Juvenile's Waiver of Miranda Rights Upheld

D.N., was a 16 year old juvenile when charged with offenses that, if committed by an adult would include second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); possession of under 50 grams of marijuana (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4)); defiant trespass (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b)) and obstructing the administration of law (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a)). Police responded to a caller saying that D.N. entered a grocery store after being notified he was not permitted to do so and, during a search, located and seized suspected marijuana from D.N.’s person. In the presence of his mother, at the police station, D.N. was read his Miranda rights and invoked his right to remain silent. Weeks later, D.N.’s mother contacted police and advised them that she had found a handgun in a backpack in her residence and, upon their arrival, consented to a search of the backpack. D.N. was taken for questioning upon returning home. The “Juvenile Miranda Warning” form was used to advise D.N. and his mother of D.N.’s rights under Miranda and D.N. and D.N. agreed to speak to the police. D.N. ultimately confessed to that he had made a deal with a gang member wherein he would be paid to deliver the gun to a third party. D.N. moved to suppress the confession and the judge held that D.N. knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights as he had exercised those rights only weeks earlier. In State of New Jersey in the interest of D.N., D.N. pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, possession of under 50 grams of marijuana, defiant trespass, and obstructing the administration of law and, pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the weapons charges. D.N. was sentenced to 2 years probation, community service, drug evaluation and participation in a residential treatment program among other conditions. D.N. appealed the denial of his suppression motion. The New Jersey Appellate Division held that the “suspect’s will was not overborne by police conduct” as is the test under State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000). Pursuant to State in the Interest of A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 147 (2010), the presence of D.N.’s mother was given considerable weight in favor of voluntariness of the confession as well. In light of prior opinions and the fact that D.N. had knowingly invoked his right to remain silent only weeks prior, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge. If a juvenile is charged with a crime, the disposition of the charges can change his or her future by prohibiting them from entering certain schools, fields of employment and, in the case of Megan's Law offenses, certain residences or neighborhoods. It is critical for any juvenile charged with a criminal offense to seek an experienced juvenile defense attorney immediately to begin protecting their rights and their future. For more information on juvenile offenses, weapons offenses, possession of marijuana, trespass or other criminal charges in NJ, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Robbery Trial 2 Years After Arrest and Right To Speedy Trial

Antonio Jones was convicted of first-degree robbery (N.J.SA. 2C:15-1) and fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division. Jones was sentenced to an extended term including life without parole with the sentence for obstruction to be served concurrently. Jones appealed based on the denial of his motion to dismiss based on failure of the State to uphold his right to a speedy trial under the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the N.J. Constitution. Jones was arrested in February 2012. In spite of defendant’s repeated requests for the State to provide discovery, the State failed to comply and the matter was delayed. In September 2012, Jones filed a speedy trial motion. In December 2012, the trial judge ordered the State to comply with discovery demands. In February 2013, the state still had not complied and Jones again filed a speedy trial motion. The Superior Court records indicated that the motion was denied in August of 2013 but without reasons set forth. The Superior Court judge merely ordered that no trial would occur until discovery was completed and a trial date was set for February 2014, 2 years after Jones was arrested. As 18 months had already elapsed when the Defendant renewed his speedy trial motion, the N.J. Appellate Division remanded the matter to the Superior Court for a review of Jones’ speedy trial motion under the 4 factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2181, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). Under Barker, the balancing test, applied in State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013) includes: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason therefor; (3) the defendant must assert his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. In Cahill, the N.J. Supreme Court considered 1 year as the amount of time triggering further inquiry under the factors set forth in Barker. First-degree robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison. The State has to remain within the confines of the law in collecting evidence, your arrest, and presenting evidence and testimony against you. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to fight for your rights each step of the way. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Bat Used in Assault Suppressed After Illegal Police Search

Kenneth Barbour was arrested for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)), resulting from an alleged assault on his neighbor. Upon arriving at the scene, police were told by the bloody victim, that his neighbor used a black baseball bat to strike him in the head following a verbal dispute. Police indicated they used a patrol car loudspeaker to command Barbour to exit his residence as he was thought to have outstanding warrants and possibly weapons in his possession. An individual ultimately exited the residence and was arrested approximately 20 feet from the residence. Police, not having a photo of Barbour and unsure he was the man who exited the residence, entered the residence to conduct a search of the premises for others. The trial court denied Barbour's motion to suppress, and other relief requested, holding that the actions of the arresting officers were legitimate as part of a protective sweep of the residence. Following a jury trial, Barbour was convicted of fourth degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)) and sentenced to 2 years probation. In State v. Barbour, the defendant challenged several aspects of the trial court's decision, including the denial of his motion to suppress the bat alleged to have been used as the weapon in the assault. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right to citizens to be free from unreasonable search and seizure unless certain very narrow exceptions apply. State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471 (2001). The New Jersey Appellate Division held that a protective sweep must be limited to "areas in a defendant's immediate control." Such a sweep is valid only when there is (1) a legitimate reason for the officers presence in the residence; and (2) officers have a reasonable suspicion that there is a dangerous individual hiding in the area to be swept and that the burden of proving these circumstances existed is on the State. State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97 (2010). In light of the evidence and testimony presented that the Defendant was outside when arrested and there was no reasonable articulable suspicion that another dangerous individual was inside the residence, the N.J. Appellate Division found the search and seizure to violate the Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and reversed the denial of the motion to suppress. Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including incarceration, the inability to obtain employment and certain licenses, and social stigma associated with such problems. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Facebook Evidence Can Have Limited Value In Sex Crimes Cases

Tony Browne was found guilty of 12 counts of federal child exploitation offenses including production of child pornography, coercion and enticement of a minor, receipt of child pornography, and transfer of obscene material to a minor with females ranging in age from 12 to 17 years old. Browne created a Facebook profile wherein he pretended to be a female and befriended the girls, ultimately obtaining nude and sexually provocative photos from them. Next, Browne utilized another Facebook account under a fictitious name, Billy Button, to threaten to post the photos unless the minors provided more photos or engaged in sexual activity with him. Additionally, Browne sent images to the minors of his erect penis. In United States of America v. Tony Jefferson Browne, Browne’s appeal was rejected but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did hold that although a preponderance of the evidence showed that Browne did create the messages, there was no way to fully authenticate the records through Facebook’s records custodian. Although the conviction was upheld, the court’s finding was that social media evidence requires authentication which takes into consideration the range of ways in which such information can be manipulated. Sex crime charges can be levied many years after an alleged incident and can result in incarceration, substantial and irreparable damage to the reputation and lifestyle of the accused in addition to the deprivation of liberty and rights, registration as a sex offender, loss of employment opportunities, possibility of civil commitment and social stigma. If you are accused of a sex crime it is absolutely imperative that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to begin working on your defense immediately. For more information about sexual assault, rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, internet crimes, child pornography or other sex crimes in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Unconstitutional Traffic Stop Leads To Suppression Of Weapons Evidence

Al-Sharif Scriven was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); third-degree receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7); fourth-degree possession of hollow-point bullets (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)); and fourth-degree possession of a large-capacity magazine (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j)). The Honorable Martin G. Cronin, for the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County granted Al-Sharif Scriven’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search following the stop of a vehicle in which Scriven was a passenger. The vehicle was stopped by an Essex County Sheriff’s Officer for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-60, driving with high beams on. The State of New Jersey appealed the court’s grant of the suppression motion. The facts adduced at trial were that Scriven was a passenger in a car which was traveling through Newark, NJ in an entirely lawful manner, with the exception of the fact that the vehicle was traveling with its high beams on. An Essex County Sheriff’s Officer observed the vehicle and flagged it down when it came to a stop at an intersection he was near. When the officer approached the driver to advise her that her high beams were on he requested her credentials. While speaking to the driver, the officer detected an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle which the officer indicated was stronger on the passenger side of the vehicle. The officer asked Scriven to exit the vehicle and Scriven first notified the officer that there was a handgun under his coat. The officer retrieved the gun from Scriven’s person and arrested him. Judge Cronin relied on State v. Witt, 435 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2014), 219 N.J. 624 (2014), which was directly on point and held that the initial stop of a vehicle is inappropriate when there is no actual violation. In Scriven, there was no oncoming vehicle within 500 feet traveling in the opposite direction as is required in order for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-60 to occur. On appeal, in State v. Scriven, the court looked to State v. Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2005), which held that when an officer makes a mistake in the belief that a violation exists the mistake does not thereby create a reasonable basis for a stop. The State also argued, under the community caretaking doctrine, the officer was acting appropriately in stopping the vehicle briefly to notify the driver that her high beams were in use. In certain cases, including State v. Martinez, 260 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1992), wherein a vehicle was traveling less than one-half the posted speed limit at 2:00 a.m., an officer would be justified in stopping the vehicle to insure there was nothing amiss. The N.J. Appellate Division upheld Judge Cronin’s decision and the State again appealed. On Wednesday, July 20, 2016, the N.J. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court below suppressing the weapon found on Al-Sharif Scriven as the fruits of an unreasonable search. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you are facing weapons charges you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Concealed Weapons Carry Permits for NJ Citizens "In Need"?

Governor Christie is in a battle with the Democrats controlling both houses of the NJ Legislature over concealed weapons carry permits in New Jersey. While Christie has determined that the restrictions requiring the showing of a “justifiable need” for a carry permit are too restrictive, the Legislature claims that Christie’s criteria requiring a showing of “serious threats” against one’s life is violative of the Legislative intent in the creation of the existing gun control laws in NJ. In addition to complaints by gun rights advocates indicating the permitting process was inefficient and overly restrictive, Chistie indicated that changes were a response to the murder of Carol Browne by her ex-boyfriend, against whom she had a restraining order, while Ms. Brown awaited approval of her gun permit. A3689 and SCR101 were immediately sponsored by the Assembly and Senate respectively in a response seeking to codify regulatory language relating to handgun carry permits. Democrats in control of the Senate and Assembly argued that the new standards could serve to substantially increase the number of carry permits in NJ and allow an overly broad spectrum of individuals to obtain permits. The Attorney General’s office replied that all other statutory requirements would continue to apply and a Superior Court judge would have to sign off on the permit so that the only change would be from the showing of an “actual need” to a showing of a specific “serious threat” against the person seeking the permit. The fate of this legislation is still pending. If you are caught illegally carrying firearms the penalties can be severe making it well worth the effort to seek a permit to carry legally. For more information about gun or weapon possession, possession of weapons during a drug related offense, armed robbery, possession of a handgun without a permit, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon or possession of a weapon while on parole or probation visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Handgun In Plain View? Prove it!

Jarrell Williams was convicted of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b) after an officer allegedly saw a handgun in plain view on the floor of his vehicle during a motor vehicle stop. At all times during the proceedings, Williams maintained that he was unaware that the vehicle, recently purchased by his mother, contained a handgun. Williams also maintained that the gun was not in plain view on the floor of the vehicle near the driver’s seat. The facts collectively presented at trial in State v. Williams are that 4 men, including the defendant, entered the vehicle and smoked marijuana then the defendant pulled the vehicle out of the driveway just as two plain clothed police officers came down the street at which point Williams immediately pulled over and turned off the vehicle. The officers claimed that the location and actions of the defendant and the vehicles’ other occupants gave rise to suspicion and the officers turned around. Seeing the officers’ vehicle turn around, all 4 occupants exited the vehicle before the officers engaged them in conversation. Conflicting accounts of the vehicle’s ownership were offered by occupants and Officer Brown approached the vehicle, with its doors open, to verify the registration. The officer’s testimony was that he observed a marijuana cigarette and plastic bag and, upon going to retrieve same, noticed the pistol on the floor in front of the driver’s seat. The 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 of the New Jersey Constitution establish and protect a defendant’s right to present a complete defense including confrontation of witnesses. Several cases including State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 (2003), State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519 (1991), State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985), State v. Crudup, 176 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1980) and State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129 (2004) have upheld this right but within the constraints of N.J.R.E. 611(a) and N.J.R.E. 401 which afford the court discretion of control over the trial. The N.J. Appellate Division ultimately decided that the jury should not be placed in the position of determining the constitutionality of a search and seizure but that Defense counsel’s line of questioning was not in danger of placing them in that position and was instead intended to determine whether the officer had a predetermined purpose in offering the statements he had made and was an attempt to introduce motive on the part of the officer to testify in a certain manner. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the defendant’s right to cross-examine the officer was violated and that, due to the possible influence this may have had on the decision of the jury, the matter was remanded for a new trial. Weapons offenses are subject to severe punishment including incarceration for 5-10 years for many such offenses. If you are charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you. For more information about possession of a handgun without a permit, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon while on parole or probation, possession of a weapon during a drug related offense or other serious weapons charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Theft of $100,000 From N.J. Employer

Deborah Meehan was convicted of second-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) after issuing checks to herself in the amount of over $100,000 by affixing the stamp of a law firm partner to checks in her control as the law firm's bookkeeper. Following an investigation, Meehan was questioned and admitted, during a videotaped interview, that she did not have permission to issue the checks. The jury found Meehan guilty of second-degree theft but, at sentencing, the trial judge downgraded the offense to third-degree and sentenced her to prison, refusing to accept her application for probation. The State appealed and the Defendant cross-appealed indicating she did not effectively waive her right to remain silent and therefore her confession should be suppressed. In State v. Meehan, the NJ Appellate Division initially reviewed the voluntariness of the Defendant's confession under State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368 (2014), Miranda V. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), State v. Graham, 59 N.J. 366 (1971), State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 1994), and State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993). The panel held that the state met it's burden of proof showing the police did not overbear Meehan's will and her statement was provided after a voluntary and knowing waiver of her rights. The panel further held that neither the jury charge nor the prosecutor's statements were prejudicial to the Defendant. The panel did find for the State in holding that it was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion to downgrade the second-degree conviction to third-degree. Pursuant to State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984), the NJ Appellate Division will not typically disturb the sentence of a trial court unless it constitutes abuse of discretion. Pursuant to State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (1989) and State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49 (2014), the state must first review the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and then balance the relevant factors and explain how the final sentencing decision is reached in light of the analysis. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) requires prison for second-degree crimes unless there are exceptional circumstances as the court fully set forth in State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003) and, under the facts, denial of probation was appropriate. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) relating to the downgrade of sentences, sets forth that where mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and the interests of justice are best served by the downgrade, the court has discretion to reduce the term to that of a crime one degree below that for which the Defendant was convicted. State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484 (1996) and State v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2009) jointly provide a valuable explanation of the analysis the court should conduct in considering a downgrade. The N.J. Appellate panel considered the legislative intent in drafting N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(1). The panel agreed with the State's likening of the matter to State v. Jones, 197 N.J. Super 604 (App. Div. 1984) wherein a defendant's second degree theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) was downgraded to third-degree and later reversed after the court found the downgrade to be abuse of the trial court's discretion. The N.J. Appellate Division ultimately reversed the downgraded sentence, holding that Meehan's theft of over $100,000 from her employer was serious and a downgrade would not serve the interests of justice, and remanded for sentencing accordingly. A second-degree theft conviction will result in a 5-10 year prison sentence. If you are facing second-degree criminal charges it is critical you obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and build a defense against the prosecution's case. For more information about theft, burglary and other serious criminal issues in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

NJ Handgun Permit Guidelines To Be Updated

Handgun permit processing in New Jersey is undergoing updates. On April 8, 2016, Acting Attorney General Robert Loughy issued new directives regarding uniformity in processing designed to limit instances of extreme delay and other problems. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 sets forth the application procedures and forms which are to be utilized by permit issuing bodies and no deviation is permitted. Agencies are prohibited from applying personal views regarding civilian firearms regulation, requiring additional forms, requiring additional information from applicants or otherwise deviating from the standards set forth. Gun permit issuing agencies have a 30 day time period to review applications under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(f), unless the applicant's life is in specific danger in which case the gun permit application review period is decreased to 14 days. Disqualification occurs upon conviction of an indictable crime or a disorderly persons domestic violence offense. Interestingly, in spite of these steps toward uniformity, there is also a very broad category for disqualification which allows issuing bodies discretion to deny a handgun permit or firearms purchaser identification card if the "issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). The New Jersey State Police are charged with the drafting of uniform investigation standards. In addition, there are to be updates to Firearms Transport Guidelines. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6, transport of a firearm that is unloaded and secured in a fastened case or gun box or inside of a locked trunk is permitted directly between a home and business, place of purchase and home or business, directly from a home or business to a range or place of hunting, between a home or business and a gun repair shop or licensed gun dealer and between residences when moving. There are also undefined "reasonably necessary" deviations permitted in the route of transportation including the purchase of fuel, food, beverages, medication and other supplies; use of a restroom, pickup or discharge of passengers, emergencies, detours and other reasons. The reasonability of the deviation and lawfulness of transport is subject to the judgment of the officer encountering an individual undertaking transport. If you have been denied the right to a carry permit after meeting all criteria to obtain one you should seek an experienced attorney to assist you in your matter. If you are caught illegally carrying firearms the penalties can be severe making it well worth the effort to seek a permit to carry legally. For more information about gun or weapon possession, possession of weapons during a drug related offense, armed robbery, possession of a handgun without a permit, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon or possession of a weapon while on parole or probation visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Aggravated Assault Results In Miscarriage

Laquesha Cathcart and Tisha Cathcart were indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)), second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2), first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), and fourth-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) after forcefully entering the victim's apartment following a dispute over a parking spot in New Brunswick, NJ. The Cathcarts assaulted R.L. and J.D., her daughter, in the presence of R.L.'s husband, F.D., and son. R.L.'s daughter and son both advised the defendant's that R.L. was pregnant but they continued the assault. R.L. miscarried within the week. The main issue in this matter is whether the defendants purposely or knowingly attempted to cause serious bodily injury to R.L. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude testimony relating to R.L.'s pregnancy and miscarriage after determining the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the likelihood it would prejudice the jury against the defendants. The appeal in State v. Cathcart focused on the exclusion of the evidence. N.J. As affirmed in State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (2013), N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits a court to exclude evidence in the event the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. More than a possibility of substantial prejudice is required State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 165 N.J. 492 (2000). To exclude evidence, the party seeking exclusion must demonstrate that the evidence is has such "inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation." State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971). A significant consideration in the decision to exclude evidence is also whether other evidence is available to prove the fact the evidence is offered to prove. Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 403 (2014). Exclusion of certain evidence, such as motive in a criminal matter, requires a higher showing of prejudice. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218 (1955). Conviction for aggravated assault requires proof by the prosecution that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, acted recklessly in an attempt to cause or did cause such bodily injury pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). State v. Mingo, 263 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd. 132 N.J. 75 (1993). This requires proof of the defendant's mental state at the time of the assault. The State's appeal centered on the fact that the defendants were advised that R.L. was pregnant yet continued with their assault which included kicking and punching R.L. in the abdomen. In its decision to reverse in part and affirm in part, the N.J. Appellate Division determined that the statements regarding R.L.'s pregnancy were highly relevant to the issue of the defendants' mental state but that the testimony regarding the miscarriage was overly prejudicial. Aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including 5 to 10 years in prison, with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA), and fines of up to $150,000. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, robbery, burglary, theft or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Lawyer Challenges His DUI Plea Based On Lack Of Counsel

Henry Aratow was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) in 1988, pled guilty to a driving under the influence (DUI) in 2004, and pled guilty to a 2009 in 2011. In the case of the 2009 DUI, Aratow was sentenced as a third offender resulting in a 10 year loss of driving privileges and 180 days incarceration. In 2013, Aratow sought post conviction relief from in the municipal court and then Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County with regard to the 2004 DUI in order to avail himself of the step-down provisions under State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014), pertaining to successive DUI convictions. The relief sought was denied and Aratow appealed to the NJ Appellate Division. In 2004, Aratow was stopped by police and charged with DWI, refusal to submit to a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), and making an improper turn (N.J.S.A. 39:4-116). Both at the time he was stopped by police and when he appeared in court for the resulting charges, Aratow was a practicing attorney. Aratow waived his right to counsel and entered into a plea to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content (BAC) between .08 and .10 with a dismissal of the refusal to submit to chemical breath testing and the improper turn charges. At the time of the 2004 plea, the municipal court judge engaged in lengthy colloquy with the defendant regarding his right to counsel, the factual basis of his plea. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the Aratow was not advised by the municipal court judge of the progressively harsher consequences of successive DUI convictions and, therefore, did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the plea as required under N.J. Court Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). The court also questioned the sufficiency of the factual basis given by the defendant, as set forth in State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218 (2013). The court found that, although Aratow admitted to operating a motor vehicle after consuming 3 vodka and tonics, he was not questioned as to whether he believed that the alcohol he consumed substantially impaired his ability to operate the vehicle or that his BAC was between .08 and .10. Under State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415 (1989), the remedy for a plea entered with an insufficient factual basis is to reinstate all charges and restore the matter to its original status prior to the entry of the plea. Accordingly, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the 2004 matter for a new trial. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Expungement Petition And Effect Of Other Crimes

In the Matter of DiGregorio involved a petitioner who sought the expungement from his record of the disorderly persons offense of lewdness and his petition was denied. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Division applied the statute relating to expungement of disorderly and petty disorderly offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 to the facts in the instant matter. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 reads as follows: Any person convicted of a disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense under the laws of this State who has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime, whether within this State or any other jurisdiction, or of another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses, may, after the expiration of a period of 5 years from the date of his conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of probation or release from incarceration, whichever is later, present a duly verified petition… praying that such conviction and all records and information pertaining thereto be expunged. The petitioner properly waited the requisite 5 year period following conviction, payment of his fines and completion of probation in order to seek expungement of the disorderly persons offense. However, the petitioner was disqualified from meeting the expungement criteria as a result of having had two subsequent criminal convictions, one in 2008 and another in 2013. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition. A criminal record can affect your ability to obtain certain jobs, get into certain schools of your choice, obtain housing and have other serious consequences including a negative social stigma. Expungement offers a second chance at a clean record. New Jersey legislators have recently taken steps to make expungement more available in an effort to prevent recidivist criminal activity. Although expungement is available, it should not be taken as a given. If you or your child are seeking an expungement, you should consult experienced criminal defense counsel in order to ensure you qualify and that the crime on your record is expungeable. For more information about expungement, disorderly persons offenses or other criminal matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

First-Degree Aggravated Sexual Assault Remanded For Jury Charge

R.P. was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(6)) against his step-daughter O.M. while she was under the age of thirteen. R.P. was sentenced to 26 years in prison with a 13 year period of parole ineligibility. On the defendant's appeal, challenging the conviction based on the trial court's failure to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1)), the NJ Appellate Division found for the Defendant and vacated the conviction. Additionally, the Appellate Division denied the state's request for a molded verdict pursuant to State v. Farrad, 753 A.2d 648, 164 N.J. 247, 192 N.J. 294 (2007), and remand for a new trial with on the first-degree aggravated sexual assault charge. The NJ Supreme Court's review of State v. R.P. was focused solely on the state's request for a molded verdict. Pursuant to State v. Farrad, the court identified 3 factors: (1) the defendant had his day in court; (2) each element of the lesser-included offense was included in the more serious offense; and (3) the jury's conviction for the more serious offense implies guilt in of the lesser-included offense. In State v. R.P., the court added a prejudice element to the 3 factors by stating that, when all 3 factors are met and the defendant is not unduly prejudiced, a molded verdict should be granted for the state. The court reversed and remanded the matter. If you are charged with a sex crime you are subject to incarceration, registration as a sex offender and the accompanying stigma which will effect where you may live, where you may work and how others will treat you and possibly even civil commitment. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you with these charges. For more information about rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact and other sex crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Motion To Suppress Handgun Denied

James Legette was indicted for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b) and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-7). Legette, once in police custody entered his residence, with officers, and attempted to remove a handgun from his own person to avoid police detecting the gun in any subsequent search of his person. State v. Legette began when police responded to a noise complaint and noted the defendant coming from a building smelling of burnt marijuana and stopped him for investigatory purposes. The defendant claimed the need to enter his apartment to obtain his identification and the officer agreed and accompanied him. While walking through the premises toward the defendant's apartment, the office noticed what appeared to be a gun in the pocket of the defendant's sweatshirt. Once inside his apartment, the defendant produced his identification and removed his sweatshirt while the officer was radioing in the defendant's information. The defendant agreed to accompany the officer back outside with the officer carrying the sweatshirt defendant had removed as evidence. Once outside, a search of the sweatshirt by the officer's K-9 obviated the handgun in the pocket of the sweatshirt and the defendant was placed under arrest. In an ensuing motion to suppress the handgun, the NJ Superior Court trial judge held that James Legette was validly accompanied into his residence by police when sought to enter his own residence for the stated purpose of obtaining his identification. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Division reviewed State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281 (2013) giving the officer the right to enter the common hallway of the building as he was called to the scene by citizens to investigate a noise complaint. Also under Walker, the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the door the defendant opened gave the officer probable cause to believe contraband may be present. State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 314 (2014) which read the fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution to guarantee individuals the right of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure in their homes. However, under State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 234 (1983) when an individual under arrest chooses to enter their residence to obtain an item, it is both permissible and reasonable for officers to accompany them into the residence. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge. If you are facing charges stemming from illegal possession of a handgun, BB gun, paintball gun or other weapon it is critical you not undertake these matters without experienced counsel. For more information about unlawful possession of a weapon, illegal weapons, possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes or other serious weapons offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

S2003/A4229 Promotes Rehabilitation Of Juvenile Offenders

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if S2003, a Senate bill, the same as A4229 in the Assembly, is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial, and represented. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would make 15 the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult. S2003 would permit juveniles to be tried as adults only for Criminal homicide other than death by auto, strict liability for drug induced deaths, first-degree robbery, carjacking, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, second-degree aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated arson, certain gang criminality; or when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent, or convicted, on the basis of certain offenses enumerated; or when the juvenile had previously been sentenced and confined in an adult penal institution; or offense against a person committed in an aggressive, violent and willful manner; or the unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon, arson or death by auto while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug; or a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; or a conspiracy; certain forms of attempt or conspiracy; or theft of an automobile pursuant to chapter 20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; or possession of a firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person of another or the crime of aggravated assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, burglary or escape if, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime including the immediate flight therefrom, the juvenile possessed a firearm; or computer criminal activity which would be a crime of the first or second degree; and other specific crimes involving controlled dangerous substances. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. In certain cases juveniles could remain in youth facilities until age 21 even if they are convicted as adults. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. A prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part would be required to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. The bill was passed by both the Senate and Assembly and now will move before Governor Chris Christie for consideration. If you or your child have been charged as a juvenile offender, it is critical that you seek an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and your future. Do not compound one mistake by choosing the wrong criminal defense attorney. For more information about juvenile offenses, gang crimes, and various criminal offenses in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Confession Admissible Under Miranda

Jerome L. Faucette was charged with first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)) and robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) after driving a vehicle for Terrence S. Clemmons during Clemmons robbery and shooting of a gas station attendant. Faucette was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to 13 years in prison with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Faucette appealed claiming his statement was not made voluntarily on the grounds that he had invoked his right to counsel. On May 14, 2008, at 7:00 pm, police requested defendant accompany them to the police station for questioning with which he complied. Faucette was read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) at the police station and spoke with police until approximately 8:00 pm when he asked to leave, however, the police continued questioning Faucette until 2:30 am. Faucette did not invoke his right to counsel. On May 15, 2008, police returned to the defendant's residence at 4:00 pm to return him to the police station where he was again advised of his Miranda rights and arrested. Detectives questioned Ms. Spencer and Mr. Gaddy, Faucette's former girlfriend and friend. Both of these individuals advised police that Faucette had admitted to participating in the robbery planned by the co-defendant, Clemons. Faucette ultimately admitted to participation in the robbery as a driver but denied involvement in the murder or prior knowledge thereof. In State v. Faucette, the judge held that the initial interview, wherein no confession was obtained, violated the defendant's rights under Miranda following the defendant's request to terminate the interview, however, the second interview was not in violation of defendant's rights and the confession provided therein was voluntary. The court granted suppression of all information obtained after 8:03 p.m. during the initial interview but found all remaining statements to be admissible. On appeal, the defendant challenged the voluntariness of his confession based on coercion and violation of his rights under Miranda. The NJ Appellate Division turned to State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) with regard to Miranda requirements when there is a challenge to voluntariness of a confession. Pursuant to State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964), reiterated in State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 109-10 (2010), as long as the findings of the trial judge are detailed and supported by factual and credible evidence the findings below are not to be disturbed. However, the deference accorded in Johnson and Davila are dependent upon the trial court's ability to hear testimony from officers, experts and witnesses and not the mere review of a videotaped confession from which the Appellate Division can also draw independent conclusions. State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565-66 (2011). The Fifth Amendment grants privilege against self-incrimination and this right is afforded to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division looked to State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993), with regard to a defendant's right against self-incrimination in New Jersey and to State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449 (2005) with regard to the upholding of that right through Miranda protections. State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993) was the case looked to by the Appellate Division in determining whether the State or defendant bears the burden of proving voluntariness of a confession and found the burden is borne by the State. State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000), dictates that a the "voluntary intelligent statement" of a defendant properly notified of his rights under Miranda is a valid and admissible confession. After reviewing the circumstances in this specific matter, the Appellate Division found that Faucette's second confession was knowingly and voluntarily given with full information and understanding of Miranda warnings and that there was no "taint from the May 14 Miranda violations" in violation of State v. O'Neil, 193 N.J. 148, (2007) or State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639 (1990). Further, the Appellate Division affirmed that Faucette did not, at any time during the questioning, invoke his right to counsel. The NJ Appellate Division found Faucette's confession to be voluntary and affirmed the decision of the trial court. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, robbery, conspiracy, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Warning To The Wise About Your Car's 'Black Box'

If you are charged with criminal activity, the police now have another source of information to use against you, the information stored in your car's 'black box.' The Senate voted to approve NJ A3579, a bill introduced by the NJ Assembly on September 11, 2013 pertaining to the use of information from automobile ‘black box’ recording devices. The information recorded and stored by the ‘black box’ includes location, time of use, number of occupants inside the vehicle, direction of travel and speed. In addition to providing evidence in the case of a motor vehicle accident, the information is also accessible for law enforcement purposes. The text of the NJ A3579 includes the following: “2. a. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, no person, except the owner of the motor vehicle that contains the recording device, or the owner's representative, may retrieve, obtain, or use data recorded, stored, or transmitted from the recording device, unless: (1) The owner of the motor vehicle, or the owner's representative, consents in writing at the time the data is retrieved, obtained, or used; (2) The recorded data is retrieved or obtained by a law enforcement officer pursuant to a search warrant issued by a judge of the Superior Court or upon order by a court of competent jurisdiction or another administrative authority having jurisdiction to issue such an order;” Although the bill, recently approved by the NJ Senate, limits the use of the stored data, it did not preclude its use by law enforcement. This means that if the police believe that a motor vehicle was utilized in the commission of a crime they may be able to obtain the information from the vehicle’s ‘black box’ that would assist in the investigation and prosecution of any suspects. For more information about specific crimes or criminal defense in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Conviction Reversed On Prejudicial Hearsay

Stephen Scharf was convicted of first-degree purposeful and knowing murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2)) for the murder of his wife, Jody Scharf. Stephen and Jody Scharf were together at the top of the Englewood Cliffs in Bergen County. The defendant contacted the police indicating Jody Scharf must have slipped from Rockefeller Lookout atop the cliffs when he returned to their vehicle to obtain a blanket. The body of Jody Scharf was later located at the bottom of the cliffs, a distance of 52 feet from the base horizontally. The defendant was interviewed by police and the parties' son corroborated his story but also added that the night prior to Jody Scharf's death, he had accompanied them to a late dinner as his mother did not wish to be alone with his father upon whom she had recently served divorce papers claiming abuse and adultery. Both of the parties' sons also provided details of their mother's fear of heights with regard to the notion of her interest in going to the edge of the cliffs. In addition to the fact that Jody Scharf had filed for divorce, the defendant stood to receive $500,000 in life insurance proceeds from her death. In State v. Scharf, pre-trial motions to suppress hearsay testimony from Jody Scharf's counselor and friends were denied based on the judge's reliance on State v. Benedetto, 120 N.J. 250 (1990) and N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) and the jury was permitted to hear statements about the likelihood defendant murdered Jody Scharf or that she had been afraid of him. The prosecution and defense offered conflicting testimony as to how the body ended up 52 feet from the base of the cliffs. Two of defendant's paramours contradicted Sharf's claims to police that he and Jody Scharf were attempting to reconcile and had terminated relationships with them. Defendant appealed the guilty verdict in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County and the sentence of life in prison with a 30-year parole ineligibility period. The NJ Appellate Division considered defendant's challenge to the hearsay evidence admitted below under N.J.R.E. 401 with regard to the weight of prejudice against the weight of probative value and N.J.R.E. 801(c) pertaining directly to hearsay defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." The Appellate Division referenced State v. Calleia, 206 N.J. 274 (2011) wherein the court considered statements of fear which had the danger of creating an inference of violence as an ongoing part of the relationship between the victim and defendant against the introduction of statements to establish the defendant's motive to commit the crime. Ultimately, motive evidence was held to be admissible as a "material issue in a case." Id. at 293-294, provided that the danger of prejudice by the statement offered does not outweigh the probative value. In this balancing, it is the burden of the party seeking exclusion of the statement to establish that it is more likely to be prejudicial than probative. State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383,453 (1998). Pursuant to Calleia, the State must then show that the accused was most likely aware of the decedent's statement. The NJ Appellate Division determined the statements offered were "neither relevant nor material" and that they were "highly prejudicial and clearly cumulative." The court held that the victims fear of defendant did not make it any more or less likely that she slipped and fell off the cliff to which she voluntarily accompanied the defendant, especially in light of the fact that the autopsy did reveal that she was clearly under the influence of alcohol while on the edge of the cliff. Ultimately, the NJ Appellate Division determined that the defendant had quite possibly been deprived of a fair trial and reversed and remanded the matter for a retrial. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

First-Degree Robbery Conviction Does Not Require Presence Of A Weapon

When a would-be bank robber claims to have a weapon and creates a reasonable fear that he does have such weapon, he is subject to charges of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b)). When Christopher Dekowski entered Commerce Bank in Roselle acting suspiciously, including feigning the locking of the banks doors, carrying a briefcase and dressed in a manner differing from the seasonal norm he quickly drew the bank manager's attention. Dekowski approached a teller, at which time the manager intervened and saw a note indicating that the teller was to place all of the money in a bag and implying that Dekowski had a bomb which he would use if the teller failed to comply. Dekowski was given $500 and apprehended. In the Superior Court, Law Division, Union County, the defendant was convicted, in State v. Dekowski, of first-degree robbery and sentenced to a 13-year prison term with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). The NJ Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence with regard to possession of a weapon, as required for a conviction of first-degree robbery, and determining second-degree robbery to be established remanded for resentencing accordingly. In State v. Williams, ___ N.J. ____, ____ (2014) the NJ Supreme Court held that a conviction for first-degree robbery does not require a weapon but only the victim's "actual and reasonable belief that a weapon exists and the defendant's threatened immediate use of such weapon." In Williams, the court relied on State v. Hutson, 107 N.J. 222, 227-228 (1987), holding that the belief in the presence of a weapon need be reasonable under the specific circumstances. The court considered the Dekowski's threat that he had a bomb in concert with the public knowledge and general fear of bombs in contemporary society in determining the reasonableness of the bank manager's belief in the presence of a weapon in making its determination that the defendant's conviction for first-degree robbery would be reinstated. First-degree robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

NJ Firearms Purchaser Identification Card Denied For NY Charges

George Winston was denied a New Jersey firearms purchaser identification (FPI) card in 2011 as a result of convictions in New York of attempted assault in 1974 and possession of a controlled dangerous substance in 1989. The Clifton, New Jersey Chief of Police denied Winston an FPI card in spite of "certificates of relief from disabilities" for the prior New York convictions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3c(1). In the Matter of the Denial of the Application of Winston the Superior Court- Law Division, Passaic County judge heard testimony from Winston and others as well as a Clifton detective undertaking the background search with regard to the application. The Clifton detective indicated that Winston's background also included domestic violence charges, a driving under the influence (DUI) charge and disputes with neighbors on more than one occasion. The Law Division judge found that the New York certificates of relief were not entitled to the Full Faith and Credit Clause as they were not equivalent to a New Jersey expungement under New York law but rather they remove certain bars to employment under New York law. If you are seeking a permit to obtain a firearm, you should seek an experienced attorney to assist you in your matter. If you are caught illegally carrying firearms the penalties can be severe making it well worth the effort to seek a permit to carry legally. For more information about gun or weapon possession, possession of weapons during a drug related offense, armed robbery, possession of a handgun without a permit, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon or possession of a weapon while on parole or probation visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.