DUI Susupensions Do Not Call For Lenity

In State v. Rodriguez, five Defendants filed consolidated appeals after convictions of fourth degree operating a motor vehicle during suspensions for driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. The Defendants had all pled guilty to driving while suspended for driving under the influence, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, were seeking to serve their sentences at night or on weekends and the judge agreed, giving two of them night sentences and the other three received weekend only sentences. The Appellate Division ruled that the sentences meted out were within the court’s discretion but that the 180 day noncontiguous sentence had to be served in blocks of 24 hours each to qualify for a “day served”. The Appellate Division’s decision included the fact that N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) does not specify that the 180 days need be served consecutively, that there is no reduction in the total term of confinement and there was an effort to allow some lenity as long as there was no reduction in the deterrent effect of the sentence. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted the State’s petition for higher appeal, 234 N.J. 314 (2018), as to whether sentences could be served intermittently and ultimately held that one sentenced to a statutory minimum term of 180 days for operating a motor vehicle while suspended for DUI must serve the entire term consecutively. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) calls for a “fixed minimum sentence of not less than 180 days during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.” The Supreme Court reasoned that when the Legislature wishes to leave discretion to the sentencing court, they normally indicate so clearly in the language of the statute. Further, the court indicated that the clear reference to a minimum 180 day period of parole ineligibility is a bar to serving the term intermittently. If you have been charged with DUI or driving while suspended for DWI, contact The Darling Law Firm, LLC now at 973-584-6200 to speak to a seasoned attorney and insure your rights are protected. For more information on driving while intoxicated or driving while suspended, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI + Refusal = Jail

James T. Dougherty was convicted, on February 4, 2009 of refusal to submit to chemical breath testing (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a) and on February 23, 2009, of driving while intoxicated (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) . On August 19, 2015, 6 years later, he was convicted of DWI and, on November 9, 2015, he was convicted for refusal. Dougherty was later stopped, on December 19, 2015,while driving during the seven-month suspension period for the refusal (N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b)), a fourth degree crime for a second or subsequent DUI conviction. Dougherty ultimately pled guilty and, after receiving the statutory minimum 180 days incarceration, appealed based on the argument, he based on State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011), that a charge of DWI or refusal could not be used to enhance the penalties of the other and that incarceration stemmed only from two convictions for driving under the influence or two convictions for refusal to submit to chemical breath testing. Dougherty also claimed the statutory language was ambiguous and required dismissal of his indictment. The appellate division cited to the strong public policy interest in addressing the damage caused by drunken drivers and found the statutory language to be unambiguous as to the fact that either two DUI convictions, two refusal convictions or one of each would meet the requirement of two predicate violations and trigger a period of 180 days incarceration. The appellate division read Ciancaglini to hold that "a defendant's refusal conviction cannot be considered a prior DWI violation for enhancement purposes" in sentencing under the DWI statute and found the decision to have no bearing on sentencing for driving during a period of suspension for DWI or refusal. Further, the appellate division looked to State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566 (2014), reaffirming In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981) which held that a prior DUI conviction would serve to enhance the sentence for a subsequent refusal conviction. The matter of the number of years between the arrests and convictions was not addressed. The penalties for driving under the influence are severe including substantial fines, insurance surcharges, loss of license and often the loss of employment when you cannot drive to work. Each time you are convicted, the penalties get more harsh and you run the very real risk of jail time. If you are facing charges of DUI, refusal, CDS in a motor vehicle or driving while suspended for DUI or refusal, call the Darling Law Firm, LLC now for representation or visit DarlingFirm.com for more information. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Repeat Offenders Will Be Punished Accordingly

Repeat DUI (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) offenders may not serve weekend jail terms. Although it was determined by the N.J. Appellate Division on July 13, 2019, that those charged with multiple driving under the influence charges are ineligible for periods of incarceration over a length of time, many charged with such repeat offenses continue to believe the alternate sentencing in possible. State v. Grabowski, a 2006 case, held that periodic imprisonment was acceptable for multiple drunk driving offenses. Pedro Anicama, a Newark restaurateur convicted of his third DWI, was permitted by the Harrison Municipal Court to serve his sentence of incarceration by spending 2 days per week in jail so as to minimize the adverse effect of the incarceration on Anicama's business. On a trial de novo in the Law Division, the ruling of the Harrison Municipal Court was overturned and the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division's ruling. The Appellate opinion, delivered by the Honorable George Leone, focused on the punitive intent of the Legislature in drafting the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:4-51, which addresses violations of 39:4-50. The Appellate Division indicated the Legislative intent to allow work-release in limited situations for first and second offenders but to prevent third or subsequent offenders the opportunity to participate in work-release programs. If you are facing charges for DUI/DWI, reckless driving, careless driving, CDS in a motor vehicle or other serious motor vehicle charges, please visit us at DarlingFirm.com or call 973-584-6200 now to schedule a consultation. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

One and One Make Two in DUI

James Dougherty was charged with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) for driving while suspended for a second or subsequent conviction or plea to driving while intoxicated (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) or refusal to submit to chemical breath testing (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a)). Dougherty, seeking to avoid mandatory jail time, took the position that 2C:40-26(b) required conviction for two charges of refusing to submit to chemical breath testing or convictions for two charges of driving under the influence while Dougherty had only one conviction of each. In August 2015, the Defendant was convicted of DWI for a charge stemming from a February 23, 2009 arrest and was convicted of a refusal in November 2015, for a charge stemming from and arrest on February 4, 2009. While serving the seven month sentence for the refusal charge, the Defendant was stopped by the police while operating a motor vehicle. Dougherty was sentenced to a mandatory term of 180 days in jail, which term was stayed pending appeal. Defendant, relying on State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011), argued that a "second or subsequent violation" under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) requires two convictions of the same predicate offense, rather than one of each. The Appellate Division found that State v. Ciancaglini does not address the issue head on. However, State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566 (2014), reaffirms In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981), holding that a prior DUI does enhance a sentence for a refusal conviction. Additionally, the legislative history of the DUI statutes is centered upon the premise of discouraging driving under the influence by including ever increasing penalties for successive offenses. The Defendant's basic premise, from State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 639 (2015) and In re Estate of Fisher, 443 N.J. Super. 180, 190-195 (App. Div. 2015), that the word "or" should be interpreted as "or" rather than "either/or" is incorrect. When considered in the framework of the history and evolution of DWI laws, becoming ever stricter, there is no question as to the interpretation of the statute to include the word "either". The Appellate Division affirmed the defendant's conviction. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Charges Follow Without Miranda After Accident

John Martens was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) after attempting to walk away from his burning vehicle. A passerby reported a vehicle fire and that the vehicle’s driver was attempting to leave the scene. The vehicle had damage to the driver’s side, flat tires and the airbags had been deployed. Investigating officers found only one person in the area who was swaying as he was walking away from the vehicle. The individual admitted he was the vehicle’s owner and that the vehicle struck the median. While speaking with Martens, officers noted his speech was slurred and eye movements were slow. They administered field sobriety tests (FSTs) and arrested Martens. Later, an Alcotest was administered and Marten’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was determined to be .17%. Martens was charged with DUI, reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96); failure to maintain lanes (39:4-88); and abandoning a vehicle (N.J.S.A. 39:4-56.6). Among other motions, Martens sought to suppress statements to the officers prior to his arrest based on the fact that he was not read his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). The suppression motion was denied and Martens entered a conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence, reserving his right to challenge the denial of the suppression motion on appeal. Martens was sentenced as a 3rd time offender and received a 180 day jail sentence, 10 year suspension of his driving privileges, 1 year ignition interlock requirement, 12 hours in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center as well as fines and surcharges. In State v. John Martens, the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, denied Martens’ suppression motions, found him guilty based upon his plea in the municipal court and imposed the same sentence as the municipal court. Martens appealed to the N.J. Appellate Division. Miranda warnings must be administered when a custodial interrogation occurs wherein the suspect has been deprived of freedom in a significant way. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 614 (1999). Police need not administer Miranda warnings during routine traffic stops. Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984); State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2005). Martens was asked a limited number of questions and was not subject to the equivalent of an arrest prior to being Mirandized by the officers following the FSTs. The decision of the N.J. Superior Court was affirmed. If you are charged with DUI, you are facing substantial penalties beginning with up to 1 year loss of driving privileges for a first offense up to a maximum of a 10 year loss of driving privileges and 180 days in jail for a third offense. In addition, you face the possibility of losing your job, certain professional licenses and the social stigma that comes with DUI. You need the assistance of an experience defense attorney and should not face these charges without one. For more information about driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, driving while suspended or other serious motor vehicle offenses in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This Blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Suspicion Is Not A Reason To Draw Blood Without A Warrant

In 2010 Timothy Adkins was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), after the vehicle he was operating struck a utility pole, injuring himself and two passengers. Adkins failed the field sobriety tests administered by police and was ultimately taken to the hospital, where the police obtained a blood sample from Adkins. Adkins blood alcohol level (BAC) was .157 percent, almost twice the legal limit of .08 percent. In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol from the blood stream over time does not, on its own, give rise to exigent circumstances such that a warrant may be avoided when the police are seeking a blood sample. Therefore, unless the individual suspected of driving while intoxicated is involved in an accident, a warrant is required. In State v. Adkins, 433 N.J. Super. 479 (App. Div. 2013) a trial judge determined that the blood sample taken from Adkins without a warrant was inadmissible. The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the ruling based on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that drawing blood from an individual suspected of drunk driving was acceptable. In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court established a new standard based on the fact that, through radios, cellular phones and facsimiles, obtaining a warrant is a much simpler and expedient process for police. As a result of the ruling in McNeely, the N.J. Supreme Court, in Adkins, DUIdetermined that the results of the blood sample, withdrawn without a warrant, must be suppressed. If you are facing DUI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving while suspended or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In DUI A Stay Of Sentence On Appeal Is Not A Right

Scott Robertson was convicted in municipal court of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50). Robertson was stopped after police observed him to be driving erratically and he admitted to the consumption of alcohol during the motor vehicle stop. Robertson performed poorly on the field sobriety tests and his blood alcohol content (BAC) registered as .13 on the Alcotest machine. He was also charged with failure to maintain a lane (N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b)), and reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96). At trial, Robertson unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of the Alcotest results based on the unavailability of repair records and diagnostic tests for the Alcotest machine used for his test. Although Robertson received numerous records, there were service related records within the manufacturer which he could not access to which he believed he was entitled. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed. Once again Robertson appealed, this time to the New Jersey Appellate Division which affirmed the DUI conviction holding that under State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 825, 129 S. Ct. 158, 172 L. Ed. 2d 41 (2008) there was no basis for excluding the Alcotest results. Of note, on each successive appeal, Robertson sought a stay of the suspension of his driving privileges. He was sentenced to 7 months loss of license in municipal court and a stay of his suspension was granted, with no reasons stated on the record, to allow for a trial de novo in the New Jersey Superior Court, Middlesex County. At the trial de novo of State v. Robertson, the New Jersey Superior Court judge found Robertson guilty based on both the DVR of the psychophysical tests and the Alcotest results. The defendant again sought a stay of his license suspension based on multiple cases pending certification in the Supreme Court with regard to the ability of those accused of DUI to obtain repair and service records relating to specific Alcotest machines and the possibility of a favorable outcome for the Defendant. The State objected to the stay based on several unreported Appellate Division opinions supporting the finding that the records sought by the Defendant need not be provided. The stay was granted and addressed by the Appellate Division as being governed by a three-part test under Crowe v. DeGoia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) requiring a showing that failure to obtain the stay would subject the defendant to irreparable harm, that the defendant has a reasonable chance of success on appeal, and there is not substantial harm created by granting the stay. In the case of DUI, the potential for harm to the public by an intoxicated driver creates a special circumstance for consideration and the Appellate Division found that stay of a suspension in a DUI case was not a matter of right pending appeal. With regard to the suppression motion, the New Jersey Appellate Division looked to precedent interpreting Chun. In State v. Maricic, 417 N.J. Super. 280, 288 (App. Div. 2010), the Appellate Division held that, although twelve foundational documents were required by Chun, that did not serve to limit additional discovery requests with a reasonable basis. The Appellate Division also reviewed State v. Carrero, 428 N.J. Super. 495, 507 (App. Div. 2012) holding that DWI cases are quasi-criminal and subject to a more limited discovery than criminal matters. Pursuant to R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(C) and 7:7-7(b)(4) the State is obligated to produce documents within the prosecutor’s custody or control but the Appellate Division reasoned that, although the Alcotest manufacturer’s documents were not within the State’s control, the Defendant could have subpoenaed them from the manufacturer had he felt they would prove to exculpate him. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found the argument that the diagnostic tests were material to the defense to be unconvincing. DWI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges and can lead to loss of driving privileges up to 10 years as well as incarceration. Additionally, the newly created statute regarding driving while suspended for multiple DUI offenses guarantees a 6 month jail term. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to determine whether you can win your case. For more information about DUI, DWI, DUID, driving while suspended for DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Case Opens Door To Further Discovery In Municipal Court

Pursuant to the N.J. Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Stein, a driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) matter, municipal court prosecutors must turn over evidence from all jurisdictions involved in an arrest. The N.J. Supreme Court’s ruling overturned both the trial and Appellate Division rulings on the matter. Robert Stein was involved in a motor vehicle accident on Route 23 in Wayne and a Pequannock officer was the first to respond to the scene. Later Wayne officers relieved the Pequannock officer. Stein was ultimately charged with driving while intoxicated, as a third offender, and found guilty in the municipal court and the N.J. Superior Court, Law Division, Passaic County. He was also charged with careless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-97). Stein was sentenced to 180 days in the Passaic County Jail; 10 year loss of driving privileges; 48 hours at the Intoxicated Driver’s Resource Center; required to install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle and substantial fines. Justice Albin drafted the opinion including that Rule 7:7-7(b) requires the municipal prosecutor to provide all relevant evidence, including that from other jurisdictions and the names of officers in possession of knowledge pertaining to the alleged incident. The N.J. Supreme Court agreed with Stein’s argument that any inculpatory evidence could also be exculpatory and needed to be turned over. In Stein’s case, he did not raise or preserve the issue of the failure of the Wayne Municipal Prosecutor to turn over the name of the Pequannock officer for appeal. However, the ruling is relevant and could prove beneficial to those facing charges in municipal court. DUI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious and can lead to incarceration and loss of driving privileges up to ten years. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Jury Trials In NJ DUI Cases

The N.J. Supreme Court ruled that in spite of substantially increasing penalties, driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) is a motor vehicle matter giving defendants no right to a jury trial. In State v. Denelsbeck, decided May 12, 2016, the court reaffirmed its decision from State v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109 (1990), wherein it was held that the Legislature, although enacting harsh penalties to deter driving while intoxicated, did not classify DUI as a criminal matter. Penalties for a third or subsequent DUI do not include more than 6 months in jail and thus are not of sufficient impact to require a jury according to the court’s reasoning. In support of this logic is the fact that the court has criminalized driving while suspended for DWI by enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 which requires incarceration for those convicted of multiple offenses. The N.J. Supreme Court did indicate that, if penalties for DUI became more harsh in the future, they could revisit their decision. If you are charged with DUI, you need experienced defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to breath tests, driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and other serious driving charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Dismissed On Speedy Trial Violation

In State v. Cahill, the defendant faced a driving under the influence (DUI) charge after being found guilty of assault by auto charges stemming from the same event. It was established that Michael Cahill consumed alcohol at a bar, later drove from the bar, swerved to avoid an obstacle in the road, crossed two lanes of traffic and collided with a police car causing injuries to the officer. Following a conviction and sentencing in the death by auto matter, the Superior Court judge remanded the driving while intoxicated charge to municipal court for disposition. A full 16 months later, Michael Cahill received notice from the municipal court that his matter had been scheduled for trial. Through counsel, he filed a motion to dismiss based on the court’s failure to uphold his right to a speedy trial. The municipal court judge denied the motion and Cahill appealed after entering a conditional guilty plea. The NJ Superior Court held that Cahill’s right to a speedy trial was violated under the particular circumstances of the matter and vacated the sentence after a review of the matter based on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Barker v. Wingo. In Barker v. Wingo, the US Supreme Court established a four factor balancing test to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was upheld. In the instant case, the NJ Superior Court found the 16 month delay was held to be too lengthy, without good cause, and prejudicial to the defendant who suffered anxiety over the prospect of the trail as well as limited his employment alternatives based on the likelihood he would be found guilty at trial. The decision to dismiss the DWI charge was upheld by the NJ Appellate Division and the NJ Supreme Court and Cahill’s sentence was vacated. Driving under the influence charges carry significant consequences including loss of driving privileges for 7-12 months for a first offense, 2 years for a second offense and ten years for a third or subsequent offense as well as substantial fines and penalties, the inability to work and the social stigma that is associated with DUI. There are ways that an attorney can help you, even if you think you will be found guilty and it is always critical that you consult with an experienced traffic attorney prior to deciding whether to enter into a guilty plea for DUI. For more information about DUI/DWI, reckless driving and other serious traffic court matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Lawyer Challenges His DUI Plea Based On Lack Of Counsel

Henry Aratow was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) in 1988, pled guilty to a driving under the influence (DUI) in 2004, and pled guilty to a 2009 in 2011. In the case of the 2009 DUI, Aratow was sentenced as a third offender resulting in a 10 year loss of driving privileges and 180 days incarceration. In 2013, Aratow sought post conviction relief from in the municipal court and then Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County with regard to the 2004 DUI in order to avail himself of the step-down provisions under State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014), pertaining to successive DUI convictions. The relief sought was denied and Aratow appealed to the NJ Appellate Division. In 2004, Aratow was stopped by police and charged with DWI, refusal to submit to a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), and making an improper turn (N.J.S.A. 39:4-116). Both at the time he was stopped by police and when he appeared in court for the resulting charges, Aratow was a practicing attorney. Aratow waived his right to counsel and entered into a plea to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content (BAC) between .08 and .10 with a dismissal of the refusal to submit to chemical breath testing and the improper turn charges. At the time of the 2004 plea, the municipal court judge engaged in lengthy colloquy with the defendant regarding his right to counsel, the factual basis of his plea. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the Aratow was not advised by the municipal court judge of the progressively harsher consequences of successive DUI convictions and, therefore, did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the plea as required under N.J. Court Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). The court also questioned the sufficiency of the factual basis given by the defendant, as set forth in State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218 (2013). The court found that, although Aratow admitted to operating a motor vehicle after consuming 3 vodka and tonics, he was not questioned as to whether he believed that the alcohol he consumed substantially impaired his ability to operate the vehicle or that his BAC was between .08 and .10. Under State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415 (1989), the remedy for a plea entered with an insufficient factual basis is to reinstate all charges and restore the matter to its original status prior to the entry of the plea. Accordingly, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the 2004 matter for a new trial. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

The Future of DUI Testing In NJ

Those arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, are most often exonerated or convicted based on the results of chemical breath testing. The Alcotest machine is presently used to determine whether individuals were driving under the influence by using chemical testing to determine their blood alcohol content (BAC) exceeds the legal limit in New Jersey. The machine has been the subject of multiple challenges, the most well-known being State v. Chun, 195 N.J. 54 (2009),and the NJ Attorney General's Office indicated to the NJ Supreme Court that the machine's use would be discontinued by the end of 2016 in light of the machine's manufacturer, Draeger Safety, announcing they would no longer support the machine. Over the years since the Alcotest 7110 was introduced in NJ in 2001, the software has become outdated and the scientific reliability has come into question. Now, as the sun is setting on the Attorney General's time to find a suitable replacement, pay for another company to service the Alcotest machine or for the state to begin serving the machine in-house, those subject to testing for driving while intoxicated, especially those found to be just over the legal limit, are left with the fact that although they may be convicted based on results that have a reasonable probability of being inaccurate, the Attorney General's Office has a window of opportunity wherein this probability is allowed to persist. Additionally, as of this date, no suitable replacement has been indicated by the Office of the Attorney General. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Refusal to Submit to DUI Breath Testing Receives Step-Down Sentence

Thomas Taylor was charged with driving under the influence (DUI)(N.J.S.A. 39:5-50) and pled guilty to refusal to submit to a breath test (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2). Taylor had been convicted of two prior driving while intoxicated charges, both of which occurred over ten years prior to the event in question. The municipal court judge sentenced Taylor as a third offender to a 10 year suspension and a $1000 fine. The defendant appealed. In State v. Taylor, Taylor used the misplaced argument that, pursuant to State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011), which addressed the impact of prior refusal convictions to enhance subsequent DUI penalties. However, In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981), reaffirmed in State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566 (2014), held that a prior driving while intoxicated conviction may be used in enhancing a sentence for a subsequent refusal conviction. Designed as punishment for driving under the influence, the penalties for refusal mirror those for DUI in that they increase with each subsequent offense. The statutes differ in that the DWI statute calls for a "step-down" in sentencing for each 10-year period in which a driver goes without a conviction for DUI, but the refusal statute does not include such a provision. This means that an individual convicted of DUI in 1990 who is convicted of a second DUI in 2001 would be again sentenced as a first offender in 2001. Likewise, a third DWI conviction occurring 10 or more years after a second conviction would subject the driver to sentencing as a second offender under the DUI statute, pursuant to State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014). Taylor argued that his refusal should be sentenced under the terms of a second offender, as more than 10 years had elapsed since his prior offense. In State v. Fielding, 290 N.J. Super 191 (App. Div. 1996) the court addressed the matter of applying step-down sentencing to refusal conviction and determined that it was appropriate under the principal of fundamental fairness. After review, the matter was remanded for resentencing as a second offense including a significantly lower 2 year suspension and $500 fine. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about refusal, DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Blood Draw Due To Exigent Circumstances

Donna Jones was suspected of driving under the influence (DUI) at the time she caused a three car accident, resulting in injury to herself and another, by rear ending a car stopped at a light then striking a second car immediately in front of the first before her vehicle came to rest. As a result of the accident, Jones was unconscious. Although officers were alerted by EMTs to an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Jones' breath at the scene, no field sobriety testing was possible due to her condition. Jones was transported to the hospital for treatment after emergency personnel extracted her from her vehicle. At the hospital Jones remained unconscious for some time and was despondent upon regaining consciousness. An officer requested that blood be extracted from Jones without a warrant and the resultant blood alcohol content (BAC) reading was .345 percent. Jones was indicted for fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)) and issued summonsed for DUI (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) and reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96). In Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), a driver was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a result of a routine traffic stop and U.S. Supreme Court determined that the natural metabolization of alcohol in an individual's bloodstream does not, without more, constitute exigent circumstances giving rise to the ability of police to forego the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and withdraw a blood sample without consent. Pursuant to the holding in McNeely and the fact that there was no proof police were unable to obtain a warrant under the particular facts of the case, the trial court suppressed Jones' blood alcohol content (BAC) reading. On appeal, in State v. Jones, the State argued that McNeely should not have been applied retroactively in this case where the incident occurred but the case was decided after McNeely. The NJ Appellate division determined the trial judge erred in his application of the standard required under McNeely and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and held that the BAC results of Jones should not have been suppressed. In State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 238 (1984), New Jersey courts held it legal to obtain a blood sample without the need for a warrant as long as there was a reasonable belief the driver was intoxicated and the blood was withdrawn "in a medically acceptable manner…without the use of excessive force." The NJ Appellate Division did consider McNeely in determining that it is a given that a person's BAC does dissipate once the alcohol is fully absorbed into the blood stream and declines over time until it is fully metabolized thus creating a need for drawing blood to preserve evidence of intoxication. The decision of the trial court with regard to suppression of the BAC results was reversed. If you are convicted of DUI you face serious penalties including loss of license for up to 10 years, incarceration for up to 180 days and substantial fines. You should obtain an experienced DUI attorney immediately to help fight your case. For more information about DWI, drug DUI, CDS in a motor vehicle, blood and urine testing, reckless driving, refusal to submit to a breath test or other serious motor vehicle offenses in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Proof Of DUI Alone Is Sufficient To Convict For Aggravated Manslaughter

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident while driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), William T. Liepe was charged with first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); second-degree vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)); and fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2). Max Guzman and 2 of his children were in a Honda Civic waiting to turn left at 1:00 p.m. on a Sunday afternoon in April, 2011. Guzman’s Honda was rear-ended by Liepe’s Ford Explorer and spun into another lane of travel where it was hit by a passing motorist, Rosa Vazquez, driving a Cadillac Escalade. Guzman’s younger child was killed, Guzman and his other child survived but suffered substantial injury. Vazquez, her mother and 2 children did not sustain life threatening injuries. Police found an open container of alcohol in Leipe’s vehicle and he admitted to the consumption of several beers earlier in the day. A sample of Leipe’s blood was taken and his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .192 typically indicates substantial impairment of one’s driving ability. Testimony was presented at trial that Liepe admitted to never having noticed the Honda in his path waiting to turn. Reconstruction of the accident revealed evidence relating to stopping distance and opportunity to avoid an accident. Ultimately, the trial court granted Liepe’s motion to dismiss aggravated manslaughter as a charge upon concluding that the State must prove more than intoxication. In State v. Liepe, the NJ Appellate Division considered State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1989) with regard to what inferences were permitted from extraneous evidence with regard to extreme indifference to human life. Radziwil also set forth that, in matters of driving under the influence, evidence of the exact degree of intoxication is not required to prove aggravated recklessness. In State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345 (2000), the court considered recklessness based on intoxication and set forth the premise that, although one could be convicted of driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) it is not conclusive evidence of reckless indifference to human life. The Appellate Division distinguished aggravated manslaughter from reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3)) in State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1984). Recklessness is shown by conscious disregard of “substantial and unjustifiable risk” of death as a result of the conduct in question. The level of disregard required is a “gross deviation” from that of a reasonable person. Aggravated manslaughter includes the heightened requirement that the situation be “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life” wherein risk becomes elevated from a possibility to a probability. The Appellate Division ultimately determined that evidence of intoxication, without more, shall survive a motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated manslaughter. If you are facing driving while intoxicated (DWI) or other criminal charges stemming from a driving under the influence or driving under the influence of drugs (DUID) charge, you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to protect yourself from loss of rights and liberties. For more information about DUI/DWI, assault by auto, aggravated assault or other serious motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

A1368 May Overhaul DUI Punishment In NJ

A1368 is a NJ bill, proposed by the Assembly, which could revise the NJ drunk driving statute, N.J.S.A 39:4-50. The bill was approved by the Assembly and Senate and currently under revision pursuant to comments by Governor Chris Christie. If accepted the new statute would permit those convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) to avoid long-term loss of driving privileges by having an ignition interlock device installed in their vehicles. First-offenders with a blood alcohol level (BAC) between .08 and .10% will be required to have an ignition interlock device installed for 3 months and those with .10 to .15% BAC readings would require 7 to 12 months with an ignition device. First-offenders with a .15% BAC or higher would lose their driving privileges for 7 to 12 months but, after 90 days, could make application to the court for an ignition interlock device. In any case, if the court determined there were too many aggravating factors including “circumstances of the offender’s conduct”, prior driving record, how long the offender has been licensed, or indicators of a substantial risk of re-offending, the current method of license suspension for a specified period between 3 and 12 months rather than ignition interlock device installation would be applicable. In the case of a first-offender with a BAC of .10 to .15%, if they do not own, lease or principally operate a vehicle and no ignition interlock may be installed, their driving privileges will simply be forfeited for 7 to 12 months. First-offenders with BAC levels of .15% or greater who do not own, lease or principally operate a vehicle will lose their driving privileges for 7 to 12 months for DUI and a consecutive 7 to 12 months making their suspension period as long as they would have been required to maintain an ignition interlock device on their vehicle. For a second driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge, the suspension would be for a period of 2 to 4 years rather than the current 2 year period. Additionally, an interlock device would be required on the person’s vehicle for the entire suspension period as well as thereafter. For a third or subsequent DUI, suspension would increase from the current 10 year period to a period of 10 to 20 years. Those convicted of refusal to provide a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2) in the case of second and subsequent events will also face these same suspension periods and interlock device requirements. This bill forgives first-offenders and provides them with opportunity to maintain their livelihood while preventing them from harming others through future instances of driving while intoxicated. Additionally, it is designed to send a strong message to drivers that re-offenders will be punished severely by long-term suspensions, additional expense of an ignition interlock device for an extended term, substantial fines and jail time. If passed, this bill will substantially alter the futures of those convicted of DUI. If you are charged with DUI, you need experienced defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to breath tests, driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and other serious driving charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alternatives To Jail For Driving While Suspended For Multiple DUI Charges?

Driving while suspended for a second or subsequent driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) charge in New Jersey now carries a 180 day mandatory minimum jail term. Since N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) was enacted on August 1, 2011, drivers sentenced to the mandatory minimum 180 days in jail without parole have been seeking alternative sentences. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), it is a fourth-degree crime to operate a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for a second or subsequent driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction or refusal to submit to chemical breath testing in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. In State v. French, 437 N.J. Super 333 (App. Div. 2014) , the trial court sentenced French to 180 days in jail, but allowed for up to 90 days of the sentence to be served in an inpatient treatment facility. The NJ Appellate Division held that sentences other that incarceration were not what the Legislature contemplated in enacting the statute and refused to find opportunity for flexibility in sentencing. In State v. Harris, John D. Harris, III, was sentenced to 180 days but allowed to serve his sentence on the Home Electronic Detention System (HEDS) program. The State appealed the sentence and the NJ Appellate Division upheld the courts finding in French finding that the Legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) was to protect the public from those who would continue to drive after multiple DUI convictions. Although there is likely to be further litigation regarding other alternatives to incarceration, including diversionary programs, for driving while suspended for DWI the present state of the law is that you will serve 180 days in jail for this offense. If you are facing charges of DUI, DWI or driving while suspended for these charges you are facing significant periods of license suspension and the possibility of jail. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DUI, DWI, driving while under the influence of drugs (DUID), driving while suspended for DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other serious traffic related charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Alternative To Jail For Driving While Suspended For DUI

Anthony Frezza was charged with operating a motor vehicle while suspended for multiple driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) charges pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) after being stopped on the Atlantic City Expressway in the early morning hours of February 4, 2012. Pursuant to the statute, the requisite sentence is 180 days in jail without parole with no sentencing discretion afforded to the court. After a trial in State v. Frezza at which the defendant was found guilty, the municipal court judge sentenced Frezza to 180 days in jail without parole with alternatives including house arrest. The State cross-appealed and appeal filed by Frezza challenging the sufficiency of evidence. The NJ Appellate Division relied on State v. Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. 308, 319 (App. Div. 2005) in holding that Frezza’s motor vehicle record was admissible as prima facie evidence that he was suspended for driving while intoxicated (DWI) at the time he was stopped and admitted to driving while suspended. Frezza was serving a suspension for a second DUI offense and, pursuant to State v. Cuccurullo, 228 N.J. Super. 517, 520-21 (App. Div. 1988), a driver is suspended for DUI when the sentence is imposed, even if the driver is still serving a suspension for an earlier event. In State v. French, 437 N.J. Super. 333, 335-39 (App. Div. 2014), the court clarified that a 180 day jail sentence without parole is required and no sentencing alternatives are permissible. As a result, the NJ Appellate Division reversed the sentence and remanded for sentencing in conformance with the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). DWI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges and can lead to loss of driving privileges up to 10 years as well as incarceration. Additionally, the newly created statute regarding driving while suspended for multiple DUI offenses guarantees a 6 month jail term. If you are facing charges or charges of driving while suspended for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about driving while suspended for DUI, DWI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Step-Down Is Not Limited To One Use Per Driver

The NJ driving under the influence (DUI) statute (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) includes a provision wherein a “step-down” in sentencing occurs after any ten (10) year period in which an individual charged with a prior DUI receives a lesser level penalty for a subsequent DUI. For example, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2), if an individual was convicted of their first DUI in 1986 and a second DUI in 1994, they would be sentenced, among other penalties, to a two year loss of driving privileges as a second offender in 1994. However, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3), if an individual was convicted of their first DUI in 1986 and a second DUI in 1997, more than ten (10) years later, they would be sentenced to, among other penalties, a seven to twelve month loss of driving privileges as a first-offender in 1997. In State v. Revie, the defendant, James Revie was convicted of a fourth driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge in 2011 in Wharton, NJ after an initial DWI in 1981 in Hillsdale, NJ, a second and uncounseled DWI in 1982 in Bogota, NJ, and a third DWI over ten (10) years later in 1994 in Montvale, NJ. Due to the fact that the second DWI was uncounseled and the defendant should have received the benefit of the step-down provision for the ten (10) year lapse between the second and third DWI convictions, the defendant argued that, for the 2011 DUI, he should be sentenced as a second-offender with regard to any term of incarceration. However, the Municipal Court Judge sentenced him as a third-offender refusing to read N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) as providing more than one “step-down” benefit to any driver. The NJ Superior Court, Law Division, Morris County affirmed as did the NJ Appellate Division. The NJ Supreme court held that there is no indication that the Legislature intended for a defendant meeting the requirements of the “step-down” provision on more than one occasion to be entitled to the benefits thereof on only one such occasion. In addition to the Legislative intent, included in the NJ Supreme Court’s consideration were also State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 498 U.S. 967, 111S.Ct. 429, 112 L. Ed. 2d 413, (1990) and State v. Hrycak, 184 N.J. 351 (2005) as they pertained to Revies’ second and uncounseled DUI and State v. Conroy, 397 N.J. Super. 324 (App.Div. 2007) as it pertained to a defendant sentenced with the benefit of Laurick and the “step-down” provision of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3). The matter was remanded to the Law Division for re-sentencing as a second-offender. DUI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges which can lead to incarceration and loss of driving privileges up to ten years. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Conviction Becomes Easier For State

The appeal of a Union County driving under the influence (DUI) charge led to removal of yet another burden of proof previously borne by the State. In State v. Peralta, the defendant sought to suppress the Alcotest result of .19% blood alcohol content (BAC) as a result after the officers processing the arrest failed to read the standard refusal statement required by N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e). The municipal court refused to suppress the Alcotest reading and Peralta was convicted of driving while intoxicated. Of note is the fact that the officers observations were not found to be sufficient to convict the defendant of DUI. On appeal, the Law Division also convicted Peralta based on the BAC result. On appeal to the NJ Appellate Division the court held that the refusal statement was created by the Legislature for the purpose of advising those who would refuse to provide a breath sample that those driving on the roads of New Jersey are "deemed to have given their consent to the taking of samples of their breath", N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(a), and advise them of the consequences of such a refusal. State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485 (2010). The Appellate Division indicated that N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) was not created to add an additional burden on officers processing DWI matters where the accused is willing to provide a breath sample upon request. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.