Juvenile's Waiver of Miranda Rights Upheld

D.N., was a 16 year old juvenile when charged with offenses that, if committed by an adult would include second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); possession of under 50 grams of marijuana (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4)); defiant trespass (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b)) and obstructing the administration of law (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a)). Police responded to a caller saying that D.N. entered a grocery store after being notified he was not permitted to do so and, during a search, located and seized suspected marijuana from D.N.’s person. In the presence of his mother, at the police station, D.N. was read his Miranda rights and invoked his right to remain silent. Weeks later, D.N.’s mother contacted police and advised them that she had found a handgun in a backpack in her residence and, upon their arrival, consented to a search of the backpack. D.N. was taken for questioning upon returning home. The “Juvenile Miranda Warning” form was used to advise D.N. and his mother of D.N.’s rights under Miranda and D.N. and D.N. agreed to speak to the police. D.N. ultimately confessed to that he had made a deal with a gang member wherein he would be paid to deliver the gun to a third party. D.N. moved to suppress the confession and the judge held that D.N. knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights as he had exercised those rights only weeks earlier. In State of New Jersey in the interest of D.N., D.N. pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, possession of under 50 grams of marijuana, defiant trespass, and obstructing the administration of law and, pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the weapons charges. D.N. was sentenced to 2 years probation, community service, drug evaluation and participation in a residential treatment program among other conditions. D.N. appealed the denial of his suppression motion. The New Jersey Appellate Division held that the “suspect’s will was not overborne by police conduct” as is the test under State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000). Pursuant to State in the Interest of A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 147 (2010), the presence of D.N.’s mother was given considerable weight in favor of voluntariness of the confession as well. In light of prior opinions and the fact that D.N. had knowingly invoked his right to remain silent only weeks prior, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge. If a juvenile is charged with a crime, the disposition of the charges can change his or her future by prohibiting them from entering certain schools, fields of employment and, in the case of Megan's Law offenses, certain residences or neighborhoods. It is critical for any juvenile charged with a criminal offense to seek an experienced juvenile defense attorney immediately to begin protecting their rights and their future. For more information on juvenile offenses, weapons offenses, possession of marijuana, trespass or other criminal charges in NJ, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Unconstitutional Traffic Stop Leads To Suppression Of Weapons Evidence

Al-Sharif Scriven was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); third-degree receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7); fourth-degree possession of hollow-point bullets (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)); and fourth-degree possession of a large-capacity magazine (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j)). The Honorable Martin G. Cronin, for the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County granted Al-Sharif Scriven’s motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search following the stop of a vehicle in which Scriven was a passenger. The vehicle was stopped by an Essex County Sheriff’s Officer for violating N.J.S.A. 39:3-60, driving with high beams on. The State of New Jersey appealed the court’s grant of the suppression motion. The facts adduced at trial were that Scriven was a passenger in a car which was traveling through Newark, NJ in an entirely lawful manner, with the exception of the fact that the vehicle was traveling with its high beams on. An Essex County Sheriff’s Officer observed the vehicle and flagged it down when it came to a stop at an intersection he was near. When the officer approached the driver to advise her that her high beams were on he requested her credentials. While speaking to the driver, the officer detected an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle which the officer indicated was stronger on the passenger side of the vehicle. The officer asked Scriven to exit the vehicle and Scriven first notified the officer that there was a handgun under his coat. The officer retrieved the gun from Scriven’s person and arrested him. Judge Cronin relied on State v. Witt, 435 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div. 2014), 219 N.J. 624 (2014), which was directly on point and held that the initial stop of a vehicle is inappropriate when there is no actual violation. In Scriven, there was no oncoming vehicle within 500 feet traveling in the opposite direction as is required in order for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-60 to occur. On appeal, in State v. Scriven, the court looked to State v. Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. 378 (App. Div. 2005), which held that when an officer makes a mistake in the belief that a violation exists the mistake does not thereby create a reasonable basis for a stop. The State also argued, under the community caretaking doctrine, the officer was acting appropriately in stopping the vehicle briefly to notify the driver that her high beams were in use. In certain cases, including State v. Martinez, 260 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1992), wherein a vehicle was traveling less than one-half the posted speed limit at 2:00 a.m., an officer would be justified in stopping the vehicle to insure there was nothing amiss. The N.J. Appellate Division upheld Judge Cronin’s decision and the State again appealed. On Wednesday, July 20, 2016, the N.J. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court below suppressing the weapon found on Al-Sharif Scriven as the fruits of an unreasonable search. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you are facing weapons charges you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Handgun In Plain View? Prove it!

Jarrell Williams was convicted of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b) after an officer allegedly saw a handgun in plain view on the floor of his vehicle during a motor vehicle stop. At all times during the proceedings, Williams maintained that he was unaware that the vehicle, recently purchased by his mother, contained a handgun. Williams also maintained that the gun was not in plain view on the floor of the vehicle near the driver’s seat. The facts collectively presented at trial in State v. Williams are that 4 men, including the defendant, entered the vehicle and smoked marijuana then the defendant pulled the vehicle out of the driveway just as two plain clothed police officers came down the street at which point Williams immediately pulled over and turned off the vehicle. The officers claimed that the location and actions of the defendant and the vehicles’ other occupants gave rise to suspicion and the officers turned around. Seeing the officers’ vehicle turn around, all 4 occupants exited the vehicle before the officers engaged them in conversation. Conflicting accounts of the vehicle’s ownership were offered by occupants and Officer Brown approached the vehicle, with its doors open, to verify the registration. The officer’s testimony was that he observed a marijuana cigarette and plastic bag and, upon going to retrieve same, noticed the pistol on the floor in front of the driver’s seat. The 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 of the New Jersey Constitution establish and protect a defendant’s right to present a complete defense including confrontation of witnesses. Several cases including State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 (2003), State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519 (1991), State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985), State v. Crudup, 176 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1980) and State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129 (2004) have upheld this right but within the constraints of N.J.R.E. 611(a) and N.J.R.E. 401 which afford the court discretion of control over the trial. The N.J. Appellate Division ultimately decided that the jury should not be placed in the position of determining the constitutionality of a search and seizure but that Defense counsel’s line of questioning was not in danger of placing them in that position and was instead intended to determine whether the officer had a predetermined purpose in offering the statements he had made and was an attempt to introduce motive on the part of the officer to testify in a certain manner. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the defendant’s right to cross-examine the officer was violated and that, due to the possible influence this may have had on the decision of the jury, the matter was remanded for a new trial. Weapons offenses are subject to severe punishment including incarceration for 5-10 years for many such offenses. If you are charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you. For more information about possession of a handgun without a permit, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon while on parole or probation, possession of a weapon during a drug related offense or other serious weapons charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Attempted Murder Reduced To Aggravated Assault For Plea

Richard Spellman was indicted on two counts of attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); two counts of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); two counts of second-degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); two counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7). Spellman confessed and his motion to suppress the confession was denied. He ultimately pled guilty, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, to all charges after the first-degree attempted murder charges were amended to second degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)). Spellman was sentenced to concurrent 17 year terms subject to an 85 percent period of parole disqualification under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2); two 10 year terms and two 5 year terms; and restitution to a victim with a 5 year period of parole supervision to follow his release. The charges stemmed from two incidents. First, while on parole for a prior aggravated assault, Spellman entered a convenience store, demanded money and then shot the clerk in the stomach after he was given the money. In the second incident, Spellman shot a man in the parking lot of a restaurant. Upon arrival at the scene, police found a gun in the parking lot and Spellman staring at them out the window of a nearby store. When officers spoke to Spellman, he indicated he was fighting with the man he shot. Officers searched Spellman and found a bullet on his person. At the police station, officers found another bullet on Spellman's person and, prior to questioning of any kind, Spellman said "I shot the attendant at the [convenience store]." Spellman was read his Miranda rights, waived his right to counsel and quickly confessed to shooting both individuals. In State v. Spellman, the NJ Appellate Division upheld the trial court judge's decision that the defendant's confessions were voluntary in spite of the defendant's challenge to the voluntariness based on mental capacity which was not raised at trial and therefore not preserved for appeal. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973). The NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1997), in holding that mental illness itself, if present, does not invalidate a confession. The record below satisfied the Appellate Division that the trial judge fully reviewed the confession and found no coercion or force to have been used. With regard to sentencing, the NJ Appellate Division did find errors with the trial judge's failure to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 and explain his or her reasoning fully on the record. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014). The Appellate Division determined that he trial judge's imposition of concurrent 17 year sentences exceeded the statutory range of 5 to 10 years set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(2). Finally, the Appellate Division and the State agreed that the trial judge failed to make adequate findings, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2b(2), as to whether the defendant was able to pay the restitution ordered. The matter was remanded for resentencing. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Gun Permit Bill Veto By Governor Christie Is Overridden

Governor Chris Christie's veto of a bill addressing gun permits in New Jersey, S-2360, was overridden by the NJ Senate. The bill would require notification to the courts when an individual sought to have mental health records expunged for the purpose of obtaining a firearms purchaser identification card. Christie called the bill a 'half-measure' which failed to address mental health issues and gun violence comprehensively. Under S-2360, individuals would have to notify New Jersey State Police, their county prosecutor and local police department when seeking expungement of their mental health records for the purpose of obtaining a gun permit. Presently, those with mental health histories are unable to obtain a gun permit under most circumstances. While proponents of the bill believe it will close loopholes which currently allow those with a history of mental illness to purchase guns legally, Christie believes the public would be better served by requiring those previously mandated to mental health treatment to prove they had been successfully treated and in order to obtain a gun permit. For more information about gun laws in New Jersey including obtaining a gun permit, possession of illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon, regulations on BB guns and paintball guns and other weapons offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

State v. Witt, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4 and Guns

Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4, police may impound your vehicle in the event that a weapon contained therein is possessed for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4); an individual is in unlawful possession of a weapon therein (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5); a motor vehicle with an occupant unlawfully possessing a weapon is used in another crime; the motor vehicle is used to further prostitution (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1); and either controlled dangerous substances (CDS) are contained within the vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10) or the vehicle is being used for drug trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5). If you are stopped for a simple traffic violation and the police find cause within the newly prescribed limits of State v. William Witt, 219 N.J. 624 (2014), wherein the New Jersey Court overturned its prior ruling in Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), relaxing the requirements for police to obtain a warrant to search your vehicle, you may find yourself facing weapons charges and without the reasonable transportation you need to obtain suitable defense counsel. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you find yourself facing weapons charges or the impoundment of your vehicle as a result of a warrantless search or search with inadequate probable cause, you should immediately seek the assistance of a seasoned criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information about possession of a controlled dangerous substance, CDS in a motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1), distribution of CDS, weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Matter Changes Warrantless Search Standard In NJ

State v. William L. Witt, (A-9-14)(074468), 435 N.J. Super. 608, 610-11 (App. Div. 2014), 219 N.J. 624 (2014), began as a possible driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) case but, due to the warrantless search of Witt's vehicle, led to an indictment for second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 5(b)) and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)). Following a trial and appeals in this matter the result was the overturning of State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), which has been the standard for automobile searches in New Jersey. After being pulled over and removed from the vehicle for field sobriety tests, which police claim he failed. After arresting Witt, the police searched the vehicle for "intoxicants" and discovered a handgun in the center console. The trial court followed Pena-Flores in holding that the warrantless search of the vehicle, beyond a plain view search for open containers of alcohol, was in violation of Witt's rights and suppressed the handgun. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision to suppress the gun finding that there were no circumstances involved in this matter which could give rise to justification of the warrantless search. The N.J. Supreme Court held, days ago, that there should be a return to the standard of State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981), wherein the automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows police with probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime to search a vehicle when unforseeable circumstances arise during a motor vehicle stop. State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000), added the need for exigent circumstances to the standard set in Alston and Pena-Flores reaffirmed Cooke adding a preference for the use of available technology to obtain warrants in if at all practicable. The State argued that the Pena-Flores standard was overly subjective, lacked uniform application, placed police officers in harm's way, motorists were ultimately consenting rather than the police applying for warrants, and where vehicles were impounded the intrusion was greater than that involved in a roadside search. The NJ Supreme Court considered the standard established by the United States Supreme Court, which requires only that the vehicle is easily moveable, including even mobile homes, and the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense. The NJ Supreme Court further considered the difficulty caused to officers by upholding the standards in Pena-Flores against the Constitutional protections it provides. The Court opted for a return to the standard established in Alston, which offers police much broader authority to avoid obtaining a search warrant than under Pena-Flores. If you are facing charges of DUI, refusal or other criminal charges as a result of an included search of your vehicle, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, illegal possession of a firearm, other weapons offenses or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Assault Conviction For Off-Duty Police Officer

Newark police officer, Hugo Fierro, was indicted for second-degree official misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2), third-degree aggravated assault causing bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)), third-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)); fourth-degree aggravated assault by pointing a handgun at another person (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4)) and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)) after a an off-duty altercation outside an Essex County bar while out with his wife. He was convicted by a jury of simple and aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1) and official misconduct and sentenced to 5 years in prison without parole, the minimum for official misconduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5.1. Evidence offered at trial indicated that Fierro, while off duty and walking with his wife in the Ironbound section of Newark after dinner and dancing, encountered a group of men drinking on the street and went out of his way to order them to disperse. He next identified himself as a police officer to another intoxicated man and guided him by the arm toward a street to help him obtain a cab. At this time, the victim claimed he approached and Fierro yelled "what's your problem? What's your problem?" and tried to grab the victim. Upon finding himself unable to catch the victim, Fierro withdrew a gun from his side, stated he was a police officer, pursued the retreating victim and hit him in the face with the barrel of the handgun at which time the victim fled. The following day the victim reported the incident and selected Fierro's photo out of a photo array. An outdoor camera had recorded the incident and Fierro was positively identified. However, Fierro testified that, while he was trying to assist an intoxicated man to a cab, the victim approached, would not go away when Fierro asked, twice slapped Fierro's hand when he attempted to create space between them and was acting in a manner which caused Fierro to believe the victim may attack. Fierro claimed that he did not strike the man but did push him away by placing his hands on the victim's chest and pushing him back while holding his gun as he believed the victim may have possessed a weapon. Additionally, an officer who took the victim's report testified that there was no visible damage to the victim's face at the time the report was made. On appeal, in State v. Fierro, the defendant argued that the jury's split verdict demonstrated the juror's lack of understanding of the elements of the charges. The NJ Appellate Division considered Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S. Ct. 189, 76 L. Ed. 356 (1932), United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 461 (1984), State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44 (2004), State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551 (2005) and others in holding that a split verdict does not definitively indicate that the jury did not fully understand and properly execute its function. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences. If you are a police officer or other official, the consequences are even more severe. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, illegal possession of a handgun, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Weapons Offense Merges Into Burglary Charge

Sherrone Robinson was charged with third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A.. 2C:5-2; 2C:12-1); second-degree conspiracy to commit burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:18-2); second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-7); fourth-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4)); and third-degree hindering apprehension (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b(1)). Robinson pled guilty to second-degree burglary and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in exchange for dismissal for the other charges. For the burglary the state recommended a 4 year prison term and concurrent 5 year term for the weapons offense. The burglary offense was subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) while the weapon offense carried a mandatory minimum term of three years pursuant to the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). In State v. Robinson, Robinson later appealed the sentence arguing that the weapon possession was for the purpose of the burglary and should be merged therewith rather than included as a separate conviction and offense. In making his argument for merger, Robinson relied on State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (citing State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975)), which held that an accused committing a single offense cannot be punished as if they committed more than one offense. State v. Messino, 378 N.J. Super. 559, 585 (App. Div. 2005) provided an alternative analysis of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8, regarding merger of offenses, which suggested a more "flexible approach" to merger wherein the elements of the crimes are considered. In State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 636 (1996), the court held that "when the only unlawful purpose in possession the [weapon] is to use it to commit the substantive offense, merger is required." The NJ Appellate Division reviewed the record and noted that defense counsel stated the prison terms as set forth in the plea agreement, the judge then reviewed those terms with the defendant on the record and the defendant indicated a full understanding thereof. The Appellate Division decided that the defendant received the benefit of the plea bargain as his counsel negotiated the plea bargain with the State on his behalf. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for correction of the judgment of conviction to reflect merger of the convictions and a sentence of 5 years total of which 4 were subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under NERA. Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, weapons, assault, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

S2003/A4229 Promotes Rehabilitation Of Juvenile Offenders

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if S2003, a Senate bill, the same as A4229 in the Assembly, is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial, and represented. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would make 15 the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult. S2003 would permit juveniles to be tried as adults only for Criminal homicide other than death by auto, strict liability for drug induced deaths, first-degree robbery, carjacking, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, second-degree aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated arson, certain gang criminality; or when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent, or convicted, on the basis of certain offenses enumerated; or when the juvenile had previously been sentenced and confined in an adult penal institution; or offense against a person committed in an aggressive, violent and willful manner; or the unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon, arson or death by auto while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug; or a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; or a conspiracy; certain forms of attempt or conspiracy; or theft of an automobile pursuant to chapter 20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; or possession of a firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person of another or the crime of aggravated assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, burglary or escape if, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime including the immediate flight therefrom, the juvenile possessed a firearm; or computer criminal activity which would be a crime of the first or second degree; and other specific crimes involving controlled dangerous substances. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. In certain cases juveniles could remain in youth facilities until age 21 even if they are convicted as adults. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. A prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part would be required to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. The bill was passed by both the Senate and Assembly and now will move before Governor Chris Christie for consideration. If you or your child have been charged as a juvenile offender, it is critical that you seek an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and your future. Do not compound one mistake by choosing the wrong criminal defense attorney. For more information about juvenile offenses, gang crimes, and various criminal offenses in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juvenile Offender Will Be Treated Differently Under NJ Senate Bill 2003

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if New Jersey Senate Bill 2003 (S2003) is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial and the level of representation required in hearings to move juvenile matters to the Criminal Part of the Superior Court. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would raise the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult to 15. S2003 would permit juvenile to be tried as adults only for the most serious offenses including criminal homicide; strict liability for drug induced deaths; first-degree robbery; carjacking; sexual assault; second-degree aggravated assault; kidnapping; aggravated arson; certain gang criminality; a crime committed at a time when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent or confined to an adult correctional facility; violent, aggressive, and willful crimes against another; unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon; arson; death by auto if the juvenile was operating the vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug (DUI); a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; a conspiracy which is a part of a continuing criminal activity and the circumstances of the crimes show the juvenile has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a source of livelihood; an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of certain enumerated acts; theft of an automobile; serious computer criminal activity; distribution of any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any property used for school purposes, or within 1,000 feet of such school property. The State would bear the burden of proving that the nature and circumstances of the charge or the prior record of the juvenile are sufficiently serious that the interests of the public require waiver. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. S2003 would require a prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. In further accord with the goal of rehabilitation, academic instruction and academic counseling, vocational education, post-secondary educational opportunities, alcohol and narcotics treatment programs, mental health services, medical and dental care, regular contact with the family members, work programs to prepare the juvenile for treatment, re-entry services, and any other services or assistance reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the juvenile shall be provided as appropriate. S2003 is sponsored by Democrats and received no support from the Republican party. The bill passed the Senate and is presently in the Assembly for consideration and revision. If you are a juvenile facing criminal charges your future is at stake and should not be left to chance. Your future and freedom may depend on the outcome of your case making it imperative that you seek experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about juvenile offenses including drug charges, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a school zone, assault, sex crimes, school issues, breaking and entering, gang related crimes, burglary or other serious matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Oral Argument Is Favored in Post-Conviction Relief Petitions

Isaiah Kinney was charged with first-degree conspiracy to commit murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and convicted of second-degree aggravated assault and second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) after a trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County. Kinney was sentenced to a discretionary extended 20 year period of incarceration with an 85% parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Kinney and Jones severely beat Floyd Simmons at a residence on Prospect Street in East Orange. After leaving the residence, Jones committed a minor driving infraction and crashed while fleeing an East Orange Police officer who noticed that, although Jones appeared not to be injured from the crash, her pants were covered in blood. Prior to Jones being chased by the officer, Kinney had exited the vehicle at a residence on Washington Terrace. Based on statements made by Jones to police, officers proceeded to the Washington Terrace residence to arrest Kinney. While at the residence without a warrant, officers discovered bloodstained clothing belonging to Kinney. At the trial level, Kinney filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on the officers’ illegal search and seizure but the suppression motion was denied. In State v. Isaiah Kinney, the Defendant appealed unsuccessfully then sought post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of assistance of counsel. The record on the Appellate level was noticeably devoid of any reference to the illegal search and seizure. The NJ Appellate Division found that oral argument in a post-conviction relief petition wherein the defendant exercises a last opportunity to raise reliability issues is deserving of oral argument although the determination of whether oral argument will be heard rests within the discretion of the PCR court. State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382, 386 (App. Div. 2001). In State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 282 (2012), the N.J. Supreme Court reinforced the factors set forth in Mayron and included that PCR judges should provide a statement of reasons for denying oral argument. The Appellate Division hearing the PCR matter determined that oral argument could have resolved uncertainty with regard to the absence of pursuit of the suppression motion but the PCR judge incorrectly held that, under State v. Moore, 273 N.J. Super. 118, 126 (App. Div. 1994), the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the suppression motion could only be raised in Kinney’s petition to the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reasoned that, as there is no right to review by the Supreme Court, the PCR judge’s ruling on this matter deprived the defendant of his right to a determination on the issue. It was further determined that the lack of any record established by oral argument pertaining to the suppression motion rendered them unable to give adequate review to the PCR petition and the Appellate Division remanded the matter with direction that the matters of the suppression motion and ineffective assistance of counsel be reviewed. If you are faced with aggravated assault charges, you are facing up to 10 years in prison with an 85% parole ineligibility period under NERA. Even simple assault charges can result in incarceration and should not be taken lightly by you as they will certainly not be taken lightly by the court. If you are charged with assault you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about assault, aggravated assault, conspiracy, murder, unlawful possession of a weapon or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Handgun Discovered In Search Will Not Be Suppressed

James J. Scarborough pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) after police found a handgun under his seat in a vehicle during an investigatory search based on the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle's interior. He was sentenced to 5 years incarceration, subject to a 3 year period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c). Police received an anonymous call about a vehicle parked in the rear lot of a closed facility and, upon responding, discovered 2 males in the vehicle involved in what the officer suspected to be drug activity. Upon encountering the driver the officer perceived an odor of burnt marijuana. Ultimately, the driver signed a consent to search form and a handgun was discovered under the passenger seat where Scarborough was sitting along with a magazine and ammunition between the passenger seat and door. Scarborough told police he found the gun in the woods earlier in the day and did not know what to do with it. Scarborough filed a motion to suppress the evidence and his statement, both of which were denied and he then entered into the guilty plea. In State v. Scarborough the defendant appealed and the NJ Appellate Division upheld the denial of the suppression motion finding that a field inquiry under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968) was permissible based on the anonymous call regarding the vehicle. The odor of burnt marijuana then gave probable cause to believe a crime was committed under State v. Vanderveer, 285 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 1995) and State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003). Once the officer had probable cause to believe criminal activity was afoot he was justified, under State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002), in seeking consent to search the vehicle. Finally the NJ Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in determining the Scarborough's statement was not coerced. The matter was, however, remanded as to sentencing factors only. Second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun in NJ carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act. If you are charged with a weapons offense you need experienced criminal defense counsel. For more information about weapons possession, possession of a weapon without a permit, use or possession of a weapon in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons or other weapon related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Warrantless Search And Seizure Results In Suppression Of Weapons And Marijuana

After losing a suppression motion based on warrantless search and seizure, Peter Samuell pled guilty to fourth-degree possession of more than 50 grams of marijuana (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3)) in exchange for the dismissal of multiple other counts of drug possession with intent to distribute and firearms offenses after losing a suppression motion. Police in Trenton received multiple calls regarding the discharge of a handgun. Officers went to the front door of a house believed to be the possible location and surrounded same. While an officer was at the front door speaking to co-defendant Crawford, several others were surrounding the fenced in rear yard. Crawford appeared on the back porch and officers asked that he come to the fence to be frisked but he refused so Officer Bledsoe scaled the fence and detained Crawford. Several officers then entered the house to secure a large number of individuals inside and discovered marijuana, weapons and ammunition in plain view. The entry by police was warrantless and the defendant appealed the constitutionality of the entry in addition to attempting to suppress the evidence obtained as “fruit of the poisonous tree”. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. ed.2d 441, 454 (1963). In State v. Samuell, the defendant appealed the warrantless search and the NJ Appellate Division reversed. The police did not have any probable cause to jump the fence onto private property in order to further their investigation of shots fired when they merely suspected criminal activity may be occurring on the property. State v. Jefferson, 413 N.J. Super. 344, 354-355 (App. Div. 2010). The NJ Appellate Division cited Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002); Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579 (1989) in holding that police must have a search warrant, consent to enter or the facts must fall under the exception to the warrant requirement as a person’s private property offers the highest degree of expectation of privacy from the intrusion of warrantless searches and seizures. The Appellate Division cited to the holding in State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204 211 (2001) that “probable cause requires a ‘well grounded’ suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed” and found that was clearly not the case here where the shots fired could have come from any location in the area with a dog house in the back yard as described by callers. The Appellate Division considered the possibility of exigent circumstances permitting entry but found that none existed in review of the holdings of State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126 (1983); State v. Penalber, 386 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2006); State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211 (2013); State v. Holland, 328 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2000) and other authoritative decisions. The Appellate Division held that it was only upon Officer Bledsoe’s unlawful entry onto the property that the police had probable cause to believe there were firearms and drugs on the property and therefore the evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree which must be suppressed. If you are facing charges and believe evidence against you was obtained in violation of your Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless search and seizure, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to fight your case. For more information about warrantless search, distribution of controlled dangerous substances (CDS), possession, CDS in a motor vehicle or other criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Manslaughter, Not Self-Defense, For Killing An Unintended Victim

For the murder of Lavern Ritch, Robert Davies was charged by a grand jury with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)-(b)); aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); passion/provocation manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2)); second-degree reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1)); third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)); fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a)); and possessing a knife under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for its use (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). At the close of a trial, Davies was found guilty of second-degree reckless manslaughter, third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful purpose, and fourth-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person. Prior to sentencing, Davies motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial were denied by the court. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison subject to a mandatory extended term for manslaughter pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(e), a discretionary extended term under the persistent offender statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) and a period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) but offered no clarification of the actual basis for the extended term. Additionally, the sentenced set forth on the record differs from that in the Judgment of Conviction as to whether sentences for the weapons convictions would run consecutive or concurrent to the manslaughter sentence. At trial, in State v. Davies, the defendant represented himself pro se for some time prior to requesting that stand-by counsel assume representation on his behalf. Testimony at trial indicated that Davies had just been punched by Chavez following the exchange of words the restroom of a bar shortly prior to the attack and was chasing Chavez when Ritch, running behind him along with other companions of Chavez touched the defendant on the shoulder from behind at which time the defendant turned around and stabbed Ritch. The defendant claimed to have stabbed Ritch thinking he was defending himself against another attack from Chavez’ companions. Witnesses testified that, when defendant spun around toward Ritch, Ritch put his hands up and stated he was trying to help Davies although some testimony differed from testimony offered to police previously. Witnesses testified to seeing Davies strike Ritch, although no knife was visible, and then seeing Davies immediately resume pursuit of Chavez. Witnesses immediately went to Ritch who was bleeding from his side and said he had been stabbed. His death ultimately resulted from a stab wound to the heart. Davies appealed seeking a new trial due to multiple alleged errors relating to the trial. With regard to the defendant's theory of self-defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 requires the need to protect oneself from death or serious bodily harm in order to justify the use of deadly force within certain confined areas. The events in the within matter occurred in a public area and did not give rise to a claim of self-defense in the opinion of the NJ Appellate Division. Additionally, under N.J.S.A. 2C:3-3 to 2C:3-8, even if Davies had been justified in using deadly force against Chavez, the Appellate Division determined the reckless and negligent use of deadly force against Ritche was unjustifiable. As such, the trial court did not err in failing to provide the jury with instructions regarding Davies self-defense claims. After ample consideration of Davies other multiple challenges to jury instructions and court procedures, the Appellate Division found there were no errors requiring a reversal of the conviction. The Appellate Division did find that, pursuant to State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628 (1996), merger is required of the offenses although the victim was ultimately an unintended victim. The matter was remand the matter for re-sentencing including the requirement that the trial court set forth fully its consideration under the factors of State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985) and the basis for any extended term pursuant to State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 610 (2014) and State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 170 (2006). Additionally, the trial court is directed to sentence Davies in consideration of his present lifestyle and conditions as opposed to how circumstances presented him on the date of the original sentencing pursuant to State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012). If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Man Is Charged With Possession Of A Firearm After Calling 9-1-1 To Aid Another

Donald Peterson was charged with second-degree possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)) and fourth-degree possession of a machete (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a)) as a result of being a good samaritan. Peterson called the Hillsborough Police to report an unconscious male in front of his residence. Ultimately a murder investigation ensued with regard to the man discovered, based on the suspicious death of the 16 year old male. The Somerset County Prosecutor’s Office obtained a warrant to search the residence of Peterson for evidence that the victim had been in Peterson’s residence including “hair, fibers, fingerprints, bodily fluids, DNA, and other microscopic/forensic evidence. During multiple interviews with police officers, after Miranda warnings, Peterson admitted to having a criminal history as well as possessing weapons. While searching Peterson’s residence, the police discovered a Winchester rifle and a machete which Peterson was prohibited from possessing under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 as a certain person prohibited from possessing weapons due to his prior criminal history. Although no evidence was discovered liking Peterson to the death of the man he discovered on his sidewalk, he was indicted for the weapons possessions charges. In State v. Peterson, the defendant sought to suppress the discovery of the weapons in light of the fact that, although discovered in plain view during the search, discovery was not inadvertent given his prior notice to officers of his possession of same. Over the State’s objection, the NJ Superior Court, Law Division- Criminal Part, Somerset County suppressed the weapons in reliance on State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236 (1983) holding inadvertent discovery to be an essential element for application of the ‘plain view’ exception to the search warrant requirement. The NJ Appellate Division reviewed the matter and found the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply in this case involving a search warrant for evidence establishing the victim’s pre-mortem presence in Peterson’s residence. Pursuant to State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 611 (2009), a lawful search should be limited to the areas likely to lead to discovery of the intended object of the search. In State v. Sheehan, 217 N.J. Super. 20 (1987), the court determined that when a search warrant applies to the entire premises, any item discovered therein is lawful as within the scope of the warrant. The court determined that State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 412 (2014) provided the N.J. Supreme Court with the opportunity to strike down or limit inadvertent discovery doctrine yet the justices did not seize upon said opportunity. The court turned to State v. Sugar, 108 N.J. 151, 156-157 (1987) establishing proof required by the State to invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine as follows: “(1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures would have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of such evidence by unlawful means.” Based on Peterson’s statements to police regarding his criminal history and his possession of the rifle, a warrant would have properly issued for a search for the weapon wholly independent of the warrant related to whether the victim had been present in Peterson’s residence pre-mortem. The NJ Appellate Division found the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply in this matter and reversed the trial court’s suppression of the rifle. If you are facing weapons charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to protect your rights. For more information about weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, certain persons not to possess weapons or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Handgun Located By Casino Valet Not Suppressed

Phillip King was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)). King left his car with a casino valet at Trump Plaza and, upon entering the vehicle the valet noticed the center console to be partially open. The valet then attempted to close the console and could not. Upon opening the console to attempt to move the obstruction, the valet saw the obstruction was the butt of a handgun. The valet returned the console lid to its partially opened position and notified local police. Upon arrival, the police found the vehicle’s center console cover to be in the partially opened position and, without first obtaining a search warrant, opened the console to look inside and removed the handgun from the center console. The vehicle had Pennsylvania license plates, King had a valid Pennsylvania driver’s license and a valid Pennsylvania gun carry permit and claimed he was unaware that he could not legally transport the firearm in his vehicle in New Jersey. King sought to suppress the handgun over the State’s argument that warrantless search was valid under the community caretaking exception, the automobile exception and the third-party exception. The court held that the State had ample time to secure a warrant as the vehicle was parked in the casino’s garage and officers present at the scene could insure the vehicle was not moved. The court further held that the officer’s search exceeded the scope of the valet’s private search and therefore the third-party exception to the warrant requirement was invalidated. The State appealed with regard to the third-party intervention exception to the warrant only. The exemption assumes that a private party discovered the item or information and turned it over to police and therefore there was no violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 (1921). The court considered State v. King to be very similar to United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed.2d 85 (1984) wherein a private party initially searched and notified authorities of the discovery then police went further in their search than the private party had. In Jacobsen the Supreme Court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cocaine discovered by the mail carrier. The court also reviewed State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1 (1991), State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307 (2012), State v. Saez, 268 N.J. Super. 250 (Ap. Div. 1993) and State v. Wright, 431 N.J. Super. 558 (App. Div. 2013), where in each case warrantless searches extended after third-party initiation were upheld by New Jersey courts. After considering the areas searched in the above mentioned matters and the expectation of privacy one could reasonably hope to have in a vehicle willingly turned over with keys to a valet, the court found that the officers actions beyond the scope of the valet in State v. King were minimal and therefore upheld the search and reversed the suppression of the handgun. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you are facing weapons charges you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Addicted Defendants No Longer Denied Admission To Drug Court For Weapons Charges

Over the rejection of the prosecution, Gregory Maurer sought entry into Drug Court while under separate indictments for (1) third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (ocycodone) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); (2) two counts of third-degree possession of CDS (oxycodone and heroin) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-(a)(1)); (3) third-degree possession of CDS (cocaine) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); and (4) two counts of third degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) and third-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1)). The prosecutor’s denial was based solely on Maurer’s prior charge for possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) and hollow point bullets. The trial court made its decision based on the defendant’s prior conviction for a weapons related offense and Maurer appealed. In State v. Maurer, the NJ Appellate Division determined that the defendant’s record, the “Manual for Operation of Adult Drug Courts In New Jersey” (July 2002)(Manual) and the Drug Court Statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14). The NJ Appellate Division did consider that Maurer had also been charged with witness tampering (N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5) and other prior CDS charges which were remanded to the respective municipal courts for disposition. They also considered Maurer’s participation in Narcotics Anonymous and other substance abuse counseling programs as well as his employment as an outreach counselor at a rehabilitation facility. The NJ Appellate Division considered that Drug Court is appropriate for “offenders most likely to benefit from treatment and do not pose a risk to public safety.” State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 428-29 (2007) (quoting Manual, Supra, at 3). The opinion also included a thorough review of Drug Court success rates and the Legislative intent to end the cycle of drug offenders interacting with the criminal justice system as a result of addiction. State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533, (App. Div.), 216 N.J. 14 (2013). There was also discussion of a two “track” system wherein, according to the Manual, a criminal history involving a firearm acts as a bar to admission in spite of the apparent Legislative intent to increase Drug Court access for those likely to benefit from resolving addiction issues. The Court resolved that an amendment to the Track Two admission criteria was required and remanded the matter for consideration of the defendant’s application to Drug Court despite his prior weapons offense. If you are facing distribution or possession charges, there are many factors which may affect how your case is ultimately resolved. You should immediately retain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information regarding drug distribution, possession with intent to distribute, weapons offenses or other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

First-Degree Robbery Conviction Does Not Require Presence Of A Weapon

When a would-be bank robber claims to have a weapon and creates a reasonable fear that he does have such weapon, he is subject to charges of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b)). When Christopher Dekowski entered Commerce Bank in Roselle acting suspiciously, including feigning the locking of the banks doors, carrying a briefcase and dressed in a manner differing from the seasonal norm he quickly drew the bank manager's attention. Dekowski approached a teller, at which time the manager intervened and saw a note indicating that the teller was to place all of the money in a bag and implying that Dekowski had a bomb which he would use if the teller failed to comply. Dekowski was given $500 and apprehended. In the Superior Court, Law Division, Union County, the defendant was convicted, in State v. Dekowski, of first-degree robbery and sentenced to a 13-year prison term with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). The NJ Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence with regard to possession of a weapon, as required for a conviction of first-degree robbery, and determining second-degree robbery to be established remanded for resentencing accordingly. In State v. Williams, ___ N.J. ____, ____ (2014) the NJ Supreme Court held that a conviction for first-degree robbery does not require a weapon but only the victim's "actual and reasonable belief that a weapon exists and the defendant's threatened immediate use of such weapon." In Williams, the court relied on State v. Hutson, 107 N.J. 222, 227-228 (1987), holding that the belief in the presence of a weapon need be reasonable under the specific circumstances. The court considered the Dekowski's threat that he had a bomb in concert with the public knowledge and general fear of bombs in contemporary society in determining the reasonableness of the bank manager's belief in the presence of a weapon in making its determination that the defendant's conviction for first-degree robbery would be reinstated. First-degree robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

NJ Firearms Purchaser Identification Card Denied For NY Charges

George Winston was denied a New Jersey firearms purchaser identification (FPI) card in 2011 as a result of convictions in New York of attempted assault in 1974 and possession of a controlled dangerous substance in 1989. The Clifton, New Jersey Chief of Police denied Winston an FPI card in spite of "certificates of relief from disabilities" for the prior New York convictions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3c(1). In the Matter of the Denial of the Application of Winston the Superior Court- Law Division, Passaic County judge heard testimony from Winston and others as well as a Clifton detective undertaking the background search with regard to the application. The Clifton detective indicated that Winston's background also included domestic violence charges, a driving under the influence (DUI) charge and disputes with neighbors on more than one occasion. The Law Division judge found that the New York certificates of relief were not entitled to the Full Faith and Credit Clause as they were not equivalent to a New Jersey expungement under New York law but rather they remove certain bars to employment under New York law. If you are seeking a permit to obtain a firearm, you should seek an experienced attorney to assist you in your matter. If you are caught illegally carrying firearms the penalties can be severe making it well worth the effort to seek a permit to carry legally. For more information about gun or weapon possession, possession of weapons during a drug related offense, armed robbery, possession of a handgun without a permit, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon or possession of a weapon while on parole or probation visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.