Sexual Assault Was Apparent To Judge But Sentencing Not As Obvious

Marvin Flores-Gamez was indicted for first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)); 2 counts of second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)); and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct with the victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)). In 2011, the Flores-Gamez contacted 12 year old Susan on Facebook, when Flores-Gamez was 19. Susan and Flores-Gamez traded messages on Facebook for some time before he began to mention the idea of having sex with her. In November 2011, Susan agreed to meet Flores-Gamez, with Susan's cousin, Kate, and Kate's boyfriend, Tim, present. The 4 went to Susan's house and the men gave the children juice that tasted like alcohol. Flores-Gamez and Susan ended up alone together in the bedroom and, when Susan resisted his advances, Flores-Gamez removed her clothes and began to have sex with her. When he refused to stop, Susan bit Flores-Gamez on the hand to make him stop. For the next 5 days, Susan and Flores-Gamez exchanges messages on Facebook until Susan's father discovered Susan had missed school and, during the subsequent inquiry, learned what had happened. Susan's father took her to the police station and, during an investigation, Flores-Gamez provided a statement with facts similar to those Susan provided. At trial, the Defendant did not testify. Both Tim and Kate testified that the Defendant and Susan were never alone together and that the Defendant did not sexually assault Susan. A psychologists report was also offered to show that Susan had indicated Tim's mother was also in the apartment and was the one who stopped the sexual assault. Following a trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Flores-Gamez was found guilty of 2 counts of second-degree sexual assault. Flores-Gamez was sentenced to a concurrent 8 year term for both counts, subject to an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). In State v. Flores-Gamez, the defendant appealed. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge except defendant's sentence. The Appellate Division held that the trial judge did not follow proper procedure with regard to sentencing. The judge listed the aggravating and mitigating factors, without making any specific findings in regard thereto, and then meted out the sentence. The judge found aggravating factors one and two; however, the victim's age was an element of second-degree sexual assault and could not be considered. Also, the trial judge failed to give any indication that the mitigating factors raised by the defendant were considered. The Appellate Division remanded for resentencing. If you are charged with a sex crime you are subject to incarceration, registration as a sex offender and the accompanying stigma which will effect where you may live, where you may work and how others will treat you and possibly even civil commitment. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you with these charges. For more information about rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact and other sex crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Aggravated Assault Results In Miscarriage

Laquesha Cathcart and Tisha Cathcart were indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)), second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2), first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), and fourth-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) after forcefully entering the victim's apartment following a dispute over a parking spot in New Brunswick, NJ. The Cathcarts assaulted R.L. and J.D., her daughter, in the presence of R.L.'s husband, F.D., and son. R.L.'s daughter and son both advised the defendant's that R.L. was pregnant but they continued the assault. R.L. miscarried within the week. The main issue in this matter is whether the defendants purposely or knowingly attempted to cause serious bodily injury to R.L. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude testimony relating to R.L.'s pregnancy and miscarriage after determining the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the likelihood it would prejudice the jury against the defendants. The appeal in State v. Cathcart focused on the exclusion of the evidence. N.J. As affirmed in State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (2013), N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits a court to exclude evidence in the event the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. More than a possibility of substantial prejudice is required State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 165 N.J. 492 (2000). To exclude evidence, the party seeking exclusion must demonstrate that the evidence is has such "inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation." State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971). A significant consideration in the decision to exclude evidence is also whether other evidence is available to prove the fact the evidence is offered to prove. Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 403 (2014). Exclusion of certain evidence, such as motive in a criminal matter, requires a higher showing of prejudice. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218 (1955). Conviction for aggravated assault requires proof by the prosecution that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, acted recklessly in an attempt to cause or did cause such bodily injury pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). State v. Mingo, 263 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd. 132 N.J. 75 (1993). This requires proof of the defendant's mental state at the time of the assault. The State's appeal centered on the fact that the defendants were advised that R.L. was pregnant yet continued with their assault which included kicking and punching R.L. in the abdomen. In its decision to reverse in part and affirm in part, the N.J. Appellate Division determined that the statements regarding R.L.'s pregnancy were highly relevant to the issue of the defendants' mental state but that the testimony regarding the miscarriage was overly prejudicial. Aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including 5 to 10 years in prison, with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA), and fines of up to $150,000. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, robbery, burglary, theft or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Attempted Murder Reduced To Aggravated Assault For Plea

Richard Spellman was indicted on two counts of attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); two counts of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); two counts of second-degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); two counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7). Spellman confessed and his motion to suppress the confession was denied. He ultimately pled guilty, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, to all charges after the first-degree attempted murder charges were amended to second degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)). Spellman was sentenced to concurrent 17 year terms subject to an 85 percent period of parole disqualification under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2); two 10 year terms and two 5 year terms; and restitution to a victim with a 5 year period of parole supervision to follow his release. The charges stemmed from two incidents. First, while on parole for a prior aggravated assault, Spellman entered a convenience store, demanded money and then shot the clerk in the stomach after he was given the money. In the second incident, Spellman shot a man in the parking lot of a restaurant. Upon arrival at the scene, police found a gun in the parking lot and Spellman staring at them out the window of a nearby store. When officers spoke to Spellman, he indicated he was fighting with the man he shot. Officers searched Spellman and found a bullet on his person. At the police station, officers found another bullet on Spellman's person and, prior to questioning of any kind, Spellman said "I shot the attendant at the [convenience store]." Spellman was read his Miranda rights, waived his right to counsel and quickly confessed to shooting both individuals. In State v. Spellman, the NJ Appellate Division upheld the trial court judge's decision that the defendant's confessions were voluntary in spite of the defendant's challenge to the voluntariness based on mental capacity which was not raised at trial and therefore not preserved for appeal. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973). The NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1997), in holding that mental illness itself, if present, does not invalidate a confession. The record below satisfied the Appellate Division that the trial judge fully reviewed the confession and found no coercion or force to have been used. With regard to sentencing, the NJ Appellate Division did find errors with the trial judge's failure to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 and explain his or her reasoning fully on the record. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014). The Appellate Division determined that he trial judge's imposition of concurrent 17 year sentences exceeded the statutory range of 5 to 10 years set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(2). Finally, the Appellate Division and the State agreed that the trial judge failed to make adequate findings, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2b(2), as to whether the defendant was able to pay the restitution ordered. The matter was remanded for resentencing. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Weapons Offense Merges Into Burglary Charge

Sherrone Robinson was charged with third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A.. 2C:5-2; 2C:12-1); second-degree conspiracy to commit burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:18-2); second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-7); fourth-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4)); and third-degree hindering apprehension (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b(1)). Robinson pled guilty to second-degree burglary and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in exchange for dismissal for the other charges. For the burglary the state recommended a 4 year prison term and concurrent 5 year term for the weapons offense. The burglary offense was subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) while the weapon offense carried a mandatory minimum term of three years pursuant to the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). In State v. Robinson, Robinson later appealed the sentence arguing that the weapon possession was for the purpose of the burglary and should be merged therewith rather than included as a separate conviction and offense. In making his argument for merger, Robinson relied on State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (citing State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975)), which held that an accused committing a single offense cannot be punished as if they committed more than one offense. State v. Messino, 378 N.J. Super. 559, 585 (App. Div. 2005) provided an alternative analysis of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8, regarding merger of offenses, which suggested a more "flexible approach" to merger wherein the elements of the crimes are considered. In State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 636 (1996), the court held that "when the only unlawful purpose in possession the [weapon] is to use it to commit the substantive offense, merger is required." The NJ Appellate Division reviewed the record and noted that defense counsel stated the prison terms as set forth in the plea agreement, the judge then reviewed those terms with the defendant on the record and the defendant indicated a full understanding thereof. The Appellate Division decided that the defendant received the benefit of the plea bargain as his counsel negotiated the plea bargain with the State on his behalf. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for correction of the judgment of conviction to reflect merger of the convictions and a sentence of 5 years total of which 4 were subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under NERA. Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, weapons, assault, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Self-Defense Applies In Manslaughter Case

Jacob R. Gentry was charged with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a), aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)) and reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b) after a fight with David Haulmark in which Gentry's girlfriend and brother are alleged to also have been involved. Gentry maintained the killing was in self-defense as, while fighting with Haulmark, he was pinned to the ground, being choked and fighting for his life. At trial, the prosecution cross-examined defendant about statements which his brother had made to police which were hearsay, inadmissible at defendant's trial and never entered into the trial by defendant and defendant's brother did not testify in defendant's trial. After the court failed to inform the jury that self-defense was not only a justification to murder but also to aggravated manslaughter, Gentry was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and third-degree endangering an injured victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2) and sentenced, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Sussex County by Judge N. Peter Conforti to 30 years in prison subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). On Appeal in State v. Gentry, the NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 170 (2008) and State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200 (1984), regarding the requirement of a jury charge regarding self-defense when the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, supports the theory of self-defense. In Gentry, there was evidence presented that defendant and Haulmark worked together and were housed together for some time during which Gentry suffered repeated physical attacks and harassment at the hands of Haulmark and Haulmark's friends which were corroborated by independent witnesses including security from Legend's Resort wherein the workers were housed and other individuals who felt harassed by Haulmark. On the night in question, defendant claimed he feared for his life as Haulmark had him in a chokehold while on the ground and was biting him at the same time, all of which were supported by a physical examination of defendant's body following the event. Defendant admitted to kicking Haulmark, 80 pounds heavier than defendant, in the head after extracting himself from Haulmark's grip, out of fear that Haulmark would get back up and pursue him further. The defendant's testimony to police indicated that he had no idea Haulmark was seriously injured or dead until the police revealed the information. In Rodriguez, supra, 195 N.J. at 172, the NJ Supreme Court specifically held that one who kills in the belief that deadly force is required to spare his or her own life 'cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter.' N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) also sets forth the circumstances in which deadly force becomes acceptable as a form of self-defense. Once self-defense is established by testimony, it is the burden of the prosecution to disprove that the defendant acted in self-defense. State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 298 (2004), sets forth the principle that after sufficient evidence exists to support a self-defense charge to the jury, failure to instruct the jury that self-defense is a complete justification for murder and manslaughter defenses constitutes plain error. With regard to the prosecutor's cross-examination with regard to the statement of the defendant's non-testifying brother to the police, the prohibition is plainly stated in State v. Haskell, 100 N.J. 469, 478 (1985), "the out-of-court statement of a co-defendant is inadmissible against another defendant because admission of the statement violates the rule prohibiting hearsay and the defendant's fundamental right to confront witnesses." In this case, the witness was available and the defendant was offered no opportunity to cross-examine him at trial which, under State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 151 (2014), could have rendered the statement admissible. Multiple questions and comments in summation by the prosecutor clearly gave rise to prejudicial error in violation of Gentry's rights under State v. Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. 229 (2003); State v. Rucki, 367 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 2004); and State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158 (2001). Based on the cumulative errors at trial, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Confession Admissible Under Miranda

Jerome L. Faucette was charged with first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)) and robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) after driving a vehicle for Terrence S. Clemmons during Clemmons robbery and shooting of a gas station attendant. Faucette was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to 13 years in prison with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Faucette appealed claiming his statement was not made voluntarily on the grounds that he had invoked his right to counsel. On May 14, 2008, at 7:00 pm, police requested defendant accompany them to the police station for questioning with which he complied. Faucette was read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) at the police station and spoke with police until approximately 8:00 pm when he asked to leave, however, the police continued questioning Faucette until 2:30 am. Faucette did not invoke his right to counsel. On May 15, 2008, police returned to the defendant's residence at 4:00 pm to return him to the police station where he was again advised of his Miranda rights and arrested. Detectives questioned Ms. Spencer and Mr. Gaddy, Faucette's former girlfriend and friend. Both of these individuals advised police that Faucette had admitted to participating in the robbery planned by the co-defendant, Clemons. Faucette ultimately admitted to participation in the robbery as a driver but denied involvement in the murder or prior knowledge thereof. In State v. Faucette, the judge held that the initial interview, wherein no confession was obtained, violated the defendant's rights under Miranda following the defendant's request to terminate the interview, however, the second interview was not in violation of defendant's rights and the confession provided therein was voluntary. The court granted suppression of all information obtained after 8:03 p.m. during the initial interview but found all remaining statements to be admissible. On appeal, the defendant challenged the voluntariness of his confession based on coercion and violation of his rights under Miranda. The NJ Appellate Division turned to State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) with regard to Miranda requirements when there is a challenge to voluntariness of a confession. Pursuant to State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964), reiterated in State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 109-10 (2010), as long as the findings of the trial judge are detailed and supported by factual and credible evidence the findings below are not to be disturbed. However, the deference accorded in Johnson and Davila are dependent upon the trial court's ability to hear testimony from officers, experts and witnesses and not the mere review of a videotaped confession from which the Appellate Division can also draw independent conclusions. State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565-66 (2011). The Fifth Amendment grants privilege against self-incrimination and this right is afforded to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division looked to State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993), with regard to a defendant's right against self-incrimination in New Jersey and to State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449 (2005) with regard to the upholding of that right through Miranda protections. State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993) was the case looked to by the Appellate Division in determining whether the State or defendant bears the burden of proving voluntariness of a confession and found the burden is borne by the State. State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000), dictates that a the "voluntary intelligent statement" of a defendant properly notified of his rights under Miranda is a valid and admissible confession. After reviewing the circumstances in this specific matter, the Appellate Division found that Faucette's second confession was knowingly and voluntarily given with full information and understanding of Miranda warnings and that there was no "taint from the May 14 Miranda violations" in violation of State v. O'Neil, 193 N.J. 148, (2007) or State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639 (1990). Further, the Appellate Division affirmed that Faucette did not, at any time during the questioning, invoke his right to counsel. The NJ Appellate Division found Faucette's confession to be voluntary and affirmed the decision of the trial court. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, robbery, conspiracy, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Oral Argument Is Favored in Post-Conviction Relief Petitions

Isaiah Kinney was charged with first-degree conspiracy to commit murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and convicted of second-degree aggravated assault and second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) after a trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County. Kinney was sentenced to a discretionary extended 20 year period of incarceration with an 85% parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Kinney and Jones severely beat Floyd Simmons at a residence on Prospect Street in East Orange. After leaving the residence, Jones committed a minor driving infraction and crashed while fleeing an East Orange Police officer who noticed that, although Jones appeared not to be injured from the crash, her pants were covered in blood. Prior to Jones being chased by the officer, Kinney had exited the vehicle at a residence on Washington Terrace. Based on statements made by Jones to police, officers proceeded to the Washington Terrace residence to arrest Kinney. While at the residence without a warrant, officers discovered bloodstained clothing belonging to Kinney. At the trial level, Kinney filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on the officers’ illegal search and seizure but the suppression motion was denied. In State v. Isaiah Kinney, the Defendant appealed unsuccessfully then sought post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of assistance of counsel. The record on the Appellate level was noticeably devoid of any reference to the illegal search and seizure. The NJ Appellate Division found that oral argument in a post-conviction relief petition wherein the defendant exercises a last opportunity to raise reliability issues is deserving of oral argument although the determination of whether oral argument will be heard rests within the discretion of the PCR court. State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382, 386 (App. Div. 2001). In State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 282 (2012), the N.J. Supreme Court reinforced the factors set forth in Mayron and included that PCR judges should provide a statement of reasons for denying oral argument. The Appellate Division hearing the PCR matter determined that oral argument could have resolved uncertainty with regard to the absence of pursuit of the suppression motion but the PCR judge incorrectly held that, under State v. Moore, 273 N.J. Super. 118, 126 (App. Div. 1994), the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the suppression motion could only be raised in Kinney’s petition to the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reasoned that, as there is no right to review by the Supreme Court, the PCR judge’s ruling on this matter deprived the defendant of his right to a determination on the issue. It was further determined that the lack of any record established by oral argument pertaining to the suppression motion rendered them unable to give adequate review to the PCR petition and the Appellate Division remanded the matter with direction that the matters of the suppression motion and ineffective assistance of counsel be reviewed. If you are faced with aggravated assault charges, you are facing up to 10 years in prison with an 85% parole ineligibility period under NERA. Even simple assault charges can result in incarceration and should not be taken lightly by you as they will certainly not be taken lightly by the court. If you are charged with assault you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about assault, aggravated assault, conspiracy, murder, unlawful possession of a weapon or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

First-Degree Robbery Conviction Does Not Require Presence Of A Weapon

When a would-be bank robber claims to have a weapon and creates a reasonable fear that he does have such weapon, he is subject to charges of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b)). When Christopher Dekowski entered Commerce Bank in Roselle acting suspiciously, including feigning the locking of the banks doors, carrying a briefcase and dressed in a manner differing from the seasonal norm he quickly drew the bank manager's attention. Dekowski approached a teller, at which time the manager intervened and saw a note indicating that the teller was to place all of the money in a bag and implying that Dekowski had a bomb which he would use if the teller failed to comply. Dekowski was given $500 and apprehended. In the Superior Court, Law Division, Union County, the defendant was convicted, in State v. Dekowski, of first-degree robbery and sentenced to a 13-year prison term with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). The NJ Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence with regard to possession of a weapon, as required for a conviction of first-degree robbery, and determining second-degree robbery to be established remanded for resentencing accordingly. In State v. Williams, ___ N.J. ____, ____ (2014) the NJ Supreme Court held that a conviction for first-degree robbery does not require a weapon but only the victim's "actual and reasonable belief that a weapon exists and the defendant's threatened immediate use of such weapon." In Williams, the court relied on State v. Hutson, 107 N.J. 222, 227-228 (1987), holding that the belief in the presence of a weapon need be reasonable under the specific circumstances. The court considered the Dekowski's threat that he had a bomb in concert with the public knowledge and general fear of bombs in contemporary society in determining the reasonableness of the bank manager's belief in the presence of a weapon in making its determination that the defendant's conviction for first-degree robbery would be reinstated. First-degree robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Attempted Murder Suspect Entitled To Fair Trial

Geraldo Rivera was charged with the attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)) of Sean and Michael Burns during a bar fight over Sean Burns' failure to tip the barmaid, Rivera's fiancée'. Sean Burns was left with four stab wounds to the torso and Michael Burns' was cut severely exposing his intestines. Rivera, who claimed self-defense, also suffered head wounds. Multiple witness accounts diverged considerably leaving the jury to decide which version was most plausible. At trial, the prosecutor utilized various methods, including PowerPoint to present the State's case. Rivera was ultimately convicted of second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) on Sean Burns and fourth-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(3)) on Michael Burns. Rivera was sentenced to eight years in prison with a period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). On Appeal in State v. Rivera, Rivera challenged the conviction based upon the State's unfair trial tactics depriving him of the right to a fair trial. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the prosecutor's display of Rivera's picture on a slide with the word guilty on it and other overly suggestive acts including climbing into the jury box at one point while Rivera was seated at the prosecutor's table to operate a projector as if to indicate fear of the defendant deprived Rivera of a fair trial. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Pled To Aggravated Manslaughter Leads To PCR Appplication

Lynn Giovanni was charged with first-degree purposeful and or knowing murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), 3(a)(2)); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). She pled to aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4) as a lesser included offense of knowing or purposeful murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), -(a)(2)) and was sentenced to 30 years in prison with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Giovanni bludgeoned her 14 year old daughter to death while she slept. At the time, Giovanni was being treated for depression and post-traumatic stress disorder and her daughter was having behavioral and adjustment problems after her parents' divorce and was being treated for depression. After killing her daughter, the defendant took multiple prescriptions in an effort to commit suicide but was unsuccessful. She then left the residence and repeatedly drove her vehicle into a guardrail trying to kill herself. During pre-trial psychological examinations of the defendant by defense experts she indicated that her actions were designed only to help her daughter end her pain and ultimately be with her through suicide and indicated that she had planned the killing for about a month. The State, under State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3 (1965),conducted psychological examinations of the defendant which found her to be capable of understanding her actions at the time of the killing and that her actions were deliberate. After considering all evidence the parties came to terms on a plea agreement to first-degree murder but with the prosecutor recommending a sentence for aggravated manslaughter. At sentencing, in State v. Giovanni, the court reviewed the plea fully and the defendant participated in the conversation, providing replies when called for. Although the defendant filed no direct appeal, the defendant sought post-conviction relief (PCR) claiming that her sentence violated Briggs as her factual basis was not appropriate to aggravated manslaughter and mental issues interfered with her ability to understand the plea or sentence. She also claimed, during the PCR hearing, that her counsel advised her not to speak at sentencing. Defendant's counsel denied any such assertion. She further referenced plea offers which never existed in reality and the fact that her counsel did not adequately pursue insanity and diminished capacity defenses. Defendant next appealed the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief and the denial was upheld on all counts but remanded for reconsideration of her application to withdraw her plea in light of the lower court's misapplication of the factors set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). Slater sets forth the standard for review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims as requiring the showing that "(1) counsel's performance was objectively deficient, falling outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; and (2) that counsel's performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional efforts, the result of the proceeding would have been different." With regard to Slater factor one in particular, the court below was seen as taking a particularly harsh view. Regarding factor two, the court was advised to reconsider the defendant's mental capacity on remand. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sexual Assault Remanded For Consideration Of Mitigating Factors

V.E.A. was indicted for second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)) and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)) and was convicted on both counts following a jury trial. The charges stemmed from the accusations of his daughter that she awoke one evening to find the Defendant’s hand inside her shorts and panties on her buttocks after falling asleep on his bed while they were watching a movie. The child testified that he then began to move his hand around toward the front of her body and upward toward her breast at which time she asked to go to the bathroom. The Defendant excused her to go to the bathroom and did not continue the behavior according to his daughter. At sentencing, V.E.A. received a 7 year prison sentence with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) for sexual assault and a concurrent 7 year prison sentence for the second count of the indictment. In State v. V.E.A. the NJ Appellate Division heard V.E.A.’s arguments with regard to aggravating and mitigating factors and the disparity in the trial court judge’s findings with regard to same. The NJ Appellate Division found that where the judge stated at sentencing that she found no mitigating factors to exist but in the Judgment of Conviction indicated mitigating factor 10 (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10)) “the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment” applied and was accorded substantial weight by the trial judge such conflicted existed as to warrant the remand of the matter for resentencing with appropriate review of the aggravating and mitigating factors. If you are charged with a sex crime you are subject to incarceration, registration as a sex offender and the accompanying stigma which will affect where you may live, where you may work and how others will treat you and possibly even civil commitment. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you with these charges. For more information about rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact and other sex crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Reversal of Manslaughter Conviction After Jury Accesses Taped Statement

Matthew Craddock was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)), as a lesser included offense of murder charges, for the stabbing death of James Grace, who was dating Craddock's ex-girlfriend, M.P. He was also convicted of third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)) and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). At trial, in addition to other evidence presented, the jury heard the defendant's entire taped confession to the police as well as a voicemail the defendant left on his girlfriend's phone after the incident. Testimony for the State was also provided by M.P., her friend L.A., and L.A.'s fiance' Mi.P who all witnessed the altercation between Craddock and Grace. None actually witnessed the actual stabbing but they did hear Grace yell "he stabbed me" and one saw the defendant throw an object that appeared to be a knife handle into the road. The defendant offered a different version of the facts than the others and claimed his actions were in self-defense as an altercation erupted when he was attempting to retrieve M.P.'s cell phone from another individual, Grace, who the defendant believed had stolen the phone. Craddock was sentenced to an aggregate 24-year term with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Craddock appealed based on the admission of the taped statements without redaction under claim that certain information in the recordings was more prejudicial than probative. In State v. Craddock, the NJ Appellate Division considered the holding in State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119 (2008) wherein it was determined that allowing a jury full access to a videotaped statement had the potential for great prejudice. In State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011) the court held that the review, by the jury, of taped statements should be undertaken in court where parties are present and judges my provide jury instructions with regard to portions replayed. Finally, in State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542 (2013) the court held that the jury should not have unfettered access to audio or videotaped statements during deliberations. Once the appellate division determined that the trial court erred in providing the jury with unfettered access to the taped statements, it was further determined that the potential prejudice to the defendant from the jury's access to the statements was not harmless error and the conviction was reversed with the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. If you are facing charges of murder, manslaughter or weapons charges, you are facing severe penalties including as much as life in prison. When confronting criminal charges, it is imperative that you have experienced criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you are afforded due process and your rights are protected. For more information about murder, manslaughter, weapons offenses or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sex Assault Conviction Overturned Due To Police Officer's Prejudicial Testimony

E.S. was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)); second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 14-2(b)); and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)) based on allegations by his stepdaughter S.W. S.W. was born in 1996 and her mother, N.S, married E.S. in 1998. E.S. and N.S. had children of their own. Living conditions in the family home were beyond crowded and the parents and five children, including S.W., all slept in one bedroom. S.W. complained to her mother in 2008 about multiple touchings by E.S. and when nothing changed, S.W. complained to Aziza Hassan, her teacher. During the interaction with Hassan, S.W. began sobbing in the early morning before school began after Hassan found S.W. waiting in the classroom. Hassan asked S.W. what the problem was and, after S.W. indicated there were problems at home, Hassan asked S.W. if she was raped. Once S.W. indicated to Hassan that S.W. had been raped, Hassan notified the police, DYFS and school authorities. E.S. was arrested after an investigation and sentenced to 12 years in prison with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) and a concurrent 6 year term also subject to NERA. In State v. E.S., E.S. appealed based on multiple issues which the court found did not prejudice his rights. The N.J. Appellate Division held that one of the issues raised on appeal by E.S. was valid and had substantial probability of prejudicing the jury. Detective Jennifer Novak of the South River Police Department made multiple statements at trial, in the jury's presence, which supported the credibility of S.W. In particular, Novak indicated her belief of S.W.'s statements and implied that the investigation revealed evidence that the crimes had occurred. Even after the admonishment of the trial judge, Novak continued to make implications about the veracity of S.W. and guilt of E.S. The N.J. Appellate Division heavily weighed the matter of Novak's testimony and sighted to multiple prior decisions regarding the matter. State v. J.Q., 252 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 1991) addressed the issue of witness credibility being a question for the jury. State v. Landeros, 20 N.J. 69, (1955) held that police officers may not offer opinions as to the defendant's culpability when testifying as fact witnesses. Novak's implication that notes written by S.W. in response to Hassan's questioning about the word 'rape' included more inculpatory evidence than they did was contrary to State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973). The N.J. Appellate Division held that the testimony of Novak could have prejudiced the jury against E.S. and reversed the convictions and remanded to the Law Division for a new trial on all three counts of the indictment. If you are accused of sexual assault or other sex crimes in NJ you are facing very serious penalties including civil commitment, prison and lifetime registry as a sex offender. You need experienced legal counsel to defend you against these charges. For more information about sexual assault, rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, solicitation of a minor, internet crimes or other sex crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Armed Robber Seeks Post-Conviction Relief

Jeffrey Toth was indicted for the armed robberies of a 7-11 and Quick Chek in Woodbridge, NJ and pled guilty to two counts of first-degree armed robbery. At 7-11, Toth was said by a clerk to have a knife and the Quick Chek clerk claimed Toth used a screwdriver as a weapon. Toth was later identified as the robber after bragging to others about robbing the stores. In State v.Toth, the Defendant pled guilty in exchange for a maximum sentence of 15-years imprisonment and dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. He was sentenced to 10-years in prison, the minimum for first-degree armed robbery, with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Years later Toth sought post-conviction relief (PCR)claiming his attorney failed to argue certain mitigating factors at sentencing but was denied without an evidentiary hearing finding Toth's counsel had made such arguments. He appealed and the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the decision for review under State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269 (2012) including either oral argument regarding his PCR petition or give adequate explanation as to why oral argument will not be held. First-degree armed robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison for each charge. If you have been charged with armed robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Evidence Of Other Man's Semen Admissible In Sexual Assault Case

Bobby Perry was found guilty of second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1)) and third-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)). He was sentenced to 8 years with an 85% parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A., N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a)) for the aggravated sexual assault and 4 years imprisonment for the aggravated assault. Additionally, Megan's Law (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23) was applicable and Perry was sentenced to parole supervision for life. Perry and the victim were drinking together at his residence when he became angry with her and punched her in the mouth and told her to "sit on him". One of the Defendant's roommates returned from a party and he let the victim go. The victim said nothing while the roommate was in the room for some time. After the roommate left the room, the Defendant took the victim downstairs and tried to anally penetrate her, which she resisted, then performed oral sex on her before again trying to orally penetrate her. After this activity, the two returned to a room in the house and sat silently looking at her for some time. The Defendant then asked the victim what she was going to say happened to her face and she agreed to say that someone else had injured her. The victim later went to Maplewood Police Department, accompanied by her ex-boyfriend Mr. Wilkins, and Sergeant Guglielmo, upon seeing her injuries, called for an ambulance. At the hospital, Detective Fuentes of the Union Township Police Department met with the victim to give a statement. On the way to the police station, the victim showed Detective Fuentes where the attack occurred and identified Perry in a photo array. Officers appeared at the residence with a warrant and used a UV light to search for signs of bodily fluids or evidence of clean-up efforts but found nothing in the basement or bathroom and on a later date, the porch where only a small amount of blood was found on the back of a chair. The blood was later matched to the victim and semen was found in her clothing, however, no DNA found matched the Defendant. The Union County Superior Court Judge hearing State v. Perry denied Defendant's application to admit DNA evidence of another man's semen under the Rape Shield Law (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7) finding that the presence of another man's semen had no bearing on whether consent was given to the Defendant and found the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudice referencing State v. Ryan, 157 N.J. Super. 121 (App. Div. 1978). Perry appealed on the basis that the evidence of other semen could indicate the possibility that the victim claimed she was raped to appease Wilkins, with whom she was in an on again, off again relationship. The Rape Shield Law was intended to protect the privacy of the victim while also ensuring defendants receive a fair trial. State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 (2003) State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519 (1991) explained that the Rape Shield Law permits prior sexual history to prove another individual is the source of the semen or to negate force. The NJ Appellate Division determined the evidence of another man's semen in the victims clothes was necessary to put on a full defense as required under State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316 (2005). The probative value of the evidence, presented for the limited purpose of proving the victim was assaulted by Wilkins and lied to the police about who assaulted her, outweighed the potential prejudice. The appellate division reversed Perry's conviction and remanded the matter with the instruction that, should the evidence of another's semen be again proffered in the case, the trial court conduct a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine admissibility of the evidence. If you have been charged with a sex crime you face severe consequences including prison, societal scorn and inclusion on the sex offender registry and possible involuntary civil commitment. It is critical you obtain experienced defense counsel to immediately begin to review the prosecution's, evidence, speak with witnesses, explore alibis you may have and build a defense. For more information about sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, endangering the welfare of a minor and other sex crimes visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Attempted Assault Plea Reversed For Lack of Factual Basis

Lee Travers pled guilty to second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) and second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)). Travers appealed his convictions and his sentence of 8 years subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Police discovered a loaded gun in Travers car after receiving a call that he pointed a gun at his wife in front of their children, threatened to kill her and then pulled the trigger multiple times while Travers was under the influence. Although the gun found in Traver's car was older and had problems it did fire when examined by the State's expert and the defense expert never had opportunity to examine the gun as it had been mistakenly destroyed by the State. In State v. Travers, the NJ Appellate Court heard Defendant's appeal based on his provision of a factual basis which maintained that he did not have the intent to cause serious bodily injury to his wife and merely said what he was told to say in order to enter into the plea. The plea transcript included Travers' statement "[w]hen she said don't kill me, I pulled it out and I showed it that it didn't work and wasn't real." After reading the transcript of the factual basis, the NJ Appellate Division did find the factual basis insufficient to establish the specific intent necessary to obtain a conviction for attempted aggravated assault as it was not clear whether Travers believed the gun to be operable at the time of the incident. Pursuant to State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 293 (1987), a Defendant must set forth sufficient facts constituting the essential elements of the crime. Attempted aggravated assault requires the purposeful attempt to cause serious bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1)). The Appellate Division also quoted State v. McAllister, 211 N.J. Super. 355, 362 (App. Div. 1986), "one cannot logically attempt to cause a particular result unless causing that result is one's 'conscious object'. The Appellate Division took no position as to Travers' belief that the gun was operable but only as to the insufficient factual basis when it reversed and remanded the matter. Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, illegal possession of a handgun, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Rap Lyrics Are Not Evidence Of Prior Crimes

Vonte Skinner was charged with attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a(3), 2C:11-3a(1)); aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)); and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2)); unlawful possession of a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5); and possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a) and convicted of attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a(3), 2C:11-3a(1)); aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)); and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2)). Skinner received an extended term of 30 years in prison and subject to certain parole ineligibility and supervision under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Skinner’s case arose as a result of the 2005 shooting of Lamont Peterson multiple times at close range with a handgun. Evidence at the scene, including a cell phone belonging to Skinner, led to his arrest. During Skinner’s arrest, while driving someone else’s vehicle, his rap lyrics were recovered on the back seat of the vehicle. Peterson survived and advised the police that Peterson and Skinner both sold drugs for Brandon C. Rothwell. After Skinner joined the team as the third man, Peterson’s profits fell and he began keeping some of Rothwell’s money. Peterson and Skinner both testified that on the night of the shooting they had been in cell phone contact multiple times to arrange a meeting during which Skinner was to buy cocaine from Peterson. When Peterson arrived to meet Skinner, Rothwell was with Skinner. Peterson remembered seeking Skinner and the gun but no other details. Skinner testified that just as Peterson was about to give him the drugs he heard a gunshot and he and Peterson both ran off in different directions. Both sides offered witnesses at trial giving conflicting testimony. The State’s main evidence was the Defendant’s rap lyrics. The jury was not advised that the lyrics were written over several years but did hear an extensive portion of the lyrics and was made aware that the lyrics were in the first person view of a narrator named “Threat” which is a name Skinner has tattooed on his arm. The lyrics described multiple violent acts by “Threat”. The matter was appealed by the Defendant based in part on the reading of Skinner’s rap lyrics to jurors by the prosecution for the purpose of establishing motive and intent on the part of Skinner. The Defendant claimed the lyrics were not properly authenticated and inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) due to substantial prejudice to defendant outweighing their probative value. The NJ Appellate Division cited State v. Crumb, 307 N.J. Super. 204 (App. Div. 1997) and State v. Koskovich, 168 NJ. 448 (2001) which held that creative writing is merely expressive and does not constitute bad acts themselves and therefore writing comes within N.J.R.E. 404(b). The NJ Appellate Division determined the reading of the lyrics to be prejudicial to Skinner and prohibited by N.J.R.E. 404(b). The NJ Supreme Court heard State v. Skinner and rendered its decision on August 4, 2014. The Justices found that there was no real connection between the lyrics and the murder other than to inaccurately portray his depiction of street violence to establish Defendant’s motive and intent and upheld the decision of the NJ Appellate Division that the lyrics were highly prejudicial and of minimal probative value. The NJ Supreme Court heard the State’s argument that, under Joynes v. State, 797 A.2d 673, 677 (Del. 2002) that the act of creating rap lyrics is not, in and of itself, a “bad act” and should be governed under that standard of relevance under N.J.R.E. 401. The Court disagreed reasoning that N.J.R.E.404(b) is to protect a defendant from evidence which proves little while doing substantial harm. The Court’s primary analysis of admissibility under N.J.R.E. 404(b) was analysis of the 4 prongs of State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992): (1) that the other crime, wrong or bad act evidence pertains to some material issue in dispute in the instant matter; (2) the other crime is similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged ; (3) proof the evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and (4) any probative value is not outweighed by prejudice. If you are charged with a crime, there are strict limits to evidence which the State may use against you in making its case. To protect your freedom and rights if you are charged with any violent crime, you should consult with experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about murder, sexual assault, drugs, weapons charges or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sentencing In Weapons Case Must Fit The Crime

The defendants, Jaquan Lee and Tony Canty, collectively appealed their convictions of 1st degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, 2nd degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a(1), 3rd degree unlawful possession of a shotgun without a firearms purchaser ID card, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, 3rd degree unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b and 2nd degree certain persons not to possess firearms N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 arising out of 3 separate robberies occurring on July 30, 2007 in Elizabeth putting multiple victims at risk. The defendants in State v. Lee were sentenced in the Union County Superior Court to 15 year terms for each count concurrent as to multiple victims in each incident but consecutive as to each incident resulting in aggregate 45 year terms subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 which requires service of 85% of their sentence before eligible for parole. On appeal, collectively State v. Lee, the defendants challenge in court identifications and excessive sentences. Canty challenged a motion to suppress and Lee challenged the adequacy of the jury charge. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing as the court did not adequately place the reasons for imposing 3 consecutive sentences on the record. In reviewing whether the sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, the Appellate Division looked to State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 644 (1985). Yarbough sets forth factors a court may consider do make such a determination including whether (1) the crimes and objectives were predominately independent of each other; (2) the crimes involved separate acts or threats of violence; (3) whether the crimes were unified in place or time or whether they were individual acts; (4) the number of victims in each criminal act; and (5) the number of convictions for which sentences will be imposed. The Appellate Division also agreed the criminal history and rate of recidivism of the actors could be considered according to State v. Mosch, 214 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1986). If you have been accused of a crime it is imperative you obtain experienced legal counsel to begin preparing a defense, recognize and challenge violations of your rights with motions to suppress or dismiss and, if you are ultimately sentenced, challenge excessive sentences. For more information regarding weapons, drugs, robbery, assault or other serious criminal charges visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sexual Assault Sentence Requires Explanation

The defendant in State v. R.D. was convicted, in a non-jury trial, of 6 counts of 2nd degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)) on his daughter C.D. while she was under the age of 13, 3 counts of 2nd degree engaging in sexual conduct that would harm, impair, or debauch the morals of a child while under a legal duty to care for her (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)) , aggravated assault on his daughter while she was under the age of 13 (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), one count of 3rd degree terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3a) to her if she disclosed the abuse and 1 count of 3rd degree attempt to cause or recklessly cause significant bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)) to C.D. The state presented witnesses on child sexual abuse. C.D. and the defendant lived in the same household from birth and the abuse became more invasive and frequent as she aged reaching a number of several times monthly and including penetration. Defendant failed to testify or present witnesses. The Bergen County trial judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate 70 year prison sentence which was subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Defendant appealed based on the court's reliance on opinion testimony concerning Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) by the State's expert and errors and omissions in the judge's sentencing analysis. The NJ Appellate Division heard the appeal as to the errors and omissions but affirmed the convictions. Due to the trial judge's failure to make clear for which sentences were intended to be consecutive or concurrent, failure to set forth the Yarbough factors to justify any consecutive sentences and failure to specifically set forth any jail credits or "gap time" credits defendant may be entitled to the Appellate Division remanded for resentencing. If you are facing charges for sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a minor or similar charges, you should consult an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. If you are convicted or plea to a sex crime in New Jersey, in addition to incarceration you face lifelong listing on a registry which can affect your ability to obtain employment, restrict where you may reside and generally have a negative impact on the remainder of your life. For more information about soliciting a minor, statutory rape, child molestation, internet crimes, child pornography or other sex crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Additional Charge In Sexual Assault On Minor Does Not Always Mean More Time

Although he did not escape guilt, the defendant did receive a reduced sentence for charges of first degree aggravated assault, second degree sexual assault and second degree endangering the welfare of a minor in State v. W.L. Following a jury trial, the defendant was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment with an 85 percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for the crime of 1st degree sexual assault into which the crime of 2nd degree sexual assault was merged. The defendant was also sentenced to 7 years for endangering the welfare of a minor to be served consecutively to the 15 years for the other charge. When sentencing, a Judge may count aggravating factors only once and must apply a Yarbough analysis when imposing an excessive sentence. The judge in State v. W.L. applied aggravating factors 2 (gravity of the offense), 3 (risk defendant will commit another offense) and 9 (the need to deter such activity) and mitigating factors 7 (defendant's lack of criminal history) and 8 (the likelihood the defendant's behavior will recur). An essential element of the conviction for aggravated sexual assault was the child's age and finding of an aggravating sentencing factor cannot be based solely on an essential element of the crime charged. Additionally, the sentencing Judge failed to apply the appropriate standards from State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-644 (1985) in determining whether to impose a consecutive sentence for count 3, endangering the welfare of a minor. If you are facing charges for sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a minor or similar charges, you should consult an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. If you are convicted or plea to a sex crime in New Jersey, in addition to incarceration you face lifelong listing on a registry which can affect your ability to obtain employment, restrict where you may reside and generally have a negative impact on the remainder of your life. For more information about soliciting a minor, statutory rape, child molestation, internet crimes, child pornography or other sex crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.