DUI + Refusal = Jail

James T. Dougherty was convicted, on February 4, 2009 of refusal to submit to chemical breath testing (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a) and on February 23, 2009, of driving while intoxicated (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) . On August 19, 2015, 6 years later, he was convicted of DWI and, on November 9, 2015, he was convicted for refusal. Dougherty was later stopped, on December 19, 2015,while driving during the seven-month suspension period for the refusal (N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b)), a fourth degree crime for a second or subsequent DUI conviction. Dougherty ultimately pled guilty and, after receiving the statutory minimum 180 days incarceration, appealed based on the argument, he based on State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011), that a charge of DWI or refusal could not be used to enhance the penalties of the other and that incarceration stemmed only from two convictions for driving under the influence or two convictions for refusal to submit to chemical breath testing. Dougherty also claimed the statutory language was ambiguous and required dismissal of his indictment. The appellate division cited to the strong public policy interest in addressing the damage caused by drunken drivers and found the statutory language to be unambiguous as to the fact that either two DUI convictions, two refusal convictions or one of each would meet the requirement of two predicate violations and trigger a period of 180 days incarceration. The appellate division read Ciancaglini to hold that "a defendant's refusal conviction cannot be considered a prior DWI violation for enhancement purposes" in sentencing under the DWI statute and found the decision to have no bearing on sentencing for driving during a period of suspension for DWI or refusal. Further, the appellate division looked to State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566 (2014), reaffirming In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981) which held that a prior DUI conviction would serve to enhance the sentence for a subsequent refusal conviction. The matter of the number of years between the arrests and convictions was not addressed. The penalties for driving under the influence are severe including substantial fines, insurance surcharges, loss of license and often the loss of employment when you cannot drive to work. Each time you are convicted, the penalties get more harsh and you run the very real risk of jail time. If you are facing charges of DUI, refusal, CDS in a motor vehicle or driving while suspended for DUI or refusal, call the Darling Law Firm, LLC now for representation or visit DarlingFirm.com for more information. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

One and One Make Two in DUI

James Dougherty was charged with violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) for driving while suspended for a second or subsequent conviction or plea to driving while intoxicated (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) or refusal to submit to chemical breath testing (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a)). Dougherty, seeking to avoid mandatory jail time, took the position that 2C:40-26(b) required conviction for two charges of refusing to submit to chemical breath testing or convictions for two charges of driving under the influence while Dougherty had only one conviction of each. In August 2015, the Defendant was convicted of DWI for a charge stemming from a February 23, 2009 arrest and was convicted of a refusal in November 2015, for a charge stemming from and arrest on February 4, 2009. While serving the seven month sentence for the refusal charge, the Defendant was stopped by the police while operating a motor vehicle. Dougherty was sentenced to a mandatory term of 180 days in jail, which term was stayed pending appeal. Defendant, relying on State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011), argued that a "second or subsequent violation" under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) requires two convictions of the same predicate offense, rather than one of each. The Appellate Division found that State v. Ciancaglini does not address the issue head on. However, State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566 (2014), reaffirms In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981), holding that a prior DUI does enhance a sentence for a refusal conviction. Additionally, the legislative history of the DUI statutes is centered upon the premise of discouraging driving under the influence by including ever increasing penalties for successive offenses. The Defendant's basic premise, from State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 639 (2015) and In re Estate of Fisher, 443 N.J. Super. 180, 190-195 (App. Div. 2015), that the word "or" should be interpreted as "or" rather than "either/or" is incorrect. When considered in the framework of the history and evolution of DWI laws, becoming ever stricter, there is no question as to the interpretation of the statute to include the word "either". The Appellate Division affirmed the defendant's conviction. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Lawyer Challenges His DUI Plea Based On Lack Of Counsel

Henry Aratow was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) in 1988, pled guilty to a driving under the influence (DUI) in 2004, and pled guilty to a 2009 in 2011. In the case of the 2009 DUI, Aratow was sentenced as a third offender resulting in a 10 year loss of driving privileges and 180 days incarceration. In 2013, Aratow sought post conviction relief from in the municipal court and then Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County with regard to the 2004 DUI in order to avail himself of the step-down provisions under State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014), pertaining to successive DUI convictions. The relief sought was denied and Aratow appealed to the NJ Appellate Division. In 2004, Aratow was stopped by police and charged with DWI, refusal to submit to a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), and making an improper turn (N.J.S.A. 39:4-116). Both at the time he was stopped by police and when he appeared in court for the resulting charges, Aratow was a practicing attorney. Aratow waived his right to counsel and entered into a plea to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content (BAC) between .08 and .10 with a dismissal of the refusal to submit to chemical breath testing and the improper turn charges. At the time of the 2004 plea, the municipal court judge engaged in lengthy colloquy with the defendant regarding his right to counsel, the factual basis of his plea. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the Aratow was not advised by the municipal court judge of the progressively harsher consequences of successive DUI convictions and, therefore, did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the plea as required under N.J. Court Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). The court also questioned the sufficiency of the factual basis given by the defendant, as set forth in State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218 (2013). The court found that, although Aratow admitted to operating a motor vehicle after consuming 3 vodka and tonics, he was not questioned as to whether he believed that the alcohol he consumed substantially impaired his ability to operate the vehicle or that his BAC was between .08 and .10. Under State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415 (1989), the remedy for a plea entered with an insufficient factual basis is to reinstate all charges and restore the matter to its original status prior to the entry of the plea. Accordingly, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the 2004 matter for a new trial. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Refusal to Submit to DUI Breath Testing Receives Step-Down Sentence

Thomas Taylor was charged with driving under the influence (DUI)(N.J.S.A. 39:5-50) and pled guilty to refusal to submit to a breath test (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2). Taylor had been convicted of two prior driving while intoxicated charges, both of which occurred over ten years prior to the event in question. The municipal court judge sentenced Taylor as a third offender to a 10 year suspension and a $1000 fine. The defendant appealed. In State v. Taylor, Taylor used the misplaced argument that, pursuant to State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011), which addressed the impact of prior refusal convictions to enhance subsequent DUI penalties. However, In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981), reaffirmed in State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566 (2014), held that a prior driving while intoxicated conviction may be used in enhancing a sentence for a subsequent refusal conviction. Designed as punishment for driving under the influence, the penalties for refusal mirror those for DUI in that they increase with each subsequent offense. The statutes differ in that the DWI statute calls for a "step-down" in sentencing for each 10-year period in which a driver goes without a conviction for DUI, but the refusal statute does not include such a provision. This means that an individual convicted of DUI in 1990 who is convicted of a second DUI in 2001 would be again sentenced as a first offender in 2001. Likewise, a third DWI conviction occurring 10 or more years after a second conviction would subject the driver to sentencing as a second offender under the DUI statute, pursuant to State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014). Taylor argued that his refusal should be sentenced under the terms of a second offender, as more than 10 years had elapsed since his prior offense. In State v. Fielding, 290 N.J. Super 191 (App. Div. 1996) the court addressed the matter of applying step-down sentencing to refusal conviction and determined that it was appropriate under the principal of fundamental fairness. After review, the matter was remanded for resentencing as a second offense including a significantly lower 2 year suspension and $500 fine. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about refusal, DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Resisting Arrest Charged May Be Managed With PTI

K.S. was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), refusal to submit to chemical breath testing (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a)), third-degree resisting arrest (N.J. S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a)), fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a police officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-13) and fourth-degree criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1)). As K.S. was being transported to the Watchung Borough police station under suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI), he attempted to spit blood onto an arresting officer. K.S. had a juvenile criminal history including assault, possession of a weapon, fighting and harassment as well as an adult charge for violent behavior which had been dismissed and, based upon this prior record, was denied entry into Pretrial Intervention (PTI) by the Somerset County Prosecutor. Prosecutors are afforded broad discretion in the determination of whether a defendant should be admitted into PTI and, barring patent abuse of discretion, the prosecutor's decision is normally upheld. State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503 (1981). The Somerset County Superior Court agreed with the prosecutor's decision to deny defendant's entry into PTI and the NJ Appellate Division affirmed on appeal. K.S. appealed to the N.J. Supreme Court and the matter was reversed and remanded based on the guidelines of N.J.C.R. 3:28 and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 which codified the PTI Program in New Jersey. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), established following the decision in State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85 (1976), the prosecutor and criminal division manager are to consider 17 separate factors. Under State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 585-586 (1996), no particular weight is to be given to any particular factor. In addition to the factors set forth is any mental illness from which the defendant suffers. State v. Hoffman, 399 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 2008). K.S. suffers from bi-polar issues, which the prosecutor claimed to have considered in denying the defendant's entry into PTI. According to the N.J. Supreme Court, in State v. K.S., the prosecutor inappropriately considered the defendant's criminal history as violent offenses which do typically give rise to denial of Pretrial Intervention. State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434 (1997). Under State v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215 (2002), it was held that the prosecutor could consider previously dismissed or diverted charges if the prior resolutions should have deterred the defendant from committing further offenses. However, the N.J. Supreme Court held that Brooks was applicable to the court's consideration, not that of the prosecutor. The N.J. Supreme Court also held that, in order to consider prior dismissed charges, they needed to be supported by undisputed facts established within a hearing or by the defendant's admission. State v. Green, 413 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2010), established the requirement that the criminal division manager and prosecutor consider a defendant's application on the merits. The N.J. Supreme Court held that, due to the prosecutor's consideration of prior dismissed charges, the denial of defendant's application was inappropriate and remanded the matter for a hearing to establish whether the defendant's prior criminal history did give rise to proper denial of entry into the PTI program. Resisting arrest is a common charge as it is a highly discretionary decision of police officers effecting an arrest. Arrest is a humiliating experience and difficult to comprehend by those who do not believe they are breaking the law, or that their "crimes" give rise to the need for handcuffs and the other consequences of arrest. If you are facing charges of resisting arrest, you should immediately seek experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about resisting arrest, assault, assault on an officer or other criminal charges, as well as DUI and other traffic related charges, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

A1368 May Overhaul DUI Punishment In NJ

A1368 is a NJ bill, proposed by the Assembly, which could revise the NJ drunk driving statute, N.J.S.A 39:4-50. The bill was approved by the Assembly and Senate and currently under revision pursuant to comments by Governor Chris Christie. If accepted the new statute would permit those convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) to avoid long-term loss of driving privileges by having an ignition interlock device installed in their vehicles. First-offenders with a blood alcohol level (BAC) between .08 and .10% will be required to have an ignition interlock device installed for 3 months and those with .10 to .15% BAC readings would require 7 to 12 months with an ignition device. First-offenders with a .15% BAC or higher would lose their driving privileges for 7 to 12 months but, after 90 days, could make application to the court for an ignition interlock device. In any case, if the court determined there were too many aggravating factors including “circumstances of the offender’s conduct”, prior driving record, how long the offender has been licensed, or indicators of a substantial risk of re-offending, the current method of license suspension for a specified period between 3 and 12 months rather than ignition interlock device installation would be applicable. In the case of a first-offender with a BAC of .10 to .15%, if they do not own, lease or principally operate a vehicle and no ignition interlock may be installed, their driving privileges will simply be forfeited for 7 to 12 months. First-offenders with BAC levels of .15% or greater who do not own, lease or principally operate a vehicle will lose their driving privileges for 7 to 12 months for DUI and a consecutive 7 to 12 months making their suspension period as long as they would have been required to maintain an ignition interlock device on their vehicle. For a second driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge, the suspension would be for a period of 2 to 4 years rather than the current 2 year period. Additionally, an interlock device would be required on the person’s vehicle for the entire suspension period as well as thereafter. For a third or subsequent DUI, suspension would increase from the current 10 year period to a period of 10 to 20 years. Those convicted of refusal to provide a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2) in the case of second and subsequent events will also face these same suspension periods and interlock device requirements. This bill forgives first-offenders and provides them with opportunity to maintain their livelihood while preventing them from harming others through future instances of driving while intoxicated. Additionally, it is designed to send a strong message to drivers that re-offenders will be punished severely by long-term suspensions, additional expense of an ignition interlock device for an extended term, substantial fines and jail time. If passed, this bill will substantially alter the futures of those convicted of DUI. If you are charged with DUI, you need experienced defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to breath tests, driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and other serious driving charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Step-Down Is Not Limited To One Use Per Driver

The NJ driving under the influence (DUI) statute (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) includes a provision wherein a “step-down” in sentencing occurs after any ten (10) year period in which an individual charged with a prior DUI receives a lesser level penalty for a subsequent DUI. For example, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2), if an individual was convicted of their first DUI in 1986 and a second DUI in 1994, they would be sentenced, among other penalties, to a two year loss of driving privileges as a second offender in 1994. However, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3), if an individual was convicted of their first DUI in 1986 and a second DUI in 1997, more than ten (10) years later, they would be sentenced to, among other penalties, a seven to twelve month loss of driving privileges as a first-offender in 1997. In State v. Revie, the defendant, James Revie was convicted of a fourth driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge in 2011 in Wharton, NJ after an initial DWI in 1981 in Hillsdale, NJ, a second and uncounseled DWI in 1982 in Bogota, NJ, and a third DWI over ten (10) years later in 1994 in Montvale, NJ. Due to the fact that the second DWI was uncounseled and the defendant should have received the benefit of the step-down provision for the ten (10) year lapse between the second and third DWI convictions, the defendant argued that, for the 2011 DUI, he should be sentenced as a second-offender with regard to any term of incarceration. However, the Municipal Court Judge sentenced him as a third-offender refusing to read N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) as providing more than one “step-down” benefit to any driver. The NJ Superior Court, Law Division, Morris County affirmed as did the NJ Appellate Division. The NJ Supreme court held that there is no indication that the Legislature intended for a defendant meeting the requirements of the “step-down” provision on more than one occasion to be entitled to the benefits thereof on only one such occasion. In addition to the Legislative intent, included in the NJ Supreme Court’s consideration were also State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1, 498 U.S. 967, 111S.Ct. 429, 112 L. Ed. 2d 413, (1990) and State v. Hrycak, 184 N.J. 351 (2005) as they pertained to Revies’ second and uncounseled DUI and State v. Conroy, 397 N.J. Super. 324 (App.Div. 2007) as it pertained to a defendant sentenced with the benefit of Laurick and the “step-down” provision of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3). The matter was remanded to the Law Division for re-sentencing as a second-offender. DUI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges which can lead to incarceration and loss of driving privileges up to ten years. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Conviction Becomes Easier For State

The appeal of a Union County driving under the influence (DUI) charge led to removal of yet another burden of proof previously borne by the State. In State v. Peralta, the defendant sought to suppress the Alcotest result of .19% blood alcohol content (BAC) as a result after the officers processing the arrest failed to read the standard refusal statement required by N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e). The municipal court refused to suppress the Alcotest reading and Peralta was convicted of driving while intoxicated. Of note is the fact that the officers observations were not found to be sufficient to convict the defendant of DUI. On appeal, the Law Division also convicted Peralta based on the BAC result. On appeal to the NJ Appellate Division the court held that the refusal statement was created by the Legislature for the purpose of advising those who would refuse to provide a breath sample that those driving on the roads of New Jersey are "deemed to have given their consent to the taking of samples of their breath", N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(a), and advise them of the consequences of such a refusal. State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485 (2010). The Appellate Division indicated that N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) was not created to add an additional burden on officers processing DWI matters where the accused is willing to provide a breath sample upon request. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Prior DUI Convictions Enhance Penalty For Refusal In NJ

In the recent case of State v. Frye, the NJ Supreme Court upheld the use of prior Driving Under the Influence (DUI) convictions to enhance the sentence for refusal to submit to chemical breath testing. In Frye, the defendant was convicted to a 10 year loss of license as a result of 2 prior DUIs. Although the court held, in State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011) that a prior refusals to submit to chemical breath testing could not be used to enhance penalties for subsequent DUIs, the Frye court found the logic behind this instant decision to be different. The Court reasoned that, failure to utilize prior DUI convictions to enhance refusal convictions would then leave a strategic opportunity to repeat DUI offenders to obtain a significantly reduced penalty for subsequent offenses by simply refusing to submit to the Alcotest. The chemical breath test refusal statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, does contemplate enhanced sentencing for repeat refusal offenses in a manner which parallels enhancement for repeat DUI offenses bringing the Frye decision in line with the Legislative intent of keeping intoxicated drivers off NJ roads. The Frye decision is not the first of its kind in New Jersey. In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981), decided by the NJ Supreme Court over 30 years ago, held that a prior DUI convictions should be used to enhance suspensions in refusal cases. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.