Manslaughter, Not Self-Defense, For Killing An Unintended Victim

For the murder of Lavern Ritch, Robert Davies was charged by a grand jury with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)-(b)); aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); passion/provocation manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2)); second-degree reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1)); third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)); fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a)); and possessing a knife under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for its use (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). At the close of a trial, Davies was found guilty of second-degree reckless manslaughter, third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. Prior to sentencing, Davies motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial were denied by the court. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison subject to a mandatory extended term for manslaughter pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e), a discretionary extended term under the persistent offender statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) and a period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) but offered no clarification of the actual basis for the extended term. Additionally, the sentenced set forth on the record differs from that in the Judgment of Conviction as to whether sentences for the weapons convictions would run consecutive or concurrent to the manslaughter sentence. At trial, in State v. Davies, the defendant represented himself pro se for some time prior to requesting that stand-by counsel assume representation on his behalf. Testimony at trial indicated that Davies had just been punched by Chavez following the exchange of words the restroom of a bar shortly prior to the attack and was chasing Chavez when Ritch, running behind him along with other companions of Chavez touched the defendant on the shoulder from behind at which time the defendant turned around and stabbed Ritch. The defendant claimed to have stabbed Ritch thinking he was defending himself against another attack from Chavez’ companions. Witnesses testified that, when defendant spun around toward Ritch, Ritch put his hands up and stated he was trying to help Davies although some testimony differed from testimony offered to police previously. Witnesses testified to seeing Davies strike Ritch, although no knife was visible, and then seeing Davies immediately resume pursuit of Chavez. Witnesses immediately went to Ritch who was bleeding from his side and said he had been stabbed. His death ultimately resulted from a stab wound to the heart. Davies appealed seeking a new trial due to multiple alleged errors relating to the trial. With regard to the defendant's theory of self-defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 requires the need to protect oneself from death or serious bodily harm in order to justify the use of deadly force within certain confined areas. The events in the within matter occurred in a public area and did not give rise to a claim of self-defense in the opinion of the NJ Appellate Division. Additionally, under N.J.S.A. 2C:3-3 to 2C:3-8, even if Davies had been justified in using deadly force against Chavez, the Appellate Division determined the reckless and negligent use of deadly force against Ritche was unjustifiable. As such, the trial court did not err in failing to provide the jury with instructions regarding Davies self-defense claims. After ample consideration of Davies other multiple challenges to jury instructions and court procedures, the Appellate Division found there were no errors requiring a reversal of the conviction. The Appellate Division did find that, pursuant to State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628 (1996), merger is required of the offenses although the victim was ultimately an unintended victim. The matter was remand the matter for re-sentencing including the requirement that the trial court set forth fully its consideration under the factors of State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985) and the basis for any extended term pursuant to State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 610 (2014) and State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 170 (2006). Additionally, the trial court is directed to sentence Davies in consideration of his present lifestyle and conditions as opposed to how circumstances presented him on the date of the original sentencing pursuant to State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012). If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Stay Of Suspension During DUI Appeals Becomes Unlikely

As a result of State v. Robinson, judges have been warned about the stay of license suspensions pending appeal in driving under the influence (DUI) cases. Brian Robertson was convicted of driving while intoxicated as a result of the officers observations and his Alcotest reading of .13% blood alcohol content (BAC) after Robertson provided breath samples. In an effort to eliminate the Alcotest results, the defendant sought records with regard to repairs and diagnostic tests with regard to the specific Alcotest machine used. The records were not provided and the defendant appealed. Both the municipal court judge and the state court judge stayed the sentence of 7 month license suspension pending appeal. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the conviction as some of the records sought had been deleted in good faith and others would not sway the court from convicting the defendant based on the officers observations and totality of the circumstances. The most problematic issue with this case for the Appellate Division was the stays of sentence permitted without findings as to the factors set forth in Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982). The factors include the result of irreparable harm to the defendant if temporary relief is not afforded, whether any substantial issue remains unsettled, whether all material facts are controverted, and the whether a hardship would result to the defendant in the event the defendant's license suspension was not stayed. Neither the municipal court judge nor law division judge made findings with regard to defendant's driving or substance abuse history or any harms, such as loss of employment, he could have sustained as a result of the sentence imposed. As a result of the need to protect the public from the possibility of defendant's re-offending during the appellate process, judges are cautioned that stays pending appeal are not to be utilized "without giving good reason for it." A conviction for driving while intoxicated or driving under the influence in NJ has serious and lasting effects including the obvious loss of license as well as ramifications in later civil or criminal suits for wrongful death, damages and the like. A DUI, even if a first, can result in lengthy suspensions, fines and even jeopardize your ability to obtain certain professional licenses or other jobs. If you are charged with DUI in NJ, you should contact an experienced driving under the influence defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information about DWI, drug DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit www.HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Mandatory And Discretionary Extended Terms In Drug Case?

James Robinson sold 3 bags of crack cocaine to an undercover officer in 2003 and was indicted for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3)); second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 500 feet of public property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1); third-degree possession of CDS (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); and third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3)). Due to Robinson's prior criminal history, including convictions for distribution of CDS in a school zone, receiving stolen property, eluding a police officer, burglary, and criminal restraint exposing another to serious bodily injury, the trial court imposed a discretionary extended term sentence of 15 years imprisonment with a 3 year period of parole ineligibility, a mandatory extended term of 15 years with a 5 year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) as a repeat drug offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) in State v. Robinson. Defendant was also sentenced to a mandatory extended term of 7 years imprisonment with a 3 year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed the sentence claiming that a court may not impose a discretionary extended term when a mandatory extended term has been imposed in the same proceeding. The appellate division affirmed the decision of the trial court. The NJ Supreme Court then reversed the decision after consideration of the Legislative intent in providing for extended terms for certain repeat offenders. Under the Model Penal Code (MPC), sentencing uniformity was a consideration in conjunction with affording courts the flexibility to achieve deterrence as needed. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) limits the number of extended terms which a court may impose in a sentencing, however, multiple mandatory extended terms may be imposed in a single proceeding (State v. Connell, 208 N.J. Super. 688 (App. Div. 1986)). The court then turned to the holding of State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513 (2012) and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) to be a bar to the addition of a discretionary extended term when the trial court is required to impose a mandatory extended term on another offense if both are in the same proceeding. If you are facing charges for possession or distribution you will be facing severe penalties and should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of CDS, possession with intent to distribute, distribution within 500 feet of a public place, distribution in a school zone, prescription drug matters or other serious drug offenses in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.