evidence that the victim had been in Peterson’s residence including “hair, fibers, fingerprints, bodily fluids, DNA, and other microscopic/forensic evidence. During multiple interviews with police officers, after Miranda warnings, Peterson admitted to having a criminal history as well as possessing weapons. While searching Peterson’s residence, the police discovered a Winchester rifle and a machete which Peterson was prohibited from possessing under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 as a certain person prohibited from possessing weapons due to his prior criminal history. Although no evidence was discovered liking Peterson to the death of the man he discovered on his sidewalk, he was indicted for the weapons possessions charges. In State v. Peterson, the defendant sought to suppress the discovery of the weapons in light of the fact that, although discovered in plain view during the search, discovery was not inadvertent given his prior notice to officers of his possession of same. Over the State’s objection, the NJ Superior Court, Law Division- Criminal Part, Somerset County suppressed the weapons in reliance on State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236 (1983) holding inadvertent discovery to be an essential element for application of the ‘plain view’ exception to the search warrant requirement. The NJ Appellate Division reviewed the matter and found the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply in this case involving a search warrant for evidence establishing the victim’s pre-mortem presence in Peterson’s residence. Pursuant to State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 611 (2009), a lawful search should be limited to the areas likely to lead to discovery of the intended object of the search. In State v. Sheehan, 217 N.J. Super. 20 (1987), the court determined that when a search warrant applies to the entire premises, any item discovered therein is lawful as within the scope of the warrant. The court determined that State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 412 (2014) provided the N.J. Supreme Court with the opportunity to strike down or limit inadvertent discovery doctrine yet the justices did not seize upon said opportunity. The court turned to State v. Sugar, 108 N.J. 151, 156-157 (1987) establishing proof required by the State to invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine as follows: “(1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures would have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of such evidence by unlawful means.” Based on Peterson’s statements to police regarding his criminal history and his possession of the rifle, a warrant would have properly issued for a search for the weapon wholly independent of the warrant related to whether the victim had been present in Peterson’s residence pre-mortem. The NJ Appellate Division found the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply in this matter and reversed the trial court’s suppression of the rifle. If you are facing weapons charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to protect your rights. For more information about weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, certain persons not to possess weapons or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juvenile Seeks To Withdraw Manslaughter And Carjacking Pleas

Demitrius Minor, a juvenile offender, was charged with first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)) and first-degree carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1)-(3))for crimes occurring on different dates and involving different victims in each circumstance. Although only sixteen (16) years of age at the time, Minor waived jurisdiction in the Chancery Division, Family Part and entered a guilty plea to first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(3)) and first-degree carjacking in the Law Division, Criminal Part. The plea agreement called for a thirty (30) year prison term for aggravated manslaughter and a concurrent ten (10) year term for the carjacking charge. Defendant was also subject to a parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) with regard to the aggravated manslaughter charge. At sentencing, approximately three (3) months after giving a lengthy and detailed factual basis for the guilty plea previously entered, Minor sought to withdraw his plea of guilty based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but the trial judge refused to allow Minor to obtain substitute counsel and sentenced him according to the plea agreement as no formal motion had been filed. In State v Minor, the defendant appealed claiming that the trial judge committed reversible error. The NJ Appellate Division determined that an application for withdrawal of a guilty plea would require application of the factors set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009) which could not reasonably be expected of a defendant without the assistance of counsel. It was apparent on its face to the Appellate Division that, under Hayes, 205 N.J. 522 (2011), it was reversible error to deny Minor’s request for an adjournment. It is long-established that denial of adjournment may lead to reversal when the defendant suffers “manifest wrong or injury” as a result of said denial. State v. Doro, 103 N.J.L. 88, 93 (E. & A. 1926). The court cited Hayes, supra, 205 N.J. at 541-42, with regard to the need to remand for the limited purpose of a plea withdrawal hearing wherein the defendant shall represented by independent counsel. If you are a juvenile charged with acts that if committed by an adult would constitute serious crimes, you need experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you immediately. An experienced criminal defense attorney can guide you through the court proceedings including whether your matter is best resolved in the Family Court or Law Division and what your options are in either event. For more information about murder, juvenile offenses or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Handgun Located By Casino Valet Not Suppressed

Phillip King was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)). King left his car with a casino valet at Trump Plaza and, upon entering the vehicle the valet noticed the center console to be partially open. The valet then attempted to close the console and could not. Upon opening the console to attempt to move the obstruction, the valet saw the obstruction was the butt of a handgun. The valet returned the console lid to its partially opened position and notified local police. Upon arrival, the police found the vehicle’s center console cover to be in the partially opened position and, without first obtaining a search warrant, opened the console to look inside and removed the handgun from the center console. The vehicle had Pennsylvania license plates, King had a valid Pennsylvania driver’s license and a valid Pennsylvania gun carry permit and claimed he was unaware that he could not legally transport the firearm in his vehicle in New Jersey. King sought to suppress the handgun over the State’s argument that warrantless search was valid under the community caretaking exception, the automobile exception and the third-party exception. The court held that the State had ample time to secure a warrant as the vehicle was parked in the casino’s garage and officers present at the scene could insure the vehicle was not moved. The court further held that the officer’s search exceeded the scope of the valet’s private search and therefore the third-party exception to the warrant requirement was invalidated. The State appealed with regard to the third-party intervention exception to the warrant only. The exemption assumes that a private party discovered the item or information and turned it over to police and therefore there was no violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921). The court considered State v. King to be very similar to United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed.2d 85 (1984) wherein a private party initially searched and notified authorities of the discovery then police went further in their search than the private party had. In Jacobsen the Supreme Court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cocaine discovered by the mail carrier. The court also reviewed State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991), State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307 (2012), State v. Saez, 268 N.J. Super. 250 (Ap. Div. 1993) and State v. Wright, 431 N.J. Super. 558 (App. Div. 2013), where in each case warrantless searches extended after third-party initiation were upheld by New Jersey courts. After considering the areas searched in the above mentioned matters and the expectation of privacy one could reasonably hope to have in a vehicle willingly turned over with keys to a valet, the court found that the officers actions beyond the scope of the valet in State v. King were minimal and therefore upheld the search and reversed the suppression of the handgun. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you are facing weapons charges you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Addicted Defendants No Longer Denied Admission To Drug Court For Weapons Charges

Over the rejection of the prosecution, Gregory Maurer sought entry into Drug Court while under separate indictments for (1) third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (ocycodone) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); (2) two counts of third-degree possession of CDS (oxycodone and heroin) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-(a)(1)); (3) third-degree possession of CDS (cocaine) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); and (4) two counts of third degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) and third-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1)). The prosecutor’s denial was based solely on Maurer’s prior charge for possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) and hollow point bullets. The trial court made its decision based on the defendant’s prior conviction for a weapons related offense and Maurer appealed. In State v. Maurer, the NJ Appellate Division determined that the defendant’s record, the “Manual for Operation of Adult Drug Courts In New Jersey” (July 2002)(Manual) and the Drug Court Statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14). The NJ Appellate Division did consider that Maurer had also been charged with witness tampering (N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5) and other prior CDS charges which were remanded to the respective municipal courts for disposition. They also considered Maurer’s participation in Narcotics Anonymous and other substance abuse counseling programs as well as his employment as an outreach counselor at a rehabilitation facility. The NJ Appellate Division considered that Drug Court is appropriate for “offenders most likely to benefit from treatment and do not pose a risk to public safety.” State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 428-29 (2007) (quoting Manual, Supra, at 3). The opinion also included a thorough review of Drug Court success rates and the Legislative intent to end the cycle of drug offenders interacting with the criminal justice system as a result of addiction. State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533, (App. Div.), 216 N.J. 14 (2013). There was also discussion of a two “track” system wherein, according to the Manual, a criminal history involving a firearm acts as a bar to admission in spite of the apparent Legislative intent to increase Drug Court access for those likely to benefit from resolving addiction issues. The Court resolved that an amendment to the Track Two admission criteria was required and remanded the matter for consideration of the defendant’s application to Drug Court despite his prior weapons offense. If you are facing distribution or possession charges, there are many factors which may affect how your case is ultimately resolved. You should immediately retain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information regarding drug distribution, possession with intent to distribute, weapons offenses or other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.