Robbery Trial 2 Years After Arrest and Right To Speedy Trial

Antonio Jones was convicted of first-degree robbery (N.J.SA. 2C:15-1) and fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division. Jones was sentenced to an extended term including life without parole with the sentence for obstruction to be served concurrently. Jones appealed based on the denial of his motion to dismiss based on failure of the State to uphold his right to a speedy trial under the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the N.J. Constitution. Jones was arrested in February 2012. In spite of defendant’s repeated requests for the State to provide discovery, the State failed to comply and the matter was delayed. In September 2012, Jones filed a speedy trial motion. In December 2012, the trial judge ordered the State to comply with discovery demands. In February 2013, the state still had not complied and Jones again filed a speedy trial motion. The Superior Court records indicated that the motion was denied in August of 2013 but without reasons set forth. The Superior Court judge merely ordered that no trial would occur until discovery was completed and a trial date was set for February 2014, 2 years after Jones was arrested. As 18 months had already elapsed when the Defendant renewed his speedy trial motion, the N.J. Appellate Division remanded the matter to the Superior Court for a review of Jones’ speedy trial motion under the 4 factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2181, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). Under Barker, the balancing test, applied in State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013) includes: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason therefor; (3) the defendant must assert his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. In Cahill, the N.J. Supreme Court considered 1 year as the amount of time triggering further inquiry under the factors set forth in Barker. First-degree robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison. The State has to remain within the confines of the law in collecting evidence, your arrest, and presenting evidence and testimony against you. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to fight for your rights each step of the way. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Bat Used in Assault Suppressed After Illegal Police Search

Kenneth Barbour was arrested for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)), resulting from an alleged assault on his neighbor. Upon arriving at the scene, police were told by the bloody victim, that his neighbor used a black baseball bat to strike him in the head following a verbal dispute. Police indicated they used a patrol car loudspeaker to command Barbour to exit his residence as he was thought to have outstanding warrants and possibly weapons in his possession. An individual ultimately exited the residence and was arrested approximately 20 feet from the residence. Police, not having a photo of Barbour and unsure he was the man who exited the residence, entered the residence to conduct a search of the premises for others. The trial court denied Barbour's motion to suppress, and other relief requested, holding that the actions of the arresting officers were legitimate as part of a protective sweep of the residence. Following a jury trial, Barbour was convicted of fourth degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)) and sentenced to 2 years probation. In State v. Barbour, the defendant challenged several aspects of the trial court's decision, including the denial of his motion to suppress the bat alleged to have been used as the weapon in the assault. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right to citizens to be free from unreasonable search and seizure unless certain very narrow exceptions apply. State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471 (2001). The New Jersey Appellate Division held that a protective sweep must be limited to "areas in a defendant's immediate control." Such a sweep is valid only when there is (1) a legitimate reason for the officers presence in the residence; and (2) officers have a reasonable suspicion that there is a dangerous individual hiding in the area to be swept and that the burden of proving these circumstances existed is on the State. State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97 (2010). In light of the evidence and testimony presented that the Defendant was outside when arrested and there was no reasonable articulable suspicion that another dangerous individual was inside the residence, the N.J. Appellate Division found the search and seizure to violate the Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and reversed the denial of the motion to suppress. Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including incarceration, the inability to obtain employment and certain licenses, and social stigma associated with such problems. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In DUI A Stay Of Sentence On Appeal Is Not A Right

Scott Robertson was convicted in municipal court of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50). Robertson was stopped after police observed him to be driving erratically and he admitted to the consumption of alcohol during the motor vehicle stop. Robertson performed poorly on the field sobriety tests and his blood alcohol content (BAC) registered as .13 on the Alcotest machine. He was also charged with failure to maintain a lane (N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b)), and reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96). At trial, Robertson unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of the Alcotest results based on the unavailability of repair records and diagnostic tests for the Alcotest machine used for his test. Although Robertson received numerous records, there were service related records within the manufacturer which he could not access to which he believed he was entitled. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed. Once again Robertson appealed, this time to the New Jersey Appellate Division which affirmed the DUI conviction holding that under State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 825, 129 S. Ct. 158, 172 L. Ed. 2d 41 (2008) there was no basis for excluding the Alcotest results. Of note, on each successive appeal, Robertson sought a stay of the suspension of his driving privileges. He was sentenced to 7 months loss of license in municipal court and a stay of his suspension was granted, with no reasons stated on the record, to allow for a trial de novo in the New Jersey Superior Court, Middlesex County. At the trial de novo of State v. Robertson, the New Jersey Superior Court judge found Robertson guilty based on both the DVR of the psychophysical tests and the Alcotest results. The defendant again sought a stay of his license suspension based on multiple cases pending certification in the Supreme Court with regard to the ability of those accused of DUI to obtain repair and service records relating to specific Alcotest machines and the possibility of a favorable outcome for the Defendant. The State objected to the stay based on several unreported Appellate Division opinions supporting the finding that the records sought by the Defendant need not be provided. The stay was granted and addressed by the Appellate Division as being governed by a three-part test under Crowe v. DeGoia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) requiring a showing that failure to obtain the stay would subject the defendant to irreparable harm, that the defendant has a reasonable chance of success on appeal, and there is not substantial harm created by granting the stay. In the case of DUI, the potential for harm to the public by an intoxicated driver creates a special circumstance for consideration and the Appellate Division found that stay of a suspension in a DUI case was not a matter of right pending appeal. With regard to the suppression motion, the New Jersey Appellate Division looked to precedent interpreting Chun. In State v. Maricic, 417 N.J. Super. 280, 288 (App. Div. 2010), the Appellate Division held that, although twelve foundational documents were required by Chun, that did not serve to limit additional discovery requests with a reasonable basis. The Appellate Division also reviewed State v. Carrero, 428 N.J. Super. 495, 507 (App. Div. 2012) holding that DWI cases are quasi-criminal and subject to a more limited discovery than criminal matters. Pursuant to R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(C) and 7:7-7(b)(4) the State is obligated to produce documents within the prosecutor’s custody or control but the Appellate Division reasoned that, although the Alcotest manufacturer’s documents were not within the State’s control, the Defendant could have subpoenaed them from the manufacturer had he felt they would prove to exculpate him. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found the argument that the diagnostic tests were material to the defense to be unconvincing. DWI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges and can lead to loss of driving privileges up to 10 years as well as incarceration. Additionally, the newly created statute regarding driving while suspended for multiple DUI offenses guarantees a 6 month jail term. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to determine whether you can win your case. For more information about DUI, DWI, DUID, driving while suspended for DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Facebook Evidence Can Have Limited Value In Sex Crimes Cases

Tony Browne was found guilty of 12 counts of federal child exploitation offenses including production of child pornography, coercion and enticement of a minor, receipt of child pornography, and transfer of obscene material to a minor with females ranging in age from 12 to 17 years old. Browne created a Facebook profile wherein he pretended to be a female and befriended the girls, ultimately obtaining nude and sexually provocative photos from them. Next, Browne utilized another Facebook account under a fictitious name, Billy Button, to threaten to post the photos unless the minors provided more photos or engaged in sexual activity with him. Additionally, Browne sent images to the minors of his erect penis. In United States of America v. Tony Jefferson Browne, Browne’s appeal was rejected but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did hold that although a preponderance of the evidence showed that Browne did create the messages, there was no way to fully authenticate the records through Facebook’s records custodian. Although the conviction was upheld, the court’s finding was that social media evidence requires authentication which takes into consideration the range of ways in which such information can be manipulated. Sex crime charges can be levied many years after an alleged incident and can result in incarceration, substantial and irreparable damage to the reputation and lifestyle of the accused in addition to the deprivation of liberty and rights, registration as a sex offender, loss of employment opportunities, possibility of civil commitment and social stigma. If you are accused of a sex crime it is absolutely imperative that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to begin working on your defense immediately. For more information about sexual assault, rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, internet crimes, child pornography or other sex crimes in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Coffee Drinking In NJ - From Keeping You Alert To A Violation?

The same penalties which apply to using a cell phone while driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3, in New Jersey could soon apply to drinking coffee or eating while driving if Assemblymen John Wisniewski of Middlesex County and Nicholas Chiaravalloti of Hudson County, both Democrats, get their way. The revisions would subject drivers to a $200 fine for a first offense, $600 fine for a second offense, with a third or subsequent offense subjecting coffee drinkers to up to $800 in fines and up to 90 day loss of license. The Assemblymen are claiming the bill is intended to prevent distracted driving, not punish would be coffee drinkers, but that theory ignores the reality that the effect is the same for drivers. In support of the bill, some are citing enforcement of seatbelt laws and a significant increase in seatbelt use with a corollary decrease in life threatening crash related injuries. The bill is still in its infancy and, as many believe this to be excessive overreaching on the part of Wisniewski and Chiaravalloti, hopes remain high that this bill will garner little support from those responsible for the stewardship of New Jersey. For more information about motor vehicle offenses including using a hand-held electronic device while driving, driving under the influence (DUI), reckless driving and other traffic offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Unconstitutional Traffic Stop Leads To Suppression Of Weapons Evidence

Al-Sharif Scriven was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); third-degree receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7); fourth-degree possession of hollow-point bullets (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)); and fourth-degree possession of a large-capacity magazine (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j)). The Honorable Martin G. Cronin, for the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County granted Al-Sharif Scriven’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search following the stop of a vehicle in which Scriven was a passenger. The vehicle was stopped by an Essex County Sheriff’s Officer for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-60, driving with high beams on. The State of New Jersey appealed the court’s grant of the suppression motion. The facts adduced at trial were that Scriven was a passenger in a car which was traveling through Newark, NJ in an entirely lawful manner, with the exception of the fact that the vehicle was traveling with its high beams on. An Essex County Sheriff’s Officer observed the vehicle and flagged it down when it came to a stop at an intersection he was near. When the officer approached the driver to advise her that her high beams were on he requested her credentials. While speaking to the driver, the officer detected an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle which the officer indicated was stronger on the passenger side of the vehicle. The officer asked Scriven to exit the vehicle and Scriven first notified the officer that there was a handgun under his coat. The officer retrieved the gun from Scriven’s person and arrested him. Judge Cronin relied on State v. Witt, 435 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2014), 219 N.J. 624 (2014), which was directly on point and held that the initial stop of a vehicle is inappropriate when there is no actual violation. In Scriven, there was no oncoming vehicle within 500 feet traveling in the opposite direction as is required in order for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-60 to occur. On appeal, in State v. Scriven, the court looked to State v. Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2005), which held that when an officer makes a mistake in the belief that a violation exists the mistake does not thereby create a reasonable basis for a stop. The State also argued, under the community caretaking doctrine, the officer was acting appropriately in stopping the vehicle briefly to notify the driver that her high beams were in use. In certain cases, including State v. Martinez, 260 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1992), wherein a vehicle was traveling less than one-half the posted speed limit at 2:00 a.m., an officer would be justified in stopping the vehicle to insure there was nothing amiss. The N.J. Appellate Division upheld Judge Cronin’s decision and the State again appealed. On Wednesday, July 20, 2016, the N.J. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court below suppressing the weapon found on Al-Sharif Scriven as the fruits of an unreasonable search. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you are facing weapons charges you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Jury Trials In NJ DUI Cases

The N.J. Supreme Court ruled that in spite of substantially increasing penalties, driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) is a motor vehicle matter giving defendants no right to a jury trial. In State v. Denelsbeck, decided May 12, 2016, the court reaffirmed its decision from State v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109 (1990), wherein it was held that the Legislature, although enacting harsh penalties to deter driving while intoxicated, did not classify DUI as a criminal matter. Penalties for a third or subsequent DUI do not include more than 6 months in jail and thus are not of sufficient impact to require a jury according to the court’s reasoning. In support of this logic is the fact that the court has criminalized driving while suspended for DWI by enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 which requires incarceration for those convicted of multiple offenses. The N.J. Supreme Court did indicate that, if penalties for DUI became more harsh in the future, they could revisit their decision. If you are charged with DUI, you need experienced defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to breath tests, driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and other serious driving charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Domestic Violence By Police Officer Found Unfit For Duty

F.M., a police officer, fought against the domestic violence claims of G.M., his wife, and defeated her attempt to obtain a final restraining order against him. However, although the Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, Family Part Judge hearing the matter refused to grant the final restraining order, the State of New Jersey moved to take control of F.M.’s firearms pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) which outlines the guidelines for the purchase of firearms in New Jersey. The Honorable Thomas J. Critchley, Jr. required F.M. to attend certain counseling and intervention programs and undergo a Fitness for Duty evaluation. Upon completion of his court ordered counseling, F.M. sought the return of his weapons in a hearing where substantial testimony with regard to prior incidents of domestic violence at the hands of F.M. was provided by G.M. Judge Critchley, after hearing the testimony of G.M. and the State’s witnesses, denied the State’s motion including in his opinion that F.M. and G.M. had a lengthy history in the Morris County Family Court to which the State’s expert psychologists were not privy yet the judges within the court were well acquainted. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed Judge Critchley’s ruling with regard to the return of F.M.’s firearms. The N.J. Supreme Court granted certification and, In The Matter of Applications Of State of New Jersey For Forfeiture of Personal Weapons and Firearms Identification Card Belonging to F.M., concluded that the Family Part judge misinterpreted the statute as requiring the F.M. suffer from a specific disorder in order to be prohibited from possession his firearms and also misapplied the statute by requiring the State to prove “more than just a showing that some danger might exist” when the State was only required to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in showing that F.M.’s possession of firearms was against the interest of the public health, safety and welfare. The N.J. Supreme Court found that the evidence presented by G.M. with regard to prior acts of domestic violence against her by F.M. and the testimony of two licensed psychologists who both concluded that F.M., based on his lack of self-control and inability to deescalate situations with his own wife, was unfit to perform the duties of a police officer. A Fitness for Duty evaluation by one of the psychologists further concluded that F.M. was a danger to himself and others and should be stripped of his weapons. If you are charged with domestic violence or seeking a final restraining order against an abuser, there are specific burdens of proof for both parties in proving or disproving the charges making it critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you in such matters. For more information regarding domestic violence, restraining orders, assault, battery and other criminal law issues in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Handgun In Plain View? Prove it!

Jarrell Williams was convicted of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b) after an officer allegedly saw a handgun in plain view on the floor of his vehicle during a motor vehicle stop. At all times during the proceedings, Williams maintained that he was unaware that the vehicle, recently purchased by his mother, contained a handgun. Williams also maintained that the gun was not in plain view on the floor of the vehicle near the driver’s seat. The facts collectively presented at trial in State v. Williams are that 4 men, including the defendant, entered the vehicle and smoked marijuana then the defendant pulled the vehicle out of the driveway just as two plain clothed police officers came down the street at which point Williams immediately pulled over and turned off the vehicle. The officers claimed that the location and actions of the defendant and the vehicles’ other occupants gave rise to suspicion and the officers turned around. Seeing the officers’ vehicle turn around, all 4 occupants exited the vehicle before the officers engaged them in conversation. Conflicting accounts of the vehicle’s ownership were offered by occupants and Officer Brown approached the vehicle, with its doors open, to verify the registration. The officer’s testimony was that he observed a marijuana cigarette and plastic bag and, upon going to retrieve same, noticed the pistol on the floor in front of the driver’s seat. The 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 of the New Jersey Constitution establish and protect a defendant’s right to present a complete defense including confrontation of witnesses. Several cases including State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 (2003), State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519 (1991), State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985), State v. Crudup, 176 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1980) and State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129 (2004) have upheld this right but within the constraints of N.J.R.E. 611(a) and N.J.R.E. 401 which afford the court discretion of control over the trial. The N.J. Appellate Division ultimately decided that the jury should not be placed in the position of determining the constitutionality of a search and seizure but that Defense counsel’s line of questioning was not in danger of placing them in that position and was instead intended to determine whether the officer had a predetermined purpose in offering the statements he had made and was an attempt to introduce motive on the part of the officer to testify in a certain manner. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the defendant’s right to cross-examine the officer was violated and that, due to the possible influence this may have had on the decision of the jury, the matter was remanded for a new trial. Weapons offenses are subject to severe punishment including incarceration for 5-10 years for many such offenses. If you are charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you. For more information about possession of a handgun without a permit, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon while on parole or probation, possession of a weapon during a drug related offense or other serious weapons charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

DUI Dismissed On Speedy Trial Violation

In State v. Cahill, the defendant faced a driving under the influence (DUI) charge after being found guilty of assault by auto charges stemming from the same event. It was established that Michael Cahill consumed alcohol at a bar, later drove from the bar, swerved to avoid an obstacle in the road, crossed two lanes of traffic and collided with a police car causing injuries to the officer. Following a conviction and sentencing in the death by auto matter, the Superior Court judge remanded the driving while intoxicated charge to municipal court for disposition. A full 16 months later, Michael Cahill received notice from the municipal court that his matter had been scheduled for trial. Through counsel, he filed a motion to dismiss based on the court’s failure to uphold his right to a speedy trial. The municipal court judge denied the motion and Cahill appealed after entering a conditional guilty plea. The NJ Superior Court held that Cahill’s right to a speedy trial was violated under the particular circumstances of the matter and vacated the sentence after a review of the matter based on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Barker v. Wingo. In Barker v. Wingo, the US Supreme Court established a four factor balancing test to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was upheld. In the instant case, the NJ Superior Court found the 16 month delay was held to be too lengthy, without good cause, and prejudicial to the defendant who suffered anxiety over the prospect of the trail as well as limited his employment alternatives based on the likelihood he would be found guilty at trial. The decision to dismiss the DWI charge was upheld by the NJ Appellate Division and the NJ Supreme Court and Cahill’s sentence was vacated. Driving under the influence charges carry significant consequences including loss of driving privileges for 7-12 months for a first offense, 2 years for a second offense and ten years for a third or subsequent offense as well as substantial fines and penalties, the inability to work and the social stigma that is associated with DUI. There are ways that an attorney can help you, even if you think you will be found guilty and it is always critical that you consult with an experienced traffic attorney prior to deciding whether to enter into a guilty plea for DUI. For more information about DUI/DWI, reckless driving and other serious traffic court matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Theft of $100,000 From N.J. Employer

Deborah Meehan was convicted of second-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) after issuing checks to herself in the amount of over $100,000 by affixing the stamp of a law firm partner to checks in her control as the law firm's bookkeeper. Following an investigation, Meehan was questioned and admitted, during a videotaped interview, that she did not have permission to issue the checks. The jury found Meehan guilty of second-degree theft but, at sentencing, the trial judge downgraded the offense to third-degree and sentenced her to prison, refusing to accept her application for probation. The State appealed and the Defendant cross-appealed indicating she did not effectively waive her right to remain silent and therefore her confession should be suppressed. In State v. Meehan, the NJ Appellate Division initially reviewed the voluntariness of the Defendant's confession under State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368 (2014), Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), State v. Graham, 59 N.J. 366 (1971), State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 1994), and State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993). The panel held that the state met it's burden of proof showing the police did not overbear Meehan's will and her statement was provided after a voluntary and knowing waiver of her rights. The panel further held that neither the jury charge nor the prosecutor's statements were prejudicial to the Defendant. The panel did find for the State in holding that it was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion to downgrade the second-degree conviction to third-degree. Pursuant to State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984), the NJ Appellate Division will not typically disturb the sentence of a trial court unless it constitutes abuse of discretion. Pursuant to State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) and State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014), the state must first review the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and then balance the relevant factors and explain how the final sentencing decision is reached in light of the analysis. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) requires prison for second-degree crimes unless there are exceptional circumstances as the court fully set forth in State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003) and, under the facts, denial of probation was appropriate. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) relating to the downgrade of sentences, sets forth that where mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and the interests of justice are best served by the downgrade, the court has discretion to reduce the term to that of a crime one degree below that for which the Defendant was convicted. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484 (1996) and State v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2009) jointly provide a valuable explanation of the analysis the court should conduct in considering a downgrade. The N.J. Appellate panel considered the legislative intent in drafting N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(1). The panel agreed with the State's likening of the matter to State v. Jones, 197 N.J. Super 604 (App. Div. 1984) wherein a defendant's second degree theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) was downgraded to third-degree and later reversed after the court found the downgrade to be abuse of the trial court's discretion. The N.J. Appellate Division ultimately reversed the downgraded sentence, holding that Meehan's theft of over $100,000 from her employer was serious and a downgrade would not serve the interests of justice, and remanded for sentencing accordingly. A second-degree theft conviction will result in a 5-10 year prison sentence. If you are facing second-degree criminal charges it is critical you obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and build a defense against the prosecution's case. For more information about theft, burglary and other serious criminal issues in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Lawyer Challenges His DUI Plea Based On Lack Of Counsel

Henry Aratow was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) in 1988, pled guilty to a driving under the influence (DUI) in 2004, and pled guilty to a 2009 in 2011. In the case of the 2009 DUI, Aratow was sentenced as a third offender resulting in a 10 year loss of driving privileges and 180 days incarceration. In 2013, Aratow sought post conviction relief from in the municipal court and then Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County with regard to the 2004 DUI in order to avail himself of the step-down provisions under State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014), pertaining to successive DUI convictions. The relief sought was denied and Aratow appealed to the NJ Appellate Division. In 2004, Aratow was stopped by police and charged with DWI, refusal to submit to a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), and making an improper turn (N.J.S.A. 39:4-116). Both at the time he was stopped by police and when he appeared in court for the resulting charges, Aratow was a practicing attorney. Aratow waived his right to counsel and entered into a plea to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content (BAC) between .08 and .10 with a dismissal of the refusal to submit to chemical breath testing and the improper turn charges. At the time of the 2004 plea, the municipal court judge engaged in lengthy colloquy with the defendant regarding his right to counsel, the factual basis of his plea. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the Aratow was not advised by the municipal court judge of the progressively harsher consequences of successive DUI convictions and, therefore, did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the plea as required under N.J. Court Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). The court also questioned the sufficiency of the factual basis given by the defendant, as set forth in State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218 (2013). The court found that, although Aratow admitted to operating a motor vehicle after consuming 3 vodka and tonics, he was not questioned as to whether he believed that the alcohol he consumed substantially impaired his ability to operate the vehicle or that his BAC was between .08 and .10. Under State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415 (1989), the remedy for a plea entered with an insufficient factual basis is to reinstate all charges and restore the matter to its original status prior to the entry of the plea. Accordingly, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the 2004 matter for a new trial. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Expungement Petition And Effect Of Other Crimes

In the Matter of DiGregorio involved a petitioner who sought the expungement from his record of the disorderly persons offense of lewdness and his petition was denied. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Division applied the statute relating to expungement of disorderly and petty disorderly offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 to the facts in the instant matter. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 reads as follows: Any person convicted of a disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense under the laws of this State who has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime, whether within this State or any other jurisdiction, or of another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses, may, after the expiration of a period of 5 years from the date of his conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or release from incarceration, whichever is later, present a duly verified petition… praying that such conviction and all records and information pertaining thereto be expunged. The petitioner properly waited the requisite 5 year period following conviction, payment of his fines and completion of probation in order to seek expungement of the disorderly persons offense. However, the petitioner was disqualified from meeting the expungement criteria as a result of having had two subsequent criminal convictions, one in 2008 and another in 2013. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition. A criminal record can affect your ability to obtain certain jobs, get into certain schools of your choice, obtain housing and have other serious consequences including a negative social stigma. Expungement offers a second chance at a clean record. New Jersey legislators have recently taken steps to make expungement more available in an effort to prevent recidivist criminal activity. Although expungement is available, it should not be taken as a given. If you or your child are seeking an expungement, you should consult experienced criminal defense counsel in order to ensure you qualify and that the crime on your record is expungeable. For more information about expungement, disorderly persons offenses or other criminal matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

First-Degree Aggravated Sexual Assault Remanded For Jury Charge

R.P. was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(6)) against his step-daughter O.M. while she was under the age of thirteen. R.P. was sentenced to 26 years in prison with a 13 year period of parole ineligibility. On the defendant's appeal, challenging the conviction based on the trial court's failure to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1)), the NJ Appellate Division found for the Defendant and vacated the conviction. Additionally, the Appellate Division denied the state's request for a molded verdict pursuant to State v. Farrad, 753 A.2d 648, 164 N.J. 247, 192 N.J. 294 (2007), and remand for a new trial with on the first-degree aggravated sexual assault charge. The NJ Supreme Court's review of State v. R.P. was focused solely on the state's request for a molded verdict. Pursuant to State v. Farrad, the court identified 3 factors: (1) the defendant had his day in court; (2) each element of the lesser-included offense was included in the more serious offense; and (3) the jury's conviction for the more serious offense implies guilt in of the lesser-included offense. In State v. R.P., the court added a prejudice element to the 3 factors by stating that, when all 3 factors are met and the defendant is not unduly prejudiced, a molded verdict should be granted for the state. The court reversed and remanded the matter. If you are charged with a sex crime you are subject to incarceration, registration as a sex offender and the accompanying stigma which will effect where you may live, where you may work and how others will treat you and possibly even civil commitment. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you with these charges. For more information about rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact and other sex crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

The Future of DUI Testing In NJ

Those arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, are most often exonerated or convicted based on the results of chemical breath testing. The Alcotest machine is presently used to determine whether individuals were driving under the influence by using chemical testing to determine their blood alcohol content (BAC) exceeds the legal limit in New Jersey. The machine has been the subject of multiple challenges, the most well-known being State v. Chun, 195 N.J. 54 (2009),and the NJ Attorney General's Office indicated to the NJ Supreme Court that the machine's use would be discontinued by the end of 2016 in light of the machine's manufacturer, Draeger Safety, announcing they would no longer support the machine. Over the years since the Alcotest 7110 was introduced in NJ in 2001, the software has become outdated and the scientific reliability has come into question. Now, as the sun is setting on the Attorney General's time to find a suitable replacement, pay for another company to service the Alcotest machine or for the state to begin serving the machine in-house, those subject to testing for driving while intoxicated, especially those found to be just over the legal limit, are left with the fact that although they may be convicted based on results that have a reasonable probability of being inaccurate, the Attorney General's Office has a window of opportunity wherein this probability is allowed to persist. Additionally, as of this date, no suitable replacement has been indicated by the Office of the Attorney General. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Confession Admissible Under Miranda

Jerome L. Faucette was charged with first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)) and robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) after driving a vehicle for Terrence S. Clemmons during Clemmons robbery and shooting of a gas station attendant. Faucette was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to 13 years in prison with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Faucette appealed claiming his statement was not made voluntarily on the grounds that he had invoked his right to counsel. On May 14, 2008, at 7:00 pm, police requested defendant accompany them to the police station for questioning with which he complied. Faucette was read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) at the police station and spoke with police until approximately 8:00 pm when he asked to leave, however, the police continued questioning Faucette until 2:30 am. Faucette did not invoke his right to counsel. On May 15, 2008, police returned to the defendant's residence at 4:00 pm to return him to the police station where he was again advised of his Miranda rights and arrested. Detectives questioned Ms. Spencer and Mr. Gaddy, Faucette's former girlfriend and friend. Both of these individuals advised police that Faucette had admitted to participating in the robbery planned by the co-defendant, Clemons. Faucette ultimately admitted to participation in the robbery as a driver but denied involvement in the murder or prior knowledge thereof. In State v. Faucette, the judge held that the initial interview, wherein no confession was obtained, violated the defendant's rights under Miranda following the defendant's request to terminate the interview, however, the second interview was not in violation of defendant's rights and the confession provided therein was voluntary. The court granted suppression of all information obtained after 8:03 p.m. during the initial interview but found all remaining statements to be admissible. On appeal, the defendant challenged the voluntariness of his confession based on coercion and violation of his rights under Miranda. The NJ Appellate Division turned to State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) with regard to Miranda requirements when there is a challenge to voluntariness of a confession. Pursuant to State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964), reiterated in State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 109-10 (2010), as long as the findings of the trial judge are detailed and supported by factual and credible evidence the findings below are not to be disturbed. However, the deference accorded in Johnson and Davila are dependent upon the trial court's ability to hear testimony from officers, experts and witnesses and not the mere review of a videotaped confession from which the Appellate Division can also draw independent conclusions. State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565-66 (2011). The Fifth Amendment grants privilege against self-incrimination and this right is afforded to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division looked to State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993), with regard to a defendant's right against self-incrimination in New Jersey and to State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449 (2005) with regard to the upholding of that right through Miranda protections. State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993) was the case looked to by the Appellate Division in determining whether the State or defendant bears the burden of proving voluntariness of a confession and found the burden is borne by the State. State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000), dictates that a the "voluntary intelligent statement" of a defendant properly notified of his rights under Miranda is a valid and admissible confession. After reviewing the circumstances in this specific matter, the Appellate Division found that Faucette's second confession was knowingly and voluntarily given with full information and understanding of Miranda warnings and that there was no "taint from the May 14 Miranda violations" in violation of State v. O'Neil, 193 N.J. 148, (2007) or State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639 (1990). Further, the Appellate Division affirmed that Faucette did not, at any time during the questioning, invoke his right to counsel. The NJ Appellate Division found Faucette's confession to be voluntary and affirmed the decision of the trial court. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, robbery, conspiracy, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juvenile Offender Will Be Treated Differently Under NJ Senate Bill 2003

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if New Jersey Senate Bill 2003 (S2003) is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial and the level of representation required in hearings to move juvenile matters to the Criminal Part of the Superior Court. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would raise the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult to 15. S2003 would permit juvenile to be tried as adults only for the most serious offenses including criminal homicide; strict liability for drug induced deaths; first-degree robbery; carjacking; sexual assault; second-degree aggravated assault; kidnapping; aggravated arson; certain gang criminality; a crime committed at a time when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent or confined to an adult correctional facility; violent, aggressive, and willful crimes against another; unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon; arson; death by auto if the juvenile was operating the vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug (DUI); a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; a conspiracy which is a part of a continuing criminal activity and the circumstances of the crimes show the juvenile has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a source of livelihood; an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of certain enumerated acts; theft of an automobile; serious computer criminal activity; distribution of any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any property used for school purposes, or within 1,000 feet of such school property. The State would bear the burden of proving that the nature and circumstances of the charge or the prior record of the juvenile are sufficiently serious that the interests of the public require waiver. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. S2003 would require a prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. In further accord with the goal of rehabilitation, academic instruction and academic counseling, vocational education, post-secondary educational opportunities, alcohol and narcotics treatment programs, mental health services, medical and dental care, regular contact with the family members, work programs to prepare the juvenile for treatment, re-entry services, and any other services or assistance reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the juvenile shall be provided as appropriate. S2003 is sponsored by Democrats and received no support from the Republican party. The bill passed the Senate and is presently in the Assembly for consideration and revision. If you are a juvenile facing criminal charges your future is at stake and should not be left to chance. Your future and freedom may depend on the outcome of your case making it imperative that you seek experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about juvenile offenses including drug charges, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a school zone, assault, sex crimes, school issues, breaking and entering, gang related crimes, burglary or other serious matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Proof Of DUI Alone Is Sufficient To Convict For Aggravated Manslaughter

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident while driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), William T. Liepe was charged with first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); second-degree vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)); and fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2). Max Guzman and 2 of his children were in a Honda Civic waiting to turn left at 1:00 p.m. on a Sunday afternoon in April, 2011. Guzman’s Honda was rear-ended by Liepe’s Ford Explorer and spun into another lane of travel where it was hit by a passing motorist, Rosa Vazquez, driving a Cadillac Escalade. Guzman’s younger child was killed, Guzman and his other child survived but suffered substantial injury. Vazquez, her mother and 2 children did not sustain life threatening injuries. Police found an open container of alcohol in Leipe’s vehicle and he admitted to the consumption of several beers earlier in the day. A sample of Leipe’s blood was taken and his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .192 typically indicates substantial impairment of one’s driving ability. Testimony was presented at trial that Liepe admitted to never having noticed the Honda in his path waiting to turn. Reconstruction of the accident revealed evidence relating to stopping distance and opportunity to avoid an accident. Ultimately, the trial court granted Liepe’s motion to dismiss aggravated manslaughter as a charge upon concluding that the State must prove more than intoxication. In State v. Liepe, the NJ Appellate Division considered State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1989) with regard to what inferences were permitted from extraneous evidence with regard to extreme indifference to human life. Radziwil also set forth that, in matters of driving under the influence, evidence of the exact degree of intoxication is not required to prove aggravated recklessness. In State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345 (2000), the court considered recklessness based on intoxication and set forth the premise that, although one could be convicted of driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) it is not conclusive evidence of reckless indifference to human life. The Appellate Division distinguished aggravated manslaughter from reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3)) in State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1984). Recklessness is shown by conscious disregard of “substantial and unjustifiable risk” of death as a result of the conduct in question. The level of disregard required is a “gross deviation” from that of a reasonable person. Aggravated manslaughter includes the heightened requirement that the situation be “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life” wherein risk becomes elevated from a possibility to a probability. The Appellate Division ultimately determined that evidence of intoxication, without more, shall survive a motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated manslaughter. If you are facing driving while intoxicated (DWI) or other criminal charges stemming from a driving under the influence or driving under the influence of drugs (DUID) charge, you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to protect yourself from loss of rights and liberties. For more information about DUI/DWI, assault by auto, aggravated assault or other serious motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Handgun Discovered In Search Will Not Be Suppressed

James J. Scarborough pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) after police found a handgun under his seat in a vehicle during an investigatory search based on the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle's interior. He was sentenced to 5 years incarceration, subject to a 3 year period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c). Police received an anonymous call about a vehicle parked in the rear lot of a closed facility and, upon responding, discovered 2 males in the vehicle involved in what the officer suspected to be drug activity. Upon encountering the driver the officer perceived an odor of burnt marijuana. Ultimately, the driver signed a consent to search form and a handgun was discovered under the passenger seat where Scarborough was sitting along with a magazine and ammunition between the passenger seat and door. Scarborough told police he found the gun in the woods earlier in the day and did not know what to do with it. Scarborough filed a motion to suppress the evidence and his statement, both of which were denied and he then entered into the guilty plea. In State v. Scarborough the defendant appealed and the NJ Appellate Division upheld the denial of the suppression motion finding that a field inquiry under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968) was permissible based on the anonymous call regarding the vehicle. The odor of burnt marijuana then gave probable cause to believe a crime was committed under State v. Vanderveer, 285 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 1995) and State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003). Once the officer had probable cause to believe criminal activity was afoot he was justified, under State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002), in seeking consent to search the vehicle. Finally the NJ Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in determining the Scarborough's statement was not coerced. The matter was, however, remanded as to sentencing factors only. Second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun in NJ carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act. If you are charged with a weapons offense you need experienced criminal defense counsel. For more information about weapons possession, possession of a weapon without a permit, use or possession of a weapon in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons or other weapon related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No PTI Application After Guilty Verdict

Sean Bell was indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) and third-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)) after fighting with another man at a party. Bell tried the case based on the second-degree charge which prevented his application to the Pre-Trial Intervention program (PTI)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to -22). During trial in State v. Bell, the second-degree charges were dismissed but Bell was convicted of the third-degree charges and made application to the PTI program. The Law Division admitted Bell to PTI in part due to Bell's reliance on State v. Halm, 319 N.J. Super. 569 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 162 N.J. 131 (1999). The State appealed based on the application being filed out of time under N.J. Court Rule 3:28(h) and State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576 (1996), wherein a dismissal of a second-degree offense was found not to justify a PTI application out of time. The NJ Appellate Division reversed finding Pre-Trial Intervention applications were required to be made prior to trial. On appeal, the State distinguished Halm by the timing of the defendant's PTI applications as well as the nature of the underlying charges. After substantial consideration of the purpose of diversionary programs, the NJ Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's holding that the purpose of PTI was to offer defendants an opportunity to avoid the stigma of a guilty verdict and prevent use of additional judicial resources at trials. Further, the NJ Supreme Court held that permitting defendants to seek PTI after a guilty verdict would modify the program into an unintended "alternative sentencing option". Assault and aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including long-term incarceration. If you are facing charges of assault or aggravated assault, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, aggravated assault, assault with a deadly weapon or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.