Road-Rage Leads To Charges Of Terroristic Threats And Weapons Possession

During a road-rage incident, Lisa Brown threatened to kill a family while swinging a large knife at the father's face. The family was stopped at a red light when a car screeched to a halt behind theirs then they heard something hit the rear of their car. The father, who was the driver of the car, exited the vehicle to find the driver of the other vehicle and the passenger, defendant, screaming at him. In State v. Brown, the defendant was tried and convicted of two counts of 3rd degree terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a)), one count of 3rd degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)) and one count of 4th degree criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1)). At sentencing, brown received a 5 year prison sentence with 18 months of parole ineligibility on all 4 convictions. Defendant appealed on multiple grounds. On appeal, the court affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing because a defendant shall be sentenced separately on each count of an indictment pursuant to State v. Orlando, 269 N.J. Super. 116 , 634 A.2d 1039 (App.Div. 1993). Also, the court shall clearly indicate which charges, if any, are to be merged and which shall run concurrent pursuant to State v. Yarbrough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44, 498 A.2d 1239 (1985). Terroristic threats in NJ are a 3rd degree crime punishable by 3-5 years in prison and up to $15,000. These charges, unless written, are difficult to prove and a skilled criminal defense attorney can prove invaluable in your defense. For more information regarding terroristic threats, weapons charges, road-rage or other criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In Gang Related Murder, Lawyer's Failure To Call Alibi Witnesses May Be Ineffective Assistance

Fedner Pierre-Louis, allegedly of the Playboy Posse criminal gang, was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)), third degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)). The defendant, in State of NJ v. Fedner Pierre-Louis, was sentenced to 45 years in prison for this murder of an oncologist, Jeffrey Perchick, at a hotel in the Newark area. Pierre-Louis was charged when a gun used in another crime was traced to him. However, Pierre-Louis offered his defense attorney seven potential alibi witnesses, including family members and friends from his night-school classes, who were willing to testify on his behalf. Defense counsel employed a private investigator who spoke with the alibi witnesses and determined them to be unreliable. As a result of the private investigator's assessment, defendant's counsel made the decision not to present any of the alibi witnesses and Pierre-Louis was convicted. Upon a post-conviction relief filing by defendant, the trial judge, Union County Superior Court Judge John Triarsi vacated the guilty verdict then reversed himself after reviewing documents demonstrating defendant's trial counsel knowingly made the decision not to present the alibi witnesses after interviews by the private investigator. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's ruling and the NJ Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certification. The NJ Supreme Court considered whether the petition for post-conviction relief satisfied the test set forth by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). The Justices heard arguments from the prosecution and defense regarding the with whom the decision to produce witnesses lies, the standard of review the trial judge must undertake and at one point the Court has the authority to disturb the trial judge's findings. Ultimately, the NJ Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were not sufficient with regard to either prong of the test and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new hearing including the presentation of the alibi witnesses for the purposes of determining credibility. If you are facing criminal charges in NJ, the consequences of a conviction can change your life. For more information about gang crimes, weapons charges, murder, manslaughter, robbery and other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In A Murder Trial, Does Replacing A Juror Deprive Defendant Of A Fair Trial?

Michael Ross II was charged with first degree murder of 2 men (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2)); second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); third degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and third degree hindering apprehension or prosecution (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1)). The matter was tried and the jury was sent for deliberations. After 6 full days of deliberations together, weighing the evidence presented at trial, the jurors sent out a note indicating they were deadlocked. Middlesex County Superior Court Judge James Mulvihill provided the jury with further instructions and ordered them to continue with deliberations. In roughly one hour's time, a juror indicated she was too ill to continue and the jurors were dismissed for the day. The following day, the juror again indicated she was too ill to participate and the judge spoke with her directly to verify that she was truly too ill to appear for further deliberations. Rather than waiting to see if the juror would be able to return, the judge replaced her. After four more days of deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Defendant appealed the matter of State v. Ross and the NJ Appellate Division reversed the conviction, determining the "jury had proceeded too far to expect the newly seated juror to be a full and equal participant in deliberations." In making their decision, the Appellate Division reconsidered State v. Banks, 395 N.J. Super. 205 (App.Div. 2007) and State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392 (1980) which addressed the replacement of jurors following deliberations and deadlock. The NJ Supreme Court took State v. Ross on the prosecution's appeal. The NJ Supreme Court justices addressed the proximity of the jurors notice of illness to the jury's indication of deadlock, the amount of time which elapsed from the substitution of the new juror to the arrival at the guilty verdicts and the extent to which the Judge went to ascertain the original juror's ability to appear in court for further deliberations. The defendant's attorney attempted to persuade the court that juror replacement should be barred following notice of a deadlock in order to protect the integrity of jury deliberations. No final decision has been reached in this matter but for those facing serious criminal charges and substantial deprivation of liberty, the result on future trials could prove substantial. For more information about murder, weapons possession, hindering or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Multiple Counts In An Ongoing Conspiracy Must Be Sentenced As A Single Event

Vereli Sotelo was charged with five counts of theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) and conspiracy to commit theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and convicted of multiple counts of theft by deception for her part in a scheme involving green cards. Vereli and her husband Tito used Tito's respected position within the salvation army to communicate to Hispanic members of the congregation how he could obtain them residency cards quickly through an attorney in Miami. Tito charged $4,000 per green card plus a donation to the church. He told people the money was being forwarded to immigration for processing. The Defendant and another woman were present to collect and count the money when people visited Tito to avail themselves of his offer. Vereli would accompany Tito to Florida for meetings with the lawyer. At some point, the parishioners began to receive letter indicating their applications had been received and the information within those letters had been falsified to include Florida addresses and describing their educational levels as including advanced degrees. Ultimately the story reached the media and, even then, the defendant maintained to parishioners that Tito was not operating a fraudulent scheme and the arrival of the residency papers would prove it. When the Union County Prosecutor's office brought the matter of State v. Sotelo to trial, the defendant was convicted and received an aggregate term of 6 years in prison including a single 3 year term on one count, a consecutive 3 year term on another 3 counts and a concurrent 3 year term on a final count. Defendant appealed on several points, most of which were affirmed, but the appellate division did find that all acts performed by the defendant were part of a general and unified plan and therefore should be sentenced as a single act of conspiracy and remanded for sentencing appropriately. Theft, including theft by deception, charges can result in substantial penalties including up to 10 years in prison for second degree theft. If you are facing charges for shoplifting, theft or theft by deception, you should immediately consult the advice of experienced criminal defense counsel. For more information regarding theft, extortion, shoplifting, forging prescription blanks, receiving stolen property or other crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Blood Sample Taken From DWI Defendant Will Not Be Suppressed If Legally Withdrawn

Blood taken without a warrant in a Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) and death by auto case need not be suppressed depending on the law at the time of the accident. The defendant was involved in a single car accident in 2010 in which 2 passengers were injured when the vehicle he was driving hit a utility pole. The police detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the defendant, Adkins, and administered field sobriety tests which he failed. Defendant was arrested and transported to the police station where he was read his Miranda rights and opted to remain silent until he had the benefit of counsel. Later that night, Defendant was transported to the hospital by police. Because alcohol remains in the body for a limited time, at the request of police and upon the signature of the defendant, police and the nurse to perform the procedure, blood was withdrawn from the defendant with his consent. At trial, in State v. Adkins, the defendant sought to suppress the blood as it was obtained without a warrant and the suppression was granted. The State appealed the matter and the NJ Appellate division considered a series of cases relating to warrantless searches and exceptions to the warrant requirement. The NJ Appellate Court was considering the issue of whether they should apply the ruling in Davis v. United States, 564 US ___ (2011), or State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 (1987), in light of federal retroactivity requirements. Under Davis the US Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule, which protects the public from warrantless seizures, would not operate in a defendant's favor where the police were acting in good-faith reliance on existing law. Under Novembrino the NJ Supreme Court held that a good-faith exception served to deprive defendants of their rights and would not be upheld. The NJ Appellate Division made its determination with its focus toward the purpose of the exclusionary rule in protecting defendants from illegal police intrusion. In 2010, at the time the blood was drawn from the defendant, the police conduct was lawful and with consent of the defendant. They were not acting pursuant to a defective warrant and their conduct was not unreasonable or improper. The suppression of the blood samples in this case would not further the interests of justice or rectify improper behavior by police. Although Adkins' personal interests may be served by suppression, the suppression of the blood sample which was taken legally at the time of the accident would severely disrupt the criminal justice system when the multitude of defendants already sentenced sought to reopen their cases with retroactive application of the law. Driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol in New Jersey bears serious consequences including loss of driving privileges from 7 months for a first event to 10 years for a third or subsequent event, heavy fines and even jail. If you are facing DUI charges, it is critical you obtain experienced defense counsel to represent you against those charges. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving without insurance or other serious municipal court charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlinglawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Conditional Dismissal in NJ Municipal Court Effective January 4, 2014

On September 6, 2013, Governor Christie signed into effect A-3598, establishing a Conditional Dismissal program in NJ municipal courts. The law became effective on January 4, 2014 and applies to those convicted of or pleading guilty to disorderly or petty disorderly offenses. The Conditional Discharge in municipal court was previously available only for drug offenders in municipal court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1. However, those convicted of or pleading guilty to certain greater offenses in the NJ Superior Court were eligible for Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI). Now the playing field for eligible first offenders is level between the courts. Conditional Discharge and PTI are one time programs available to those accused of criminal offenses. Once they are utilized, defendants are ineligible to use them again. Additionally, use of PTI renders you ineligible for Conditional Discharge and the converse is true as well. Also, domestic violence and driving under the influence (DUI) defendants are not eligible for Conditional Dismissal. Although an individual may be eligible for Conditional Dismissal, the court retains discretion as to whether a defendant is admitted based on criteria including the nature of the offense, the interests of the victim, the defendant's history and public interest. This program is a diversionary program wherein defendants are placed on probation for a period of one year wherein certain requirements must be met or the defendant will be expelled from the program and returned to court to face the original charges against them. Additionally, those pleading to or found guilty of other offenses during their probationary term will be expelled from the diversionary program. Although this program helps avoid a criminal record, fingerprinting is required under N.J.S.A. 53:1-15 and there are associated fees as well. Successful completion of the program will not be deemed a conviction on a defendant's criminal record and will not be counted as a first conviction for sentencing purposes in the event of future convictions. However, a Conditional Dismissal will appear on their criminal record and bar eligibility for future diversionary programs. Criminal charges in NJ can have a serious, lasting and detrimental effect on your future. if you are facing criminal charges, whether in municipal or superior court, it is critical you obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney to help resolve your matter. For more information about Conditional Dismissal, Conditional Discharge, Pre-Trial Intervention or criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Distribution Penalties Enhanced Under Controlled Substances Act

In order to be eligible for enhanced penalties under the Controlled Substances Act (U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(C)), the use of the drug distributed must independently cause the victim's death or seriously bodily injury. In the case of Burrage v. United States, a long-time drug user in poor physical condition died after using heroin purchased from the defendant. On April 14, 2010, Banka began smoking marijuana with a friend and he later crushed and injected oxycodone pills. His wife then purchased heroin for him from Burrage which he used on at least 2 occasions that same night. In the morning of April 15, Banka's wife woke to find him dead. Responding police found heroin, oxycodone, hydrocodone, alprazolam, clonazepam and syringes in the residence. At trial, testimony was presented by medical experts indicating the presence of codiene, alprazolam, clonazepam, oxycodone and herion in Banka's system at the time of death. The experts could not conclusively say Banka would have lived had he not injected the heroin, only that it was a "contributing factor" making the death more likely. The jury convicted Burrage after the judge instructed them that the government need prove only that the heroin contributed to the death. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison under the Controlled Substances Act and the Appellate Court upheld the decision. Burrage appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Controlled Substances Act includes a "death results" enhanced penalty which subjects drug dealers to increased sentences when someone dies as a result of using drugs the dealer sold them. The US Supreme Court held that drug use as a contributing factor to death was not sufficient to impose the enhanced penalty. The US Supreme Court found that "results from" was not defined in the Act but found it to require proof that "the harm would not have occurred in the absence of…the defendant's conduct." University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. ___________, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). The Government argued that applying the ordinary meaning to "results from" would protect criminals from liability for their acts. The Supreme Court found this argument to lack merit on the grounds that, even without proof of but-for causation, criminals remain subject to the remaining provisions of U.S.C. Section 841. If you are facing charges for drug distribution, there are multiple components which may affect the ultimate outcome. Although there is often no way to obtain an acquittal in such cases, there is often great disparity in sentencing depending on the interpretation of statutes and factors applied and weighed at the time of sentencing. Drug distribution charges are met with harsh penalties due to the public interest in deterrence and it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect you against the charges and penalties. For more information regarding drug distribution, possession and possession with intent to distribute visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.