Juvenile's Excited Utterance Admissible Under Hearsay Exception

State of New Jersey In the Interest of A.R. involved a 14 year old juvenile found guilty of touching a 7 year old child, J.C., sexually on a school bus, a crime that would constitute second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)) if committed by an adult. J.C. was diagnosed with autism and ADHD. Upon exiting the bus, which was returning the children from summer camp, J.C. exclaimed that A.R. had touched him. There were 20 children on the bus and no witnesses to the alleged act. J.C. repeated his statement to a detective days later. The trial judge from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County court found that the exclamation upon exiting the bus and statements during the detective's interview were admissible under the "tender years" exception to the hearsay rule (N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27)). At the bench trial in the, the court found J.C. incompetent to understand the proceedings and offer testimony but did accept J.C.'s testimony based on N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). On appeal, the N.J. Appellate Division determined that the statements to the detective were testimonial in nature, under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and A.R.'s counsel was not able to protect the confrontational rights of the 14 year old through cross-examination due to the incompetence of J.C. The Appellate Division held that the exclamation upon exiting the bus was not testimonial in nature and remanded for reconsideration. If a juvenile is charged with a crime, the disposition of the charges can change his or her future by prohibiting them from entering certain schools, fields of employment and, in the case of Megan's Law offenses, certain residences or neighborhoods. It is critical for any juvenile charged with a criminal offense to seek an experienced juvenile defense attorney immediately to begin protecting their rights and their future. For more information on juvenile offenses, sex-offenses, Megan's Law provisions or other criminal charges in NJ, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sexual Assault Was Apparent To Judge But Sentencing Not As Obvious

Marvin Flores-Gamez was indicted for first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)); 2 counts of second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)); and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct with the victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)). In 2011, the Flores-Gamez contacted 12 year old Susan on Facebook, when Flores-Gamez was 19. Susan and Flores-Gamez traded messages on Facebook for some time before he began to mention the idea of having sex with her. In November 2011, Susan agreed to meet Flores-Gamez, with Susan's cousin, Kate, and Kate's boyfriend, Tim, present. The 4 went to Susan's house and the men gave the children juice that tasted like alcohol. Flores-Gamez and Susan ended up alone together in the bedroom and, when Susan resisted his advances, Flores-Gamez removed her clothes and began to have sex with her. When he refused to stop, Susan bit Flores-Gamez on the hand to make him stop. For the next 5 days, Susan and Flores-Gamez exchanges messages on Facebook until Susan's father discovered Susan had missed school and, during the subsequent inquiry, learned what had happened. Susan's father took her to the police station and, during an investigation, Flores-Gamez provided a statement with facts similar to those Susan provided. At trial, the Defendant did not testify. Both Tim and Kate testified that the Defendant and Susan were never alone together and that the Defendant did not sexually assault Susan. A psychologists report was also offered to show that Susan had indicated Tim's mother was also in the apartment and was the one who stopped the sexual assault. Following a trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Flores-Gamez was found guilty of 2 counts of second-degree sexual assault. Flores-Gamez was sentenced to a concurrent 8 year term for both counts, subject to an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). In State v. Flores-Gamez, the defendant appealed. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge except defendant's sentence. The Appellate Division held that the trial judge did not follow proper procedure with regard to sentencing. The judge listed the aggravating and mitigating factors, without making any specific findings in regard thereto, and then meted out the sentence. The judge found aggravating factors one and two; however, the victim's age was an element of second-degree sexual assault and could not be considered. Also, the trial judge failed to give any indication that the mitigating factors raised by the defendant were considered. The Appellate Division remanded for resentencing. If you are charged with a sex crime you are subject to incarceration, registration as a sex offender and the accompanying stigma which will effect where you may live, where you may work and how others will treat you and possibly even civil commitment. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you with these charges. For more information about rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact and other sex crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Right To Own Firearms If Determined A Danger To The Public Health, Safety and Welfare

Firearms purchaser identification cards and purchase permits may be denied in the event of danger to the "public health, safety and welfare" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-39(c)(5) of the New Jersey Gun Control Law. In 1998, Z.L. was acquitted of a domestic violence charge. Between 2003 and 2011 the police were called to the residence of Z.L. and his wife on five separate occasions for domestic violence issues. In 2013, Z.L applied for a gun purchase permit and the police chief denied the application in light of the prior history of domestic violence. The matter was tried and a Monmouth County Superior Court Judge determined that the permit should not be granted. On appeal, the N.J. Appellate Division held that Z.L. has demonstrated the propensity to react violently and that the presence of a firearm in such a situation has the potential for great harm and no permit should be issued to him. For more information about gun laws in New Jersey including obtaining a gun permit, possession of illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon, regulations on BB guns and paintball guns and other weapons offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Domestic Violence Charge Leads To More After Audio Recording

Kingkamanu Nantambu was arrested for domestic violence when police responded to a 911 call and his girlfriend, Crystal Aikens, reported he had threatened her with a gun. Nantambu reported that Aikens had threatened him with a knife and required medical treatment for multiple cuts. When a search of his apartment revealed a handgun hidden under a bed, he was also charged with weapons offenses. Finally, Aikens reported that Nantambu offered her money in exchange for more favorable testimony and was charged with bribery of a witness (N.J.S.A.2C:28-5(d)) and witness-tampering (N.J.S.A.2C:28-5(a)). Aikens agreed to allow police to record a telephone conversation between herself and Nantambu. After approximately 8 minutes of the conversation took place another call came in which Aikens took then resumed the call with Nantambu. Shortly after the call with Nantambu was resumed, the recording was cut off. By the time detectives reconnected the recording device, the call ended. In State of New Jersey v. Kinkamau Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390 (2015), Nantambu sought to exclude the recording as unreliable. The New Jersey Superior Court judge hearing the case granted the motion to suppress the recording of two conversations between Aikens and Nantambu. The State appealed. State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255 (1962), State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 531, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090, 93 S. Ct. 699, 34 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1972), and State v. Cusmano, 274 N.J. Super. 496, 517 (App. Div. 1994), inform that the omission of a portion of a conversation does not require exclusion of the entire conversation. In Driver, the court established a test for the admissibility of audio recordings which set forth 5 criteria: (1) the device was capable of taking the conversation or statement, (2) its operator was competent, (3) the recording is authentic and correct, (4) no changes, additions or deletions have been made, and (5) in instances of alleged confessions, that the statements were elicited voluntarily and without any inducement. The N.J. Appellate Division held that, under precedent, including the test set forth in Driver, the recording was admissible and reversed the decision of the N.J. Superior Court. Domestic violence is a very serious charge in New Jersey and the need to deter would be abusers has resulted in escalating penalties over time. If you are charged with domestic violence or are seeking a final restraining order against an abuser, you will find yourself in the position of proving or disproving the charges. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you in such matters. For more information regarding domestic violence, restraining orders, assault, battery and other criminal law issues in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Suspicion Is Not A Reason To Draw Blood Without A Warrant

In 2010 Timothy Adkins was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), after the vehicle he was operating struck a utility pole, injuring himself and two passengers. Adkins failed the field sobriety tests administered by police and was ultimately taken to the hospital, where the police obtained a blood sample from Adkins. Adkins blood alcohol level (BAC) was .157 percent, almost twice the legal limit of .08 percent. In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol from the blood stream over time does not, on its own, give rise to exigent circumstances such that a warrant may be avoided when the police are seeking a blood sample. Therefore, unless the individual suspected of driving while intoxicated is involved in an accident, a warrant is required. In State v. Adkins, 433 N.J. Super. 479 (App. Div. 2013) a trial judge determined that the blood sample taken from Adkins without a warrant was inadmissible. The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the ruling based on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that drawing blood from an individual suspected of drunk driving was acceptable. In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court established a new standard based on the fact that, through radios, cellular phones and facsimiles, obtaining a warrant is a much simpler and expedient process for police. As a result of the ruling in McNeely, the N.J. Supreme Court, in Adkins, DUIdetermined that the results of the blood sample, withdrawn without a warrant, must be suppressed. If you are facing DUI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving while suspended or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In DUI A Stay Of Sentence On Appeal Is Not A Right

Scott Robertson was convicted in municipal court of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50). Robertson was stopped after police observed him to be driving erratically and he admitted to the consumption of alcohol during the motor vehicle stop. Robertson performed poorly on the field sobriety tests and his blood alcohol content (BAC) registered as .13 on the Alcotest machine. He was also charged with failure to maintain a lane (N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b)), and reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96). At trial, Robertson unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of the Alcotest results based on the unavailability of repair records and diagnostic tests for the Alcotest machine used for his test. Although Robertson received numerous records, there were service related records within the manufacturer which he could not access to which he believed he was entitled. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed. Once again Robertson appealed, this time to the New Jersey Appellate Division which affirmed the DUI conviction holding that under State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 825, 129 S. Ct. 158, 172 L. Ed. 2d 41 (2008) there was no basis for excluding the Alcotest results. Of note, on each successive appeal, Robertson sought a stay of the suspension of his driving privileges. He was sentenced to 7 months loss of license in municipal court and a stay of his suspension was granted, with no reasons stated on the record, to allow for a trial de novo in the New Jersey Superior Court, Middlesex County. At the trial de novo of State v. Robertson, the New Jersey Superior Court judge found Robertson guilty based on both the DVR of the psychophysical tests and the Alcotest results. The defendant again sought a stay of his license suspension based on multiple cases pending certification in the Supreme Court with regard to the ability of those accused of DUI to obtain repair and service records relating to specific Alcotest machines and the possibility of a favorable outcome for the Defendant. The State objected to the stay based on several unreported Appellate Division opinions supporting the finding that the records sought by the Defendant need not be provided. The stay was granted and addressed by the Appellate Division as being governed by a three-part test under Crowe v. DeGoia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) requiring a showing that failure to obtain the stay would subject the defendant to irreparable harm, that the defendant has a reasonable chance of success on appeal, and there is not substantial harm created by granting the stay. In the case of DUI, the potential for harm to the public by an intoxicated driver creates a special circumstance for consideration and the Appellate Division found that stay of a suspension in a DUI case was not a matter of right pending appeal. With regard to the suppression motion, the New Jersey Appellate Division looked to precedent interpreting Chun. In State v. Maricic, 417 N.J. Super. 280, 288 (App. Div. 2010), the Appellate Division held that, although twelve foundational documents were required by Chun, that did not serve to limit additional discovery requests with a reasonable basis. The Appellate Division also reviewed State v. Carrero, 428 N.J. Super. 495, 507 (App. Div. 2012) holding that DWI cases are quasi-criminal and subject to a more limited discovery than criminal matters. Pursuant to R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(C) and 7:7-7(b)(4) the State is obligated to produce documents within the prosecutor’s custody or control but the Appellate Division reasoned that, although the Alcotest manufacturer’s documents were not within the State’s control, the Defendant could have subpoenaed them from the manufacturer had he felt they would prove to exculpate him. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found the argument that the diagnostic tests were material to the defense to be unconvincing. DWI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges and can lead to loss of driving privileges up to 10 years as well as incarceration. Additionally, the newly created statute regarding driving while suspended for multiple DUI offenses guarantees a 6 month jail term. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to determine whether you can win your case. For more information about DUI, DWI, DUID, driving while suspended for DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Facebook Evidence Can Have Limited Value In Sex Crimes Cases

Tony Browne was found guilty of 12 counts of federal child exploitation offenses including production of child pornography, coercion and enticement of a minor, receipt of child pornography, and transfer of obscene material to a minor with females ranging in age from 12 to 17 years old. Browne created a Facebook profile wherein he pretended to be a female and befriended the girls, ultimately obtaining nude and sexually provocative photos from them. Next, Browne utilized another Facebook account under a fictitious name, Billy Button, to threaten to post the photos unless the minors provided more photos or engaged in sexual activity with him. Additionally, Browne sent images to the minors of his erect penis. In United States of America v. Tony Jefferson Browne, Browne’s appeal was rejected but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did hold that although a preponderance of the evidence showed that Browne did create the messages, there was no way to fully authenticate the records through Facebook’s records custodian. Although the conviction was upheld, the court’s finding was that social media evidence requires authentication which takes into consideration the range of ways in which such information can be manipulated. Sex crime charges can be levied many years after an alleged incident and can result in incarceration, substantial and irreparable damage to the reputation and lifestyle of the accused in addition to the deprivation of liberty and rights, registration as a sex offender, loss of employment opportunities, possibility of civil commitment and social stigma. If you are accused of a sex crime it is absolutely imperative that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to begin working on your defense immediately. For more information about sexual assault, rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, internet crimes, child pornography or other sex crimes in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Coffee Drinking In NJ - From Keeping You Alert To A Violation?

The same penalties which apply to using a cell phone while driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3, in New Jersey could soon apply to drinking coffee or eating while driving if Assemblymen John Wisniewski of Middlesex County and Nicholas Chiaravalloti of Hudson County, both Democrats, get their way. The revisions would subject drivers to a $200 fine for a first offense, $600 fine for a second offense, with a third or subsequent offense subjecting coffee drinkers to up to $800 in fines and up to 90 day loss of license. The Assemblymen are claiming the bill is intended to prevent distracted driving, not punish would be coffee drinkers, but that theory ignores the reality that the effect is the same for drivers. In support of the bill, some are citing enforcement of seatbelt laws and a significant increase in seatbelt use with a corollary decrease in life threatening crash related injuries. The bill is still in its infancy and, as many believe this to be excessive overreaching on the part of Wisniewski and Chiaravalloti, hopes remain high that this bill will garner little support from those responsible for the stewardship of New Jersey. For more information about motor vehicle offenses including using a hand-held electronic device while driving, driving under the influence (DUI), reckless driving and other traffic offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Case Opens Door To Further Discovery In Municipal Court

Pursuant to the N.J. Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Stein, a driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) matter, municipal court prosecutors must turn over evidence from all jurisdictions involved in an arrest. The N.J. Supreme Court’s ruling overturned both the trial and Appellate Division rulings on the matter. Robert Stein was involved in a motor vehicle accident on Route 23 in Wayne and a Pequannock officer was the first to respond to the scene. Later Wayne officers relieved the Pequannock officer. Stein was ultimately charged with driving while intoxicated, as a third offender, and found guilty in the municipal court and the N.J. Superior Court, Law Division, Passaic County. He was also charged with careless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-97). Stein was sentenced to 180 days in the Passaic County Jail; 10 year loss of driving privileges; 48 hours at the Intoxicated Driver’s Resource Center; required to install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle and substantial fines. Justice Albin drafted the opinion including that Rule 7:7-7(b) requires the municipal prosecutor to provide all relevant evidence, including that from other jurisdictions and the names of officers in possession of knowledge pertaining to the alleged incident. The N.J. Supreme Court agreed with Stein’s argument that any inculpatory evidence could also be exculpatory and needed to be turned over. In Stein’s case, he did not raise or preserve the issue of the failure of the Wayne Municipal Prosecutor to turn over the name of the Pequannock officer for appeal. However, the ruling is relevant and could prove beneficial to those facing charges in municipal court. DUI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious and can lead to incarceration and loss of driving privileges up to ten years. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Unconstitutional Traffic Stop Leads To Suppression Of Weapons Evidence

Al-Sharif Scriven was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); third-degree receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7); fourth-degree possession of hollow-point bullets (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)); and fourth-degree possession of a large-capacity magazine (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j)). The Honorable Martin G. Cronin, for the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County granted Al-Sharif Scriven’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search following the stop of a vehicle in which Scriven was a passenger. The vehicle was stopped by an Essex County Sheriff’s Officer for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-60, driving with high beams on. The State of New Jersey appealed the court’s grant of the suppression motion. The facts adduced at trial were that Scriven was a passenger in a car which was traveling through Newark, NJ in an entirely lawful manner, with the exception of the fact that the vehicle was traveling with its high beams on. An Essex County Sheriff’s Officer observed the vehicle and flagged it down when it came to a stop at an intersection he was near. When the officer approached the driver to advise her that her high beams were on he requested her credentials. While speaking to the driver, the officer detected an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle which the officer indicated was stronger on the passenger side of the vehicle. The officer asked Scriven to exit the vehicle and Scriven first notified the officer that there was a handgun under his coat. The officer retrieved the gun from Scriven’s person and arrested him. Judge Cronin relied on State v. Witt, 435 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2014), 219 N.J. 624 (2014), which was directly on point and held that the initial stop of a vehicle is inappropriate when there is no actual violation. In Scriven, there was no oncoming vehicle within 500 feet traveling in the opposite direction as is required in order for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-60 to occur. On appeal, in State v. Scriven, the court looked to State v. Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2005), which held that when an officer makes a mistake in the belief that a violation exists the mistake does not thereby create a reasonable basis for a stop. The State also argued, under the community caretaking doctrine, the officer was acting appropriately in stopping the vehicle briefly to notify the driver that her high beams were in use. In certain cases, including State v. Martinez, 260 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1992), wherein a vehicle was traveling less than one-half the posted speed limit at 2:00 a.m., an officer would be justified in stopping the vehicle to insure there was nothing amiss. The N.J. Appellate Division upheld Judge Cronin’s decision and the State again appealed. On Wednesday, July 20, 2016, the N.J. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court below suppressing the weapon found on Al-Sharif Scriven as the fruits of an unreasonable search. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you are facing weapons charges you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Jury Trials In NJ DUI Cases

The N.J. Supreme Court ruled that in spite of substantially increasing penalties, driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) is a motor vehicle matter giving defendants no right to a jury trial. In State v. Denelsbeck, decided May 12, 2016, the court reaffirmed its decision from State v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109 (1990), wherein it was held that the Legislature, although enacting harsh penalties to deter driving while intoxicated, did not classify DUI as a criminal matter. Penalties for a third or subsequent DUI do not include more than 6 months in jail and thus are not of sufficient impact to require a jury according to the court’s reasoning. In support of this logic is the fact that the court has criminalized driving while suspended for DWI by enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 which requires incarceration for those convicted of multiple offenses. The N.J. Supreme Court did indicate that, if penalties for DUI became more harsh in the future, they could revisit their decision. If you are charged with DUI, you need experienced defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to breath tests, driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and other serious driving charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Conviction Reversed For Lack of Passion Provocation Consideration

Fernando Carrero was charged with the first-degree murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2)); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); third-degree possession of a handgun without the requisite permit (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and third-degree hindering apprehension (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1)). Pretrial hearings led to the admission of the revolver used to murder the victim, Jason Hall; evidence that the Defendant had been abusive and controlling toward his girlfriend; statements by the Defendant to the police; and a statement by the victim to a third party. Carrero was convicted by a jury of all counts and sentenced to life in prison. At trial, testimony was presented indicating the Defendant and Lowenstein were involved in a romantic relationship wherein he became controlling, jealous and paranoid. At one point, after he repeatedy struck her for “lying” when he questioned her about her friends Jason Hall and Hicks, Lowenstein provided Carrero with the answer he wanted which was that Hall had set Carrero up. Hall and Carrero were alone together some time later at Lowenstein’s family residence and Hall began to provoke the Defendant after entering the kitchen to find Carerro and Lowenstein kissing with her hands around Carerro’s waist. Lowenstein left the room to locate her parents and heard a gunshot. She returned to the room to find Hall on the floor and Carrero pointing a gun at Hall. In spite of Lowenstein’s pleas and physical efforts to prevent harm to Hall, Carrero shot Hall in the head. The Defendant’s account was that, after Lowenstein left the room, Hall threatened him and pulled the gun from his waistband. Carrero testified that the original gunshot occurred during the struggle wherein Carrero wrestled the gun from Hall’s hand. Carrero further testified that he did not intend to shoot Hall and never had his finger on the trigger but the gun accidentally went off when Lowenstein attempted to physically prevent him from shooting Hall. Hicks was in the basement below during the incident and claimed to have heard yelling and “thumping” noises and arrived upstairs to see Carrero flee with a gun in his hand. Newark Police later located the Defendant with the murder weapon. Carrero challenged on multiple grounds including the denial of his request for a passion/provocation manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2)) charge to the jury; the admission of hearsay; the gravity of his sentence and the admission of prior-bad-acts he was involved in. The N.J. Appellate Division found that a fair trial requires proper jury charges pursuant to State v. Daniels, 224 N.J. 168 (2016), and that if there is evidence supporting the possibility that a jury could reasonably acquit the Defendant of the original charges but find the Defendant guilty of the lesser included charge then a plenary review of the reason for the denial of the lesser included charge is required under State v. Brent, 137 N.J. 107 (1994). Even when a lesser included charge is inconsistent with the defense’s theory of the case it should be offered as an option for the jury if the evidence at trial supports it. State v. Castagna, 376 N.J. Super. 323, 356 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402 (1990); State v. Taylor; 350 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 2002). In the case of State v. Carrero, a passion/provocation manslaughter charge, defined under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2) as a homicide which is committed in the heat of passion with reasonable provocation, should have been offered for the jury’s consideration. The four elements required to establish passion/provocation murder are adequate provocation; the provocation and the actions of Defendant had to occur proximately; the Defendant had to actually become impassioned by the provocation of the victim; and the Defendant must not have calmed down prior to acting against the victim. Mauricio, supra, 117 N.J. at 411. Although a passion/provocation charge is inconsistent with the Defendant’s self-defense theory, it is nonetheless an appropriate jury charge under the evidence presented, including that Hall was trying to provoke Carrero immediately before Hall was shot. The N.J. Appellate Division found that the trial court was incorrect in finding that a passion/provocation charge should not be presented because inconsistencies in the charges presented could confuse the jurors. Further, the Appellate panel found there was a rational basis to support the passion/provocation charge as there was evidence presented of threats, a struggle, Lowenstein’s testimony that her hands were around Carrerro’s waist immediately prior to the incident, and the Defendant’s testimony that Hall was the one who had the gun initially. Based on their findings, the Appellate panel reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial rendering the Defendant’s other points on appeal moot. If you are facing murder charges you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Domestic Violence By Police Officer Found Unfit For Duty

F.M., a police officer, fought against the domestic violence claims of G.M., his wife, and defeated her attempt to obtain a final restraining order against him. However, although the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, Family Part Judge hearing the matter refused to grant the final restraining order, the State of New Jersey moved to take control of F.M.’s firearms pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) which outlines the guidelines for the purchase of firearms in New Jersey. The Honorable Thomas J. Critchley, Jr. required F.M. to attend certain counseling and intervention programs and undergo a Fitness for Duty evaluation. Upon completion of his court ordered counseling, F.M. sought the return of his weapons in a hearing where substantial testimony with regard to prior incidents of domestic violence at the hands of F.M. was provided by G.M. Judge Critchley, after hearing the testimony of G.M. and the State’s witnesses, denied the State’s motion including in his opinion that F.M. and G.M. had a lengthy history in the Morris County Family Court to which the State’s expert psychologists were not privy yet the judges within the court were well acquainted. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed Judge Critchley’s ruling with regard to the return of F.M.’s firearms. The N.J. Supreme Court granted certification and, In The Matter of Applications Of State of New Jersey For Forfeiture of Personal Weapons and Firearms Identification Card Belonging to F.M., concluded that the Family Part judge misinterpreted the statute as requiring the F.M. suffer from a specific disorder in order to be prohibited from possession his firearms and also misapplied the statute by requiring the State to prove “more than just a showing that some danger might exist” when the State was only required to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in showing that F.M.’s possession of firearms was against the interest of the public health, safety and welfare. The N.J. Supreme Court found that the evidence presented by G.M. with regard to prior acts of domestic violence against her by F.M. and the testimony of two licensed psychologists who both concluded that F.M., based on his lack of self-control and inability to deescalate situations with his own wife, was unfit to perform the duties of a police officer. A Fitness for Duty evaluation by one of the psychologists further concluded that F.M. was a danger to himself and others and should be stripped of his weapons. If you are charged with domestic violence or seeking a final restraining order against an abuser, there are specific burdens of proof for both parties in proving or disproving the charges making it critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you in such matters. For more information regarding domestic violence, restraining orders, assault, battery and other criminal law issues in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Concealed Weapons Carry Permits for NJ Citizens "In Need"?

Governor Christie is in a battle with the Democrats controlling both houses of the NJ Legislature over concealed weapons carry permits in New Jersey. While Christie has determined that the restrictions requiring the showing of a “justifiable need” for a carry permit are too restrictive, the Legislature claims that Christie’s criteria requiring a showing of “serious threats” against one’s life is violative of the Legislative intent in the creation of the existing gun control laws in NJ. In addition to complaints by gun rights advocates indicating the permitting process was inefficient and overly restrictive, Chistie indicated that changes were a response to the murder of Carol Browne by her ex-boyfriend, against whom she had a restraining order, while Ms. Brown awaited approval of her gun permit. A3689 and SCR101 were immediately sponsored by the Assembly and Senate respectively in a response seeking to codify regulatory language relating to handgun carry permits. Democrats in control of the Senate and Assembly argued that the new standards could serve to substantially increase the number of carry permits in NJ and allow an overly broad spectrum of individuals to obtain permits. The Attorney General’s office replied that all other statutory requirements would continue to apply and a Superior Court judge would have to sign off on the permit so that the only change would be from the showing of an “actual need” to a showing of a specific “serious threat” against the person seeking the permit. The fate of this legislation is still pending. If you are caught illegally carrying firearms the penalties can be severe making it well worth the effort to seek a permit to carry legally. For more information about gun or weapon possession, possession of weapons during a drug related offense, armed robbery, possession of a handgun without a permit, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon or possession of a weapon while on parole or probation visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Happy Independence Day

The 4th of July calls to mind images of fireworks, the beach, barbecues with family and friends and generally good times. While enjoying the day, please remember to keep yourself and others safe by celebrating responsibly. Happy Independence Day from The Darling Law Firm.

Seizure of Drugs Found During Illegal Stop Upheld

In Utah v. Edward Strieff, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ability of police to obtain a conviction based upon drugs found in his vehicle during an illegal stop. Justice Clarence Thomas provided the decision of the Court holding that an individual’s Fourth Amendment Rights are not violated if an officer, in the process of an illegal stop, finds a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest and the search incident to arrest leads to the discovery of evidence. A residence in Salt Lake City was being monitored following an anonymous report of drug activity. After an officer watched random individuals come and go from the residence, he stopped Streiff and discovered that Streiff had an outstanding warrant for a prior traffic violation. The stop was later determined to be unlawful as the officer lacked probable cause to stop the vehicle and there was no reasonable suspicion with regard to any particular individual. Based on the warrant the officer took Streiff into custody and conducted a search incident to arrest. During the search, the officer found Streiff to be in possession of methamphetamines and drug paraphernalia. Streiff filed a motion to suppress the narcotics based upon the unlawful stop and the matter was litigated through the courts and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to this case based on the Fourth Amendment rights involved. The United States Supreme Court was divided 5 to 3 on the issue. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent indicating her belief that the ruling will have a disproportionate effect on “people of color” although Edward Streiff is a white male. Sotomayor further indicated she believed the decision greatly increase the power of police going so far as allowing them to conduct random stops to check for warrants even if they had no belief any crime was afoot. Sotomayor included that the 8 million open warrants in the U.S. mean many are subject to prosecution based on evidence seized as a result of illegal and pretextual stops and included that such stops “corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives” referring to those “black and brown” people most often targeted. The majority opinion of the court was that the evidence was not “fruit of the poisonous tree” as established in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) as it fell under the “attenuation doctrine” set forth in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) to the exclusionary rule established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks held that evidence resulting from an unlawful search could not be used by the prosecution. The court, in Hudson v. Michigan, held that evidence from an illegal search could be admissible when the connection between the unconstitutional conduct of the police and the discovery of the evidence is “sufficiently remote” or there are “intervening circumstances.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593. The reasoning offered in Streiff was that the discovery of the warrant was sufficient to break the causal link between the illegal stop and the discovery of the controlled dangerous substances (CDS) thereby rendering the methamphetamines a product of the warrant rather than the illegal stop. The court did leave room for future litigation with regard to good faith actions on the part of the officer finding that in the case of Streiff the officer was at worst negligent. Sotomayor’s dissent indicated that good faith must be rejected when the sole purpose of the stop was to search for evidence which would prove drug activity was going on in the residence. Drug charges can destroy your future and you are subject to greater consequences each time you are convicted of a drug charge. If you are facing drug charges for possession or distribution, you should consult an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substance (CDS) charges, distribution, possession, driving under the influence charges, paraphernalia or CDS in a motor vehicle visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Handgun In Plain View? Prove it!

Jarrell Williams was convicted of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b) after an officer allegedly saw a handgun in plain view on the floor of his vehicle during a motor vehicle stop. At all times during the proceedings, Williams maintained that he was unaware that the vehicle, recently purchased by his mother, contained a handgun. Williams also maintained that the gun was not in plain view on the floor of the vehicle near the driver’s seat. The facts collectively presented at trial in State v. Williams are that 4 men, including the defendant, entered the vehicle and smoked marijuana then the defendant pulled the vehicle out of the driveway just as two plain clothed police officers came down the street at which point Williams immediately pulled over and turned off the vehicle. The officers claimed that the location and actions of the defendant and the vehicles’ other occupants gave rise to suspicion and the officers turned around. Seeing the officers’ vehicle turn around, all 4 occupants exited the vehicle before the officers engaged them in conversation. Conflicting accounts of the vehicle’s ownership were offered by occupants and Officer Brown approached the vehicle, with its doors open, to verify the registration. The officer’s testimony was that he observed a marijuana cigarette and plastic bag and, upon going to retrieve same, noticed the pistol on the floor in front of the driver’s seat. The 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 of the New Jersey Constitution establish and protect a defendant’s right to present a complete defense including confrontation of witnesses. Several cases including State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 (2003), State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519 (1991), State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985), State v. Crudup, 176 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1980) and State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129 (2004) have upheld this right but within the constraints of N.J.R.E. 611(a) and N.J.R.E. 401 which afford the court discretion of control over the trial. The N.J. Appellate Division ultimately decided that the jury should not be placed in the position of determining the constitutionality of a search and seizure but that Defense counsel’s line of questioning was not in danger of placing them in that position and was instead intended to determine whether the officer had a predetermined purpose in offering the statements he had made and was an attempt to introduce motive on the part of the officer to testify in a certain manner. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the defendant’s right to cross-examine the officer was violated and that, due to the possible influence this may have had on the decision of the jury, the matter was remanded for a new trial. Weapons offenses are subject to severe punishment including incarceration for 5-10 years for many such offenses. If you are charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you. For more information about possession of a handgun without a permit, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon while on parole or probation, possession of a weapon during a drug related offense or other serious weapons charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

DUI Dismissed On Speedy Trial Violation

In State v. Cahill, the defendant faced a driving under the influence (DUI) charge after being found guilty of assault by auto charges stemming from the same event. It was established that Michael Cahill consumed alcohol at a bar, later drove from the bar, swerved to avoid an obstacle in the road, crossed two lanes of traffic and collided with a police car causing injuries to the officer. Following a conviction and sentencing in the death by auto matter, the Superior Court judge remanded the driving while intoxicated charge to municipal court for disposition. A full 16 months later, Michael Cahill received notice from the municipal court that his matter had been scheduled for trial. Through counsel, he filed a motion to dismiss based on the court’s failure to uphold his right to a speedy trial. The municipal court judge denied the motion and Cahill appealed after entering a conditional guilty plea. The NJ Superior Court held that Cahill’s right to a speedy trial was violated under the particular circumstances of the matter and vacated the sentence after a review of the matter based on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Barker v. Wingo. In Barker v. Wingo, the US Supreme Court established a four factor balancing test to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was upheld. In the instant case, the NJ Superior Court found the 16 month delay was held to be too lengthy, without good cause, and prejudicial to the defendant who suffered anxiety over the prospect of the trail as well as limited his employment alternatives based on the likelihood he would be found guilty at trial. The decision to dismiss the DWI charge was upheld by the NJ Appellate Division and the NJ Supreme Court and Cahill’s sentence was vacated. Driving under the influence charges carry significant consequences including loss of driving privileges for 7-12 months for a first offense, 2 years for a second offense and ten years for a third or subsequent offense as well as substantial fines and penalties, the inability to work and the social stigma that is associated with DUI. There are ways that an attorney can help you, even if you think you will be found guilty and it is always critical that you consult with an experienced traffic attorney prior to deciding whether to enter into a guilty plea for DUI. For more information about DUI/DWI, reckless driving and other serious traffic court matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Celebrating Memorial Day

Memorial Day is synonymous with the start of the summer season and also with driving under the influence (DUI) for police, courts and lawyers. Please remember to celebrate responsibly! Most importantly, remember that Memorial Day is a day on which those who died in active military service are remembered. Take time this weekend to reflect, remember and give thanks to those who are no longer with as as well as those serving today to keep us safe and our country free. To all who serve, have served, and those who have lost family members who made the ultimate sacrifice, thank you from The Darling Law Firm.

Theft of $100,000 From N.J. Employer

Deborah Meehan was convicted of second-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) after issuing checks to herself in the amount of over $100,000 by affixing the stamp of a law firm partner to checks in her control as the law firm's bookkeeper. Following an investigation, Meehan was questioned and admitted, during a videotaped interview, that she did not have permission to issue the checks. The jury found Meehan guilty of second-degree theft but, at sentencing, the trial judge downgraded the offense to third-degree and sentenced her to prison, refusing to accept her application for probation. The State appealed and the Defendant cross-appealed indicating she did not effectively waive her right to remain silent and therefore her confession should be suppressed. In State v. Meehan, the NJ Appellate Division initially reviewed the voluntariness of the Defendant's confession under State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368 (2014), Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), State v. Graham, 59 N.J. 366 (1971), State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 1994), and State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993). The panel held that the state met it's burden of proof showing the police did not overbear Meehan's will and her statement was provided after a voluntary and knowing waiver of her rights. The panel further held that neither the jury charge nor the prosecutor's statements were prejudicial to the Defendant. The panel did find for the State in holding that it was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion to downgrade the second-degree conviction to third-degree. Pursuant to State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984), the NJ Appellate Division will not typically disturb the sentence of a trial court unless it constitutes abuse of discretion. Pursuant to State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) and State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014), the state must first review the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and then balance the relevant factors and explain how the final sentencing decision is reached in light of the analysis. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) requires prison for second-degree crimes unless there are exceptional circumstances as the court fully set forth in State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003) and, under the facts, denial of probation was appropriate. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) relating to the downgrade of sentences, sets forth that where mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and the interests of justice are best served by the downgrade, the court has discretion to reduce the term to that of a crime one degree below that for which the Defendant was convicted. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484 (1996) and State v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2009) jointly provide a valuable explanation of the analysis the court should conduct in considering a downgrade. The N.J. Appellate panel considered the legislative intent in drafting N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(1). The panel agreed with the State's likening of the matter to State v. Jones, 197 N.J. Super 604 (App. Div. 1984) wherein a defendant's second degree theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) was downgraded to third-degree and later reversed after the court found the downgrade to be abuse of the trial court's discretion. The N.J. Appellate Division ultimately reversed the downgraded sentence, holding that Meehan's theft of over $100,000 from her employer was serious and a downgrade would not serve the interests of justice, and remanded for sentencing accordingly. A second-degree theft conviction will result in a 5-10 year prison sentence. If you are facing second-degree criminal charges it is critical you obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and build a defense against the prosecution's case. For more information about theft, burglary and other serious criminal issues in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

NJ Handgun Permit Guidelines To Be Updated

Handgun permit processing in New Jersey is undergoing updates. On April 8, 2016, Acting Attorney General Robert Loughy issued new directives regarding uniformity in processing designed to limit instances of extreme delay and other problems. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 sets forth the application procedures and forms which are to be utilized by permit issuing bodies and no deviation is permitted. Agencies are prohibited from applying personal views regarding civilian firearms regulation, requiring additional forms, requiring additional information from applicants or otherwise deviating from the standards set forth. Gun permit issuing agencies have a 30 day time period to review applications under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f), unless the applicant's life is in specific danger in which case the gun permit application review period is decreased to 14 days. Disqualification occurs upon conviction of an indictable crime or a disorderly persons domestic violence offense. Interestingly, in spite of these steps toward uniformity, there is also a very broad category for disqualification which allows issuing bodies discretion to deny a handgun permit or firearms purchaser identification card if the "issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). The New Jersey State Police are charged with the drafting of uniform investigation standards. In addition, there are to be updates to Firearms Transport Guidelines. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6, transport of a firearm that is unloaded and secured in a fastened case or gun box or inside of a locked trunk is permitted directly between a home and business, place of purchase and home or business, directly from a home or business to a range or place of hunting, between a home or business and a gun repair shop or licensed gun dealer and between residences when moving. There are also undefined "reasonably necessary" deviations permitted in the route of transportation including the purchase of fuel, food, beverages, medication and other supplies; use of a restroom, pickup or discharge of passengers, emergencies, detours and other reasons. The reasonability of the deviation and lawfulness of transport is subject to the judgment of the officer encountering an individual undertaking transport. If you have been denied the right to a carry permit after meeting all criteria to obtain one you should seek an experienced attorney to assist you in your matter. If you are caught illegally carrying firearms the penalties can be severe making it well worth the effort to seek a permit to carry legally. For more information about gun or weapon possession, possession of weapons during a drug related offense, armed robbery, possession of a handgun without a permit, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon or possession of a weapon while on parole or probation visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Crime On NJ Transit Trains

Undoubtedly the use of private conversations on NJ Transit trains to prosecute those engaged in criminal activity will be an area ripe for litigation. Not only is there constant video surveillance on NJ Transit trains but there is also an audio recording ongoing at all times. Although only on some lines at this time, there is little doubt that all lines will be under constant audio and video surveillance soon. Those conducting or discussing criminal activities on NJ Transit may expect no right to privacy during their travels. The trains display signs advising passengers of the audio and video surveillance, presumably an implicit waiver of privacy for those who do not heed the warnings. In today's world, many are becoming accustomed to their rights to privacy being chipped away in favor of safety. The question is whether an individual has a right to a private conversation with the individual sitting next to them. Initially, the audio and video recording systems were being installed on NJ Transit trains to protect passengers from criminals targeting them for their electronic devices. After 9/11 security increased and now, with the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, when it comes to public transportation, "no" is becoming the obvious answer to the question of whether an individual's right to a private conversation in a public place is greater than the safety of the general public. This is not a new concept as PATH trains have been equipped with video recording systems for some time. NJ Transit policies for storing the recordings have not been released and certain groups are concerned about the government using the recordings to gather information about individuals. For more information about your rights to privacy, visit DarlingFirm.com.

Aggravated Assault Results In Miscarriage

Laquesha Cathcart and Tisha Cathcart were indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)), second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2), first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), and fourth-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) after forcefully entering the victim's apartment following a dispute over a parking spot in New Brunswick, NJ. The Cathcarts assaulted R.L. and J.D., her daughter, in the presence of R.L.'s husband, F.D., and son. R.L.'s daughter and son both advised the defendant's that R.L. was pregnant but they continued the assault. R.L. miscarried within the week. The main issue in this matter is whether the defendants purposely or knowingly attempted to cause serious bodily injury to R.L. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude testimony relating to R.L.'s pregnancy and miscarriage after determining the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the likelihood it would prejudice the jury against the defendants. The appeal in State v. Cathcart focused on the exclusion of the evidence. N.J. As affirmed in State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (2013), N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits a court to exclude evidence in the event the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. More than a possibility of substantial prejudice is required State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 165 N.J. 492 (2000). To exclude evidence, the party seeking exclusion must demonstrate that the evidence is has such "inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation." State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971). A significant consideration in the decision to exclude evidence is also whether other evidence is available to prove the fact the evidence is offered to prove. Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 403 (2014). Exclusion of certain evidence, such as motive in a criminal matter, requires a higher showing of prejudice. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218 (1955). Conviction for aggravated assault requires proof by the prosecution that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, acted recklessly in an attempt to cause or did cause such bodily injury pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). State v. Mingo, 263 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd. 132 N.J. 75 (1993). This requires proof of the defendant's mental state at the time of the assault. The State's appeal centered on the fact that the defendants were advised that R.L. was pregnant yet continued with their assault which included kicking and punching R.L. in the abdomen. In its decision to reverse in part and affirm in part, the N.J. Appellate Division determined that the statements regarding R.L.'s pregnancy were highly relevant to the issue of the defendants' mental state but that the testimony regarding the miscarriage was overly prejudicial. Aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including 5 to 10 years in prison, with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA), and fines of up to $150,000. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, robbery, burglary, theft or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Lawyer Challenges His DUI Plea Based On Lack Of Counsel

Henry Aratow was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) in 1988, pled guilty to a driving under the influence (DUI) in 2004, and pled guilty to a 2009 in 2011. In the case of the 2009 DUI, Aratow was sentenced as a third offender resulting in a 10 year loss of driving privileges and 180 days incarceration. In 2013, Aratow sought post conviction relief from in the municipal court and then Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County with regard to the 2004 DUI in order to avail himself of the step-down provisions under State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014), pertaining to successive DUI convictions. The relief sought was denied and Aratow appealed to the NJ Appellate Division. In 2004, Aratow was stopped by police and charged with DWI, refusal to submit to a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), and making an improper turn (N.J.S.A. 39:4-116). Both at the time he was stopped by police and when he appeared in court for the resulting charges, Aratow was a practicing attorney. Aratow waived his right to counsel and entered into a plea to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content (BAC) between .08 and .10 with a dismissal of the refusal to submit to chemical breath testing and the improper turn charges. At the time of the 2004 plea, the municipal court judge engaged in lengthy colloquy with the defendant regarding his right to counsel, the factual basis of his plea. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the Aratow was not advised by the municipal court judge of the progressively harsher consequences of successive DUI convictions and, therefore, did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the plea as required under N.J. Court Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). The court also questioned the sufficiency of the factual basis given by the defendant, as set forth in State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218 (2013). The court found that, although Aratow admitted to operating a motor vehicle after consuming 3 vodka and tonics, he was not questioned as to whether he believed that the alcohol he consumed substantially impaired his ability to operate the vehicle or that his BAC was between .08 and .10. Under State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415 (1989), the remedy for a plea entered with an insufficient factual basis is to reinstate all charges and restore the matter to its original status prior to the entry of the plea. Accordingly, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the 2004 matter for a new trial. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Possession Charges In Superior Court Barred By Same Evidence Test

During an undercover drug operation, Rodney Miles was charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(12)) as well as a petty disorderly persons offense of possession of under 50 grams of marijuana (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a). While lodged in the Camden County Jail, following indictment, the defendant appeared pro se, waiving his right to counsel, via video conference from the county jail and entered into a guilty plea for the disorderly persons offense of possession of under 50 grams of marijuana after it was downgraded to the offense of loitering to possess marijuana (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b)(1)). During the colloquy during which the plea was entered, Miles attempted to obtain clarification with regard to the specific matter on which he was appearing, and whether charges would remain in the Superior Court following the plea. It was very apparent, from the responses offered by the judge, that the municipal court judge did not understand the questions asked by the defendant regarding his remaining charges. Thereafter, In State v. Miles, Miles sought dismissal of the charges pending in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County based on double jeopardy as he had entered a guilty plea to charges stemming from the same event. In State v. Salter, 425 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2012), the court interpreted the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, 11 of the New Jersey Constitution as protecting against a second prosecution following acquittal or conviction and multiple punishments for a single offense or set of events. In State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573 (1982), the court held the Constitutional protections to be applicable in the municipal court. Although the court held that fundamental fairness pursuant to the defendant's argument grounded on State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679 (1989) was not applicable, any subsequent prosecution in the Superior Court was barred under the same evidence test set forth in State v. Salter. The Court held that the municipal court plea resolved all charges stemming from the defendant's arrest. Drug charges can destroy your future and, if you have prior drug charges, you are subject to harsher sentences each time. If you are facing charges for drug possession or distribution you should consult an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances (CDS), distribution, possession, under the influence, paraphernalia or CDS in a motor vehicle visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Expungement Petition And Effect Of Other Crimes

In the Matter of DiGregorio involved a petitioner who sought the expungement from his record of the disorderly persons offense of lewdness and his petition was denied. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Division applied the statute relating to expungement of disorderly and petty disorderly offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 to the facts in the instant matter. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 reads as follows: Any person convicted of a disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense under the laws of this State who has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime, whether within this State or any other jurisdiction, or of another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses, may, after the expiration of a period of 5 years from the date of his conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or release from incarceration, whichever is later, present a duly verified petition… praying that such conviction and all records and information pertaining thereto be expunged. The petitioner properly waited the requisite 5 year period following conviction, payment of his fines and completion of probation in order to seek expungement of the disorderly persons offense. However, the petitioner was disqualified from meeting the expungement criteria as a result of having had two subsequent criminal convictions, one in 2008 and another in 2013. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition. A criminal record can affect your ability to obtain certain jobs, get into certain schools of your choice, obtain housing and have other serious consequences including a negative social stigma. Expungement offers a second chance at a clean record. New Jersey legislators have recently taken steps to make expungement more available in an effort to prevent recidivist criminal activity. Although expungement is available, it should not be taken as a given. If you or your child are seeking an expungement, you should consult experienced criminal defense counsel in order to ensure you qualify and that the crime on your record is expungeable. For more information about expungement, disorderly persons offenses or other criminal matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

First-Degree Aggravated Sexual Assault Remanded For Jury Charge

R.P. was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(6)) against his step-daughter O.M. while she was under the age of thirteen. R.P. was sentenced to 26 years in prison with a 13 year period of parole ineligibility. On the defendant's appeal, challenging the conviction based on the trial court's failure to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1)), the NJ Appellate Division found for the Defendant and vacated the conviction. Additionally, the Appellate Division denied the state's request for a molded verdict pursuant to State v. Farrad, 753 A.2d 648, 164 N.J. 247, 192 N.J. 294 (2007), and remand for a new trial with on the first-degree aggravated sexual assault charge. The NJ Supreme Court's review of State v. R.P. was focused solely on the state's request for a molded verdict. Pursuant to State v. Farrad, the court identified 3 factors: (1) the defendant had his day in court; (2) each element of the lesser-included offense was included in the more serious offense; and (3) the jury's conviction for the more serious offense implies guilt in of the lesser-included offense. In State v. R.P., the court added a prejudice element to the 3 factors by stating that, when all 3 factors are met and the defendant is not unduly prejudiced, a molded verdict should be granted for the state. The court reversed and remanded the matter. If you are charged with a sex crime you are subject to incarceration, registration as a sex offender and the accompanying stigma which will effect where you may live, where you may work and how others will treat you and possibly even civil commitment. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you with these charges. For more information about rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact and other sex crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

The Future of DUI Testing In NJ

Those arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, are most often exonerated or convicted based on the results of chemical breath testing. The Alcotest machine is presently used to determine whether individuals were driving under the influence by using chemical testing to determine their blood alcohol content (BAC) exceeds the legal limit in New Jersey. The machine has been the subject of multiple challenges, the most well-known being State v. Chun, 195 N.J. 54 (2009),and the NJ Attorney General's Office indicated to the NJ Supreme Court that the machine's use would be discontinued by the end of 2016 in light of the machine's manufacturer, Draeger Safety, announcing they would no longer support the machine. Over the years since the Alcotest 7110 was introduced in NJ in 2001, the software has become outdated and the scientific reliability has come into question. Now, as the sun is setting on the Attorney General's time to find a suitable replacement, pay for another company to service the Alcotest machine or for the state to begin serving the machine in-house, those subject to testing for driving while intoxicated, especially those found to be just over the legal limit, are left with the fact that although they may be convicted based on results that have a reasonable probability of being inaccurate, the Attorney General's Office has a window of opportunity wherein this probability is allowed to persist. Additionally, as of this date, no suitable replacement has been indicated by the Office of the Attorney General. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Refusal to Submit to DUI Breath Testing Receives Step-Down Sentence

Thomas Taylor was charged with driving under the influence (DUI)(N.J.S.A. 39:5-50) and pled guilty to refusal to submit to a breath test (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2). Taylor had been convicted of two prior driving while intoxicated charges, both of which occurred over ten years prior to the event in question. The municipal court judge sentenced Taylor as a third offender to a 10 year suspension and a $1000 fine. The defendant appealed. In State v. Taylor, Taylor used the misplaced argument that, pursuant to State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011), which addressed the impact of prior refusal convictions to enhance subsequent DUI penalties. However, In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981), reaffirmed in State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566 (2014), held that a prior driving while intoxicated conviction may be used in enhancing a sentence for a subsequent refusal conviction. Designed as punishment for driving under the influence, the penalties for refusal mirror those for DUI in that they increase with each subsequent offense. The statutes differ in that the DWI statute calls for a "step-down" in sentencing for each 10-year period in which a driver goes without a conviction for DUI, but the refusal statute does not include such a provision. This means that an individual convicted of DUI in 1990 who is convicted of a second DUI in 2001 would be again sentenced as a first offender in 2001. Likewise, a third DWI conviction occurring 10 or more years after a second conviction would subject the driver to sentencing as a second offender under the DUI statute, pursuant to State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014). Taylor argued that his refusal should be sentenced under the terms of a second offender, as more than 10 years had elapsed since his prior offense. In State v. Fielding, 290 N.J. Super 191 (App. Div. 1996) the court addressed the matter of applying step-down sentencing to refusal conviction and determined that it was appropriate under the principal of fundamental fairness. After review, the matter was remanded for resentencing as a second offense including a significantly lower 2 year suspension and $500 fine. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about refusal, DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Attempted Murder Reduced To Aggravated Assault For Plea

Richard Spellman was indicted on two counts of attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); two counts of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); two counts of second-degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); two counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7). Spellman confessed and his motion to suppress the confession was denied. He ultimately pled guilty, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, to all charges after the first-degree attempted murder charges were amended to second degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)). Spellman was sentenced to concurrent 17 year terms subject to an 85 percent period of parole disqualification under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2); two 10 year terms and two 5 year terms; and restitution to a victim with a 5 year period of parole supervision to follow his release. The charges stemmed from two incidents. First, while on parole for a prior aggravated assault, Spellman entered a convenience store, demanded money and then shot the clerk in the stomach after he was given the money. In the second incident, Spellman shot a man in the parking lot of a restaurant. Upon arrival at the scene, police found a gun in the parking lot and Spellman staring at them out the window of a nearby store. When officers spoke to Spellman, he indicated he was fighting with the man he shot. Officers searched Spellman and found a bullet on his person. At the police station, officers found another bullet on Spellman's person and, prior to questioning of any kind, Spellman said "I shot the attendant at the [convenience store]." Spellman was read his Miranda rights, waived his right to counsel and quickly confessed to shooting both individuals. In State v. Spellman, the NJ Appellate Division upheld the trial court judge's decision that the defendant's confessions were voluntary in spite of the defendant's challenge to the voluntariness based on mental capacity which was not raised at trial and therefore not preserved for appeal. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973). The NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1997), in holding that mental illness itself, if present, does not invalidate a confession. The record below satisfied the Appellate Division that the trial judge fully reviewed the confession and found no coercion or force to have been used. With regard to sentencing, the NJ Appellate Division did find errors with the trial judge's failure to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 and explain his or her reasoning fully on the record. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014). The Appellate Division determined that he trial judge's imposition of concurrent 17 year sentences exceeded the statutory range of 5 to 10 years set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(2). Finally, the Appellate Division and the State agreed that the trial judge failed to make adequate findings, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2b(2), as to whether the defendant was able to pay the restitution ordered. The matter was remanded for resentencing. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.