Self-Defense Applies In Manslaughter Case

Jacob R. Gentry was charged with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a), aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)) and reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b) after a fight with David Haulmark in which Gentry's girlfriend and brother are alleged to also have been involved. Gentry maintained the killing was in self-defense as, while fighting with Haulmark, he was pinned to the ground, being choked and fighting for his life. At trial, the prosecution cross-examined defendant about statements which his brother had made to police which were hearsay, inadmissible at defendant's trial and never entered into the trial by defendant and defendant's brother did not testify in defendant's trial. After the court failed to inform the jury that self-defense was not only a justification to murder but also to aggravated manslaughter, Gentry was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and third-degree endangering an injured victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2) and sentenced, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Sussex County by Judge N. Peter Conforti to 30 years in prison subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). On Appeal in State v. Gentry, the NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 170 (2008) and State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200 (1984), regarding the requirement of a jury charge regarding self-defense when the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, supports the theory of self-defense. In Gentry, there was evidence presented that defendant and Haulmark worked together and were housed together for some time during which Gentry suffered repeated physical attacks and harassment at the hands of Haulmark and Haulmark's friends which were corroborated by independent witnesses including security from Legend's Resort wherein the workers were housed and other individuals who felt harassed by Haulmark. On the night in question, defendant claimed he feared for his life as Haulmark had him in a chokehold while on the ground and was biting him at the same time, all of which were supported by a physical examination of defendant's body following the event. Defendant admitted to kicking Haulmark, 80 pounds heavier than defendant, in the head after extracting himself from Haulmark's grip, out of fear that Haulmark would get back up and pursue him further. The defendant's testimony to police indicated that he had no idea Haulmark was seriously injured or dead until the police revealed the information. In Rodriguez, supra, 195 N.J. at 172, the NJ Supreme Court specifically held that one who kills in the belief that deadly force is required to spare his or her own life 'cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter.' N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) also sets forth the circumstances in which deadly force becomes acceptable as a form of self-defense. Once self-defense is established by testimony, it is the burden of the prosecution to disprove that the defendant acted in self-defense. State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 298 (2004), sets forth the principle that after sufficient evidence exists to support a self-defense charge to the jury, failure to instruct the jury that self-defense is a complete justification for murder and manslaughter defenses constitutes plain error. With regard to the prosecutor's cross-examination with regard to the statement of the defendant's non-testifying brother to the police, the prohibition is plainly stated in State v. Haskell, 100 N.J. 469, 478 (1985), "the out-of-court statement of a co-defendant is inadmissible against another defendant because admission of the statement violates the rule prohibiting hearsay and the defendant's fundamental right to confront witnesses." In this case, the witness was available and the defendant was offered no opportunity to cross-examine him at trial which, under State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 151 (2014), could have rendered the statement admissible. Multiple questions and comments in summation by the prosecutor clearly gave rise to prejudicial error in violation of Gentry's rights under State v. Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. 229 (2003); State v. Rucki, 367 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 2004); and State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158 (2001). Based on the cumulative errors at trial, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

NJ Robbery Matter leads To Another Jail Credit Decision

In a case stemming from two separate robberies in Essex County, allegedly committed by Amerigo Rodriguez, the NJ Appellate Court considered the manner in which jail credits accrue. Rodriguez pled to two 2nd degree robbery charges and was sentenced to two consecutive 10 year terms, each of which carried an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Before a parole detainer was lodged against Rodriguez, he received 4 days of jail credit on one judgment of conviction and none on the other. Rodriguez appealed the decision regarding jail credit and the NJ Appellate Division, in State v. Rodriguez, reviewed the facts in light of other NJ cases in which parole detainers were lodged against defendant's awaiting disposition of other charges. In State v. Harvey, 273 N.J. Super. 572 (App. Div. 1994), Harvey was charged with 3rd degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 of a school zone and 3rd degree conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The Harvey court considered Rule 3:21-8 to uphold a decision that defendant would receive only 3 days of jail credit for pre-sentence custody. In Harvey, the Appellate Court reasoned that, had the defendant bailed out on the new charges he would have remained in custody due to the parole violation and therefore no jail credits would accrue on the new charges. In State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438 (1998), a case commonly cited to when courts are considering jail credits, the NJ Superior Court held that any confinement served as a result of a parole warrant did not qualify in the accrual of jail credits during the pendency of sentencing on later matters. Ultimately, the guidance of prior decisions led to the court's affirmation of the decision below in Rodriguez If you are facing criminal charges in New Jersey while under supervision for other charges, the view the prosecution or finder of fact may take of you and the final sentence you may receive are likely to be affected by the prior supervision issue. It is imperative that you seek experienced criminal defense counsel when facing any charges against you and prior supervision only serves to complicate your matter by magnification of any negative issues the prosecution can find against you. For more information about robbery, burglary, drug charges or other serious criminal or municipal court offenses in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of legal counsel.