Self-Defense Applies In Manslaughter Case

Jacob R. Gentry was charged with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a), aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)) and reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b) after a fight with David Haulmark in which Gentry's girlfriend and brother are alleged to also have been involved. Gentry maintained the killing was in self-defense as, while fighting with Haulmark, he was pinned to the ground, being choked and fighting for his life. At trial, the prosecution cross-examined defendant about statements which his brother had made to police which were hearsay, inadmissible at defendant's trial and never entered into the trial by defendant and defendant's brother did not testify in defendant's trial. After the court failed to inform the jury that self-defense was not only a justification to murder but also to aggravated manslaughter, Gentry was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and third-degree endangering an injured victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2) and sentenced, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Sussex County by Judge N. Peter Conforti to 30 years in prison subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). On Appeal in State v. Gentry, the NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 170 (2008) and State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200 (1984), regarding the requirement of a jury charge regarding self-defense when the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, supports the theory of self-defense. In Gentry, there was evidence presented that defendant and Haulmark worked together and were housed together for some time during which Gentry suffered repeated physical attacks and harassment at the hands of Haulmark and Haulmark's friends which were corroborated by independent witnesses including security from Legend's Resort wherein the workers were housed and other individuals who felt harassed by Haulmark. On the night in question, defendant claimed he feared for his life as Haulmark had him in a chokehold while on the ground and was biting him at the same time, all of which were supported by a physical examination of defendant's body following the event. Defendant admitted to kicking Haulmark, 80 pounds heavier than defendant, in the head after extracting himself from Haulmark's grip, out of fear that Haulmark would get back up and pursue him further. The defendant's testimony to police indicated that he had no idea Haulmark was seriously injured or dead until the police revealed the information. In Rodriguez, supra, 195 N.J. at 172, the NJ Supreme Court specifically held that one who kills in the belief that deadly force is required to spare his or her own life 'cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter.' N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) also sets forth the circumstances in which deadly force becomes acceptable as a form of self-defense. Once self-defense is established by testimony, it is the burden of the prosecution to disprove that the defendant acted in self-defense. State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 298 (2004), sets forth the principle that after sufficient evidence exists to support a self-defense charge to the jury, failure to instruct the jury that self-defense is a complete justification for murder and manslaughter defenses constitutes plain error. With regard to the prosecutor's cross-examination with regard to the statement of the defendant's non-testifying brother to the police, the prohibition is plainly stated in State v. Haskell, 100 N.J. 469, 478 (1985), "the out-of-court statement of a co-defendant is inadmissible against another defendant because admission of the statement violates the rule prohibiting hearsay and the defendant's fundamental right to confront witnesses." In this case, the witness was available and the defendant was offered no opportunity to cross-examine him at trial which, under State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 151 (2014), could have rendered the statement admissible. Multiple questions and comments in summation by the prosecutor clearly gave rise to prejudicial error in violation of Gentry's rights under State v. Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. 229 (2003); State v. Rucki, 367 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 2004); and State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158 (2001). Based on the cumulative errors at trial, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Proof Of DUI Alone Is Sufficient To Convict For Aggravated Manslaughter

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident while driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), William T. Liepe was charged with first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); second-degree vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)); and fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2). Max Guzman and 2 of his children were in a Honda Civic waiting to turn left at 1:00 p.m. on a Sunday afternoon in April, 2011. Guzman’s Honda was rear-ended by Liepe’s Ford Explorer and spun into another lane of travel where it was hit by a passing motorist, Rosa Vazquez, driving a Cadillac Escalade. Guzman’s younger child was killed, Guzman and his other child survived but suffered substantial injury. Vazquez, her mother and 2 children did not sustain life threatening injuries. Police found an open container of alcohol in Leipe’s vehicle and he admitted to the consumption of several beers earlier in the day. A sample of Leipe’s blood was taken and his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .192 typically indicates substantial impairment of one’s driving ability. Testimony was presented at trial that Liepe admitted to never having noticed the Honda in his path waiting to turn. Reconstruction of the accident revealed evidence relating to stopping distance and opportunity to avoid an accident. Ultimately, the trial court granted Liepe’s motion to dismiss aggravated manslaughter as a charge upon concluding that the State must prove more than intoxication. In State v. Liepe, the NJ Appellate Division considered State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1989) with regard to what inferences were permitted from extraneous evidence with regard to extreme indifference to human life. Radziwil also set forth that, in matters of driving under the influence, evidence of the exact degree of intoxication is not required to prove aggravated recklessness. In State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345 (2000), the court considered recklessness based on intoxication and set forth the premise that, although one could be convicted of driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) it is not conclusive evidence of reckless indifference to human life. The Appellate Division distinguished aggravated manslaughter from reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3)) in State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1984). Recklessness is shown by conscious disregard of “substantial and unjustifiable risk” of death as a result of the conduct in question. The level of disregard required is a “gross deviation” from that of a reasonable person. Aggravated manslaughter includes the heightened requirement that the situation be “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life” wherein risk becomes elevated from a possibility to a probability. The Appellate Division ultimately determined that evidence of intoxication, without more, shall survive a motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated manslaughter. If you are facing driving while intoxicated (DWI) or other criminal charges stemming from a driving under the influence or driving under the influence of drugs (DUID) charge, you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to protect yourself from loss of rights and liberties. For more information about DUI/DWI, assault by auto, aggravated assault or other serious motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Manslaughter, Not Self-Defense, For Killing An Unintended Victim

For the murder of Lavern Ritch, Robert Davies was charged by a grand jury with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)-(b)); aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); passion/provocation manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2)); second-degree reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1)); third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)); fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a)); and possessing a knife under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for its use (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). At the close of a trial, Davies was found guilty of second-degree reckless manslaughter, third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. Prior to sentencing, Davies motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial were denied by the court. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison subject to a mandatory extended term for manslaughter pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e), a discretionary extended term under the persistent offender statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) and a period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) but offered no clarification of the actual basis for the extended term. Additionally, the sentenced set forth on the record differs from that in the Judgment of Conviction as to whether sentences for the weapons convictions would run consecutive or concurrent to the manslaughter sentence. At trial, in State v. Davies, the defendant represented himself pro se for some time prior to requesting that stand-by counsel assume representation on his behalf. Testimony at trial indicated that Davies had just been punched by Chavez following the exchange of words the restroom of a bar shortly prior to the attack and was chasing Chavez when Ritch, running behind him along with other companions of Chavez touched the defendant on the shoulder from behind at which time the defendant turned around and stabbed Ritch. The defendant claimed to have stabbed Ritch thinking he was defending himself against another attack from Chavez’ companions. Witnesses testified that, when defendant spun around toward Ritch, Ritch put his hands up and stated he was trying to help Davies although some testimony differed from testimony offered to police previously. Witnesses testified to seeing Davies strike Ritch, although no knife was visible, and then seeing Davies immediately resume pursuit of Chavez. Witnesses immediately went to Ritch who was bleeding from his side and said he had been stabbed. His death ultimately resulted from a stab wound to the heart. Davies appealed seeking a new trial due to multiple alleged errors relating to the trial. With regard to the defendant's theory of self-defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 requires the need to protect oneself from death or serious bodily harm in order to justify the use of deadly force within certain confined areas. The events in the within matter occurred in a public area and did not give rise to a claim of self-defense in the opinion of the NJ Appellate Division. Additionally, under N.J.S.A. 2C:3-3 to 2C:3-8, even if Davies had been justified in using deadly force against Chavez, the Appellate Division determined the reckless and negligent use of deadly force against Ritche was unjustifiable. As such, the trial court did not err in failing to provide the jury with instructions regarding Davies self-defense claims. After ample consideration of Davies other multiple challenges to jury instructions and court procedures, the Appellate Division found there were no errors requiring a reversal of the conviction. The Appellate Division did find that, pursuant to State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628 (1996), merger is required of the offenses although the victim was ultimately an unintended victim. The matter was remand the matter for re-sentencing including the requirement that the trial court set forth fully its consideration under the factors of State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985) and the basis for any extended term pursuant to State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 610 (2014) and State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 170 (2006). Additionally, the trial court is directed to sentence Davies in consideration of his present lifestyle and conditions as opposed to how circumstances presented him on the date of the original sentencing pursuant to State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012). If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juvenile Seeks To Withdraw Manslaughter And Carjacking Pleas

Demitrius Minor, a juvenile offender, was charged with first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)) and first-degree carjacking (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1)-(3))for crimes occurring on different dates and involving different victims in each circumstance. Although only sixteen (16) years of age at the time, Minor waived jurisdiction in the Chancery Division, Family Part and entered a guilty plea to first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(3)) and first-degree carjacking in the Law Division, Criminal Part. The plea agreement called for a thirty (30) year prison term for aggravated manslaughter and a concurrent ten (10) year term for the carjacking charge. Defendant was also subject to a parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) with regard to the aggravated manslaughter charge. At sentencing, approximately three (3) months after giving a lengthy and detailed factual basis for the guilty plea previously entered, Minor sought to withdraw his plea of guilty based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but the trial judge refused to allow Minor to obtain substitute counsel and sentenced him according to the plea agreement as no formal motion had been filed. In State v Minor, the defendant appealed claiming that the trial judge committed reversible error. The NJ Appellate Division determined that an application for withdrawal of a guilty plea would require application of the factors set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009) which could not reasonably be expected of a defendant without the assistance of counsel. It was apparent on its face to the Appellate Division that, under Hayes, 205 N.J. 522 (2011), it was reversible error to deny Minor’s request for an adjournment. It is long-established that denial of adjournment may lead to reversal when the defendant suffers “manifest wrong or injury” as a result of said denial. State v. Doro, 103 N.J.L. 88, 93 (E. & A. 1926). The court cited Hayes, supra, 205 N.J. at 541-42, with regard to the need to remand for the limited purpose of a plea withdrawal hearing wherein the defendant shall represented by independent counsel. If you are a juvenile charged with acts that if committed by an adult would constitute serious crimes, you need experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you immediately. An experienced criminal defense attorney can guide you through the court proceedings including whether your matter is best resolved in the Family Court or Law Division and what your options are in either event. For more information about murder, juvenile offenses or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Expungement Changes May Still Come For NJ

NJ Assembly bill, A206, permitting automatic expungement of certain criminal records and reducing the waiting period required to obtain an expungement remains before the New Jersey Senate. The statutory waiting period prior to seeking expungement of more serious but expugnable crimes would be reduced from ten to seven years. The statutory waiting period for seeking expungement of disorderly or petty disorderly persons offenses would be reduced from five years to three years. Juvenile records could also be expunged after four years rather than the current five year period if the bill passes. Current requirements, including the non-commission of other prior or subsequent crimes during the requisite waiting period for expungement, would remain as existing with only the modification of the commensurate waiting periods required. The bill also provides for the automatic expungement, after three years, of disorderly or petty disorderly persons offenses for criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3) or shoplifting (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11) as well as drug offenses included in 2C:35 or 2C:36 offenses. This would reduce the waiting period from five to three years for expungement of these offenses. The current requirement that the applicant have no other convictions for any other prior or subsequent crimes or any other three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses would remain intact. Certain crimes including murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1), manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4), kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1), sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2), arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1), robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and other serious crimes shall remain unexpungeable. Additionally, conviction relating to the sale, distribution or possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances (CDS) shall not be subject to expungement except in certain narrowly defined circumstances. Proponents of the bill argue that there is no societal benefit to the extended waiting periods prior to seeking expungement and also cite to the societal interest in cleansing records in order to return eligible non-recidivists to the workforce. If you would like to expunge past mistakes from your record, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney to determine whether you are eligible for expungement and for help navigating the process of obtaining an expungement. For more information about the expungement of a criminal record, visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Pled To Aggravated Manslaughter Leads To PCR Appplication

Lynn Giovanni was charged with first-degree purposeful and or knowing murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), 3(a)(2)); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). She pled to aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4) as a lesser included offense of knowing or purposeful murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), -(a)(2)) and was sentenced to 30 years in prison with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Giovanni bludgeoned her 14 year old daughter to death while she slept. At the time, Giovanni was being treated for depression and post-traumatic stress disorder and her daughter was having behavioral and adjustment problems after her parents' divorce and was being treated for depression. After killing her daughter, the defendant took multiple prescriptions in an effort to commit suicide but was unsuccessful. She then left the residence and repeatedly drove her vehicle into a guardrail trying to kill herself. During pre-trial psychological examinations of the defendant by defense experts she indicated that her actions were designed only to help her daughter end her pain and ultimately be with her through suicide and indicated that she had planned the killing for about a month. The State, under State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3 (1965),conducted psychological examinations of the defendant which found her to be capable of understanding her actions at the time of the killing and that her actions were deliberate. After considering all evidence the parties came to terms on a plea agreement to first-degree murder but with the prosecutor recommending a sentence for aggravated manslaughter. At sentencing, in State v. Giovanni, the court reviewed the plea fully and the defendant participated in the conversation, providing replies when called for. Although the defendant filed no direct appeal, the defendant sought post-conviction relief (PCR) claiming that her sentence violated Briggs as her factual basis was not appropriate to aggravated manslaughter and mental issues interfered with her ability to understand the plea or sentence. She also claimed, during the PCR hearing, that her counsel advised her not to speak at sentencing. Defendant's counsel denied any such assertion. She further referenced plea offers which never existed in reality and the fact that her counsel did not adequately pursue insanity and diminished capacity defenses. Defendant next appealed the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief and the denial was upheld on all counts but remanded for reconsideration of her application to withdraw her plea in light of the lower court's misapplication of the factors set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). Slater sets forth the standard for review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims as requiring the showing that "(1) counsel's performance was objectively deficient, falling outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; and (2) that counsel's performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional efforts, the result of the proceeding would have been different." With regard to Slater factor one in particular, the court below was seen as taking a particularly harsh view. Regarding factor two, the court was advised to reconsider the defendant's mental capacity on remand. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Aggravated Manslaughter Conviction Reversed Due To Error

Dwayne Slaughter was convicted of aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4), conspiracy (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1) following the beating of his 79 year old neighbor, Roosevelt Morrow. The Defendant and Pritchard Watts both admitted to police they intended to enter Morrow's residence and rob him. Although the 2 men admitted they conspired to rob Morrow, they each blamed the other for his beating death. The Defendant's live-in girlfriend, Tanisha Day, gave police a taped statement which was presented to the jury at trial. Day's statement attributed an incriminating comment by using the term "he" but never indicated whether "he" implied Watts or Slaughter. However, Day did not testify and Defendant lost his opportunity to cross-examine her about her statement. Watts had taken a plea to first-degree robbery in exchange for his testimony at trial against Slaughter. There was no physical evidence indicating Slaughter was the actor. Slaughter appealed the conviction based on the admission of Day's statement. The NJ Appellate Division found that the admission of Day's statement was error but the error was harmless. The NJ Supreme Court found the error was not harmless as Day's statement could have implied either Watts or Slaughter and vacated the Defendant's conviction and remanded for new trial. If you are facing charges of murder, assault, or conspiracy you are facing severe penalties including as much as life in prison. When confronting criminal charges, it is imperative that you have experienced criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you are afforded due process and your rights are protected. For more information about murder, assault or conspiracy in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In Gang Related Murder, Lawyer's Failure To Call Alibi Witnesses May Be Ineffective Assistance

Fedner Pierre-Louis, allegedly of the Playboy Posse criminal gang, was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)), third degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)). The defendant, in State of NJ v. Fedner Pierre-Louis, was sentenced to 45 years in prison for this murder of an oncologist, Jeffrey Perchick, at a hotel in the Newark area. Pierre-Louis was charged when a gun used in another crime was traced to him. However, Pierre-Louis offered his defense attorney seven potential alibi witnesses, including family members and friends from his night-school classes, who were willing to testify on his behalf. Defense counsel employed a private investigator who spoke with the alibi witnesses and determined them to be unreliable. As a result of the private investigator's assessment, defendant's counsel made the decision not to present any of the alibi witnesses and Pierre-Louis was convicted. Upon a post-conviction relief filing by defendant, the trial judge, Union County Superior Court Judge John Triarsi vacated the guilty verdict then reversed himself after reviewing documents demonstrating defendant's trial counsel knowingly made the decision not to present the alibi witnesses after interviews by the private investigator. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's ruling and the NJ Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certification. The NJ Supreme Court considered whether the petition for post-conviction relief satisfied the test set forth by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). The Justices heard arguments from the prosecution and defense regarding the with whom the decision to produce witnesses lies, the standard of review the trial judge must undertake and at one point the Court has the authority to disturb the trial judge's findings. Ultimately, the NJ Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were not sufficient with regard to either prong of the test and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new hearing including the presentation of the alibi witnesses for the purposes of determining credibility. If you are facing criminal charges in NJ, the consequences of a conviction can change your life. For more information about gang crimes, weapons charges, murder, manslaughter, robbery and other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.