Gun And Drugs Discovered Due To Defendant's Suspicious Behavior

Ramier Dunbar was indicted for second degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); fourth degree possession of a hollow-point bullet (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)); third degree resisting arrest (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)); and fourth degree obstruction of the administration of law (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1). State v. Dunbar arose from a custodial stop for which the police claimed to have probable cause. In Jersey City officers were dispatched to a report of gunshots fired. Responding officers arrived within seconds to find a group of approximately 30 individuals. They immediately noticed one individual they claimed to appear overly nervous within the screaming crowd. While maintaining constant visual contact with a marked patrol car, Dunbar disappeared down an alley momentarily then re-emerged and began walking away from the scene. Officers followed him in the patrol car and attempted to question him about the shots fired but the defendant ignored officers and, by their account, appeared more nervous. Officers ordered the Defendant to stop at which point he began to run. While running from the police, the Defendant pulled a handgun from his waistband and threw it. Officers apprehended the Defendant shortly and also discovered a bag of marijuana on his person. At trial, the judge granted Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during his arrest. The NJ Appellate Division reversed the trial court. In rendering the decision, the Appellate Division differentiated Dunbar from State v. Williams, 410 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 2009) wherein police involved in community policing stopped an individual who fled the area upon sight of the police, ignored their commands to stop, discarded contraband upon apprehension and the evidence was suppressed as the officers actions were not founded on reasonable suspicion in the eyes of the court. In State v. DeLorenzo, 166 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 1979) the court held that an investigatory stop is not reasonable based on simple nervousness. Unlike Williams, the prosecution in Dunbar argued that, based on the facts, the officers formed reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant had committed a crime, the gun was abandoned property lawfully recovered after the Defendant discarded it and the marijuana was seized incident to arrest. Also, unlike DeLorenzo, Dunbar’s nervousness was accompanied by flight while constantly observing police and in the midst of an excited crowd immediately after gun shots were reported. The Appellate Division found the stop and seizure to fall within Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) as an exception to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution wherein a warrant is required in matters of search and seizure. The totality of “shots fired”, a “chaotic scene” and the defendant’s behavior were enough to enable the Appellate Judges to find the officers had a reasonable basis for their actions. If you are facing weapons charges or drug charges you are subject to harsh penalties including lengthy incarceration and substantial fines. You should seek the assistance of an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights. For more information regarding weapons possession, use of a weapon for an improper purpose, illegal weapons, robbery, possession of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) or other serious criminal offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Driving While Suspended For DUI Without the DUI?

In deciding State v. Suzanne Sylvester, the court held that driving while suspended for a second or subsequent driving under the influence (DUI) charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b is a 4th degree crime even in the event the underlying DUI suspension is later vacated. Sylvester was convicted in the Somerset County Superior Court of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b and sentenced to a 3 year probationary term with a mandatory minimum incarceration of 180 days without parole. Sylvester had been convicted of DUI in 1991, 1992 and in Mendham Municipal Court in 2011. It was during the suspension for the 2011 DUI when the defendant was charged with driving while suspended. Although Sylvester was permitted to rely on a sentencing step-down afforded under State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990) due to the lapse of time between her second and third DUI convictions, the Appellate Division found that Defendant was aware of a valid suspension at the time she drove and therefore the conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b was also valid. In upholding the decision of the court below, the NJ Appellate Division relied on the earlier decision in State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010) wherein the court established that a defendant violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b shall not be entitled to relief from conviction in the event the DUI is later vacated. If you are found guilty of driving while suspended for a second or subsequent DUI, you may be punished under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b which bears minimum penalties of 180 days in jail and an additional 1 year loss of license. For more information about driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other serious driving offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Blood Withdrawal Does Not Require Warrant

In State v. Sekhon, a single car fatal accident took place in which it was believed the defendant was driving under the influence (DUI). A passenger died when the vehicle exited the roadway and crashed. Responding officers detected an odor of alcoholic beverages on the driver, who admitted to having two drinks, but the officers had no opportunity to take breath samples as the driver was taken to the hospital by ambulance from the scene. At the hospital blood was drawn from Sundeep Sekhon without seeking a warrant and without the defendant's consent. Although the defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was only .062, the prosecution still intended to utilize the evidence to show defendant was drinking before the accident in the second-degree vehicular homicide case. There is a long history of cases relating to the need to preserve evidence creating exigent circumstances as balanced against the 4th Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure. Missouri v. NcNeely _______U.S. ________, ________, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) considered the premise that the speed with which a warrant may be obtained, exigent circumstances may no longer be presumed in DUI matters requiring a blood sample rather than breath sample. In State v. Adkins, 433 N.J. Super. 479 (App. Div. 2013), the Appellate Division held that the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of blood tests taken without a warrant in certain circumstances as long as the motor vehicle stop occurred before McNeely was decided. Adkins requires the that police have probable cause to believe that the driver was under the influence and that the police action in taking the blood samples occurred in good faith reliance on then existing law. Under the guidance of McNeely and Adkins the NJ Appellate Division held that the BAC results from Sekhon need not be suppressed. DUI charges carry serious and lasting consequences. If you are facing DUI charges, you should seek experienced defense counsel immediately to protect your rights. For more information regarding DUI, drug DUI, controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious municipal court matters in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Prior DUI Convictions Enhance Penalty For Refusal In NJ

In the recent case of State v. Frye, the NJ Supreme Court upheld the use of prior Driving Under the Influence (DUI) convictions to enhance the sentence for refusal to submit to chemical breath testing. In Frye, the defendant was convicted to a 10 year loss of license as a result of 2 prior DUIs. Although the court held, in State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011) that a prior refusals to submit to chemical breath testing could not be used to enhance penalties for subsequent DUIs, the Frye court found the logic behind this instant decision to be different. The Court reasoned that, failure to utilize prior DUI convictions to enhance refusal convictions would then leave a strategic opportunity to repeat DUI offenders to obtain a significantly reduced penalty for subsequent offenses by simply refusing to submit to the Alcotest. The chemical breath test refusal statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, does contemplate enhanced sentencing for repeat refusal offenses in a manner which parallels enhancement for repeat DUI offenses bringing the Frye decision in line with the Legislative intent of keeping intoxicated drivers off NJ roads. The Frye decision is not the first of its kind in New Jersey. In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981), decided by the NJ Supreme Court over 30 years ago, held that a prior DUI convictions should be used to enhance suspensions in refusal cases. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Convicted Drug Dealer Is To Have Jail Credits Recalculated

Ramon Wilson entered into a negotiated plea agreement to third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (cocaine), with intent to distribute within a school zone (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a)), third-degree possession of a CDS (cocaine) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)) and a violation of probation. the State's offer was to recommend concurrent aggregate 5 year prison terms with a 3 year parole ineligibility period as well as dismissal of the remaining charges. Pursuant to the agreement, the remaining charges under the indictment were dismissed including second-degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute (cocaine) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(2), second-degree possession of a CDS (cocaine) with intent to distribute within 500 feet of a public housing facility, public park or public building (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1) and third-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2). Wilson, prior to entering into the plea, had filed an unsuccessful suppression motion to suppress drugs seized by the police and appealed the court's denial of the motion. Defendant's appeal with regard to the drugs was grounded in lack of lawful presence of police officers in an apartment when the drugs were discovered. Whitehead, the renter of an apartment known to permit dealers to distribute from his residence in exchange for free narcotics, was encountered by police on a visit to the building regarding a call about drug distribution therein. Upon encountering police, Whitehead advised that he had just returned home to three "crackheads" in his apartment distributing drugs and asked that the police remove the drug dealers from his unit. When police entered the apartment defendant jumped up and ran toward the bathroom and a bag of crack cocaine fell from his lap. Police also recovered 18 grams of crack cocaine from behind the toilet tank in the bathroom into which the defendant attempted to flee. The appellate court, in State v. Wilson, found the denial of defendant's motion to suppress to be grounded in sound legal principles and saw no reason to disturb the finding of the court below. Defendant also sought a recalculation of jail credits for the period of incarcerations between his December 2010 incarceration and August 12, 2011 sentencing. The sentencing court credited the defendant with 257 days of jail credit, however, the appellate division determined that the jail credits were not calculated according to the principles in State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011) and remanded for recalculation of defendant's jail credits. If you are facing charges of distribution or possession of CDS, you should obtain an experienced criminal defense lawyer immediately. For more information about drug distribution, possession, prescription medication, under the influence, CDS in a motor vehicle, DUI or other drug related matters in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.