Showing posts with label theft. Show all posts
Showing posts with label theft. Show all posts
Thursday, May 19, 2016
Theft of $100,000 From N.J. Employer
Deborah Meehan was convicted of second-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) after issuing checks to herself in the amount of over $100,000 by affixing the stamp of a law firm partner to checks in her control as the law firm's bookkeeper. Following an investigation, Meehan was questioned and admitted, during a videotaped interview, that she did not have permission to issue the checks. The jury found Meehan guilty of second-degree theft but, at sentencing, the trial judge downgraded the offense to third-degree and sentenced her to prison, refusing to accept her application for probation. The State appealed and the Defendant cross-appealed indicating she did not effectively waive her right to remain silent and therefore her confession should be suppressed.
In State v. Meehan, the NJ Appellate Division initially reviewed the voluntariness of the Defendant's confession under State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368 (2014), Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), State v. Graham, 59 N.J. 366 (1971), State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 1994), and State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993). The panel held that the state met it's burden of proof showing the police did not overbear Meehan's will and her statement was provided after a voluntary and knowing waiver of her rights. The panel further held that neither the jury charge nor the prosecutor's statements were prejudicial to the Defendant. The panel did find for the State in holding that it was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion to downgrade the second-degree conviction to third-degree.
Pursuant to State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984), the NJ Appellate Division will not typically disturb the sentence of a trial court unless it constitutes abuse of discretion. Pursuant to State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) and State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014), the state must first review the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and then balance the relevant factors and explain how the final sentencing decision is reached in light of the analysis. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) requires prison for second-degree crimes unless there are exceptional circumstances as the court fully set forth in State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003) and, under the facts, denial of probation was appropriate. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) relating to the downgrade of sentences, sets forth that where mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and the interests of justice are best served by the downgrade, the court has discretion to reduce the term to that of a crime one degree below that for which the Defendant was convicted. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484 (1996) and State v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2009) jointly provide a valuable explanation of the analysis the court should conduct in considering a downgrade. The N.J. Appellate panel considered the legislative intent in drafting N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(1). The panel agreed with the State's likening of the matter to State v. Jones, 197 N.J. Super 604 (App. Div. 1984) wherein a defendant's second degree theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) was downgraded to third-degree and later reversed after the court found the downgrade to be abuse of the trial court's discretion. The N.J. Appellate Division ultimately reversed the downgraded sentence, holding that Meehan's theft of over $100,000 from her employer was serious and a downgrade would not serve the interests of justice, and remanded for sentencing accordingly.
A second-degree theft conviction will result in a 5-10 year prison sentence. If you are facing second-degree criminal charges it is critical you obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and build a defense against the prosecution's case. For more information about theft, burglary and other serious criminal issues in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.
Labels:
2C:20-2,
2C:20-3,
2C:20-4,
2C:44-1,
attorney,
criminal,
defense,
lawyer,
Miranda,
State v. Galloway,
State v. Meehan,
State v. O'Donnell,
theft
Tuesday, February 23, 2016
Aggravated Assault Results In Miscarriage
Laquesha Cathcart and Tisha Cathcart were indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)), second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2), first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), and fourth-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) after forcefully entering the victim's apartment following a dispute over a parking spot in New Brunswick, NJ. The Cathcarts assaulted R.L. and J.D., her daughter, in the presence of R.L.'s husband, F.D., and son. R.L.'s daughter and son both advised the defendant's that R.L. was pregnant but they continued the assault. R.L. miscarried within the week.
The main issue in this matter is whether the defendants purposely or knowingly attempted to cause serious bodily injury to R.L. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude testimony relating to R.L.'s pregnancy and miscarriage after determining the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the likelihood it would prejudice the jury against the defendants. The appeal in State v. Cathcart focused on the exclusion of the evidence. N.J. As affirmed in State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (2013), N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits a court to exclude evidence in the event the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. More than a possibility of substantial prejudice is required State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 165 N.J. 492 (2000). To exclude evidence, the party seeking exclusion must demonstrate that the evidence is has such "inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation." State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971). A significant consideration in the decision to exclude evidence is also whether other evidence is available to prove the fact the evidence is offered to prove. Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 403 (2014). Exclusion of certain evidence, such as motive in a criminal matter, requires a higher showing of prejudice. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218 (1955). Conviction for aggravated assault requires proof by the prosecution that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, acted recklessly in an attempt to cause or did cause such bodily injury pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). State v. Mingo, 263 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd. 132 N.J. 75 (1993). This requires proof of the defendant's mental state at the time of the assault. The State's appeal centered on the fact that the defendants were advised that R.L. was pregnant yet continued with their assault which included kicking and punching R.L. in the abdomen. In its decision to reverse in part and affirm in part, the N.J. Appellate Division determined that the statements regarding R.L.'s pregnancy were highly relevant to the issue of the defendants' mental state but that the testimony regarding the miscarriage was overly prejudicial.
Aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including 5 to 10 years in prison, with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA), and fines of up to $150,000. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, robbery, burglary, theft or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:12-1,
2C:15-1,
2C:18-2,
2C:20-3,
aggravated assault,
assault,
burglary,
Cathcart,
criminal,
NERA,
robbery,
State v. Rogers,
State v. Swint,
State v. Thompson,
theft
Wednesday, December 3, 2014
No Expungement After Plea In Money Laundering Scheme
R.Z. sought an expungement of convictions of second-degree theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) and second-degree money laundering (N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25) to which he entered guilty pleas. In 2012, the trial court granted the expungement and in 2013 the NJ Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision.
The convictions stemmed from ongoing and continuous fraudulent claims to Medicaid from which in excess of $50,000 was received by R.Z.. Pursuant to In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2008), which interpreted New Jersey's expungement statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a)), a requirement for expungement of more than one crime is that the crimes be committed concurrently rather than on separate occasions as expungement is not available to those who have committed prior or subsequent crimes.
In the Matter of Expungement petition of R.Z. included an effort by petitioner to utilize provisions of a 2010 amendment to the N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) which included a means for early expungement when certain criteria are met including that the public interest warranting an early expungement in certain matters. Pursuant to In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557 (2012), a petitioner seeking an early expungement must still meet all other requirements of the expungement statute. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the denial of R.Z.'s petition for expungement.
If you have prior crimes haunting you and would like to expunge them from your record, you should consult with an experienced attorney to determine your eligibility prior to filing a petition for expungement. For more information about expungement, theft, drug crimes, disorderly persons offenses, or other criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:20-4,
2C:21-25,
2C:52-2,
crime,
criminal,
expungement,
In re Kollman,
In re Ross,
In the matter of expungement of R.Z.,
money laundering,
theft
Thursday, November 20, 2014
Conviction For Attempted Murder of Newark Police Officer Upheld On Appeal
Omar Bridges and two co-conspirators were charged, by an Essex County grand jury, with three counts of first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and 2C:5-1); three counts of second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); second-degree possession of a weapon, a handgun, for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f)); third-degree receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7); second-degree eluding (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)); and first-degree conspiracy to attempt to murder the occupants of a vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:11-3). Bridges was ultimately convicted of the attempted murder of Newark Police Officer Patinho, aggravated assault on Officer Patinho, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, unlawful possession of an assault weapon, receiving stolen property and certain persons not to have weapons.
For his participation in stealing a Jaguar, engaging in a shoot-out with occupants of another vehicle and the shooting of a police officer in the chase thereafter, Omar Bridges was sentenced to an aggregate 40-year prison term. Officer Pathino's testimony at trial was that he saw the shoot-out while on patrol and, upon turning on the squad car's lights, a Jaguar and Subaru fled in different directions with Pathino chasing the Jaguar. The chase through Newark lasted approximately two minutes at 90 to 100 miles per hour until the Jaguar went airborne crossing railroad tracks and sustained heavy damage. When the Jaguar came to rest, Officer Pathino exited the squad car and ordered the Jaguar's passengers to show their hands at which time the passenger shot Officer Pathino. Officer Gasavage exchanged fire and the vehicle's occupants fled on foot.
On appeal in State v. Bridges, the Defendant claimed the trial court erred in denying his request for a Wade hearing with regard to Officer Pathino's photo identification of the Defendant. Although New Jersey took a more broad approach to pre-trial identification in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), the Appellate Division determined that, under the circumstances of the case, United States v. Wade, 388, U.S. 218 (1967) did not serve to extend exclusionary principles of pre-trial identification procedures to in-court trial identifications in Defendant's case.
The Defendant next raised the point that the sentencing court did not perform an appropriate analysis under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) which requires the court to consider six specific criteria in sentencing. The NJ Appellate Division agreed with the Defendant and remanded the matter to the sentencing court for a full statement of its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences as required under State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001).
If you are facing murder or other serious charges, you are facing a prison sentence which may last your entire life. You require an experienced criminal defense attorney to protect your rights and ensure that your are provided with the best possible defense. For more information about murder, weapons offenses, theft and other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
assault firearm,
attempt,
crime,
criminal,
handgun,
murder,
shooting,
State v. Bridges,
State v. Henderson,
State v. Yarbough,
theft,
unlawful purpose,
US v. Wade,
wade hearing,
weapon,
Yarbough Factors
Monday, June 23, 2014
Burglary Punishment Must Fit Crime Not Criminal
In State v. Nieves, Eric Nieves was charged in 4 residential burglaries and related crimes. The jury found him guilty of four burglaries (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); three thefts (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3); dealing in stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7.1b); receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7) and conspiracy with codefendants (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, :18-2, :20-7.1). Nieves was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment with 150 months of parole ineligibility. On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence and returned to the court below for resentencing based on the factors set forth in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985).
On appeal, Nieves objected to the jury instructions regarding certain lesser included offenses and complicity. Pursuant to State v. Singleton, 211, N.J. 157, 182 (2012), "if the defendant did not object to the charge when given, there is a presumption the charge was not error and unlikely to prejudice defendant's case." Prior to instructing the jury, the judge advised the attorneys of the intended charges and defense counsel gave his assent to both charging decisions. Defendant then bears the burden of showing plain error having a clear capacity of producing and unjust result R. 2:10-2 and the burden was not met. The Appellate Division found defendant's claim of error in the jury instruction on accomplice liability to have insufficient merit and affirmed all convictions.
With regard to the custodial sentence, the defendant was sentenced on each of the 10 third degree crimes and received an aggregate sentence of 25 years with 12 1/2 years of parole ineligibility. Defendant did not deny his lengthy criminal history and was aware he qualified as a persistent offender but Nieves argued that the courts extensive reliance on his criminal history was inappropriate. In Yarbough, the court set forth the fact that "punishment should fit the crime, not the criminal, and that there should be a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing." 100 N.J. at 630. State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011) the New Jersey Supreme Court enumerated the Yarbough factors as modified by statute and offered guidance for appellate review of consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division found the discussion of Yarbough factors by the court below to be too cursory to permit adequate review. Further, any conspiracy conviction must be merged with the underlying completed crime.
Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
100 N.J. 627 (1985),
2C:18-2,
2C:20-7.1,
2C:5-2,
burglary,
conspiracy,
robbery,
State v. miller,
State v. Nieves,
State v. Yarbough,
theft,
Yarbough Factors
Sunday, March 16, 2014
Multiple Counts In An Ongoing Conspiracy Must Be Sentenced As A Single Event
Vereli Sotelo was charged with five counts of theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) and conspiracy to commit theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and convicted of multiple counts of theft by deception for her part in a scheme involving green cards. Vereli and her husband Tito used Tito's respected position within the salvation army to communicate to Hispanic members of the congregation how he could obtain them residency cards quickly through an attorney in Miami. Tito charged $4,000 per green card plus a donation to the church. He told people the money was being forwarded to immigration for processing. The Defendant and another woman were present to collect and count the money when people visited Tito to avail themselves of his offer. Vereli would accompany Tito to Florida for meetings with the lawyer.
At some point, the parishioners began to receive letter indicating their applications had been received and the information within those letters had been falsified to include Florida addresses and describing their educational levels as including advanced degrees. Ultimately the story reached the media and, even then, the defendant maintained to parishioners that Tito was not operating a fraudulent scheme and the arrival of the residency papers would prove it. When the Union County Prosecutor's office brought the matter of State v. Sotelo to trial, the defendant was convicted and received an aggregate term of 6 years in prison including a single 3 year term on one count, a consecutive 3 year term on another 3 counts and a concurrent 3 year term on a final count. Defendant appealed on several points, most of which were affirmed, but the appellate division did find that all acts performed by the defendant were part of a general and unified plan and therefore should be sentenced as a single act of conspiracy and remanded for sentencing appropriately.
Theft, including theft by deception, charges can result in substantial penalties including up to 10 years in prison for second degree theft. If you are facing charges for shoplifting, theft or theft by deception, you should immediately consult the advice of experienced criminal defense counsel. For more information regarding theft, extortion, shoplifting, forging prescription blanks, receiving stolen property or other crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:20,
2C:5,
conspiracy,
deception,
forge prescription,
fraud,
receiving stolen property,
shoplifting,
theft,
Vereli Sotelo
Wednesday, February 12, 2014
Judge Acts As Judge, Jury and Prosecutor in Theft Case
Linden Municipal Court Judge DiLeo denied the requests of Anthony and Wendell Kirkland for appointed public defenders in their theft case and then conducted the trial without a prosecutor present. The judge went so far as to take on the prosecutor's role by undertaking direct examination of the police officers, thereby eliciting the information he felt should be heard, and cross-examining the defendants.
The Kirklands were charged with attempting to steal tires from a vehicle. Initially, they sought private counsel then later requested public defenders. The judge found the defendants to have waived their right to counsel. At the trial, the judge invited the Kirklands to participate in cross-examination of the police officers testifying and also to present testimony on their own behalf. The Kirklands presented no testimony or witnesses yet the judge allowed the officers to cross-examine the Kirklands. At the close of this farce, DiLeo found the defendants guilty of theft of moveable property, possession of burglary tools and possession of under 50 grams of marijuana and sentenced them to county jail terms.
By the time NJ Superior Court Judge Scott Moynihan heard the Kirklands' appeal, resulting in dismissal of the drug charges and remand to the municipal court for a hearing on the remaining theft charges, the Kirklands had spent 124 days in the Union County jail.
This case resulted in a new standard for imposition of punishment on judges for misconduct on the bench. When a reasonable person would find the conduct of the judge to be obviously and seriously wrong, contrary to clearly determined law without question as to interpretation, egregious and made in bad faith or as part of a pattern of error.
If you have been accused of a crime, you cannot rely on the legal system to protect your rights. Although the system is designed, on its face, to protect the interests of both the state and the accused, the prosecutors, judges and police officers involved in your case are human and fallible. For more information about theft, burglary, possession of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) or other criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Friday, February 7, 2014
African-American Male Wrongfully Charged With Theft From Apple Store Based on Color
Terrell Gray, an African-American male from NJ was arrested for theft when he sought a replacement for his broken iPad in a Berkeley, CA Apple store. Gray was offered a free replacement cracked screen but Apple employees in the store stated the store would not replace the device. Police arrived on the scene and arrested Gray who was placed in a psychiatric hospital overnight. Upon release Gray returned to the store and was arrested, detained for approximately a week without being formally charged then placed in a psychiatric hospital for over a month. Upon release, Gray returned to NJ and visited a doctor regarding mental anguish, emotional distress, paranoia, emotional pain and suffering as well as other mental issues. As a result of Gray's consultation with the doctor in NJ he was committed to Trenton psychiatric hospital for approximately 3 months.
Gray is now suing Apple and the City of Berkeley under for violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981(Equal Rights Under the Law), 1982 (Property Rights of Citizens) and 1985 (Conspiracy to Interfere With Civil Rights) for discrimination against people of color based on his own treatment and in-store video showing Apple employees disproportionately targeting shoppers based on race, nationality, or ethnicity and confronting them with false accusations of criminal activity, false imprisonment, and other forms of harassment. Gray has also brought a case against the City of Berkeley with assault and battery, false imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress and other charges.
If you are facing criminal charges it is critical you obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and build a defense against the prosecution's case. Although the justice system is designed to protect the innocent and bring just punishment to the guilty to deter others from following suit while also rehabilitating them when necessary there are times when innocent individuals are grouped among the guilty for an assortment of reasons. If this happens it is critical to have someone fighting hard for your good name. For more information about theft, burglary or other criminal issues in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.
Labels:
42 USC 1981,
42 USC 1982,
42 USC 1985,
civil rights,
discrimination,
false imprisonment,
harassment,
Terrell Grey,
theft
Monday, January 27, 2014
Prostitutes Charged With Committing Robbery In Atlantic City Hotel Suite
In State v. Rodriguez, the defendant was charged with 2nd degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and convicted of the lesser included offense of 3rd degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3), simple assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a), 4th degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d). The defendant and her co-defendant, Mayo, were acquitted of 2nd degree conspiracy to commit robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and 3rd degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d).
Defendant and co-defendant, prostitutes, met 3 men in the lobby of an Atlantic City hotel and proceeded to join the men in their room. Once there both women surrounded one of the men and began touching him in an erotic manner. Shortly thereafter, the man realized his money was missing and attempted to stop the women from leaving the suite when he was sprayed in the face with pepper spray by the defendant.
The defendant was sentenced to 5 years in prison with a 2 year parole disqualifier for theft by unlawful taking, a concurrent 6 month term for the simple assault charge and 1 year in prison for unlawful possession of a weapon which was to be served concurrently. Defendant was also on probation for a prior conviction of 3rd degree theft from the person at the time of the offense and pled guilty to a violation of probation (VOP) and received a concurrent 5 year sentence for the VOP.
The defendant challenged her conviction based on comments during the prosecution's summation, adequacy of the jury instructions, a weapons conviction with regard to pepper spray, failure to submit lesser included offenses to the jury, cumulative error depriving the defendant of a fair trial and the sentence. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but remanded for sentencing with regard to the VOP as the trial judge failed to set forth aggravating and mitigating factors as required under N.J.C.R. 3:21-4(g) and State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 177 (1989).
Robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery and the lesser included offense of theft are very serious charges that carry substantial penalties including up to 10 years in prison for each charge. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
114 NJ 169,
2C:12-1,
2C:15-1,
2C:20-3,
2C:39-4,
2C:395,
2C:5-2,
conspiracy,
NJSA 2C:15,
possession,
probation,
robbery,
Rule 3:21-4,
State v. Baylass,
theft,
VOP,
weapon
Thursday, November 14, 2013
Drug Suppression Motion For Warrantless Search Denied
In State v. Salladino the defendant was indicted for 3rd theft of movable property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) and 3rd degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a1). The defendant won a suppression motion relating to the Oxycodone found during the warrantless search by police. The prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal and the N.J. Appellate Court determined that, although the Oxycodone was found during a search of the defendant's person exceeding the scope of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the drugs would have inevitably been discovered when the defendant was searched incident to the arrest for the robbery charges. According to the court's holding in State v. Sugar, 100, N.J. 211 (1985) if the evidence would have inevitably been discovered as a result of an independent and predictable circumstance, it remains admissible even if seized by other unlawful means. The Appellate division held that the suppression motion should not have been granted and remanded for further proceedings.
Following a call from a robbery victim, police located 2 suspects in the vicinity matching the description given by the victim. The officer in charge of the investigation ordered that the suspects be brought before the victim for a show-up identification. Prior to transporting Salladino to the show-up, a police officer conducted a pat-down search of the defendant to ensure the defendant has no weapons. During the frisk, the officer felt a "hard bulge" and retrieved a pill bottle without a label or lid which contained 83 Percocet pills. The officer seized the pills but made no arrest regarding the Percocet. The suspects were positively identified by the victim during a show-up identification and they were arrested. At no time between the stop and the arrest could the defendant have removed the pills from his person without notice by the police, therefore, the Percocet would have been inevitably discovered during the search incident to arrest even though retrieving the pill bottle from the defendant's person exceeded the scope of a Terry stop as there was no reasonable basis to conclude the defendant was armed and the officer never claimed he believed the "hard bulge" was a weapon.
If you are facing drug charges and believe evidence obtained against you may have been obtained in violation of your rights, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances, robbery, warrantless searches, CDS in a motor vehicle or other criminal issues in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
CDS,
controlled dangerous substance,
drugs,
oxycodone,
pat down,
percocet,
robbery,
State v. Salladino,
State v. Sugar,
stop and frisk,
Terry stop,
Terry v. Ohio,
theft,
warrant,
warrantless
Saturday, June 8, 2013
Prior Crimes Evidence Inadmissible In Theft Trial
In a theft trial, the prosecution has limited ability to present evidence of prior theft offenses. In State v. Lige, defendant was charged with 3rd degree receiving stolen property in regard to a tow truck and license plate. Defendant's prior criminal history included 18 theft convictions in the Superior Court as well as multiple other offenses. The trial court permitted the prosecution to offer witness testimony indicating defendant was in possession of stolen property on at least 6 other instances.
The NJ Appellate Division reversed the case and found a new trial was in order as N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(b), which pertains to receiving stolen property, had been misapplied by the Superior Court. The statute includes that the jury may presume defendant knew the property was stolen if defendant is: (1) in possession of 2 or more items of stolen property on 2 or more separate occasions; or (2) has received stolen property in other transactions within 1 year of the property at issue; or (3) normally transacts in such property but did not make reasonable inquiry into how it was acquired; or (4) is found in possession of 2 or more defaced devices.
Under NJ Evidentiary Rule 404(b), evidence of prior crimes is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. In State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992) the Court set forth a 4-part test for determining admissibility under 404(b). In order to be admissible, evidence of prior crimes must be (1) relevant to the material issue in dispute; (2) similar and reasonable proximate in time to the crime charged; (3) clear and convincing; and (4) while offering proof, is not substantially prejudicial to the defendant. Although the evidence presented may have met the criteria of N.J.R.E 404(b), the witnesses proffered by the prosecution presented extensive information to the jury of crimes more than 1 year before or months after the crime charged. In making its decision to reverse the verdict and require a new trial, the Appellate Division held the testimony did not fit within the 1 year statutory limitation or N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(b) and was therefore inadmissible.
If you have been charged with receiving stolen property or any other theft offense in NJ, you should immediately obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information on protecting your rights if charged with theft, burglary, shoplifting or other crimes in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and is not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
burglary,
crime,
criminal,
evidence,
NJRE 404(b),
prosecution,
State v. Cofield,
State v. Lige,
stolen property,
theft,
witness
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