In DUI A Stay Of Sentence On Appeal Is Not A Right

Scott Robertson was convicted in municipal court of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50). Robertson was stopped after police observed him to be driving erratically and he admitted to the consumption of alcohol during the motor vehicle stop. Robertson performed poorly on the field sobriety tests and his blood alcohol content (BAC) registered as .13 on the Alcotest machine. He was also charged with failure to maintain a lane (N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b)), and reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96). At trial, Robertson unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of the Alcotest results based on the unavailability of repair records and diagnostic tests for the Alcotest machine used for his test. Although Robertson received numerous records, there were service related records within the manufacturer which he could not access to which he believed he was entitled. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed. Once again Robertson appealed, this time to the New Jersey Appellate Division which affirmed the DUI conviction holding that under State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 825, 129 S. Ct. 158, 172 L. Ed. 2d 41 (2008) there was no basis for excluding the Alcotest results. Of note, on each successive appeal, Robertson sought a stay of the suspension of his driving privileges. He was sentenced to 7 months loss of license in municipal court and a stay of his suspension was granted, with no reasons stated on the record, to allow for a trial de novo in the New Jersey Superior Court, Middlesex County. At the trial de novo of State v. Robertson, the New Jersey Superior Court judge found Robertson guilty based on both the DVR of the psychophysical tests and the Alcotest results. The defendant again sought a stay of his license suspension based on multiple cases pending certification in the Supreme Court with regard to the ability of those accused of DUI to obtain repair and service records relating to specific Alcotest machines and the possibility of a favorable outcome for the Defendant. The State objected to the stay based on several unreported Appellate Division opinions supporting the finding that the records sought by the Defendant need not be provided. The stay was granted and addressed by the Appellate Division as being governed by a three-part test under Crowe v. DeGoia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) requiring a showing that failure to obtain the stay would subject the defendant to irreparable harm, that the defendant has a reasonable chance of success on appeal, and there is not substantial harm created by granting the stay. In the case of DUI, the potential for harm to the public by an intoxicated driver creates a special circumstance for consideration and the Appellate Division found that stay of a suspension in a DUI case was not a matter of right pending appeal. With regard to the suppression motion, the New Jersey Appellate Division looked to precedent interpreting Chun. In State v. Maricic, 417 N.J. Super. 280, 288 (App. Div. 2010), the Appellate Division held that, although twelve foundational documents were required by Chun, that did not serve to limit additional discovery requests with a reasonable basis. The Appellate Division also reviewed State v. Carrero, 428 N.J. Super. 495, 507 (App. Div. 2012) holding that DWI cases are quasi-criminal and subject to a more limited discovery than criminal matters. Pursuant to R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(C) and 7:7-7(b)(4) the State is obligated to produce documents within the prosecutor’s custody or control but the Appellate Division reasoned that, although the Alcotest manufacturer’s documents were not within the State’s control, the Defendant could have subpoenaed them from the manufacturer had he felt they would prove to exculpate him. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found the argument that the diagnostic tests were material to the defense to be unconvincing. DWI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges and can lead to loss of driving privileges up to 10 years as well as incarceration. Additionally, the newly created statute regarding driving while suspended for multiple DUI offenses guarantees a 6 month jail term. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to determine whether you can win your case. For more information about DUI, DWI, DUID, driving while suspended for DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Possession Charges In Superior Court Barred By Same Evidence Test

During an undercover drug operation, Rodney Miles was charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(12)) as well as a petty disorderly persons offense of possession of under 50 grams of marijuana (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a). While lodged in the Camden County Jail, following indictment, the defendant appeared pro se, waiving his right to counsel, via video conference from the county jail and entered into a guilty plea for the disorderly persons offense of possession of under 50 grams of marijuana after it was downgraded to the offense of loitering to possess marijuana (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(b)(1)). During the colloquy during which the plea was entered, Miles attempted to obtain clarification with regard to the specific matter on which he was appearing, and whether charges would remain in the Superior Court following the plea. It was very apparent, from the responses offered by the judge, that the municipal court judge did not understand the questions asked by the defendant regarding his remaining charges. Thereafter, In State v. Miles, Miles sought dismissal of the charges pending in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County based on double jeopardy as he had entered a guilty plea to charges stemming from the same event. In State v. Salter, 425 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2012), the court interpreted the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, 11 of the New Jersey Constitution as protecting against a second prosecution following acquittal or conviction and multiple punishments for a single offense or set of events. In State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573 (1982), the court held the Constitutional protections to be applicable in the municipal court. Although the court held that fundamental fairness pursuant to the defendant's argument grounded on State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679 (1989) was not applicable, any subsequent prosecution in the Superior Court was barred under the same evidence test set forth in State v. Salter. The Court held that the municipal court plea resolved all charges stemming from the defendant's arrest. Drug charges can destroy your future and, if you have prior drug charges, you are subject to harsher sentences each time. If you are facing charges for drug possession or distribution you should consult an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances (CDS), distribution, possession, under the influence, paraphernalia or CDS in a motor vehicle visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

S385/A1368 And DUI In NJ

Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) can have devastating consequences to both victims and drivers alike. New Jersey legislation, S385/A1368, has been proposed as a means of preventing would-be repeat offenders from getting behind the wheel while allowing individuals who made an innocent but costly mistake a chance to continue to drive by installing an Ignition Interlock Device on their primary vehicle or vehicles. The proposed legislation includes only 10 day license suspensions upon conviction for the purpose of installing the device on the vehicle. Once installed, the driver must blow into the device, which detects alcohol on the breath, in order to start the vehicle. If the ignition interlock device detects that the driver's blood alcohol content (BAC) is elevated over .05%, the ignition will be disabled. Additionally, once the vehicle is in operation, the ignition interlock device requires the driver to blow into the mouthpiece at certain intervals to better insure the individual driving the vehicle remains sober and the individual who initially blew into the device is in fact the driver. NJ S385/A1368 would permit first-offenders with a BAC of between .08 and .10% to avoid long-term license suspension by installing in ignition interlock device for 3 to 6 months, unless aggravating circumstances exist which indicate a long-term license suspension is appropriate. First-time offenders with a BAC of .10% or greater would be required to install the device for 7 to 12 months. Additionally, there are additional penalties for those who circumvent the ignition interlock device or drive a vehicle without an interlock device during their required installation period. Those who in any way facilitate another in circumventing an ignition interlock device, by blowing into the device, disabling it or providing another vehicle to the suspended driver also face criminal charges which can result in up to 6 months in jail. Second-offenders would be required to install the device for a period of 2 to 4 years. Persistent offenders would continue to face long-term suspension and jail terms. The ignition interlock device bears an installation cost as well as a monthly service fee and drivers still face increased insurance costs and other motor vehicle fees in the event of a DUI conviction. If you are facing DUI charges, the consequences can include large fines, loss of a job due to inability to commute or loss of certain professional licenses as a result of the DUI, jail and the social stigma associated with DUI. If you have been charged with driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, you need experienced defense counsel in your corner. For more information about DUI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

State v. Witt, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4 and Guns

Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4, police may impound your vehicle in the event that a weapon contained therein is possessed for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4); an individual is in unlawful possession of a weapon therein (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5); a motor vehicle with an occupant unlawfully possessing a weapon is used in another crime; the motor vehicle is used to further prostitution (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1); and either controlled dangerous substances (CDS) are contained within the vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10) or the vehicle is being used for drug trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5). If you are stopped for a simple traffic violation and the police find cause within the newly prescribed limits of State v. William Witt, 219 N.J. 624 (2014), wherein the New Jersey Court overturned its prior ruling in Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), relaxing the requirements for police to obtain a warrant to search your vehicle, you may find yourself facing weapons charges and without the reasonable transportation you need to obtain suitable defense counsel. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you find yourself facing weapons charges or the impoundment of your vehicle as a result of a warrantless search or search with inadequate probable cause, you should immediately seek the assistance of a seasoned criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information about possession of a controlled dangerous substance, CDS in a motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1), distribution of CDS, weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Racketeering Conspiracy Charges Based On Warrantless Search

Xiomara Gonzales was charged with second-degree racketeering conspiracy (N.J.S.A 2C:5-2 and 2C:41-2(d)); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); first-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2:35-5(b)(1)); and first-degree distribution of CDS (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1)) after police conducted a planned stop of her vehicle with knowledge that there would likely be drugs therein. Gonzales sought to have heroin seized from her vehicle suppressed and the trial court judge denied her motion to suppress based upon the automobile exception and plain view exception to the search warrant requirement. Following the denial of her suppression motion, Gonzales pled to third-degree conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:35-10(a)(1)). On appeal in State v. Gonzales, the NJ Appellate reversed and remanded the matter concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. The record revealed that the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office, Newark Police Department Narcotics Unit and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) were conducting investigations into various individuals. Through the use of a wiretap, the agencies received information indicating a suspect would be traveling to Newark to pick up heroin. The intent was to utilize a “wall off” traffic stop whereby the underlying wiretapping remains undisclosed by making the stop appear to be a routine traffic stop. Essex County law enforcement officers began following the suspect and Gonzales as they entered the Newark area in separate vehicles. Officers observed the suspect enter 2 separate locations and, at one point, place large bags obtained at the second location into the rear seat of Gonzales vehicle. Gonzales was then called by the suspect, whose phone was being tapped, and instructed to return to their point of origin without the suspect, as well as how to proceed through the Garden State Parkway toll booth without paying. After the pair separated, the police took their opportunity to “wall off” Gonzales from the suspect and avoid the risk that the suspect would realize his phone was tapped. Essex County officers were specifically told which vehicle to stop based on the information received by investigators from the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office by virtue of the wiretap. Upon stopping Gonzales vehicle, officers observed bricks of heroin which had fallen out of the bags onto the rear floor area of defendant’s vehicle and were then in plain view. The trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Monmouth County held that the three prongs of the plain view exception articulated in State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192 (2002) were satisfied and upheld the search. The NJ Appellate Division reviewed State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211 (2013), Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed.2d 639 (1980), State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97 (2010) and State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169 (1989) in holding that a search is presumptively invalid without a warrant issued by a neutral judge after a full recitation of the facts upon which said warrant is being sought or the search falls squarely within one of the well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Appellate Division held that the plain view exception is applicable, under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed.2d 564 (1971), only in the event the evidence comes into plain view inadvertently and that items discovered in plain view following pretextual stops are subject to suppression under State v. Damplias, 282 N.J. Super 471 (App. Div. 1995) and therefore the exception was not satisfied. The Appellate Division further considered State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 2022 (2009), wherein it was set forth that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is satisfied in the event that: “(1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband; (2) the circumstances demonstrate an exigency making it impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant; and (3) the traffic stop is ‘unforeseen and spontaneous.” The NJ Appellate Division held that during the time the police were following Gonzales through the Newark area prior to stopping her vehicle they had ample time to obtain a warrant to search her vehicle and their failure to do so did not entitle them to the benefit of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and reversed and remanded the matter to the NJ Superior Court. Racketeering and gang activity are serious criminal charges with severe penalties including lengthy prison sentences and prohibitive fines. If you are facing these charges you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to protect your rights and freedom. For more information about racketeering conspiracy, gang activity, possession of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of CDS with intent to distribute or distribution of CDS visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juvenile Offender Will Be Treated Differently Under NJ Senate Bill 2003

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if New Jersey Senate Bill 2003 (S2003) is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial and the level of representation required in hearings to move juvenile matters to the Criminal Part of the Superior Court. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would raise the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult to 15. S2003 would permit juvenile to be tried as adults only for the most serious offenses including criminal homicide; strict liability for drug induced deaths; first-degree robbery; carjacking; sexual assault; second-degree aggravated assault; kidnapping; aggravated arson; certain gang criminality; a crime committed at a time when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent or confined to an adult correctional facility; violent, aggressive, and willful crimes against another; unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon; arson; death by auto if the juvenile was operating the vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug (DUI); a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; a conspiracy which is a part of a continuing criminal activity and the circumstances of the crimes show the juvenile has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a source of livelihood; an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of certain enumerated acts; theft of an automobile; serious computer criminal activity; distribution of any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any property used for school purposes, or within 1,000 feet of such school property. The State would bear the burden of proving that the nature and circumstances of the charge or the prior record of the juvenile are sufficiently serious that the interests of the public require waiver. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. S2003 would require a prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. In further accord with the goal of rehabilitation, academic instruction and academic counseling, vocational education, post-secondary educational opportunities, alcohol and narcotics treatment programs, mental health services, medical and dental care, regular contact with the family members, work programs to prepare the juvenile for treatment, re-entry services, and any other services or assistance reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the juvenile shall be provided as appropriate. S2003 is sponsored by Democrats and received no support from the Republican party. The bill passed the Senate and is presently in the Assembly for consideration and revision. If you are a juvenile facing criminal charges your future is at stake and should not be left to chance. Your future and freedom may depend on the outcome of your case making it imperative that you seek experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about juvenile offenses including drug charges, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a school zone, assault, sex crimes, school issues, breaking and entering, gang related crimes, burglary or other serious matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Officer Unqualified To Give Opinion Allows Reversal Of Drug Convictions

Wasan Brockington was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), possession with intent to distribute CDS, distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in a school zone and conspiracy. The drugs in question were cocaine and heroin. New Brunswick Police were conducting surveillance in a specific location. Sergeant Quick claimed to have witnessed several transactions wherein money was handed by third-parties to the co-defendant, Fitzpatrick, then the defendant would walk down a driveway with the third-party and they would both return within a minute and the third-party would walk off. Quick suspected these were drug transactions and even characterized each transaction as a heroin transaction or a cocaine transaction. However, he made no arrests, had no evidence to test and claimed to be at a substantial distance viewing the transactions through binoculars. At some point, officers closed in and saw Brockington throw down a newspaper with bags of suspected heroin inside and found 2 bags each of heroin and cocaine on the third-party suspected drug buyer leaving the scene. After police seized Brockington and the evidence, he advised that all of the drugs were his and that the co-defendant was innocent. In State v. Brockington, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement, to compel the disclosure of the officers’ surveillance point and other pre-trial motions but all were denied by trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County. The defendant also objected to the inclusion of Sergeant Quick’s testimony regarding drug transactions he allegedly witnessed as his testimony was elicited by the prosecutor in a manner making him appear to be an expert on the subject of drugs and drug transactions when he offered that he could discern cocaine from heroin at a great distance but the court allowed it. At the conclusion of trial, no limiting instruction to the jury was requested. Brockington was sentenced to 10 years with a 5 year parole ineligibility period. Defendant appealed and the N.J. Appellate Division looked to N.J.R.E. 701as interpreted in the similar matters of State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) and United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1154, 128 S. Ct. 1100, 169 L. Ed.2d 831 (2008) wherein it was held that “a lay opinion must be the product of reasoning processes familiar to the average person in everyday life.” The Appellate Division found the opinion of Sergeant Quick to far exceed the established boundary of lay opinion testimony. The prosecutor also bolstered Quick’s testimony as credible and accurate which further prejudiced the defendant in violation of the strictures set forth in State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J 493 (2008) and State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76 (1999). The Appellate Division then reviewed and compared a litany of cases to determine whether testimony about the other alleged transactions in which no arrests were made and from which no evidence was retrieved violated N.J.R.E. 404 (b) and determined it may be used as the probative value was not likely substantially outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. The matter was ultimately reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the likelihood of unfair prejudice toward Brockington. Penalties for drug distribution in NJ are severe and lasting, often including lengthy prison terms with significant parole ineligibility periods. If you have been charged with a drug offense an experienced criminal defense attorney can protect your rights. For more information about drug distribution, possession, possession with intent to distribute or controlled dangerous substances (CDS) visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Possession Conviction Reversed On Right To Remain Silent

Jamaal Shockley was indicted for third-degree possession of cocaine, a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); third-degree possession of cocaine, a CDS, with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)); and second-degree eluding police (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)) after he fled from police when they attempted to get him to stop while he was riding a dirt bike. Shockley fled and the pursuit continued until he fell off the motorcycle and was tackled by officers while attempting to run away. The defendant was patted down for weapons at the scene, his jacket was searched at the police department and his shoes and jacket were again checked prior to leaving the hospital after treatment. While being booked into the county jail, the defendant was again patted down before removing his clothes. Each of the prior searches was negative for weapons or contraband. After Shockley had removed his clothing as part of processing and was already lodged in jail, corrections officer Brooks again searched his clothing outside of his presence and discovered a bag containing 14 bags of cocaine within another small bag in the pocket of the defendant's sweatshirt. In State v. Shockley, the defendant was found guilty of possession of a CDS and eluding police. Shockley was sentenced to 8 years with 4 years of parole ineligibility for the eluding charge and a concurrent 6 year term with 3 years of parole ineligibility for the CDS charges. The defendant appealed on multiple grounds including that corrections officer Brooks testified regarding Shockley's silence when notified by Brooks that the cocaine had been discovered. Although the defendant did not object to Brooks' testimony at trial, reversal is required if it was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State v. Taffaro, 195 N. J. 442 (2008). The Appellate Division looked to State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 59 (2012) wherein the court considered the privilege against self-incrimination as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503. The court cited Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L. Ed.2d 91, 98 (1976) with regard to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the protection it offers both pre and post-arrest silence. In NJ, State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 610 (1990) affords an accused the right to remain silent while "in custody or under interrogation." The NJ Appellate Division found the testimony to be plain error as it offered no probative value and was clearly in violation of Shockley's rights to remain silent and a fair trial. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new trial. A drug related conviction in NJ can have serious and lasting consequences including prison, loss of license, substantial fines and the stigma of the conviction or plea can result in the loss of certain employment or educational opportunities. If you are facing charges of use, possession or distribution of CDS, it is critical you consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights. For more information about prescription or non-prescription drug charges for use possession or distribution, controlled dangerous substances in a motor vehicle, DUI and other criminal and serious municipal court matters visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Addicted Defendants No Longer Denied Admission To Drug Court For Weapons Charges

Over the rejection of the prosecution, Gregory Maurer sought entry into Drug Court while under separate indictments for (1) third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (ocycodone) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); (2) two counts of third-degree possession of CDS (oxycodone and heroin) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-(a)(1)); (3) third-degree possession of CDS (cocaine) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); and (4) two counts of third degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) and third-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1)). The prosecutor’s denial was based solely on Maurer’s prior charge for possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) and hollow point bullets. The trial court made its decision based on the defendant’s prior conviction for a weapons related offense and Maurer appealed. In State v. Maurer, the NJ Appellate Division determined that the defendant’s record, the “Manual for Operation of Adult Drug Courts In New Jersey” (July 2002)(Manual) and the Drug Court Statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14). The NJ Appellate Division did consider that Maurer had also been charged with witness tampering (N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5) and other prior CDS charges which were remanded to the respective municipal courts for disposition. They also considered Maurer’s participation in Narcotics Anonymous and other substance abuse counseling programs as well as his employment as an outreach counselor at a rehabilitation facility. The NJ Appellate Division considered that Drug Court is appropriate for “offenders most likely to benefit from treatment and do not pose a risk to public safety.” State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 428-29 (2007) (quoting Manual, Supra, at 3). The opinion also included a thorough review of Drug Court success rates and the Legislative intent to end the cycle of drug offenders interacting with the criminal justice system as a result of addiction. State v. Bishop, 429 N.J. Super. 533, (App. Div.), 216 N.J. 14 (2013). There was also discussion of a two “track” system wherein, according to the Manual, a criminal history involving a firearm acts as a bar to admission in spite of the apparent Legislative intent to increase Drug Court access for those likely to benefit from resolving addiction issues. The Court resolved that an amendment to the Track Two admission criteria was required and remanded the matter for consideration of the defendant’s application to Drug Court despite his prior weapons offense. If you are facing distribution or possession charges, there are many factors which may affect how your case is ultimately resolved. You should immediately retain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information regarding drug distribution, possession with intent to distribute, weapons offenses or other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Step-Down Is Not Limited To One Use Per Driver

The NJ driving under the influence (DUI) statute (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) includes a provision wherein a “step-down” in sentencing occurs after any ten (10) year period in which an individual charged with a prior DUI receives a lesser level penalty for a subsequent DUI. For example, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2), if an individual was convicted of their first DUI in 1986 and a second DUI in 1994, they would be sentenced, among other penalties, to a two year loss of driving privileges as a second offender in 1994. However, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3), if an individual was convicted of their first DUI in 1986 and a second DUI in 1997, more than ten (10) years later, they would be sentenced to, among other penalties, a seven to twelve month loss of driving privileges as a first-offender in 1997. In State v. Revie, the defendant, James Revie was convicted of a fourth driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge in 2011 in Wharton, NJ after an initial DWI in 1981 in Hillsdale, NJ, a second and uncounseled DWI in 1982 in Bogota, NJ, and a third DWI over ten (10) years later in 1994 in Montvale, NJ. Due to the fact that the second DWI was uncounseled and the defendant should have received the benefit of the step-down provision for the ten (10) year lapse between the second and third DWI convictions, the defendant argued that, for the 2011 DUI, he should be sentenced as a second-offender with regard to any term of incarceration. However, the Municipal Court Judge sentenced him as a third-offender refusing to read N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) as providing more than one “step-down” benefit to any driver. The NJ Superior Court, Law Division, Morris County affirmed as did the NJ Appellate Division. The NJ Supreme court held that there is no indication that the Legislature intended for a defendant meeting the requirements of the “step-down” provision on more than one occasion to be entitled to the benefits thereof on only one such occasion. In addition to the Legislative intent, included in the NJ Supreme Court’s consideration were also State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 498 U.S. 967, 111S.Ct. 429, 112 L. Ed. 2d 413, (1990) and State v. Hrycak, 184 N.J. 351 (2005) as they pertained to Revies’ second and uncounseled DUI and State v. Conroy, 397 N.J. Super. 324 (App.Div. 2007) as it pertained to a defendant sentenced with the benefit of Laurick and the “step-down” provision of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3). The matter was remanded to the Law Division for re-sentencing as a second-offender. DUI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges which can lead to incarceration and loss of driving privileges up to ten years. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sentence For Possession With Intent To Distribute Should Fit The Offender At The Time Of Sentencing

Joseph Jafee pled guilty, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, to third-degree conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)) for which the judge imposed a three-year sentence in spite of marked changes in Jaffee’s lifestyle in the year between his guilty plea and sentencing. Jaffee became engaged and acted as a father to his fiancee’s son, remained sober, routinely attended substance abuse meetings and became a counselor to at-risk youth. Additionally, as part of the plea agreement, Jaffee cooperated in the prosecution of his co-defendants. Judge Manahan followed the sentencing guidelines but refused to consider the changes Jaffee had made in the prior year. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the sentence and Jaffee appealed. In State v. Jaffe, the NJ Supreme Court considered the opinions of State v. Bridges, 131 N.J. 402 (1993) and State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369 (1984) with regard to its analysis of uniform sentencing consideration. In addition, the NJ Supreme Court pointed to the fact that the NJ Code of Criminal Justice does allow for consideration of the defendant’s individual situation. Ultimately, the NJ Supreme Court held that, in light of State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012), the Law Division should have assess the defendant “as he stands before the court on the day of sentencing” in addition to simply weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. After making the determination that Jaffe’s circumstances at the time of sentencing should be considered, the NJ Supreme Court remanded for resentencing in light of the fact that the sentencing judge specifically declined consideration thereof. If you have been charged with possession or possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately in order that all exculpatory evidence may be obtained, favorable witnesses may be located, and all appropriate procedures are followed by the police and the prosecution. There are frequently problems with consent to search, warrants, Miranda warnings, inappropriate denial of suppression motions and improper trial procedure which may make a substantial difference in the outcome of your matter. For more information about possession, intent to distribute, CDS, conspiracy and other drug charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Conviction Becomes Easier For State

The appeal of a Union County driving under the influence (DUI) charge led to removal of yet another burden of proof previously borne by the State. In State v. Peralta, the defendant sought to suppress the Alcotest result of .19% blood alcohol content (BAC) as a result after the officers processing the arrest failed to read the standard refusal statement required by N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e). The municipal court refused to suppress the Alcotest reading and Peralta was convicted of driving while intoxicated. Of note is the fact that the officers observations were not found to be sufficient to convict the defendant of DUI. On appeal, the Law Division also convicted Peralta based on the BAC result. On appeal to the NJ Appellate Division the court held that the refusal statement was created by the Legislature for the purpose of advising those who would refuse to provide a breath sample that those driving on the roads of New Jersey are "deemed to have given their consent to the taking of samples of their breath", N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(a), and advise them of the consequences of such a refusal. State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485 (2010). The Appellate Division indicated that N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) was not created to add an additional burden on officers processing DWI matters where the accused is willing to provide a breath sample upon request. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drugs Suppressed When Found Outside Scope Of Warrant

Police executing a no-knock warrant at a residence located Chad Bivins and co-defendant, Sayid Jordan, in a vehicle located several residences away and, upon removing them from the car searching them, discovered 30 bags of crack cocaine on each of them. Bivins sought to have the crack cocaine suppressed based on his location well outside the residence subject to the warrant but the trial court denied the motion holding that defendant's location was proximate to the residence based on the totality of the circumstances, especially in light of the fact that an officer assigned to the scene located Bivins and co-defendants after receiving a report of individual exiting the residence to be searched. The defendant appealed the denial of the suppression motion in State v. Bivins. The NJ Appellate Division reversed in reliance on a existing laws with regard to the scope of a search warrant. State v. Reldon, 100 N.J. 187 (1985) limits officers to a search of appropriate areas when executing a search. the warrant in question limited police to search the residence and "all persons present reasonably believed to be connected to said property and investigation. The Appellate Division distinguished this from State v. Carolino, 373 N.J. Super. 377 (App..Div. 2004) wherein "any and app persons arriving at, departing from and located [in] the residence and vehicle in question were included in the warrant and both the behavior and proximity of the defendant therein differed greatly from Bivins. Bailey v. United States, ___U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed.2d 19 (2013) dictates that specific facts are required to connect an individual to a scene once they have departed premises subject to a warrant. The Appellate Division applied Bailey to the facts including neither the defendant nor the Pontiac in which he was located were described in the affidavit supporting the warrant, he was located a substantial distance outside the residence to be searched, the officer who searched the defendant received no report that the individuals fled the premises with evidence sought under the warrant being executed and the defendant did not act in a suspicious manner. The Appellate Division found that upholding the search would afford officers executing warrants overly broad discretion and therefore reversed the denial of the suppression motion. Drug charges, particularly distribution charges, have serious consequences including substantial terms of incarceration and enhanced penalties under certain circumstances. If you are facing drug charges and believe evidence obtained against you may have been obtained in violation of your rights, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances (CDS), warrantless searches, distribution of CDS, possession, CDS in a motor vehicle or other criminal issues in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Dash Camera Video Available In Traffic Cases?

In October 2014, New Jersey Superior Court Judge Vincent Grasso issued two rulings regarding police dash cam video records that have stirred quite a bit of interest from attorneys who handle traffic cases in New Jersey. As an attorney, I routinely hear a story from my clients which differs greatly from the contents of the police report I receive in response to my discovery request. Although the officer prepares a routine report at the end or shortly after their shift, they handle many similar matters day in and day out. This results in an awareness of what highlights to give attention to when writing a report as well as a blurring of their memory as to specific incidents as a result of substantial similarity in driving under the influence (DUI) stops, reckless driving stops and other motor vehicle stops. On the other hand, a driver facing DUI, reckless driving, careless driving or other motor vehicle charges is likely to be stopped on an infrequent basis and have absolutely no confusion about the conditions and events surrounding the motor vehicle stop. On the other hand, the driver is most often unfamiliar with the statute under which they are being stopped and the portions of the event they recall specifically may not relate to the statutory factors which will determine their guilt or innocence. For example, drivers often focus on conditions external to the stop which, in their opinion, gave rise to the circumstances resulting in the stop such as the need to move a vehicle after consuming alcohol. In either version of the event, the officers or the defendant's, there is the possibility for error. If Judge Grasso's ruling with regard to the cases, including Ganzweig v. Township of Lakewood, result in the routine provision of video footage to the public, the diverging stories will become of less import as there will be an accurate and unbiased video recording of the event for the defendant, the officer, the prosecutor, defense counsel and the judge to view. As it stands, obtaining video of traffic stops, when available at all, can be challenging resulting in substantial delays of the matter and frustration to clients paying attorneys for continued court appearances for no purpose other than discovery motions with regard to the video sought in any particular matter. If you are facing charges for a traffic violation including DUI, driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), reckless driving, driving while suspended, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other traffic matters you can face incarceration, loss of license, substantial fines and surcharges and increased insurance rates. You should seek an experienced municipal court attorney to protect your rights. For more information about traffic court matters visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Second DUI Offense Requires Mandatory Confinement

Roger Dent struck two vehicles stopped at a red light and was charged with driving under the influence (DUI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), careless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-97), possession of an open container of alcohol (N.J.S.A. 39:4-51(b)) and failure to wear a seatbelt (N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2(f)). The defendant was convicted of DUI in municipal court and sentenced to 180 days in prison as a third offender, as well as 10 year loss of driving privileges and substantial fines. Dent had three prior convictions for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Due to one of the prior DUIs being without counsel, that particular DUI could not be used to enhance any future custodial sentences for DUI pursuant to State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990). Following appeal of the municipal court decision, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County. Dent was sentenced to 60 days in prison as a second-time DUI offender which, pursuant to the judge, he could serve in the County Supplemental Labor Service (CSLSP), frequently referred to as SLAP. In State v. Dent, the State appealed the sentence as contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2) and (3) which specifies a minimum 48 hour period of incarceration which is also not to exceed 90 days and that said sentence “shall not be suspended or served on probation…” but the statute does allow for “county jail, to the workhouse of the county wherein the offense was committed, to an inpatient rehabilitation program or to an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center…” The NJ Appellate Division held that, pursuant to State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 174 (1964), “imprisonment was intended to be mandatory” for second-time or subsequent DWI offenders and remanded the matter to the Superior Court for resentencing. Dent’s argument that his 48 hours in an Intoxicated Driver’s Resource Center satisfied the 48 hour incarceration period may be considered by the Law Division as credit against any sentence he may be given thereby. If you are convicted of DUI you face serious penalties including loss of license for up to 10 years, incarceration for up to 180 days and substantial fines. You should obtain an experienced DUI attorney immediately to help fight your case. For more information about DWI, drug DUI (DUID), controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving, refusal to submit to a breath test or other serious motor vehicle offenses in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Acquittal Of Burglary And Arson But 6-year Sentence For CDS

Michael Naples was indicted for second-degree aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)), third-degree arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b)(2)), third-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1)) and possession of drugs (cocaine) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)). Following a fire, surveillance video revealed Naples riding his bicycle past a vacant building into a parking lot then showed the defendant in the lot again shortly after the fire began. Detectives had seen Naples in the past and quickly located him for questioning. During the conversation, the defendant admitted to having a crack pipe, which he provided to officers, and was also found to have a gas cap in his possession. He denied any knowledge of the fire but smelled of gasoline according to the detectives. His motion to suppress the evidence was denied and the jury acquitted Naples of arson and burglary and found him guilty only of the cocaine possession. He was sentence to a discretionary extended 6-year term in prison with a 3-year period of parole ineligibility. In State v. Naples, the NJ Appellate Court heard the defendant's arguments against the trial court's denial of the suppression motion and the extended sentence imposed for the minute amount of drugs. As to the suppression motion, the Appellate Division quoted State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 21 (2004) in holding that based on the "facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant[ed] a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." With regard to the sentence imposed, the Appellate Division found a "clear showing of abuse of discretion", pursuant to State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979) on the part of the trial court. Although the prosecution moved for an extended sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) applicable to persistent offenders as Naples was over 21 years old, previously convicted on at least 2 separate occasions of 2 separate crimes committed at different times after attaining the age of 18 years old and 10 years had not passed since the commission of his last release from confinement the Appellate Division held that being a persistent offender is only part of the consideration in sentencing to an extended term under State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987). In Dunbar, the court held that the court must also determine whether an extended sentence is appropriate to protect the public under State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 164-65 (2006), weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and determine whether to impose a parole ineligibility period. The Appellate Division determined that the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings and gave too much weight to the controlled dangerous substance (CDS) found in Naples possession. The matter was reversed and remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of the appropriate criteria and Naples criminal history. Drug charges often heavily sentenced and, if found guilty, you risk incarceration, loss of driver's license and substantial fine. If you are facing drug charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, drug charges, CDS, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Distribution Conviction Reversed For Lack Of Probable Cause

Jermaine Wright was charged with possession of controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a) and possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5). Wright's arrest was made by police in Trenton after Ewing Township detectives received a tip from a confidential informant that "Jazzz" was delivering CDS in Trenton in a specific vehicle. Initially the Ewing detectives followed up on the tip, verifying the vehicle and general location provided by the informant, but seeing no activity indicative of drug trade, then Ewing was dispatched to another call and passed the information on to Trenton detectives. Trenton detectives located the vehicle and approached on foot. Later testimony would conflict as to whether the officers guns were drawn as they approached the vehicle. The officer used flashlights to illuminate the occupied vehicle's interior and saw the occupants using a scale to measure a quantity of CDS, which they suspected to be cocaine. As the driver exited the vehicle, a large amount of money could be viewed plainly in the purse she left behind and a bag on the passenger seat was partially open leaving a significant quantity of cocaine in plain view. In State v. Wright, Defendant attempted to suppress the evidence claiming the officers' actions constituted de facto arrest without probable cause but the judge held that the stop was investigative in nature, of limited duration and of little intrusion upon the Defendant's liberty. The judge further held that the evidence initially seized was in plain view and the remainder was seized based on probable cause and under exigent circumstances. In spite of the motion judge's determination that Trenton officers parked their vehicle in a manner to prevent the defendants' exit and swift approach with guns drawn conveying the message they were not free to leave, the judge held the stop was not thereby converted to an arrest requiring probable cause. The Defendant's motion to suppress the CDS was denied and he entered a guilty plea to narcotics related offenses. The NJ Appellate Division referred to State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 475 (1998) in holding "the temporary detention of individuals during an automobile stop by police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose constitutes a seizure. The Appellate Division also referenced State v. Gibson, ___ N.J. ___, (2014) in finding the judge below inaccurately utilized the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard for a stop rather than the probable cause standard required for an arrest. After a thorough analysis of warrantless seizure cases (State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000) and State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328 (2010)) and cases involving levels of police interaction (State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), State v. Stoval, 170 N.J. 346 (2002), State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2011)) the appellate judges looked to further considerations including the duration of the stop, reasonableness, degree of the intrusion and the State's interest in the welfare of the public. The Appellate Division further reasoned that a reasonable articulable suspicion was required in this case but there were no particularized facts justifying the seizure. In fact, Trenton detectives testified they observed nothing giving rise to suspicion and approached the vehicle solely on the limited information provided by the Ewing Township detectives. The appellate division reasoned that the seizure of Wright was illegal as it was not supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion. Therefore, pursuant to State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83 (1998), the appellate division reasoned the evidence obtained from the unlawful seizure must be suppressed and reversed the decision of the court below. Drug distribution charges are met with harsh penalties due to the public interest in deterrence. If you are facing charges for drug distribution or possession, there are multiple factors which may affect the ultimate outcome and an experienced criminal defense attorney will know how to protect your rights. For more information regarding drug distribution, possession, possession with intent to distribute or controlled dangerous substances (CDS) visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

180 Days In Jail For Driving While Suspended For DUI

James French had been convicted of 9 Driving Under the Influence (DUI) events prior to being stopped by police in Warren County, NJ who observed him to be driving erratically and to have an inoperable brake light on his vehicle. He was sentenced, by Warren County Superior Court Judge Ann Bartlett, to 90 days in jail followed by 90 days in an inpatient treatment facility. The Prosecutor appealed French's sentence as not meeting the requirements of the applicable statute. In 2011, the NJ State Legislature passed new legislation, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), directed at driving while suspended for DUI. The statute was drafted by the legislature to punish those driving while suspended for multiple DUIs. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) makes driving while suspended for a second or subsequent DUI or refusal to submit to chemical breath tests a 4th degree criminal offense and requires a 180 day jail sentence with no possibility of parole. Under DUI Statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, a 3rd or subsequent DUI is punished by a minimum 180 days in jail, 90 of which may be served in an inpatient rehabilitation facility. In State v. French, the NJ Appellate Division decided that the legislative intent in drafting N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) was to levy a higher penalty on those who would continue to drive while suspended for DUI. In reversing the decision of the Warren County Superior Court Judge, the NJ Appellate Division determined that the statute plainly includes a 180 day jail sentence without eligibility for parole and makes no provision for inpatient rehabilitation. DUI is a very serious offense with substantial consequences including jail and loss of driving privileges which may result in loss of your job and other consequences. If you are facing DUI charges, you should obtain an experienced DUI defense attorney immediately. For more information about DUI, Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), underage DUI, drug DUI, controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other serious driving infractions in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Change To Spousal Privilege Following Drug Distribution Case?

Yolanda Terry, Teron Savoy and multiple others were charged with conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute as well as distribution of cocaine and heroin (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:35-5a and 2C:35-5b(1)). Teron Savoy and his wife, Yolanda Terry, were part of an alleged drug manufacturing and trafficking network along with approximately 20 others. Savoy was also charged as a leader of a drug trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3) and possession with intent to distribute heroin (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3). As a result of their observations of Savoy and others including Terry who purportedly worked under Savoy, the State obtained a warrant to intercept communications of Savoy and others. In State v. Yolanda Terry, the spousal communication privilege was determined to protect communications between husband and wife even in the event that such communications are in furtherance of ongoing or future criminal activity. The NJ Supreme Court, in upholding the privilege and suppressing communications intercepted by the State through a wiretap of Yolanda Terry's phone, did make clear that upholding the privilege in the face of criminal activity was likely contrary to the Legislative intent. Although communications were overheard and therefore would be disclosed by the State as a third party they do not lose their privileged status according to N.J.S.A. 2A:156-11, a provision of the NJ Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -37). In rendering its unanimous opinion the NJ Supreme Court held that although safeguarded under current legislation, the marital privilege is intended to encourage communication between spouses with the goal of harmonious marriages and is not intended to further spouses engaged in joint criminal enterprise. Also included in the opinion of the Court was the fact that multiple other privileges are set aside under exception when ongoing or future criminal activity is furthered by said privileges. An example included in the opinion of the Court was Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N.J. Eq. 455, 465-70 (Ch. 1891) where the "crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege was recognized in New Jersey common law in the case that first acknowledged the privilege itself." As a result of this case, the NJ Supreme Court petitioned the Legislature to modify New Jersey Rule of Evidence 509 to create an exception when the marital privilege serves to further criminal acts. If you have been charged with drug related crimes or were charged with criminal activity as a result of a wiretap, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances (CDS) including possession, manufacturing, distribution or possession with the intent to distribute, CDS in a motor vehicle or driving under the influence (DUI) as a result of ingesting CDS visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Mandatory And Discretionary Extended Terms In Drug Case?

James Robinson sold 3 bags of crack cocaine to an undercover officer in 2003 and was indicted for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3)); second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 500 feet of public property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1); third-degree possession of CDS (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); and third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3)). Due to Robinson's prior criminal history, including convictions for distribution of CDS in a school zone, receiving stolen property, eluding a police officer, burglary, and criminal restraint exposing another to serious bodily injury, the trial court imposed a discretionary extended term sentence of 15 years imprisonment with a 3 year period of parole ineligibility, a mandatory extended term of 15 years with a 5 year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) as a repeat drug offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) in State v. Robinson. Defendant was also sentenced to a mandatory extended term of 7 years imprisonment with a 3 year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed the sentence claiming that a court may not impose a discretionary extended term when a mandatory extended term has been imposed in the same proceeding. The appellate division affirmed the decision of the trial court. The NJ Supreme Court then reversed the decision after consideration of the Legislative intent in providing for extended terms for certain repeat offenders. Under the Model Penal Code (MPC), sentencing uniformity was a consideration in conjunction with affording courts the flexibility to achieve deterrence as needed. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) limits the number of extended terms which a court may impose in a sentencing, however, multiple mandatory extended terms may be imposed in a single proceeding (State v. Connell, 208 N.J. Super. 688 (App. Div. 1986)). The court then turned to the holding of State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513 (2012) and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) to be a bar to the addition of a discretionary extended term when the trial court is required to impose a mandatory extended term on another offense if both are in the same proceeding. If you are facing charges for possession or distribution you will be facing severe penalties and should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of CDS, possession with intent to distribute, distribution within 500 feet of a public place, distribution in a school zone, prescription drug matters or other serious drug offenses in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.