Showing posts with label 2C:44-1. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2C:44-1. Show all posts
Thursday, May 19, 2016
Theft of $100,000 From N.J. Employer
Deborah Meehan was convicted of second-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) after issuing checks to herself in the amount of over $100,000 by affixing the stamp of a law firm partner to checks in her control as the law firm's bookkeeper. Following an investigation, Meehan was questioned and admitted, during a videotaped interview, that she did not have permission to issue the checks. The jury found Meehan guilty of second-degree theft but, at sentencing, the trial judge downgraded the offense to third-degree and sentenced her to prison, refusing to accept her application for probation. The State appealed and the Defendant cross-appealed indicating she did not effectively waive her right to remain silent and therefore her confession should be suppressed.
In State v. Meehan, the NJ Appellate Division initially reviewed the voluntariness of the Defendant's confession under State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368 (2014), Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), State v. Graham, 59 N.J. 366 (1971), State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 1994), and State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993). The panel held that the state met it's burden of proof showing the police did not overbear Meehan's will and her statement was provided after a voluntary and knowing waiver of her rights. The panel further held that neither the jury charge nor the prosecutor's statements were prejudicial to the Defendant. The panel did find for the State in holding that it was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion to downgrade the second-degree conviction to third-degree.
Pursuant to State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984), the NJ Appellate Division will not typically disturb the sentence of a trial court unless it constitutes abuse of discretion. Pursuant to State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) and State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014), the state must first review the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and then balance the relevant factors and explain how the final sentencing decision is reached in light of the analysis. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) requires prison for second-degree crimes unless there are exceptional circumstances as the court fully set forth in State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003) and, under the facts, denial of probation was appropriate. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) relating to the downgrade of sentences, sets forth that where mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and the interests of justice are best served by the downgrade, the court has discretion to reduce the term to that of a crime one degree below that for which the Defendant was convicted. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484 (1996) and State v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2009) jointly provide a valuable explanation of the analysis the court should conduct in considering a downgrade. The N.J. Appellate panel considered the legislative intent in drafting N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(1). The panel agreed with the State's likening of the matter to State v. Jones, 197 N.J. Super 604 (App. Div. 1984) wherein a defendant's second degree theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) was downgraded to third-degree and later reversed after the court found the downgrade to be abuse of the trial court's discretion. The N.J. Appellate Division ultimately reversed the downgraded sentence, holding that Meehan's theft of over $100,000 from her employer was serious and a downgrade would not serve the interests of justice, and remanded for sentencing accordingly.
A second-degree theft conviction will result in a 5-10 year prison sentence. If you are facing second-degree criminal charges it is critical you obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and build a defense against the prosecution's case. For more information about theft, burglary and other serious criminal issues in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.
Labels:
2C:20-2,
2C:20-3,
2C:20-4,
2C:44-1,
attorney,
criminal,
defense,
lawyer,
Miranda,
State v. Galloway,
State v. Meehan,
State v. O'Donnell,
theft
Monday, December 22, 2014
Sexual Assault Remanded For Consideration Of Mitigating Factors
V.E.A. was indicted for second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)) and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)) and was convicted on both counts following a jury trial. The charges stemmed from the accusations of his daughter that she awoke one evening to find the Defendant’s hand inside her shorts and panties on her buttocks after falling asleep on his bed while they were watching a movie. The child testified that he then began to move his hand around toward the front of her body and upward toward her breast at which time she asked to go to the bathroom. The Defendant excused her to go to the bathroom and did not continue the behavior according to his daughter. At sentencing, V.E.A. received a 7 year prison sentence with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) for sexual assault and a concurrent 7 year prison sentence for the second count of the indictment.
In State v. V.E.A. the NJ Appellate Division heard V.E.A.’s arguments with regard to aggravating and mitigating factors and the disparity in the trial court judge’s findings with regard to same. The NJ Appellate Division found that where the judge stated at sentencing that she found no mitigating factors to exist but in the Judgment of Conviction indicated mitigating factor 10 (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10)) “the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment” applied and was accorded substantial weight by the trial judge such conflicted existed as to warrant the remand of the matter for resentencing with appropriate review of the aggravating and mitigating factors.
If you are charged with a sex crime you are subject to incarceration, registration as a sex offender and the accompanying stigma which will affect where you may live, where you may work and how others will treat you and possibly even civil commitment. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you with these charges. For more information about rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact and other sex crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:14-2,
2C:24-4,
2C:43-7.2,
2C:44-1,
aggravating factors,
endangering,
mitigating factors,
NERA,
No Early Release Act,
sentencing factors,
Sex crimes,
sexual assault,
State v. V.E.A.,
welfare of a minor
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