Manslaughter, Not Self-Defense, For Killing An Unintended Victim

For the murder of Lavern Ritch, Robert Davies was charged by a grand jury with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)-(b)); aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); passion/provocation manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2)); second-degree reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1)); third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)); fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a)); and possessing a knife under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for its use (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). At the close of a trial, Davies was found guilty of second-degree reckless manslaughter, third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. Prior to sentencing, Davies motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial were denied by the court. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison subject to a mandatory extended term for manslaughter pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e), a discretionary extended term under the persistent offender statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) and a period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) but offered no clarification of the actual basis for the extended term. Additionally, the sentenced set forth on the record differs from that in the Judgment of Conviction as to whether sentences for the weapons convictions would run consecutive or concurrent to the manslaughter sentence. At trial, in State v. Davies, the defendant represented himself pro se for some time prior to requesting that stand-by counsel assume representation on his behalf. Testimony at trial indicated that Davies had just been punched by Chavez following the exchange of words the restroom of a bar shortly prior to the attack and was chasing Chavez when Ritch, running behind him along with other companions of Chavez touched the defendant on the shoulder from behind at which time the defendant turned around and stabbed Ritch. The defendant claimed to have stabbed Ritch thinking he was defending himself against another attack from Chavez’ companions. Witnesses testified that, when defendant spun around toward Ritch, Ritch put his hands up and stated he was trying to help Davies although some testimony differed from testimony offered to police previously. Witnesses testified to seeing Davies strike Ritch, although no knife was visible, and then seeing Davies immediately resume pursuit of Chavez. Witnesses immediately went to Ritch who was bleeding from his side and said he had been stabbed. His death ultimately resulted from a stab wound to the heart. Davies appealed seeking a new trial due to multiple alleged errors relating to the trial. With regard to the defendant's theory of self-defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 requires the need to protect oneself from death or serious bodily harm in order to justify the use of deadly force within certain confined areas. The events in the within matter occurred in a public area and did not give rise to a claim of self-defense in the opinion of the NJ Appellate Division. Additionally, under N.J.S.A. 2C:3-3 to 2C:3-8, even if Davies had been justified in using deadly force against Chavez, the Appellate Division determined the reckless and negligent use of deadly force against Ritche was unjustifiable. As such, the trial court did not err in failing to provide the jury with instructions regarding Davies self-defense claims. After ample consideration of Davies other multiple challenges to jury instructions and court procedures, the Appellate Division found there were no errors requiring a reversal of the conviction. The Appellate Division did find that, pursuant to State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628 (1996), merger is required of the offenses although the victim was ultimately an unintended victim. The matter was remand the matter for re-sentencing including the requirement that the trial court set forth fully its consideration under the factors of State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985) and the basis for any extended term pursuant to State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 610 (2014) and State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 170 (2006). Additionally, the trial court is directed to sentence Davies in consideration of his present lifestyle and conditions as opposed to how circumstances presented him on the date of the original sentencing pursuant to State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012). If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Handgun Located By Casino Valet Not Suppressed

Phillip King was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)). King left his car with a casino valet at Trump Plaza and, upon entering the vehicle the valet noticed the center console to be partially open. The valet then attempted to close the console and could not. Upon opening the console to attempt to move the obstruction, the valet saw the obstruction was the butt of a handgun. The valet returned the console lid to its partially opened position and notified local police. Upon arrival, the police found the vehicle’s center console cover to be in the partially opened position and, without first obtaining a search warrant, opened the console to look inside and removed the handgun from the center console. The vehicle had Pennsylvania license plates, King had a valid Pennsylvania driver’s license and a valid Pennsylvania gun carry permit and claimed he was unaware that he could not legally transport the firearm in his vehicle in New Jersey. King sought to suppress the handgun over the State’s argument that warrantless search was valid under the community caretaking exception, the automobile exception and the third-party exception. The court held that the State had ample time to secure a warrant as the vehicle was parked in the casino’s garage and officers present at the scene could insure the vehicle was not moved. The court further held that the officer’s search exceeded the scope of the valet’s private search and therefore the third-party exception to the warrant requirement was invalidated. The State appealed with regard to the third-party intervention exception to the warrant only. The exemption assumes that a private party discovered the item or information and turned it over to police and therefore there was no violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921). The court considered State v. King to be very similar to United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed.2d 85 (1984) wherein a private party initially searched and notified authorities of the discovery then police went further in their search than the private party had. In Jacobsen the Supreme Court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cocaine discovered by the mail carrier. The court also reviewed State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991), State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307 (2012), State v. Saez, 268 N.J. Super. 250 (Ap. Div. 1993) and State v. Wright, 431 N.J. Super. 558 (App. Div. 2013), where in each case warrantless searches extended after third-party initiation were upheld by New Jersey courts. After considering the areas searched in the above mentioned matters and the expectation of privacy one could reasonably hope to have in a vehicle willingly turned over with keys to a valet, the court found that the officers actions beyond the scope of the valet in State v. King were minimal and therefore upheld the search and reversed the suppression of the handgun. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you are facing weapons charges you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Conviction Upheld After Graphic Photos Were Shown To Jury

Darwin Rodriguez-Ferreira was convicted of knowing and purposeful murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2)); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d). At sentencing the defendant received a thirty year prison sentence including a thirty year parole disqualifier and consecutive eighteen month sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon. Kendall was found lying in the street near his Jersey City home with multiple stab wounds. Multiple calls to and from "Darwin" were found in Kendall's cell phone log and a bloody knife wrapped in boxer shorts was found nearby shortly thereafter. The blood contained Kendall's DNA and the boxer shorts contained Darwin's DNA. The defendant left the country with a one-way ticket the day after the murder and police found bloodstains with Kendall's DNA on Darwin's floor while searching Darwin's residence. In State v. Rodriguez-Ferreira, the defendant appealed the convictions and sentence received in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County. At trial, over Darwin's objection, four graphic photos of Kendall's body depicting stab wounds to the neck and face, torso and forearm were presented to the jury. One photo, taken during the autopsy included stab wounds suffered by internal organs extracted from the body during the autopsy. N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits the inclusion of evidence if the probative value substantially outweighs the risk of prejudice to the jury through its revelation. In State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263 (1990), the NJ Supreme Court held that vivid and graphic details which may be difficult to look at do not necessarily call for exclusion of photographic evidence. State v. Sanchez, 244 N.J. Super. 231, 249-51 (App. Div. 1988) allows admission of murder victim photographs to prove the act was "purposeful and knowing." N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the photos. With regard to the sentence imposed, the trial court failed to consider the relevant factors under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) and the matter was remanded by the Appellate Division for sentencing including an articulation of the how the Yarbough Factors apply to require a consecutive sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon. If you are facing murder charges, it is the state's burden to prove your guilt and they must do so in a just and appropriate manner, without the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence or testimony. It is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to ensure your rights are protected against prejudicial acts by the prosecution or the judge. For more information regarding homicide, assault, weapons charges or other serious criminal issues in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Pled To Aggravated Manslaughter Leads To PCR Appplication

Lynn Giovanni was charged with first-degree purposeful and or knowing murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), 3(a)(2)); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). She pled to aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4) as a lesser included offense of knowing or purposeful murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), -(a)(2)) and was sentenced to 30 years in prison with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Giovanni bludgeoned her 14 year old daughter to death while she slept. At the time, Giovanni was being treated for depression and post-traumatic stress disorder and her daughter was having behavioral and adjustment problems after her parents' divorce and was being treated for depression. After killing her daughter, the defendant took multiple prescriptions in an effort to commit suicide but was unsuccessful. She then left the residence and repeatedly drove her vehicle into a guardrail trying to kill herself. During pre-trial psychological examinations of the defendant by defense experts she indicated that her actions were designed only to help her daughter end her pain and ultimately be with her through suicide and indicated that she had planned the killing for about a month. The State, under State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3 (1965),conducted psychological examinations of the defendant which found her to be capable of understanding her actions at the time of the killing and that her actions were deliberate. After considering all evidence the parties came to terms on a plea agreement to first-degree murder but with the prosecutor recommending a sentence for aggravated manslaughter. At sentencing, in State v. Giovanni, the court reviewed the plea fully and the defendant participated in the conversation, providing replies when called for. Although the defendant filed no direct appeal, the defendant sought post-conviction relief (PCR) claiming that her sentence violated Briggs as her factual basis was not appropriate to aggravated manslaughter and mental issues interfered with her ability to understand the plea or sentence. She also claimed, during the PCR hearing, that her counsel advised her not to speak at sentencing. Defendant's counsel denied any such assertion. She further referenced plea offers which never existed in reality and the fact that her counsel did not adequately pursue insanity and diminished capacity defenses. Defendant next appealed the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief and the denial was upheld on all counts but remanded for reconsideration of her application to withdraw her plea in light of the lower court's misapplication of the factors set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). Slater sets forth the standard for review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims as requiring the showing that "(1) counsel's performance was objectively deficient, falling outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; and (2) that counsel's performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional efforts, the result of the proceeding would have been different." With regard to Slater factor one in particular, the court below was seen as taking a particularly harsh view. Regarding factor two, the court was advised to reconsider the defendant's mental capacity on remand. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Reversal of Manslaughter Conviction After Jury Accesses Taped Statement

Matthew Craddock was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)), as a lesser included offense of murder charges, for the stabbing death of James Grace, who was dating Craddock's ex-girlfriend, M.P. He was also convicted of third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)) and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). At trial, in addition to other evidence presented, the jury heard the defendant's entire taped confession to the police as well as a voicemail the defendant left on his girlfriend's phone after the incident. Testimony for the State was also provided by M.P., her friend L.A., and L.A.'s fiance' Mi.P who all witnessed the altercation between Craddock and Grace. None actually witnessed the actual stabbing but they did hear Grace yell "he stabbed me" and one saw the defendant throw an object that appeared to be a knife handle into the road. The defendant offered a different version of the facts than the others and claimed his actions were in self-defense as an altercation erupted when he was attempting to retrieve M.P.'s cell phone from another individual, Grace, who the defendant believed had stolen the phone. Craddock was sentenced to an aggregate 24-year term with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Craddock appealed based on the admission of the taped statements without redaction under claim that certain information in the recordings was more prejudicial than probative. In State v. Craddock, the NJ Appellate Division considered the holding in State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119 (2008) wherein it was determined that allowing a jury full access to a videotaped statement had the potential for great prejudice. In State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011) the court held that the review, by the jury, of taped statements should be undertaken in court where parties are present and judges my provide jury instructions with regard to portions replayed. Finally, in State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542 (2013) the court held that the jury should not have unfettered access to audio or videotaped statements during deliberations. Once the appellate division determined that the trial court erred in providing the jury with unfettered access to the taped statements, it was further determined that the potential prejudice to the defendant from the jury's access to the statements was not harmless error and the conviction was reversed with the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. If you are facing charges of murder, manslaughter or weapons charges, you are facing severe penalties including as much as life in prison. When confronting criminal charges, it is imperative that you have experienced criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you are afforded due process and your rights are protected. For more information about murder, manslaughter, weapons offenses or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Conviction For Attempted Murder of Newark Police Officer Upheld On Appeal

Omar Bridges and two co-conspirators were charged, by an Essex County grand jury, with three counts of first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and 2C:5-1); three counts of second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); second-degree possession of a weapon, a handgun, for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f)); third-degree receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7); second-degree eluding (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)); and first-degree conspiracy to attempt to murder the occupants of a vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:11-3). Bridges was ultimately convicted of the attempted murder of Newark Police Officer Patinho, aggravated assault on Officer Patinho, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, unlawful possession of an assault weapon, receiving stolen property and certain persons not to have weapons. For his participation in stealing a Jaguar, engaging in a shoot-out with occupants of another vehicle and the shooting of a police officer in the chase thereafter, Omar Bridges was sentenced to an aggregate 40-year prison term. Officer Pathino's testimony at trial was that he saw the shoot-out while on patrol and, upon turning on the squad car's lights, a Jaguar and Subaru fled in different directions with Pathino chasing the Jaguar. The chase through Newark lasted approximately two minutes at 90 to 100 miles per hour until the Jaguar went airborne crossing railroad tracks and sustained heavy damage. When the Jaguar came to rest, Officer Pathino exited the squad car and ordered the Jaguar's passengers to show their hands at which time the passenger shot Officer Pathino. Officer Gasavage exchanged fire and the vehicle's occupants fled on foot. On appeal in State v. Bridges, the Defendant claimed the trial court erred in denying his request for a Wade hearing with regard to Officer Pathino's photo identification of the Defendant. Although New Jersey took a more broad approach to pre-trial identification in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), the Appellate Division determined that, under the circumstances of the case, United States v. Wade, 388, U.S. 218 (1967) did not serve to extend exclusionary principles of pre-trial identification procedures to in-court trial identifications in Defendant's case. The Defendant next raised the point that the sentencing court did not perform an appropriate analysis under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) which requires the court to consider six specific criteria in sentencing. The NJ Appellate Division agreed with the Defendant and remanded the matter to the sentencing court for a full statement of its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences as required under State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001). If you are facing murder or other serious charges, you are facing a prison sentence which may last your entire life. You require an experienced criminal defense attorney to protect your rights and ensure that your are provided with the best possible defense. For more information about murder, weapons offenses, theft and other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Conviction Cannot Stand on Cumulative Trial Errors

Jahnell Weaver and Khalil Bryant were in attendance at a graduation party in Camden, NJ where someone pulled a gun and fired 5 shots killing Edward Williams and wounding Amyr Hill. Although only one individual could have fired the gun, both Hill and Weaver were implicated by others at the party. Jahnell Weaver and Khalil Bryant were juveniles but both were charged as adults with first-degree murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2)); first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); third-degree assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and third-degree endangering an injured victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2). At trial, the only significant dispute was weather Weaver or Bryant was the shooter. Both Weaver and Bryant were seen with guns at the party. Hill identified Bryant as the shooter then changed his testimony while other witnesses offered conflicting testimony. Weaver offered that Bryant later used the same weapon in a shooting as a defense and Weaver moved for a separate trial. The court denied Weaver’s application to admit other crimes evidence regarding Bryant’s shooting of another individual shortly after the incident in question due to the substantial prejudice it would cause against Bryant as well as denying Weaver’s request for a separate trial. The State was able to admit Bryant’s statement that he received the gun immediately after the shooting in question. However, because Bryant did not testify, Weaver did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him with regard to the statement. Lamike Goffney, an eyewitness, saw one of the men fleeing the scene hand the gun to another man fleeing the scene and other evidence in the trial led the jury to the conclusion that Bryant then received the weapon from Weaver. Weaver was ultimately convicted and appealed. After the NJ Appellate Division upheld the decision of the trial court, State v. Weaver was heard by the NJ Supreme Court. The NJ Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and remanded the matter for a new trial based on the potential prejudice to Weaver as a result of the cumulative errors in denying his request for a separate trial, refusing to allow other crimes evidence and allowing Bryant’s statement to enter without cross-examination. The penalty for murder is severe including 30 years to life in prison. If you are facing homicide charges, you need experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about murder, homicide, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, assault, assault with a deadly weapon or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Rap Lyrics Are Not Evidence Of Prior Crimes

Vonte Skinner was charged with attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a(3), 2C:11-3a(1)); aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)); and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2)); unlawful possession of a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5); and possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a) and convicted of attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a(3), 2C:11-3a(1)); aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)); and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2)). Skinner received an extended term of 30 years in prison and subject to certain parole ineligibility and supervision under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Skinner’s case arose as a result of the 2005 shooting of Lamont Peterson multiple times at close range with a handgun. Evidence at the scene, including a cell phone belonging to Skinner, led to his arrest. During Skinner’s arrest, while driving someone else’s vehicle, his rap lyrics were recovered on the back seat of the vehicle. Peterson survived and advised the police that Peterson and Skinner both sold drugs for Brandon C. Rothwell. After Skinner joined the team as the third man, Peterson’s profits fell and he began keeping some of Rothwell’s money. Peterson and Skinner both testified that on the night of the shooting they had been in cell phone contact multiple times to arrange a meeting during which Skinner was to buy cocaine from Peterson. When Peterson arrived to meet Skinner, Rothwell was with Skinner. Peterson remembered seeking Skinner and the gun but no other details. Skinner testified that just as Peterson was about to give him the drugs he heard a gunshot and he and Peterson both ran off in different directions. Both sides offered witnesses at trial giving conflicting testimony. The State’s main evidence was the Defendant’s rap lyrics. The jury was not advised that the lyrics were written over several years but did hear an extensive portion of the lyrics and was made aware that the lyrics were in the first person view of a narrator named “Threat” which is a name Skinner has tattooed on his arm. The lyrics described multiple violent acts by “Threat”. The matter was appealed by the Defendant based in part on the reading of Skinner’s rap lyrics to jurors by the prosecution for the purpose of establishing motive and intent on the part of Skinner. The Defendant claimed the lyrics were not properly authenticated and inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) due to substantial prejudice to defendant outweighing their probative value. The NJ Appellate Division cited State v. Crumb, 307 N.J. Super. 204 (App. Div. 1997) and State v. Koskovich, 168 NJ. 448 (2001) which held that creative writing is merely expressive and does not constitute bad acts themselves and therefore writing comes within N.J.R.E. 404(b). The NJ Appellate Division determined the reading of the lyrics to be prejudicial to Skinner and prohibited by N.J.R.E. 404(b). The NJ Supreme Court heard State v. Skinner and rendered its decision on August 4, 2014. The Justices found that there was no real connection between the lyrics and the murder other than to inaccurately portray his depiction of street violence to establish Defendant’s motive and intent and upheld the decision of the NJ Appellate Division that the lyrics were highly prejudicial and of minimal probative value. The NJ Supreme Court heard the State’s argument that, under Joynes v. State, 797 A.2d 673, 677 (Del. 2002) that the act of creating rap lyrics is not, in and of itself, a “bad act” and should be governed under that standard of relevance under N.J.R.E. 401. The Court disagreed reasoning that N.J.R.E.404(b) is to protect a defendant from evidence which proves little while doing substantial harm. The Court’s primary analysis of admissibility under N.J.R.E. 404(b) was analysis of the 4 prongs of State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992): (1) that the other crime, wrong or bad act evidence pertains to some material issue in dispute in the instant matter; (2) the other crime is similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged ; (3) proof the evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and (4) any probative value is not outweighed by prejudice. If you are charged with a crime, there are strict limits to evidence which the State may use against you in making its case. To protect your freedom and rights if you are charged with any violent crime, you should consult with experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about murder, sexual assault, drugs, weapons charges or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In Gang Related Murder, Lawyer's Failure To Call Alibi Witnesses May Be Ineffective Assistance

Fedner Pierre-Louis, allegedly of the Playboy Posse criminal gang, was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)), third degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)). The defendant, in State of NJ v. Fedner Pierre-Louis, was sentenced to 45 years in prison for this murder of an oncologist, Jeffrey Perchick, at a hotel in the Newark area. Pierre-Louis was charged when a gun used in another crime was traced to him. However, Pierre-Louis offered his defense attorney seven potential alibi witnesses, including family members and friends from his night-school classes, who were willing to testify on his behalf. Defense counsel employed a private investigator who spoke with the alibi witnesses and determined them to be unreliable. As a result of the private investigator's assessment, defendant's counsel made the decision not to present any of the alibi witnesses and Pierre-Louis was convicted. Upon a post-conviction relief filing by defendant, the trial judge, Union County Superior Court Judge John Triarsi vacated the guilty verdict then reversed himself after reviewing documents demonstrating defendant's trial counsel knowingly made the decision not to present the alibi witnesses after interviews by the private investigator. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's ruling and the NJ Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certification. The NJ Supreme Court considered whether the petition for post-conviction relief satisfied the test set forth by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). The Justices heard arguments from the prosecution and defense regarding the with whom the decision to produce witnesses lies, the standard of review the trial judge must undertake and at one point the Court has the authority to disturb the trial judge's findings. Ultimately, the NJ Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were not sufficient with regard to either prong of the test and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new hearing including the presentation of the alibi witnesses for the purposes of determining credibility. If you are facing criminal charges in NJ, the consequences of a conviction can change your life. For more information about gang crimes, weapons charges, murder, manslaughter, robbery and other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In A Murder Trial, Does Replacing A Juror Deprive Defendant Of A Fair Trial?

Michael Ross II was charged with first degree murder of 2 men (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2)); second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); third degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and third degree hindering apprehension or prosecution (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1)). The matter was tried and the jury was sent for deliberations. After 6 full days of deliberations together, weighing the evidence presented at trial, the jurors sent out a note indicating they were deadlocked. Middlesex County Superior Court Judge James Mulvihill provided the jury with further instructions and ordered them to continue with deliberations. In roughly one hour's time, a juror indicated she was too ill to continue and the jurors were dismissed for the day. The following day, the juror again indicated she was too ill to participate and the judge spoke with her directly to verify that she was truly too ill to appear for further deliberations. Rather than waiting to see if the juror would be able to return, the judge replaced her. After four more days of deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Defendant appealed the matter of State v. Ross and the NJ Appellate Division reversed the conviction, determining the "jury had proceeded too far to expect the newly seated juror to be a full and equal participant in deliberations." In making their decision, the Appellate Division reconsidered State v. Banks, 395 N.J. Super. 205 (App.Div. 2007) and State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392 (1980) which addressed the replacement of jurors following deliberations and deadlock. The NJ Supreme Court took State v. Ross on the prosecution's appeal. The NJ Supreme Court justices addressed the proximity of the jurors notice of illness to the jury's indication of deadlock, the amount of time which elapsed from the substitution of the new juror to the arrival at the guilty verdicts and the extent to which the Judge went to ascertain the original juror's ability to appear in court for further deliberations. The defendant's attorney attempted to persuade the court that juror replacement should be barred following notice of a deadlock in order to protect the integrity of jury deliberations. No final decision has been reached in this matter but for those facing serious criminal charges and substantial deprivation of liberty, the result on future trials could prove substantial. For more information about murder, weapons possession, hindering or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.