Showing posts with label crime. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crime. Show all posts
Monday, February 8, 2016
First-Degree Aggravated Sexual Assault Remanded For Jury Charge
R.P. was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(6)) against his step-daughter O.M. while she was under the age of thirteen. R.P. was sentenced to 26 years in prison with a 13 year period of parole ineligibility. On the defendant's appeal, challenging the conviction based on the trial court's failure to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1)), the NJ Appellate Division found for the Defendant and vacated the conviction. Additionally, the Appellate Division denied the state's request for a molded verdict pursuant to State v. Farrad, 753 A.2d 648, 164 N.J. 247, 192 N.J. 294 (2007), and remand for a new trial with on the first-degree aggravated sexual assault charge.
The NJ Supreme Court's review of State v. R.P. was focused solely on the state's request for a molded verdict. Pursuant to State v. Farrad, the court identified 3 factors: (1) the defendant had his day in court; (2) each element of the lesser-included offense was included in the more serious offense; and (3) the jury's conviction for the more serious offense implies guilt in of the lesser-included offense. In State v. R.P., the court added a prejudice element to the 3 factors by stating that, when all 3 factors are met and the defendant is not unduly prejudiced, a molded verdict should be granted for the state. The court reversed and remanded the matter.
If you are charged with a sex crime you are subject to incarceration, registration as a sex offender and the accompanying stigma which will effect where you may live, where you may work and how others will treat you and possibly even civil commitment. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to assist you with these charges. For more information about rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, sexual assault, criminal sexual contact and other sex crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:14-2,
753 A.2d 648,
attorney,
Civil commitment,
crime,
criminal,
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sex offender registry,
sexual assault,
State v. Farrad,
State v.R.P.
Tuesday, July 21, 2015
S2003/A4229 Promotes Rehabilitation Of Juvenile Offenders
In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if S2003, a Senate bill, the same as A4229 in the Assembly, is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial, and represented.
Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would make 15 the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult. S2003 would permit juveniles to be tried as adults only for Criminal homicide other than death by auto, strict liability for drug induced deaths, first-degree robbery, carjacking, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, second-degree aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated arson, certain gang criminality; or when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent, or convicted, on the basis of certain offenses enumerated; or when the juvenile had previously been sentenced and confined in an adult penal institution; or offense against a person committed in an aggressive, violent and willful manner; or the unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon, arson or death by auto while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug; or a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; or a conspiracy; certain forms of attempt or conspiracy; or theft of an automobile pursuant to chapter 20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; or possession of a firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person of another or the crime of aggravated assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, burglary or escape if, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime including the immediate flight therefrom, the juvenile possessed a firearm; or computer criminal activity which would be a crime of the first or second degree; and other specific crimes involving controlled dangerous substances.
Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. In certain cases juveniles could remain in youth facilities until age 21 even if they are convicted as adults. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over.
Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. A prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part would be required to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. The bill was passed by both the Senate and Assembly and now will move before Governor Chris Christie for consideration.
If you or your child have been charged as a juvenile offender, it is critical that you seek an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and your future. Do not compound one mistake by choosing the wrong criminal defense attorney. For more information about juvenile offenses, gang crimes, and various criminal offenses in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
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A4229,
controlled dangerous substance,
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drug,
gang,
gun,
juvenile,
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racketeering,
S2003,
weapon
Friday, June 26, 2015
Sexual Assault Conviction Upheld After Appellate Dissent
T.J.M. was accused by the daughter of his girlfriend, with whom he resided, of sexual abuse. T.J.M. was charged with second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)), first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A.. 2C:14-2(a)(1)) and second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)) and was ultimately convicted of second-degree sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a minor. Chloe, the child making the accusations, indicated that T.J.M. had abused here over a period of roughly 4 years in the residence they shared and in the defendant's van.
The conviction of T.J.M. in the Bergen County Superior Court, Law Division, Criminal part was affirmed by the NJ Appellate Division but a dissenting opinion within the Appellate Division led to an appeal. In a pretrial hearing, the trial judge determined that the defendant's 6 year old conviction for resisting arrest during a driving under the influence (DUI) stop could be utilized to impeach him at trial. Additionally, Chloe's lengthy history of involvement with the juvenile justice system prior to making the allegations against the defendant was limited to defense counsel's cross-examination at trial. The defendant raised, on appeal, Chloe's entrance and presence in the courtroom during summation of the defense and prosecution to which an objection had been raised during trial as well as the fact that person's in the courtroom were identified. The dissenting opinion focused on the cumulative errors set forth above resulting in a deprivation of the defendant's right to a fair trial.
During an appeal as a matter of right, in State v. T.J.M., the NJ Appellate Division determined that the dissenting opinion was not correct in its interpretations and focus and upheld the opinion of the NJ Appellate Division affirming the defendant's conviction.
Sex crime charges can be levied many years after an alleged incident and can result in incarceration, substantial and irreparable damage to the reputation and lifestyle of the accused in addition to the deprivation of liberty and rights, registration as a sex offender, loss of employment opportunities, possibility of civil commitment and social stigma. If you are accused of a sex crime it is absolutely imperative that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to begin working on your defense immediately. For more information about sexual assault, rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, internet crimes, child pornography or other sex crimes in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.
Labels:
2C:14-2,
2C:24-4,
child pornography,
crime,
defense counsel,
internet crimes,
rape,
sexual assault,
State v. T.J.M.
Monday, May 11, 2015
Handgun Discovered In Search Will Not Be Suppressed
James J. Scarborough pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) after police found a handgun under his seat in a vehicle during an investigatory search based on the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle's interior. He was sentenced to 5 years incarceration, subject to a 3 year period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c).
Police received an anonymous call about a vehicle parked in the rear lot of a closed facility and, upon responding, discovered 2 males in the vehicle involved in what the officer suspected to be drug activity. Upon encountering the driver the officer perceived an odor of burnt marijuana. Ultimately, the driver signed a consent to search form and a handgun was discovered under the passenger seat where Scarborough was sitting along with a magazine and ammunition between the passenger seat and door. Scarborough told police he found the gun in the woods earlier in the day and did not know what to do with it. Scarborough filed a motion to suppress the evidence and his statement, both of which were denied and he then entered into the guilty plea.
In State v. Scarborough the defendant appealed and the NJ Appellate Division upheld the denial of the suppression motion finding that a field inquiry under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968) was permissible based on the anonymous call regarding the vehicle. The odor of burnt marijuana then gave probable cause to believe a crime was committed under State v. Vanderveer, 285 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 1995) and State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003). Once the officer had probable cause to believe criminal activity was afoot he was justified, under State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002), in seeking consent to search the vehicle. Finally the NJ Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in determining the Scarborough's statement was not coerced. The matter was, however, remanded as to sentencing factors only.
Second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun in NJ carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act. If you are charged with a weapons offense you need experienced criminal defense counsel. For more information about weapons possession, possession of a weapon without a permit, use or possession of a weapon in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons or other weapon related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
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2C:43-6c,
attorney,
Carty,
crime,
defense,
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Nishina,
Scarborough,
search,
seizure,
suppress,
Terry v. Ohio,
Vanderveer,
weapon
Friday, March 27, 2015
Expungement Changes May Still Come For NJ
NJ Assembly bill, A206, permitting automatic expungement of certain criminal records and reducing the waiting period required to obtain an expungement remains before the New Jersey Senate. The statutory waiting period prior to seeking expungement of more serious but expugnable crimes would be reduced from ten to seven years. The statutory waiting period for seeking expungement of disorderly or petty disorderly persons offenses would be reduced from five years to three years. Juvenile records could also be expunged after four years rather than the current five year period if the bill passes. Current requirements, including the non-commission of other prior or subsequent crimes during the requisite waiting period for expungement, would remain as existing with only the modification of the commensurate waiting periods required.
The bill also provides for the automatic expungement, after three years, of disorderly or petty disorderly persons offenses for criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3) or shoplifting (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11) as well as drug offenses included in 2C:35 or 2C:36 offenses. This would reduce the waiting period from five to three years for expungement of these offenses. The current requirement that the applicant have no other convictions for any other prior or subsequent crimes or any other three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses would remain intact.
Certain crimes including murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1), manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4), kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1), sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2), arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1), robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and other serious crimes shall remain unexpungeable. Additionally, conviction relating to the sale, distribution or possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances (CDS) shall not be subject to expungement except in certain narrowly defined circumstances.
Proponents of the bill argue that there is no societal benefit to the extended waiting periods prior to seeking expungement and also cite to the societal interest in cleansing records in order to return eligible non-recidivists to the workforce.
If you would like to expunge past mistakes from your record, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney to determine whether you are eligible for expungement and for help navigating the process of obtaining an expungement. For more information about the expungement of a criminal record, visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-1,
2C:11-4,
2C:13-1,
2C:14-2,
2C:15-1,
2C:17-1,
2C:35,
A206,
assembly,
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criminal record,
disorderly person,
expungement
Friday, March 20, 2015
Warning To The Wise About Your Car's 'Black Box'
If you are charged with criminal activity, the police now have another source of information to use against you, the information stored in your car's 'black box.' The Senate voted to approve NJ A3579, a bill introduced by the NJ Assembly on September 11, 2013 pertaining to the use of information from automobile ‘black box’ recording devices. The information recorded and stored by the ‘black box’ includes location, time of use, number of occupants inside the vehicle, direction of travel and speed. In addition to providing evidence in the case of a motor vehicle accident, the information is also accessible for law enforcement purposes.
The text of the NJ A3579 includes the following:
“2. a. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, no person, except the owner of the motor vehicle that contains the recording device, or the owner's representative, may retrieve, obtain, or use data recorded, stored, or transmitted from the recording device, unless:
(1) The owner of the motor vehicle, or the owner's representative, consents in writing at the time the data is retrieved, obtained, or used;
(2) The recorded data is retrieved or obtained by a law enforcement officer pursuant to a search warrant issued by a judge of the Superior Court or upon order by a court of competent jurisdiction or another administrative authority having jurisdiction to issue such an order;”
Although the bill, recently approved by the NJ Senate, limits the use of the stored data, it did not preclude its use by law enforcement. This means that if the police believe that a motor vehicle was utilized in the commission of a crime they may be able to obtain the information from the vehicle’s ‘black box’ that would assist in the investigation and prosecution of any suspects.
For more information about specific crimes or criminal defense in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Thursday, March 19, 2015
Murder Conviction Reversed On Prejudicial Hearsay
Stephen Scharf was convicted of first-degree purposeful and knowing murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2)) for the murder of his wife, Jody Scharf. Stephen and Jody Scharf were together at the top of the Englewood Cliffs in Bergen County. The defendant contacted the police indicating Jody Scharf must have slipped from Rockefeller Lookout atop the cliffs when he returned to their vehicle to obtain a blanket. The body of Jody Scharf was later located at the bottom of the cliffs, a distance of 52 feet from the base horizontally.
The defendant was interviewed by police and the parties' son corroborated his story but also added that the night prior to Jody Scharf's death, he had accompanied them to a late dinner as his mother did not wish to be alone with his father upon whom she had recently served divorce papers claiming abuse and adultery. Both of the parties' sons also provided details of their mother's fear of heights with regard to the notion of her interest in going to the edge of the cliffs. In addition to the fact that Jody Scharf had filed for divorce, the defendant stood to receive $500,000 in life insurance proceeds from her death.
In State v. Scharf, pre-trial motions to suppress hearsay testimony from Jody Scharf's counselor and friends were denied based on the judge's reliance on State v. Benedetto, 120 N.J. 250 (1990) and N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3) and the jury was permitted to hear statements about the likelihood defendant murdered Jody Scharf or that she had been afraid of him. The prosecution and defense offered conflicting testimony as to how the body ended up 52 feet from the base of the cliffs. Two of defendant's paramours contradicted Sharf's claims to police that he and Jody Scharf were attempting to reconcile and had terminated relationships with them. Defendant appealed the guilty verdict in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County and the sentence of life in prison with a 30-year parole ineligibility period.
The NJ Appellate Division considered defendant's challenge to the hearsay evidence admitted below under N.J.R.E. 401 with regard to the weight of prejudice against the weight of probative value and N.J.R.E. 801(c) pertaining directly to hearsay defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." The Appellate Division referenced State v. Calleia, 206 N.J. 274 (2011) wherein the court considered statements of fear which had the danger of creating an inference of violence as an ongoing part of the relationship between the victim and defendant against the introduction of statements to establish the defendant's motive to commit the crime. Ultimately, motive evidence was held to be admissible as a "material issue in a case." Id. at 293-294, provided that the danger of prejudice by the statement offered does not outweigh the probative value. In this balancing, it is the burden of the party seeking exclusion of the statement to establish that it is more likely to be prejudicial than probative. State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383,453 (1998). Pursuant to Calleia, the State must then show that the accused was most likely aware of the decedent's statement. The NJ Appellate Division determined the statements offered were "neither relevant nor material" and that they were "highly prejudicial and clearly cumulative." The court held that the victims fear of defendant did not make it any more or less likely that she slipped and fell off the cliff to which she voluntarily accompanied the defendant, especially in light of the fact that the autopsy did reveal that she was clearly under the influence of alcohol while on the edge of the cliff. Ultimately, the NJ Appellate Division determined that the defendant had quite possibly been deprived of a fair trial and reversed and remanded the matter for a retrial.
If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
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State v. Benedetto,
State v. Calleia,
State v. Morton,
State v. Scharf,
Stephen Scharf
Friday, March 13, 2015
First-Degree Robbery Conviction Does Not Require Presence Of A Weapon
When a would-be bank robber claims to have a weapon and creates a reasonable fear that he does have such weapon, he is subject to charges of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b)). When Christopher Dekowski entered Commerce Bank in Roselle acting suspiciously, including feigning the locking of the banks doors, carrying a briefcase and dressed in a manner differing from the seasonal norm he quickly drew the bank manager's attention. Dekowski approached a teller, at which time the manager intervened and saw a note indicating that the teller was to place all of the money in a bag and implying that Dekowski had a bomb which he would use if the teller failed to comply. Dekowski was given $500 and apprehended.
In the Superior Court, Law Division, Union County, the defendant was convicted, in State v. Dekowski, of first-degree robbery and sentenced to a 13-year prison term with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). The NJ Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence with regard to possession of a weapon, as required for a conviction of first-degree robbery, and determining second-degree robbery to be established remanded for resentencing accordingly. In State v. Williams, ___ N.J. ____, ____ (2014) the NJ Supreme Court held that a conviction for first-degree robbery does not require a weapon but only the victim's "actual and reasonable belief that a weapon exists and the defendant's threatened immediate use of such weapon." In Williams, the court relied on State v. Hutson, 107 N.J. 222, 227-228 (1987), holding that the belief in the presence of a weapon need be reasonable under the specific circumstances. The court considered the Dekowski's threat that he had a bomb in concert with the public knowledge and general fear of bombs in contemporary society in determining the reasonableness of the bank manager's belief in the presence of a weapon in making its determination that the defendant's conviction for first-degree robbery would be reinstated.
First-degree robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
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crime,
criminal,
NERA,
No Early Release Act,
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Sate v. Williams,
State v. Dekowski,
State v. Hutson,
weapon
Monday, March 9, 2015
NJ Firearms Purchaser Identification Card Denied For NY Charges
George Winston was denied a New Jersey firearms purchaser identification (FPI) card in 2011 as a result of convictions in New York of attempted assault in 1974 and possession of a controlled dangerous substance in 1989. The Clifton, New Jersey Chief of Police denied Winston an FPI card in spite of "certificates of relief from disabilities" for the prior New York convictions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3c(1).
In the Matter of the Denial of the Application of Winston the Superior Court- Law Division, Passaic County judge heard testimony from Winston and others as well as a Clifton detective undertaking the background search with regard to the application. The Clifton detective indicated that Winston's background also included domestic violence charges, a driving under the influence (DUI) charge and disputes with neighbors on more than one occasion. The Law Division judge found that the New York certificates of relief were not entitled to the Full Faith and Credit Clause as they were not equivalent to a New Jersey expungement under New York law but rather they remove certain bars to employment under New York law.
If you are seeking a permit to obtain a firearm, you should seek an experienced attorney to assist you in your matter. If you are caught illegally carrying firearms the penalties can be severe making it well worth the effort to seek a permit to carry legally. For more information about gun or weapon possession, possession of weapons during a drug related offense, armed robbery, possession of a handgun without a permit, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon or possession of a weapon while on parole or probation visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
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In the Matter of the denial of the application of Winston,
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unlawful possession,
weapon
Tuesday, February 10, 2015
Drugs Suppressed When Found Outside Scope Of Warrant
Police executing a no-knock warrant at a residence located Chad Bivins and co-defendant, Sayid Jordan, in a vehicle located several residences away and, upon removing them from the car searching them, discovered 30 bags of crack cocaine on each of them. Bivins sought to have the crack cocaine suppressed based on his location well outside the residence subject to the warrant but the trial court denied the motion holding that defendant's location was proximate to the residence based on the totality of the circumstances, especially in light of the fact that an officer assigned to the scene located Bivins and co-defendants after receiving a report of individual exiting the residence to be searched.
The defendant appealed the denial of the suppression motion in State v. Bivins. The NJ Appellate Division reversed in reliance on a existing laws with regard to the scope of a search warrant. State v. Reldon, 100 N.J. 187 (1985) limits officers to a search of appropriate areas when executing a search. the warrant in question limited police to search the residence and "all persons present reasonably believed to be connected to said property and investigation. The Appellate Division distinguished this from State v. Carolino, 373 N.J. Super. 377 (App..Div. 2004) wherein "any and app persons arriving at, departing from and located [in] the residence and vehicle in question were included in the warrant and both the behavior and proximity of the defendant therein differed greatly from Bivins. Bailey v. United States, ___U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed.2d 19 (2013) dictates that specific facts are required to connect an individual to a scene once they have departed premises subject to a warrant. The Appellate Division applied Bailey to the facts including neither the defendant nor the Pontiac in which he was located were described in the affidavit supporting the warrant, he was located a substantial distance outside the residence to be searched, the officer who searched the defendant received no report that the individuals fled the premises with evidence sought under the warrant being executed and the defendant did not act in a suspicious manner. The Appellate Division found that upholding the search would afford officers executing warrants overly broad discretion and therefore reversed the denial of the suppression motion.
Drug charges, particularly distribution charges, have serious consequences including substantial terms of incarceration and enhanced penalties under certain circumstances. If you are facing drug charges and believe evidence obtained against you may have been obtained in violation of your rights, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances (CDS), warrantless searches, distribution of CDS, possession, CDS in a motor vehicle or other criminal issues in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
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cocaine,
crack,
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no-knock,
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search and seizure,
State v. Bivins,
State v. Carolino,
State v. Reldon,
warrant,
warrantless search
Monday, February 9, 2015
No PTI Application After Guilty Verdict
Sean Bell was indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) and third-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)) after fighting with another man at a party. Bell tried the case based on the second-degree charge which prevented his application to the Pre-Trial Intervention program (PTI)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to -22). During trial in State v. Bell, the second-degree charges were dismissed but Bell was convicted of the third-degree charges and made application to the PTI program. The Law Division admitted Bell to PTI in part due to Bell's reliance on State v. Halm, 319 N.J. Super. 569 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 162 N.J. 131 (1999). The State appealed based on the application being filed out of time under N.J. Court Rule 3:28(h) and State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576 (1996), wherein a dismissal of a second-degree offense was found not to justify a PTI application out of time. The NJ Appellate Division reversed finding Pre-Trial Intervention applications were required to be made prior to trial. On appeal, the State distinguished Halm by the timing of the defendant's PTI applications as well as the nature of the underlying charges. After substantial consideration of the purpose of diversionary programs, the NJ Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's holding that the purpose of PTI was to offer defendants an opportunity to avoid the stigma of a guilty verdict and prevent use of additional judicial resources at trials. Further, the NJ Supreme Court held that permitting defendants to seek PTI after a guilty verdict would modify the program into an unintended "alternative sentencing option".
Assault and aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including long-term incarceration. If you are facing charges of assault or aggravated assault, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, aggravated assault, assault with a deadly weapon or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
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State v. Bell,
State v. Halm,
State v. Wallace
Friday, December 26, 2014
Acquittal Of Burglary And Arson But 6-year Sentence For CDS
Michael Naples was indicted for second-degree aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)), third-degree arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b)(2)), third-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1)) and possession of drugs (cocaine) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)). Following a fire, surveillance video revealed Naples riding his bicycle past a vacant building into a parking lot then showed the defendant in the lot again shortly after the fire began. Detectives had seen Naples in the past and quickly located him for questioning. During the conversation, the defendant admitted to having a crack pipe, which he provided to officers, and was also found to have a gas cap in his possession. He denied any knowledge of the fire but smelled of gasoline according to the detectives. His motion to suppress the evidence was denied and the jury acquitted Naples of arson and burglary and found him guilty only of the cocaine possession. He was sentence to a discretionary extended 6-year term in prison with a 3-year period of parole ineligibility.
In State v. Naples, the NJ Appellate Court heard the defendant's arguments against the trial court's denial of the suppression motion and the extended sentence imposed for the minute amount of drugs. As to the suppression motion, the Appellate Division quoted State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 21 (2004) in holding that based on the "facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant[ed] a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." With regard to the sentence imposed, the Appellate Division found a "clear showing of abuse of discretion", pursuant to State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979) on the part of the trial court. Although the prosecution moved for an extended sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) applicable to persistent offenders as Naples was over 21 years old, previously convicted on at least 2 separate occasions of 2 separate crimes committed at different times after attaining the age of 18 years old and 10 years had not passed since the commission of his last release from confinement the Appellate Division held that being a persistent offender is only part of the consideration in sentencing to an extended term under State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987). In Dunbar, the court held that the court must also determine whether an extended sentence is appropriate to protect the public under State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 164-65 (2006), weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and determine whether to impose a parole ineligibility period. The Appellate Division determined that the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings and gave too much weight to the controlled dangerous substance (CDS) found in Naples possession. The matter was reversed and remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of the appropriate criteria and Naples criminal history.
Drug charges often heavily sentenced and, if found guilty, you risk incarceration, loss of driver's license and substantial fine. If you are facing drug charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, drug charges, CDS, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:17-1,
2C:18-2,
2C:35-10,
2C:44-3,
arson,
burglary,
CDS,
cocaine,
crime,
criminal,
drugs,
State v. Dunbar,
State v. Naples,
State v. Pierce,
State v. Pineiro,
State v. Whitaker
Wednesday, December 3, 2014
No Expungement After Plea In Money Laundering Scheme
R.Z. sought an expungement of convictions of second-degree theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) and second-degree money laundering (N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25) to which he entered guilty pleas. In 2012, the trial court granted the expungement and in 2013 the NJ Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision.
The convictions stemmed from ongoing and continuous fraudulent claims to Medicaid from which in excess of $50,000 was received by R.Z.. Pursuant to In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2008), which interpreted New Jersey's expungement statute (N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a)), a requirement for expungement of more than one crime is that the crimes be committed concurrently rather than on separate occasions as expungement is not available to those who have committed prior or subsequent crimes.
In the Matter of Expungement petition of R.Z. included an effort by petitioner to utilize provisions of a 2010 amendment to the N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) which included a means for early expungement when certain criteria are met including that the public interest warranting an early expungement in certain matters. Pursuant to In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557 (2012), a petitioner seeking an early expungement must still meet all other requirements of the expungement statute. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the denial of R.Z.'s petition for expungement.
If you have prior crimes haunting you and would like to expunge them from your record, you should consult with an experienced attorney to determine your eligibility prior to filing a petition for expungement. For more information about expungement, theft, drug crimes, disorderly persons offenses, or other criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:20-4,
2C:21-25,
2C:52-2,
crime,
criminal,
expungement,
In re Kollman,
In re Ross,
In the matter of expungement of R.Z.,
money laundering,
theft
Monday, November 24, 2014
Armed Robber Seeks Post-Conviction Relief
Jeffrey Toth was indicted for the armed robberies of a 7-11 and Quick Chek in Woodbridge, NJ and pled guilty to two counts of first-degree armed robbery. At 7-11, Toth was said by a clerk to have a knife and the Quick Chek clerk claimed Toth used a screwdriver as a weapon. Toth was later identified as the robber after bragging to others about robbing the stores.
In State v.Toth, the Defendant pled guilty in exchange for a maximum sentence of 15-years imprisonment and dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. He was sentenced to 10-years in prison, the minimum for first-degree armed robbery, with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Years later Toth sought post-conviction relief (PCR)claiming his attorney failed to argue certain mitigating factors at sentencing but was denied without an evidentiary hearing finding Toth's counsel had made such arguments. He appealed and the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the decision for review under State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269 (2012) including either oral argument regarding his PCR petition or give adequate explanation as to why oral argument will not be held.
First-degree armed robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison for each charge. If you have been charged with armed robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
armed robbery,
crime,
criminal,
NERA,
No Early Release Act,
parole disqualifier,
PCR,
post-conviction relief,
robbery,
State v. Parker,
State v. Toth,
weapon
Thursday, November 20, 2014
Conviction For Attempted Murder of Newark Police Officer Upheld On Appeal
Omar Bridges and two co-conspirators were charged, by an Essex County grand jury, with three counts of first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and 2C:5-1); three counts of second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); second-degree possession of a weapon, a handgun, for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f)); third-degree receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7); second-degree eluding (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)); and first-degree conspiracy to attempt to murder the occupants of a vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:11-3). Bridges was ultimately convicted of the attempted murder of Newark Police Officer Patinho, aggravated assault on Officer Patinho, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, unlawful possession of an assault weapon, receiving stolen property and certain persons not to have weapons.
For his participation in stealing a Jaguar, engaging in a shoot-out with occupants of another vehicle and the shooting of a police officer in the chase thereafter, Omar Bridges was sentenced to an aggregate 40-year prison term. Officer Pathino's testimony at trial was that he saw the shoot-out while on patrol and, upon turning on the squad car's lights, a Jaguar and Subaru fled in different directions with Pathino chasing the Jaguar. The chase through Newark lasted approximately two minutes at 90 to 100 miles per hour until the Jaguar went airborne crossing railroad tracks and sustained heavy damage. When the Jaguar came to rest, Officer Pathino exited the squad car and ordered the Jaguar's passengers to show their hands at which time the passenger shot Officer Pathino. Officer Gasavage exchanged fire and the vehicle's occupants fled on foot.
On appeal in State v. Bridges, the Defendant claimed the trial court erred in denying his request for a Wade hearing with regard to Officer Pathino's photo identification of the Defendant. Although New Jersey took a more broad approach to pre-trial identification in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), the Appellate Division determined that, under the circumstances of the case, United States v. Wade, 388, U.S. 218 (1967) did not serve to extend exclusionary principles of pre-trial identification procedures to in-court trial identifications in Defendant's case.
The Defendant next raised the point that the sentencing court did not perform an appropriate analysis under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) which requires the court to consider six specific criteria in sentencing. The NJ Appellate Division agreed with the Defendant and remanded the matter to the sentencing court for a full statement of its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences as required under State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413 (2001).
If you are facing murder or other serious charges, you are facing a prison sentence which may last your entire life. You require an experienced criminal defense attorney to protect your rights and ensure that your are provided with the best possible defense. For more information about murder, weapons offenses, theft and other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
assault firearm,
attempt,
crime,
criminal,
handgun,
murder,
shooting,
State v. Bridges,
State v. Henderson,
State v. Yarbough,
theft,
unlawful purpose,
US v. Wade,
wade hearing,
weapon,
Yarbough Factors
Monday, November 10, 2014
Aggravated Manslaughter Conviction Reversed Due To Error
Dwayne Slaughter was convicted of aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4), conspiracy (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1) following the beating of his 79 year old neighbor, Roosevelt Morrow. The Defendant and Pritchard Watts both admitted to police they intended to enter Morrow's residence and rob him. Although the 2 men admitted they conspired to rob Morrow, they each blamed the other for his beating death. The Defendant's live-in girlfriend, Tanisha Day, gave police a taped statement which was presented to the jury at trial. Day's statement attributed an incriminating comment by using the term "he" but never indicated whether "he" implied Watts or Slaughter. However, Day did not testify and Defendant lost his opportunity to cross-examine her about her statement. Watts had taken a plea to first-degree robbery in exchange for his testimony at trial against Slaughter. There was no physical evidence indicating Slaughter was the actor.
Slaughter appealed the conviction based on the admission of Day's statement. The NJ Appellate Division found that the admission of Day's statement was error but the error was harmless. The NJ Supreme Court found the error was not harmless as Day's statement could have implied either Watts or Slaughter and vacated the Defendant's conviction and remanded for new trial.
If you are facing charges of murder, assault, or conspiracy you are facing severe penalties including as much as life in prison. When confronting criminal charges, it is imperative that you have experienced criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you are afforded due process and your rights are protected. For more information about murder, assault or conspiracy in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-4,
2C:12-1,
2C:5-2,
Aggravated Assualt,
Aggravated manslaughter,
conspiracy,
crime,
criminal,
Dwayne Slaughter,
State v. Slaughter
Friday, November 7, 2014
Evidence Of Other Man's Semen Admissible In Sexual Assault Case
Bobby Perry was found guilty of second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1)) and third-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)). He was sentenced to 8 years with an 85% parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A., N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a)) for the aggravated sexual assault and 4 years imprisonment for the aggravated assault. Additionally, Megan's Law (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23) was applicable and Perry was sentenced to parole supervision for life.
Perry and the victim were drinking together at his residence when he became angry with her and punched her in the mouth and told her to "sit on him". One of the Defendant's roommates returned from a party and he let the victim go. The victim said nothing while the roommate was in the room for some time. After the roommate left the room, the Defendant took the victim downstairs and tried to anally penetrate her, which she resisted, then performed oral sex on her before again trying to orally penetrate her. After this activity, the two returned to a room in the house and sat silently looking at her for some time. The Defendant then asked the victim what she was going to say happened to her face and she agreed to say that someone else had injured her.
The victim later went to Maplewood Police Department, accompanied by her ex-boyfriend Mr. Wilkins, and Sergeant Guglielmo, upon seeing her injuries, called for an ambulance. At the hospital, Detective Fuentes of the Union Township Police Department met with the victim to give a statement. On the way to the police station, the victim showed Detective Fuentes where the attack occurred and identified Perry in a photo array. Officers appeared at the residence with a warrant and used a UV light to search for signs of bodily fluids or evidence of clean-up efforts but found nothing in the basement or bathroom and on a later date, the porch where only a small amount of blood was found on the back of a chair. The blood was later matched to the victim and semen was found in her clothing, however, no DNA found matched the Defendant.
The Union County Superior Court Judge hearing State v. Perry denied Defendant's application to admit DNA evidence of another man's semen under the Rape Shield Law (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7) finding that the presence of another man's semen had no bearing on whether consent was given to the Defendant and found the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudice referencing State v. Ryan, 157 N.J. Super. 121 (App. Div. 1978).
Perry appealed on the basis that the evidence of other semen could indicate the possibility that the victim claimed she was raped to appease Wilkins, with whom she was in an on again, off again relationship. The Rape Shield Law was intended to protect the privacy of the victim while also ensuring defendants receive a fair trial. State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 (2003) State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519 (1991) explained that the Rape Shield Law permits prior sexual history to prove another individual is the source of the semen or to negate force. The NJ Appellate Division determined the evidence of another man's semen in the victims clothes was necessary to put on a full defense as required under State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316 (2005). The probative value of the evidence, presented for the limited purpose of proving the victim was assaulted by Wilkins and lied to the police about who assaulted her, outweighed the potential prejudice. The appellate division reversed Perry's conviction and remanded the matter with the instruction that, should the evidence of another's semen be again proffered in the case, the trial court conduct a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine admissibility of the evidence.
If you have been charged with a sex crime you face severe consequences including prison, societal scorn and inclusion on the sex offender registry and possible involuntary civil commitment. It is critical you obtain experienced defense counsel to immediately begin to review the prosecution's, evidence, speak with witnesses, explore alibis you may have and build a defense. For more information about sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, endangering the welfare of a minor and other sex crimes visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:12-1,
2C:14-2,
2C:14-7,
2C:7,
aggravated assault,
crime,
criminal,
DNA,
Megan's Law,
NERA,
rape shield law,
sex assault,
sex crime,
sex offender registry,
State v. Garron,
State v. Perry,
State v. Ryan
Tuesday, September 30, 2014
Murder Conviction Cannot Stand on Cumulative Trial Errors
Jahnell Weaver and Khalil Bryant were in attendance at a graduation party in Camden, NJ where someone pulled a gun and fired 5 shots killing Edward Williams and wounding Amyr Hill. Although only one individual could have fired the gun, both Hill and Weaver were implicated by others at the party.
Jahnell Weaver and Khalil Bryant were juveniles but both were charged as adults with first-degree murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2)); first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); third-degree assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and third-degree endangering an injured victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2). At trial, the only significant dispute was weather Weaver or Bryant was the shooter. Both Weaver and Bryant were seen with guns at the party. Hill identified Bryant as the shooter then changed his testimony while other witnesses offered conflicting testimony. Weaver offered that Bryant later used the same weapon in a shooting as a defense and Weaver moved for a separate trial. The court denied Weaver’s application to admit other crimes evidence regarding Bryant’s shooting of another individual shortly after the incident in question due to the substantial prejudice it would cause against Bryant as well as denying Weaver’s request for a separate trial. The State was able to admit Bryant’s statement that he received the gun immediately after the shooting in question. However, because Bryant did not testify, Weaver did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him with regard to the statement. Lamike Goffney, an eyewitness, saw one of the men fleeing the scene hand the gun to another man fleeing the scene and other evidence in the trial led the jury to the conclusion that Bryant then received the weapon from Weaver.
Weaver was ultimately convicted and appealed. After the NJ Appellate Division upheld the decision of the trial court, State v. Weaver was heard by the NJ Supreme Court. The NJ Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and remanded the matter for a new trial based on the potential prejudice to Weaver as a result of the cumulative errors in denying his request for a separate trial, refusing to allow other crimes evidence and allowing Bryant’s statement to enter without cross-examination.
The penalty for murder is severe including 30 years to life in prison. If you are facing homicide charges, you need experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about murder, homicide, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, assault, assault with a deadly weapon or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-3,
2C:12-1,
2C:39-4,
2C:39-5,
2C:5-1,
aggravated assault,
assault,
crime,
criminal,
deadly weapon,
gun,
homicide,
murder,
State v. Weaver,
unlawful purpose,
weapon
Tuesday, September 9, 2014
Attempted Assault Plea Reversed For Lack of Factual Basis
Lee Travers pled guilty to second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) and second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)). Travers appealed his convictions and his sentence of 8 years subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2).
Police discovered a loaded gun in Travers car after receiving a call that he pointed a gun at his wife in front of their children, threatened to kill her and then pulled the trigger multiple times while Travers was under the influence. Although the gun found in Traver's car was older and had problems it did fire when examined by the State's expert and the defense expert never had opportunity to examine the gun as it had been mistakenly destroyed by the State.
In State v. Travers, the NJ Appellate Court heard Defendant's appeal based on his provision of a factual basis which maintained that he did not have the intent to cause serious bodily injury to his wife and merely said what he was told to say in order to enter into the plea. The plea transcript included Travers' statement "[w]hen she said don't kill me, I pulled it out and I showed it that it didn't work and wasn't real." After reading the transcript of the factual basis, the NJ Appellate Division did find the factual basis insufficient to establish the specific intent necessary to obtain a conviction for attempted aggravated assault as it was not clear whether Travers believed the gun to be operable at the time of the incident. Pursuant to State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 293 (1987), a Defendant must set forth sufficient facts constituting the essential elements of the crime. Attempted aggravated assault requires the purposeful attempt to cause serious bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1)). The Appellate Division also quoted State v. McAllister, 211 N.J. Super. 355, 362 (App. Div. 1986), "one cannot logically attempt to cause a particular result unless causing that result is one's 'conscious object'. The Appellate Division took no position as to Travers' belief that the gun was operable but only as to the insufficient factual basis when it reversed and remanded the matter.
Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, illegal possession of a handgun, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
aggravated assault,
assault,
crime,
criminal,
handgun,
NERA,
No Early Release,
State v. McAllister,
State v. Sainz,
weapon
Sunday, August 10, 2014
Robbery Suspects Apprehended By Police GPS Use Without Warrant
US v. Katzin, 732 F. 3d 187 (2013), involved the warrantless placing of a GPS tracking device by police on the vehicle of brothers suspected in the robbery of multiple Rite Aid pharmacies in New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland. Harry Katzin and his van were seen in the proximity of several of the pharmacies where the robberies took place. Using the GPS device, police tracked the Katzin brothers van as they drove to a Rite-Aid where a robbery took place then stopped them shortly thereafter. Evidence gathered during the traffic stop, which resulted from the use of the GPS device, led to their arrest. The device was installed on December 14, 2012 and the Katzins were apprehended on December 16, 2012, limiting the use to approximately 48 hours.
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2914 (2011), 564 U.S. ___ (2011) holding that evidence discovered while police were conducting searches in good faith reliance on legalities at the time of the search. In U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 565 U.S. ___ (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle constituted trespass and therefore required a warrant but never addressed whether the warrantless tracking utilizing the GPS device was unreasonable. Justice Steven Breyer's comments during Jones likened the ability of police to monitor individuals 24 hours per day at will using GPS devices to George Orwell's novel 1984.
In Katzin, the brothers' suppression motion was granted by a District Judge hearing the matter and government appealed to the Third Circuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that heard arguments in the case held that any evidence obtained through the use of the GPS tracking device must be suppressed. The prosecution maintained that, with probable cause to believe the vehicle is involved in criminal activity, no warrant should be required as the Fourth Amendment requires either a warrant or probable cause. The prosecution further argued that while attached to the vehicle, the device provided no information beyond what could be observed by simple visual surveillance. The ACLU argued that Jones found the original attachment of the GPS device to require a warrant, without consideration of whether limiting the time of the tracking would affect the need for a warrant. The ACLU further argued that the ease and cost-effectiveness of using a GPS device will render law enforcement likely to track individuals even where it there is no reasonableness.
Without the requirement of a warrant, police could use GPS devices to gather information and use that information to establish probable cause. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that law enforcement officers must have a valid warrant before installing a GPS tracking device on a suspect's vehicle. If you are facing charges of robbery, the penalties can be severe and you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For further information regarding robbery, warrantless searches, burglary or other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
4th amendment,
burglary,
crime,
criminal,
Davis v. United States,
GPS,
robbery,
US v. Jones,
US v. Katzin,
warrant
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