Robbery Trial 2 Years After Arrest and Right To Speedy Trial

Antonio Jones was convicted of first-degree robbery (N.J.SA. 2C:15-1) and fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division. Jones was sentenced to an extended term including life without parole with the sentence for obstruction to be served concurrently. Jones appealed based on the denial of his motion to dismiss based on failure of the State to uphold his right to a speedy trial under the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the N.J. Constitution. Jones was arrested in February 2012. In spite of defendant’s repeated requests for the State to provide discovery, the State failed to comply and the matter was delayed. In September 2012, Jones filed a speedy trial motion. In December 2012, the trial judge ordered the State to comply with discovery demands. In February 2013, the state still had not complied and Jones again filed a speedy trial motion. The Superior Court records indicated that the motion was denied in August of 2013 but without reasons set forth. The Superior Court judge merely ordered that no trial would occur until discovery was completed and a trial date was set for February 2014, 2 years after Jones was arrested. As 18 months had already elapsed when the Defendant renewed his speedy trial motion, the N.J. Appellate Division remanded the matter to the Superior Court for a review of Jones’ speedy trial motion under the 4 factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2181, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). Under Barker, the balancing test, applied in State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013) includes: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason therefor; (3) the defendant must assert his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. In Cahill, the N.J. Supreme Court considered 1 year as the amount of time triggering further inquiry under the factors set forth in Barker. First-degree robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison. The State has to remain within the confines of the law in collecting evidence, your arrest, and presenting evidence and testimony against you. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to fight for your rights each step of the way. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Aggravated Assault Results In Miscarriage

Laquesha Cathcart and Tisha Cathcart were indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)), second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2), first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), and fourth-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) after forcefully entering the victim's apartment following a dispute over a parking spot in New Brunswick, NJ. The Cathcarts assaulted R.L. and J.D., her daughter, in the presence of R.L.'s husband, F.D., and son. R.L.'s daughter and son both advised the defendant's that R.L. was pregnant but they continued the assault. R.L. miscarried within the week. The main issue in this matter is whether the defendants purposely or knowingly attempted to cause serious bodily injury to R.L. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude testimony relating to R.L.'s pregnancy and miscarriage after determining the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the likelihood it would prejudice the jury against the defendants. The appeal in State v. Cathcart focused on the exclusion of the evidence. N.J. As affirmed in State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (2013), N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits a court to exclude evidence in the event the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. More than a possibility of substantial prejudice is required State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 165 N.J. 492 (2000). To exclude evidence, the party seeking exclusion must demonstrate that the evidence is has such "inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation." State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971). A significant consideration in the decision to exclude evidence is also whether other evidence is available to prove the fact the evidence is offered to prove. Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 403 (2014). Exclusion of certain evidence, such as motive in a criminal matter, requires a higher showing of prejudice. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218 (1955). Conviction for aggravated assault requires proof by the prosecution that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, acted recklessly in an attempt to cause or did cause such bodily injury pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). State v. Mingo, 263 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd. 132 N.J. 75 (1993). This requires proof of the defendant's mental state at the time of the assault. The State's appeal centered on the fact that the defendants were advised that R.L. was pregnant yet continued with their assault which included kicking and punching R.L. in the abdomen. In its decision to reverse in part and affirm in part, the N.J. Appellate Division determined that the statements regarding R.L.'s pregnancy were highly relevant to the issue of the defendants' mental state but that the testimony regarding the miscarriage was overly prejudicial. Aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including 5 to 10 years in prison, with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA), and fines of up to $150,000. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, robbery, burglary, theft or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Confession Admissible Under Miranda

Jerome L. Faucette was charged with first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)) and robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) after driving a vehicle for Terrence S. Clemmons during Clemmons robbery and shooting of a gas station attendant. Faucette was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to 13 years in prison with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Faucette appealed claiming his statement was not made voluntarily on the grounds that he had invoked his right to counsel. On May 14, 2008, at 7:00 pm, police requested defendant accompany them to the police station for questioning with which he complied. Faucette was read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) at the police station and spoke with police until approximately 8:00 pm when he asked to leave, however, the police continued questioning Faucette until 2:30 am. Faucette did not invoke his right to counsel. On May 15, 2008, police returned to the defendant's residence at 4:00 pm to return him to the police station where he was again advised of his Miranda rights and arrested. Detectives questioned Ms. Spencer and Mr. Gaddy, Faucette's former girlfriend and friend. Both of these individuals advised police that Faucette had admitted to participating in the robbery planned by the co-defendant, Clemons. Faucette ultimately admitted to participation in the robbery as a driver but denied involvement in the murder or prior knowledge thereof. In State v. Faucette, the judge held that the initial interview, wherein no confession was obtained, violated the defendant's rights under Miranda following the defendant's request to terminate the interview, however, the second interview was not in violation of defendant's rights and the confession provided therein was voluntary. The court granted suppression of all information obtained after 8:03 p.m. during the initial interview but found all remaining statements to be admissible. On appeal, the defendant challenged the voluntariness of his confession based on coercion and violation of his rights under Miranda. The NJ Appellate Division turned to State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) with regard to Miranda requirements when there is a challenge to voluntariness of a confession. Pursuant to State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964), reiterated in State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 109-10 (2010), as long as the findings of the trial judge are detailed and supported by factual and credible evidence the findings below are not to be disturbed. However, the deference accorded in Johnson and Davila are dependent upon the trial court's ability to hear testimony from officers, experts and witnesses and not the mere review of a videotaped confession from which the Appellate Division can also draw independent conclusions. State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565-66 (2011). The Fifth Amendment grants privilege against self-incrimination and this right is afforded to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division looked to State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993), with regard to a defendant's right against self-incrimination in New Jersey and to State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449 (2005) with regard to the upholding of that right through Miranda protections. State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993) was the case looked to by the Appellate Division in determining whether the State or defendant bears the burden of proving voluntariness of a confession and found the burden is borne by the State. State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000), dictates that a the "voluntary intelligent statement" of a defendant properly notified of his rights under Miranda is a valid and admissible confession. After reviewing the circumstances in this specific matter, the Appellate Division found that Faucette's second confession was knowingly and voluntarily given with full information and understanding of Miranda warnings and that there was no "taint from the May 14 Miranda violations" in violation of State v. O'Neil, 193 N.J. 148, (2007) or State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639 (1990). Further, the Appellate Division affirmed that Faucette did not, at any time during the questioning, invoke his right to counsel. The NJ Appellate Division found Faucette's confession to be voluntary and affirmed the decision of the trial court. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, robbery, conspiracy, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juvenile Offender Will Be Treated Differently Under NJ Senate Bill 2003

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if New Jersey Senate Bill 2003 (S2003) is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial and the level of representation required in hearings to move juvenile matters to the Criminal Part of the Superior Court. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would raise the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult to 15. S2003 would permit juvenile to be tried as adults only for the most serious offenses including criminal homicide; strict liability for drug induced deaths; first-degree robbery; carjacking; sexual assault; second-degree aggravated assault; kidnapping; aggravated arson; certain gang criminality; a crime committed at a time when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent or confined to an adult correctional facility; violent, aggressive, and willful crimes against another; unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon; arson; death by auto if the juvenile was operating the vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug (DUI); a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; a conspiracy which is a part of a continuing criminal activity and the circumstances of the crimes show the juvenile has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a source of livelihood; an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of certain enumerated acts; theft of an automobile; serious computer criminal activity; distribution of any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any property used for school purposes, or within 1,000 feet of such school property. The State would bear the burden of proving that the nature and circumstances of the charge or the prior record of the juvenile are sufficiently serious that the interests of the public require waiver. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. S2003 would require a prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. In further accord with the goal of rehabilitation, academic instruction and academic counseling, vocational education, post-secondary educational opportunities, alcohol and narcotics treatment programs, mental health services, medical and dental care, regular contact with the family members, work programs to prepare the juvenile for treatment, re-entry services, and any other services or assistance reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the juvenile shall be provided as appropriate. S2003 is sponsored by Democrats and received no support from the Republican party. The bill passed the Senate and is presently in the Assembly for consideration and revision. If you are a juvenile facing criminal charges your future is at stake and should not be left to chance. Your future and freedom may depend on the outcome of your case making it imperative that you seek experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about juvenile offenses including drug charges, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a school zone, assault, sex crimes, school issues, breaking and entering, gang related crimes, burglary or other serious matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Aggravated Assault and Robbery Convictions Reversed Due To Comments At Trial By Detective And Prosecutor

Anthony Coles was charged with second-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and third-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)) after a physical altercation with another man outside a store in Union County, NJ wherein Coles allegedly robbed the man of several hundred dollars. Although the store had a recording system, the detective charged with obtaining the video failed to obtain the pertinent part thereof in order to bolster the State's case. Prior to the taping over of the portion of the video wherein Coles and the victim both appeared in the store, the video was viewed by officers who responded to the scene as well as the victim who identified Coles in the video as the person who beat and robbed him. Coles indicated that he knew the victim prior to the event because he had previously purchased marijuana from the victim and gave a different version of the reasons for the altercation. In State v. Coles, the detective charged with obtaining the video testified regarding the benefit the missing video would have offered the State's case as well as opinion testimony with regard to the State's case in general. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial judge permitted the testimony of the detective and inappropriate statements made by the prosecutor during the state's closing argument. Based on the cases presented, the defendant was convicted of theft from the person (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(a)(2(e)) and simple assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1)) and sentenced to an extended 9 year term in prison as a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) with a discretionary parole disqualifier of 4.5 years. The NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) and State v. Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. 229 (2003) regarding the matter of lay opinion testimony removing one function of the jury. McLean specifically sets forth that officer testimony may "include opinion…or what the officer 'believed', 'thought' or 'suspected,'…"McLean, 205 N.J. at 460. The Appellate Division determined it was error by the trial court to permit the detective's opinion testimony. Additionally, State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 474 (1994) and State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J.123, 322 (1987) lent guidance to the Appellate Division with regard to reversal of a conviction when the prosecution's closing arguments deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The Appellate Division held it impermissible for the prosecutor to use the defendant's presence at trial to discredit testimony provided by the defendant in summation as "tailored" after presentation of the state's case pursuant to State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 (2004) and felt the impropriety to have raised a strong question regarding whether the defendant's right to a fair trial was upheld. As a result of the likelihood that defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial the NJ Appellate Division remanded the matter for a new trial. Aggravated assault and assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about aggravated assault, robbery and other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

First-Degree Robbery Conviction Does Not Require Presence Of A Weapon

When a would-be bank robber claims to have a weapon and creates a reasonable fear that he does have such weapon, he is subject to charges of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b)). When Christopher Dekowski entered Commerce Bank in Roselle acting suspiciously, including feigning the locking of the banks doors, carrying a briefcase and dressed in a manner differing from the seasonal norm he quickly drew the bank manager's attention. Dekowski approached a teller, at which time the manager intervened and saw a note indicating that the teller was to place all of the money in a bag and implying that Dekowski had a bomb which he would use if the teller failed to comply. Dekowski was given $500 and apprehended. In the Superior Court, Law Division, Union County, the defendant was convicted, in State v. Dekowski, of first-degree robbery and sentenced to a 13-year prison term with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). The NJ Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence with regard to possession of a weapon, as required for a conviction of first-degree robbery, and determining second-degree robbery to be established remanded for resentencing accordingly. In State v. Williams, ___ N.J. ____, ____ (2014) the NJ Supreme Court held that a conviction for first-degree robbery does not require a weapon but only the victim's "actual and reasonable belief that a weapon exists and the defendant's threatened immediate use of such weapon." In Williams, the court relied on State v. Hutson, 107 N.J. 222, 227-228 (1987), holding that the belief in the presence of a weapon need be reasonable under the specific circumstances. The court considered the Dekowski's threat that he had a bomb in concert with the public knowledge and general fear of bombs in contemporary society in determining the reasonableness of the bank manager's belief in the presence of a weapon in making its determination that the defendant's conviction for first-degree robbery would be reinstated. First-degree robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Armed Robber Seeks Post-Conviction Relief

Jeffrey Toth was indicted for the armed robberies of a 7-11 and Quick Chek in Woodbridge, NJ and pled guilty to two counts of first-degree armed robbery. At 7-11, Toth was said by a clerk to have a knife and the Quick Chek clerk claimed Toth used a screwdriver as a weapon. Toth was later identified as the robber after bragging to others about robbing the stores. In State v.Toth, the Defendant pled guilty in exchange for a maximum sentence of 15-years imprisonment and dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. He was sentenced to 10-years in prison, the minimum for first-degree armed robbery, with an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Years later Toth sought post-conviction relief (PCR)claiming his attorney failed to argue certain mitigating factors at sentencing but was denied without an evidentiary hearing finding Toth's counsel had made such arguments. He appealed and the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the decision for review under State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269 (2012) including either oral argument regarding his PCR petition or give adequate explanation as to why oral argument will not be held. First-degree armed robbery is a very serious charge that carries substantial penalties including up to 20 years in prison for each charge. If you have been charged with armed robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Robbery Suspects Apprehended By Police GPS Use Without Warrant

US v. Katzin, 732 F. 3d 187 (2013), involved the warrantless placing of a GPS tracking device by police on the vehicle of brothers suspected in the robbery of multiple Rite Aid pharmacies in New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland. Harry Katzin and his van were seen in the proximity of several of the pharmacies where the robberies took place. Using the GPS device, police tracked the Katzin brothers van as they drove to a Rite-Aid where a robbery took place then stopped them shortly thereafter. Evidence gathered during the traffic stop, which resulted from the use of the GPS device, led to their arrest. The device was installed on December 14, 2012 and the Katzins were apprehended on December 16, 2012, limiting the use to approximately 48 hours. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2914 (2011), 564 U.S. ___ (2011) holding that evidence discovered while police were conducting searches in good faith reliance on legalities at the time of the search. In U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 565 U.S. ___ (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle constituted trespass and therefore required a warrant but never addressed whether the warrantless tracking utilizing the GPS device was unreasonable. Justice Steven Breyer's comments during Jones likened the ability of police to monitor individuals 24 hours per day at will using GPS devices to George Orwell's novel 1984. In Katzin, the brothers' suppression motion was granted by a District Judge hearing the matter and government appealed to the Third Circuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that heard arguments in the case held that any evidence obtained through the use of the GPS tracking device must be suppressed. The prosecution maintained that, with probable cause to believe the vehicle is involved in criminal activity, no warrant should be required as the Fourth Amendment requires either a warrant or probable cause. The prosecution further argued that while attached to the vehicle, the device provided no information beyond what could be observed by simple visual surveillance. The ACLU argued that Jones found the original attachment of the GPS device to require a warrant, without consideration of whether limiting the time of the tracking would affect the need for a warrant. The ACLU further argued that the ease and cost-effectiveness of using a GPS device will render law enforcement likely to track individuals even where it there is no reasonableness. Without the requirement of a warrant, police could use GPS devices to gather information and use that information to establish probable cause. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that law enforcement officers must have a valid warrant before installing a GPS tracking device on a suspect's vehicle. If you are facing charges of robbery, the penalties can be severe and you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For further information regarding robbery, warrantless searches, burglary or other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Burglary Punishment Must Fit Crime Not Criminal

In State v. Nieves, Eric Nieves was charged in 4 residential burglaries and related crimes. The jury found him guilty of four burglaries (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); three thefts (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3); dealing in stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7.1b); receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7) and conspiracy with codefendants (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, :18-2, :20-7.1). Nieves was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment with 150 months of parole ineligibility. On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence and returned to the court below for resentencing based on the factors set forth in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985). On appeal, Nieves objected to the jury instructions regarding certain lesser included offenses and complicity. Pursuant to State v. Singleton, 211, N.J. 157, 182 (2012), "if the defendant did not object to the charge when given, there is a presumption the charge was not error and unlikely to prejudice defendant's case." Prior to instructing the jury, the judge advised the attorneys of the intended charges and defense counsel gave his assent to both charging decisions. Defendant then bears the burden of showing plain error having a clear capacity of producing and unjust result R. 2:10-2 and the burden was not met. The Appellate Division found defendant's claim of error in the jury instruction on accomplice liability to have insufficient merit and affirmed all convictions. With regard to the custodial sentence, the defendant was sentenced on each of the 10 third degree crimes and received an aggregate sentence of 25 years with 12 1/2 years of parole ineligibility. Defendant did not deny his lengthy criminal history and was aware he qualified as a persistent offender but Nieves argued that the courts extensive reliance on his criminal history was inappropriate. In Yarbough, the court set forth the fact that "punishment should fit the crime, not the criminal, and that there should be a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing." 100 N.J. at 630. State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011) the New Jersey Supreme Court enumerated the Yarbough factors as modified by statute and offered guidance for appellate review of consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division found the discussion of Yarbough factors by the court below to be too cursory to permit adequate review. Further, any conspiracy conviction must be merged with the underlying completed crime. Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In Gang Related Murder, Lawyer's Failure To Call Alibi Witnesses May Be Ineffective Assistance

Fedner Pierre-Louis, allegedly of the Playboy Posse criminal gang, was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)), third degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)). The defendant, in State of NJ v. Fedner Pierre-Louis, was sentenced to 45 years in prison for this murder of an oncologist, Jeffrey Perchick, at a hotel in the Newark area. Pierre-Louis was charged when a gun used in another crime was traced to him. However, Pierre-Louis offered his defense attorney seven potential alibi witnesses, including family members and friends from his night-school classes, who were willing to testify on his behalf. Defense counsel employed a private investigator who spoke with the alibi witnesses and determined them to be unreliable. As a result of the private investigator's assessment, defendant's counsel made the decision not to present any of the alibi witnesses and Pierre-Louis was convicted. Upon a post-conviction relief filing by defendant, the trial judge, Union County Superior Court Judge John Triarsi vacated the guilty verdict then reversed himself after reviewing documents demonstrating defendant's trial counsel knowingly made the decision not to present the alibi witnesses after interviews by the private investigator. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's ruling and the NJ Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certification. The NJ Supreme Court considered whether the petition for post-conviction relief satisfied the test set forth by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). The Justices heard arguments from the prosecution and defense regarding the with whom the decision to produce witnesses lies, the standard of review the trial judge must undertake and at one point the Court has the authority to disturb the trial judge's findings. Ultimately, the NJ Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were not sufficient with regard to either prong of the test and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new hearing including the presentation of the alibi witnesses for the purposes of determining credibility. If you are facing criminal charges in NJ, the consequences of a conviction can change your life. For more information about gang crimes, weapons charges, murder, manslaughter, robbery and other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Prostitutes Charged With Committing Robbery In Atlantic City Hotel Suite

In State v. Rodriguez, the defendant was charged with 2nd degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and convicted of the lesser included offense of 3rd degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3), simple assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a), 4th degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d). The defendant and her co-defendant, Mayo, were acquitted of 2nd degree conspiracy to commit robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and 3rd degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d). Defendant and co-defendant, prostitutes, met 3 men in the lobby of an Atlantic City hotel and proceeded to join the men in their room. Once there both women surrounded one of the men and began touching him in an erotic manner. Shortly thereafter, the man realized his money was missing and attempted to stop the women from leaving the suite when he was sprayed in the face with pepper spray by the defendant. The defendant was sentenced to 5 years in prison with a 2 year parole disqualifier for theft by unlawful taking, a concurrent 6 month term for the simple assault charge and 1 year in prison for unlawful possession of a weapon which was to be served concurrently. Defendant was also on probation for a prior conviction of 3rd degree theft from the person at the time of the offense and pled guilty to a violation of probation (VOP) and received a concurrent 5 year sentence for the VOP. The defendant challenged her conviction based on comments during the prosecution's summation, adequacy of the jury instructions, a weapons conviction with regard to pepper spray, failure to submit lesser included offenses to the jury, cumulative error depriving the defendant of a fair trial and the sentence. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but remanded for sentencing with regard to the VOP as the trial judge failed to set forth aggravating and mitigating factors as required under N.J.C.R. 3:21-4(g) and State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 177 (1989). Robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery and the lesser included offense of theft are very serious charges that carry substantial penalties including up to 10 years in prison for each charge. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juror Replacement Leads to Robbery Conviction Reverasl

In State v. Musa, Humfrey A. Musa was convicted of second degree robbery after jury deliberations. The defendant appealed the conviction based on substitution of Juror #2 after the first full day of deliberations. At the close of the first day of deliberations, the judge was provided a note from the jury including the jury's inquiry as to whether a juror could be excused. The judge indicated that, barring emergency in the form of illness or other special circumstances, jurors would not be excused. On the following day, Juror #2 failed to appear, provided no notice and the court placed telephone calls to the juror and left messages at her home requesting contact, as well as making efforts to contact her at the work number listed only to find she was not employed where claimed, but ultimately did not locate the missing juror. Defense counsel requested that the judge inquire of the remaining jurors whether Juror #2 was the one referenced in their note the previous day regarding substitution as a result of non-cooperation. The prosecution argued that the judges answer to the jurors question as to whether a substitution was permissible was adequate. By 11:00 a.m. the court determined they would move forward with an alternate juror replacing Juror #2. On the second day of deliberations, the judge recharged the jury and in only 3 hours the defendant was found guilty by the jury with the replaced member. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Court questioned the reason Juror #2 failed to return and the relatively rapid decision by the jury following the substitution of the alternate. The Appellate Court reasoned that, based the previous day's inquiry regarding dismissal of a juror and the rapid decision the following day, that Juror #2 had differences with the remaining jurors as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and that the court failed to make adequate inquiry into that matter. Although there substitutions for certain reasons are permissible, in State v. Jenkins, 182 N.J. 112, 124 (2004) the court held that substitution is specifically prohibited when requested due to difficulty with other jurors during deliberations. The trial judge made adequate efforts to contact the juror but failed to make adequate efforts to determine the basis of the initial jury inquiry relative to substitution. State v. Hightower, 146 N.J. 239, 253 (1996) established that "any conduct that could upset the process of jury deliberations, even judicial conduct such as juror substitution, must be carefully scrutinized." Based on the lack of record as to why Juror #2 did not return the second day, the there was not adequate information upon which to review the matter of the substitution and any prejudicial effect on the defendant and the Appellate Court reversed the decision and remanded for a new trial. Robbery is a very serious charge bearing heavy consequences. If you are charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to review evidence, the prosecutions case and insure the trial process is undertaken in the spirit of justice without breach of your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, burglary or other criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Suppression Motion For Warrantless Search Denied

In State v. Salladino the defendant was indicted for 3rd theft of movable property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) and 3rd degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a1). The defendant won a suppression motion relating to the Oxycodone found during the warrantless search by police. The prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal and the N.J. Appellate Court determined that, although the Oxycodone was found during a search of the defendant's person exceeding the scope of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the drugs would have inevitably been discovered when the defendant was searched incident to the arrest for the robbery charges. According to the court's holding in State v. Sugar, 100, N.J. 211 (1985) if the evidence would have inevitably been discovered as a result of an independent and predictable circumstance, it remains admissible even if seized by other unlawful means. The Appellate division held that the suppression motion should not have been granted and remanded for further proceedings. Following a call from a robbery victim, police located 2 suspects in the vicinity matching the description given by the victim. The officer in charge of the investigation ordered that the suspects be brought before the victim for a show-up identification. Prior to transporting Salladino to the show-up, a police officer conducted a pat-down search of the defendant to ensure the defendant has no weapons. During the frisk, the officer felt a "hard bulge" and retrieved a pill bottle without a label or lid which contained 83 Percocet pills. The officer seized the pills but made no arrest regarding the Percocet. The suspects were positively identified by the victim during a show-up identification and they were arrested. At no time between the stop and the arrest could the defendant have removed the pills from his person without notice by the police, therefore, the Percocet would have been inevitably discovered during the search incident to arrest even though retrieving the pill bottle from the defendant's person exceeded the scope of a Terry stop as there was no reasonable basis to conclude the defendant was armed and the officer never claimed he believed the "hard bulge" was a weapon. If you are facing drug charges and believe evidence obtained against you may have been obtained in violation of your rights, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances, robbery, warrantless searches, CDS in a motor vehicle or other criminal issues in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Denying Defendant Access To Witnesses Results In Reversal of Robbery Conviction

In 2007, a convenience store robbery took place in which a man showed the cashier a gun hidden in his hooded sweatshirt and demanded the money from the register. The cashier identified a photograph of Daniel Blazas from a photo array shown to him by police the following day at the Sayreville police station. Defendant's ex-fiancee, Jennifer McHugh, provided police with a statement a couple of days after the robbery saying she received a call from defendant indicating he had robbed the "Indian store." Defendant was charged with first-degree armed robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); 3rd degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); 2nd degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); 4th degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4)); and 3rd degree theft (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3). Defendant filed, among other motions, a motion to dismiss the indictment based on bias based on the misconduct of the prosecution in preventing the defense from speaking with Ms. McHugh directly or Sayreville police officers. After certain denials on the part of the prosecution, the trial judge denied defendant's motion. On the appeal of State v. Blazas, the court held that a defendant's right to due process is violated when the government substantially interferes with defendant's ability to present a complete defense. The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a complete defense which includes access to evidence the prosecution has whether said evidence is negative or favorable according to the Court in State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243 (2003). In Blazas, the denial of access to witnesses by the prosecution was held to be conduct in violation of defendant's due process rights and requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction. If you or a loved one have been charged with a crime and believe a critical issue in the case will be witness testimony, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney to ensure your rights are protected. A criminal record can have substantial impact in both the short and long term. In the short term, you may be facing prison, jail, drug court, rehabilitation or probation and in the long term you may face inability to obtain employment, denial of educational opportunities, loss of professional licenses, discrimination, registration as a sex offender or other embarrassing and limiting consequences. For more information regarding robbery, burglary, weapons offenses, assault, drug charges or other criminal law matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

NJ Robbery Matter leads To Another Jail Credit Decision

In a case stemming from two separate robberies in Essex County, allegedly committed by Amerigo Rodriguez, the NJ Appellate Court considered the manner in which jail credits accrue. Rodriguez pled to two 2nd degree robbery charges and was sentenced to two consecutive 10 year terms, each of which carried an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Before a parole detainer was lodged against Rodriguez, he received 4 days of jail credit on one judgment of conviction and none on the other. Rodriguez appealed the decision regarding jail credit and the NJ Appellate Division, in State v. Rodriguez, reviewed the facts in light of other NJ cases in which parole detainers were lodged against defendant's awaiting disposition of other charges. In State v. Harvey, 273 N.J. Super. 572 (App. Div. 1994), Harvey was charged with 3rd degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 of a school zone and 3rd degree conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The Harvey court considered Rule 3:21-8 to uphold a decision that defendant would receive only 3 days of jail credit for pre-sentence custody. In Harvey, the Appellate Court reasoned that, had the defendant bailed out on the new charges he would have remained in custody due to the parole violation and therefore no jail credits would accrue on the new charges. In State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438 (1998), a case commonly cited to when courts are considering jail credits, the NJ Superior Court held that any confinement served as a result of a parole warrant did not qualify in the accrual of jail credits during the pendency of sentencing on later matters. Ultimately, the guidance of prior decisions led to the court's affirmation of the decision below in Rodriguez If you are facing criminal charges in New Jersey while under supervision for other charges, the view the prosecution or finder of fact may take of you and the final sentence you may receive are likely to be affected by the prior supervision issue. It is imperative that you seek experienced criminal defense counsel when facing any charges against you and prior supervision only serves to complicate your matter by magnification of any negative issues the prosecution can find against you. For more information about robbery, burglary, drug charges or other serious criminal or municipal court offenses in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of legal counsel.

How High Should Bail Be To Insure Defendant's Appearance

In State v. Steele, 61 A.3d 174 (2013), Defendant Tyrone Steels appealed from the order of the Passaic County Superior Court denying his motion to reduce bail on two indictments for fourth degree offenses. Bail was set at $150,000, cash only, for 6 counts of lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4b(1), and $50,000, no 10% option, for violating a condition of community supervision for life (CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4d for failing to report arrests to his parole officer and refrain from initiating contact with a minor. The Defendant pled guilty to 1st degree kidnapping, robbery and attempted sexual assault under separate indictments from Bergen and Passaic in 1997 and was incarcerated until 2010 when released subject to CSL and Megan's Law. The charges relating to the challenged bails occurred while defendant was on bail for prior violations of CSL. The State's plea offer included recommendations of 2 concurrent 18 month terms for the lewdness charges which would run consecutive to 3 concurrent 18 month charges for the community supervision violations charged. The NJ Appellate Division reviewed the Superior Court Judge's denial of the bail reduction motion and found that the trial court was incorrect in its consideration of the safety of the community when setting the bail amount for the two 4th degree offenses in excess of the $2,500 maximum set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:6-1. In order for bail to have been set at $150,000, cash only, and $50,000 no 10%, there would be a necessary showing that defendant's release on bail constituted a serious threat of destruction of evidence by defendant or danger to witnesses. In spite of the fact that the bail amounts set were excessive, the defendant faced exposure to sentences significantly longer than typical for the underlying offenses and bail in excess of the $2,500 maximum was appropriate and necessary to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial. If you are arrested and facing bail, it is critical you secure your release so you can continue to work and can participate in your own defense. However, bail is often high and many are forced to incur financial hardship through non-payment of other expenses to meet bail or pay fees to a bondsman in order to obtain their release. An experienced attorney can often obtain a decrease in your bail amount so you are free to return to your job and family and are better able to assist in your defense. For more information about bail reduction, bail setting or other criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

NJ Governor Signs In New Gun Control Laws

Last Thursday New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed ten bills looking to strengthen gun control and upgrade penalties for those who are arrested for unlawful gun possession throughout the state. These gun control measures were introduced in the state senate after the tragic shooting that took place December 14th, 2012 at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. The series of newly signed bills is designed to create a safer and more well monitored system for the purchase and sales of all firearms throughout the state. Along with making the system more safe these bills are also going to make punishment crimes involving guns more harsh. One of the significant bills signed by the governor was the Anti-Gun Trafficking Act of 2013. This act focuses on the illegal transfer and sale of firearms across state lines. Many believe one of the most significant ways to cut down on illegal gun possession is to stop it at its source, which is by way of illegal sales from sources outside of New Jersey. For those who are convicted of transporting guns into New Jersey for illegal purposes under the Anti-Gun Trafficking Act of 2013, the crime is considered one of the second degree, meaning that there is a minimum of five years incarceration, which is not within the discretion of the sentencing judge. For those who presently own an illegal weapon there is a grace period of six months to dispose of the firearms before being convicted or punished. Unlawful possession of a firearm in NJ will have a serious impact on your life and can have significant implications in related matters such as later personal injury or other criminal charges. Given the serious implications of weapons charges it is critical that, if you are charged with illegal gun possession or trafficking in NJ, whether knowingly or unknowingly, you should seek an experienced attorney who can immediately begin preparing your defense. For more information about robbery, gun possession without a permit, possession of weapons for an unlawful purpose, illegal weapons or other serious matters stemming from gun use or possession in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney in your matter.

Prior Convictions Inadmissible After 10 Years?

In State v. Harris,, 209 N.J. 431 (2012) the defendant was charged with robbery and burglary and the Superior Court Judge permitted the prosecutor to use defendant's 13 year old drug convictions to impeach defendant's testimony. The NJ Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge. Most of the defendant's convictions from 1994 through 2007 were disorderly persons offenses but were still permitted to close the gap of remoteness. As a result, a NJ Supreme Court subcommittee is recommending the adoption of revisions to N.J. Rule of Evidence 609 to prevent the prosecution from introducing evidence of convictions more than 10 years old. In actual practice, a remoteness analysis could be undertaken including the following considerations: (1) whether there are other convictions between the accused crime and any prior crimes the prosecution wishes to admit and the nature and seriousness thereof; (2) whether any of the prior convictions involves fraud or dishonesty and (3) the seriousness of the offense. The final result would be to bar the introduction of evidence regarding prior convictions over 10 years old unless the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence after judicial analysis. If you have been charged with theft, burglary or any other criminal offense in NJ, you should immediately obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information on protecting your rights if charged with theft, burglary, shoplifting or other crimes in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and is not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.