DUI Susupensions Do Not Call For Lenity

In State v. Rodriguez, five Defendants filed consolidated appeals after convictions of fourth degree operating a motor vehicle during suspensions for driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. The Defendants had all pled guilty to driving while suspended for driving under the influence, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, were seeking to serve their sentences at night or on weekends and the judge agreed, giving two of them night sentences and the other three received weekend only sentences. The Appellate Division ruled that the sentences meted out were within the court’s discretion but that the 180 day noncontiguous sentence had to be served in blocks of 24 hours each to qualify for a “day served”. The Appellate Division’s decision included the fact that N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) does not specify that the 180 days need be served consecutively, that there is no reduction in the total term of confinement and there was an effort to allow some lenity as long as there was no reduction in the deterrent effect of the sentence. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted the State’s petition for higher appeal, 234 N.J. 314 (2018), as to whether sentences could be served intermittently and ultimately held that one sentenced to a statutory minimum term of 180 days for operating a motor vehicle while suspended for DUI must serve the entire term consecutively. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) calls for a “fixed minimum sentence of not less than 180 days during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole.” The Supreme Court reasoned that when the Legislature wishes to leave discretion to the sentencing court, they normally indicate so clearly in the language of the statute. Further, the court indicated that the clear reference to a minimum 180 day period of parole ineligibility is a bar to serving the term intermittently. If you have been charged with DUI or driving while suspended for DWI, contact The Darling Law Firm, LLC now at 973-584-6200 to speak to a seasoned attorney and insure your rights are protected. For more information on driving while intoxicated or driving while suspended, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Suspicion Is Not A Reason To Draw Blood Without A Warrant

In 2010 Timothy Adkins was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), after the vehicle he was operating struck a utility pole, injuring himself and two passengers. Adkins failed the field sobriety tests administered by police and was ultimately taken to the hospital, where the police obtained a blood sample from Adkins. Adkins blood alcohol level (BAC) was .157 percent, almost twice the legal limit of .08 percent. In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the natural dissipation of alcohol from the blood stream over time does not, on its own, give rise to exigent circumstances such that a warrant may be avoided when the police are seeking a blood sample. Therefore, unless the individual suspected of driving while intoxicated is involved in an accident, a warrant is required. In State v. Adkins, 433 N.J. Super. 479 (App. Div. 2013) a trial judge determined that the blood sample taken from Adkins without a warrant was inadmissible. The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed the ruling based on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that drawing blood from an individual suspected of drunk driving was acceptable. In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court established a new standard based on the fact that, through radios, cellular phones and facsimiles, obtaining a warrant is a much simpler and expedient process for police. As a result of the ruling in McNeely, the N.J. Supreme Court, in Adkins, DUIdetermined that the results of the blood sample, withdrawn without a warrant, must be suppressed. If you are facing DUI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving while suspended or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

In DUI A Stay Of Sentence On Appeal Is Not A Right

Scott Robertson was convicted in municipal court of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50). Robertson was stopped after police observed him to be driving erratically and he admitted to the consumption of alcohol during the motor vehicle stop. Robertson performed poorly on the field sobriety tests and his blood alcohol content (BAC) registered as .13 on the Alcotest machine. He was also charged with failure to maintain a lane (N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b)), and reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96). At trial, Robertson unsuccessfully challenged the admissibility of the Alcotest results based on the unavailability of repair records and diagnostic tests for the Alcotest machine used for his test. Although Robertson received numerous records, there were service related records within the manufacturer which he could not access to which he believed he was entitled. On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed. Once again Robertson appealed, this time to the New Jersey Appellate Division which affirmed the DUI conviction holding that under State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 825, 129 S. Ct. 158, 172 L. Ed. 2d 41 (2008) there was no basis for excluding the Alcotest results. Of note, on each successive appeal, Robertson sought a stay of the suspension of his driving privileges. He was sentenced to 7 months loss of license in municipal court and a stay of his suspension was granted, with no reasons stated on the record, to allow for a trial de novo in the New Jersey Superior Court, Middlesex County. At the trial de novo of State v. Robertson, the New Jersey Superior Court judge found Robertson guilty based on both the DVR of the psychophysical tests and the Alcotest results. The defendant again sought a stay of his license suspension based on multiple cases pending certification in the Supreme Court with regard to the ability of those accused of DUI to obtain repair and service records relating to specific Alcotest machines and the possibility of a favorable outcome for the Defendant. The State objected to the stay based on several unreported Appellate Division opinions supporting the finding that the records sought by the Defendant need not be provided. The stay was granted and addressed by the Appellate Division as being governed by a three-part test under Crowe v. DeGoia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) requiring a showing that failure to obtain the stay would subject the defendant to irreparable harm, that the defendant has a reasonable chance of success on appeal, and there is not substantial harm created by granting the stay. In the case of DUI, the potential for harm to the public by an intoxicated driver creates a special circumstance for consideration and the Appellate Division found that stay of a suspension in a DUI case was not a matter of right pending appeal. With regard to the suppression motion, the New Jersey Appellate Division looked to precedent interpreting Chun. In State v. Maricic, 417 N.J. Super. 280, 288 (App. Div. 2010), the Appellate Division held that, although twelve foundational documents were required by Chun, that did not serve to limit additional discovery requests with a reasonable basis. The Appellate Division also reviewed State v. Carrero, 428 N.J. Super. 495, 507 (App. Div. 2012) holding that DWI cases are quasi-criminal and subject to a more limited discovery than criminal matters. Pursuant to R. 3:13-3(b)(1)(C) and 7:7-7(b)(4) the State is obligated to produce documents within the prosecutor’s custody or control but the Appellate Division reasoned that, although the Alcotest manufacturer’s documents were not within the State’s control, the Defendant could have subpoenaed them from the manufacturer had he felt they would prove to exculpate him. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found the argument that the diagnostic tests were material to the defense to be unconvincing. DWI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges and can lead to loss of driving privileges up to 10 years as well as incarceration. Additionally, the newly created statute regarding driving while suspended for multiple DUI offenses guarantees a 6 month jail term. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to determine whether you can win your case. For more information about DUI, DWI, DUID, driving while suspended for DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Case Opens Door To Further Discovery In Municipal Court

Pursuant to the N.J. Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Stein, a driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) matter, municipal court prosecutors must turn over evidence from all jurisdictions involved in an arrest. The N.J. Supreme Court’s ruling overturned both the trial and Appellate Division rulings on the matter. Robert Stein was involved in a motor vehicle accident on Route 23 in Wayne and a Pequannock officer was the first to respond to the scene. Later Wayne officers relieved the Pequannock officer. Stein was ultimately charged with driving while intoxicated, as a third offender, and found guilty in the municipal court and the N.J. Superior Court, Law Division, Passaic County. He was also charged with careless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-97). Stein was sentenced to 180 days in the Passaic County Jail; 10 year loss of driving privileges; 48 hours at the Intoxicated Driver’s Resource Center; required to install an ignition interlock device on his vehicle and substantial fines. Justice Albin drafted the opinion including that Rule 7:7-7(b) requires the municipal prosecutor to provide all relevant evidence, including that from other jurisdictions and the names of officers in possession of knowledge pertaining to the alleged incident. The N.J. Supreme Court agreed with Stein’s argument that any inculpatory evidence could also be exculpatory and needed to be turned over. In Stein’s case, he did not raise or preserve the issue of the failure of the Wayne Municipal Prosecutor to turn over the name of the Pequannock officer for appeal. However, the ruling is relevant and could prove beneficial to those facing charges in municipal court. DUI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious and can lead to incarceration and loss of driving privileges up to ten years. If you are facing charges for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Jury Trials In NJ DUI Cases

The N.J. Supreme Court ruled that in spite of substantially increasing penalties, driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) is a motor vehicle matter giving defendants no right to a jury trial. In State v. Denelsbeck, decided May 12, 2016, the court reaffirmed its decision from State v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109 (1990), wherein it was held that the Legislature, although enacting harsh penalties to deter driving while intoxicated, did not classify DUI as a criminal matter. Penalties for a third or subsequent DUI do not include more than 6 months in jail and thus are not of sufficient impact to require a jury according to the court’s reasoning. In support of this logic is the fact that the court has criminalized driving while suspended for DWI by enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 which requires incarceration for those convicted of multiple offenses. The N.J. Supreme Court did indicate that, if penalties for DUI became more harsh in the future, they could revisit their decision. If you are charged with DUI, you need experienced defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to breath tests, driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and other serious driving charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Dismissed On Speedy Trial Violation

In State v. Cahill, the defendant faced a driving under the influence (DUI) charge after being found guilty of assault by auto charges stemming from the same event. It was established that Michael Cahill consumed alcohol at a bar, later drove from the bar, swerved to avoid an obstacle in the road, crossed two lanes of traffic and collided with a police car causing injuries to the officer. Following a conviction and sentencing in the death by auto matter, the Superior Court judge remanded the driving while intoxicated charge to municipal court for disposition. A full 16 months later, Michael Cahill received notice from the municipal court that his matter had been scheduled for trial. Through counsel, he filed a motion to dismiss based on the court’s failure to uphold his right to a speedy trial. The municipal court judge denied the motion and Cahill appealed after entering a conditional guilty plea. The NJ Superior Court held that Cahill’s right to a speedy trial was violated under the particular circumstances of the matter and vacated the sentence after a review of the matter based on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Barker v. Wingo. In Barker v. Wingo, the US Supreme Court established a four factor balancing test to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was upheld. In the instant case, the NJ Superior Court found the 16 month delay was held to be too lengthy, without good cause, and prejudicial to the defendant who suffered anxiety over the prospect of the trail as well as limited his employment alternatives based on the likelihood he would be found guilty at trial. The decision to dismiss the DWI charge was upheld by the NJ Appellate Division and the NJ Supreme Court and Cahill’s sentence was vacated. Driving under the influence charges carry significant consequences including loss of driving privileges for 7-12 months for a first offense, 2 years for a second offense and ten years for a third or subsequent offense as well as substantial fines and penalties, the inability to work and the social stigma that is associated with DUI. There are ways that an attorney can help you, even if you think you will be found guilty and it is always critical that you consult with an experienced traffic attorney prior to deciding whether to enter into a guilty plea for DUI. For more information about DUI/DWI, reckless driving and other serious traffic court matters, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Lawyer Challenges His DUI Plea Based On Lack Of Counsel

Henry Aratow was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI)(N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) in 1988, pled guilty to a driving under the influence (DUI) in 2004, and pled guilty to a 2009 in 2011. In the case of the 2009 DUI, Aratow was sentenced as a third offender resulting in a 10 year loss of driving privileges and 180 days incarceration. In 2013, Aratow sought post conviction relief from in the municipal court and then Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County with regard to the 2004 DUI in order to avail himself of the step-down provisions under State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014), pertaining to successive DUI convictions. The relief sought was denied and Aratow appealed to the NJ Appellate Division. In 2004, Aratow was stopped by police and charged with DWI, refusal to submit to a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), and making an improper turn (N.J.S.A. 39:4-116). Both at the time he was stopped by police and when he appeared in court for the resulting charges, Aratow was a practicing attorney. Aratow waived his right to counsel and entered into a plea to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content (BAC) between .08 and .10 with a dismissal of the refusal to submit to chemical breath testing and the improper turn charges. At the time of the 2004 plea, the municipal court judge engaged in lengthy colloquy with the defendant regarding his right to counsel, the factual basis of his plea. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the Aratow was not advised by the municipal court judge of the progressively harsher consequences of successive DUI convictions and, therefore, did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the plea as required under N.J. Court Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). The court also questioned the sufficiency of the factual basis given by the defendant, as set forth in State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218 (2013). The court found that, although Aratow admitted to operating a motor vehicle after consuming 3 vodka and tonics, he was not questioned as to whether he believed that the alcohol he consumed substantially impaired his ability to operate the vehicle or that his BAC was between .08 and .10. Under State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415 (1989), the remedy for a plea entered with an insufficient factual basis is to reinstate all charges and restore the matter to its original status prior to the entry of the plea. Accordingly, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the 2004 matter for a new trial. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

The Future of DUI Testing In NJ

Those arrested for driving under the influence (DUI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, are most often exonerated or convicted based on the results of chemical breath testing. The Alcotest machine is presently used to determine whether individuals were driving under the influence by using chemical testing to determine their blood alcohol content (BAC) exceeds the legal limit in New Jersey. The machine has been the subject of multiple challenges, the most well-known being State v. Chun, 195 N.J. 54 (2009),and the NJ Attorney General's Office indicated to the NJ Supreme Court that the machine's use would be discontinued by the end of 2016 in light of the machine's manufacturer, Draeger Safety, announcing they would no longer support the machine. Over the years since the Alcotest 7110 was introduced in NJ in 2001, the software has become outdated and the scientific reliability has come into question. Now, as the sun is setting on the Attorney General's time to find a suitable replacement, pay for another company to service the Alcotest machine or for the state to begin serving the machine in-house, those subject to testing for driving while intoxicated, especially those found to be just over the legal limit, are left with the fact that although they may be convicted based on results that have a reasonable probability of being inaccurate, the Attorney General's Office has a window of opportunity wherein this probability is allowed to persist. Additionally, as of this date, no suitable replacement has been indicated by the Office of the Attorney General. If you are facing charges of DUI, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to chemical breath testing, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

S385/A1368 And DUI In NJ

Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) can have devastating consequences to both victims and drivers alike. New Jersey legislation, S385/A1368, has been proposed as a means of preventing would-be repeat offenders from getting behind the wheel while allowing individuals who made an innocent but costly mistake a chance to continue to drive by installing an Ignition Interlock Device on their primary vehicle or vehicles. The proposed legislation includes only 10 day license suspensions upon conviction for the purpose of installing the device on the vehicle. Once installed, the driver must blow into the device, which detects alcohol on the breath, in order to start the vehicle. If the ignition interlock device detects that the driver's blood alcohol content (BAC) is elevated over .05%, the ignition will be disabled. Additionally, once the vehicle is in operation, the ignition interlock device requires the driver to blow into the mouthpiece at certain intervals to better insure the individual driving the vehicle remains sober and the individual who initially blew into the device is in fact the driver. NJ S385/A1368 would permit first-offenders with a BAC of between .08 and .10% to avoid long-term license suspension by installing in ignition interlock device for 3 to 6 months, unless aggravating circumstances exist which indicate a long-term license suspension is appropriate. First-time offenders with a BAC of .10% or greater would be required to install the device for 7 to 12 months. Additionally, there are additional penalties for those who circumvent the ignition interlock device or drive a vehicle without an interlock device during their required installation period. Those who in any way facilitate another in circumventing an ignition interlock device, by blowing into the device, disabling it or providing another vehicle to the suspended driver also face criminal charges which can result in up to 6 months in jail. Second-offenders would be required to install the device for a period of 2 to 4 years. Persistent offenders would continue to face long-term suspension and jail terms. The ignition interlock device bears an installation cost as well as a monthly service fee and drivers still face increased insurance costs and other motor vehicle fees in the event of a DUI conviction. If you are facing DUI charges, the consequences can include large fines, loss of a job due to inability to commute or loss of certain professional licenses as a result of the DUI, jail and the social stigma associated with DUI. If you have been charged with driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, you need experienced defense counsel in your corner. For more information about DUI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Matter Changes Warrantless Search Standard In NJ

State v. William L. Witt, (A-9-14)(074468), 435 N.J. Super. 608, 610-11 (App. Div. 2014), 219 N.J. 624 (2014), began as a possible driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) case but, due to the warrantless search of Witt's vehicle, led to an indictment for second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 5(b)) and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)). Following a trial and appeals in this matter the result was the overturning of State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), which has been the standard for automobile searches in New Jersey. After being pulled over and removed from the vehicle for field sobriety tests, which police claim he failed. After arresting Witt, the police searched the vehicle for "intoxicants" and discovered a handgun in the center console. The trial court followed Pena-Flores in holding that the warrantless search of the vehicle, beyond a plain view search for open containers of alcohol, was in violation of Witt's rights and suppressed the handgun. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision to suppress the gun finding that there were no circumstances involved in this matter which could give rise to justification of the warrantless search. The N.J. Supreme Court held, days ago, that there should be a return to the standard of State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981), wherein the automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows police with probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime to search a vehicle when unforseeable circumstances arise during a motor vehicle stop. State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000), added the need for exigent circumstances to the standard set in Alston and Pena-Flores reaffirmed Cooke adding a preference for the use of available technology to obtain warrants in if at all practicable. The State argued that the Pena-Flores standard was overly subjective, lacked uniform application, placed police officers in harm's way, motorists were ultimately consenting rather than the police applying for warrants, and where vehicles were impounded the intrusion was greater than that involved in a roadside search. The NJ Supreme Court considered the standard established by the United States Supreme Court, which requires only that the vehicle is easily moveable, including even mobile homes, and the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense. The NJ Supreme Court further considered the difficulty caused to officers by upholding the standards in Pena-Flores against the Constitutional protections it provides. The Court opted for a return to the standard established in Alston, which offers police much broader authority to avoid obtaining a search warrant than under Pena-Flores. If you are facing charges of DUI, refusal or other criminal charges as a result of an included search of your vehicle, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, illegal possession of a firearm, other weapons offenses or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Blood Draw Due To Exigent Circumstances

Donna Jones was suspected of driving under the influence (DUI) at the time she caused a three car accident, resulting in injury to herself and another, by rear ending a car stopped at a light then striking a second car immediately in front of the first before her vehicle came to rest. As a result of the accident, Jones was unconscious. Although officers were alerted by EMTs to an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Jones' breath at the scene, no field sobriety testing was possible due to her condition. Jones was transported to the hospital for treatment after emergency personnel extracted her from her vehicle. At the hospital Jones remained unconscious for some time and was despondent upon regaining consciousness. An officer requested that blood be extracted from Jones without a warrant and the resultant blood alcohol content (BAC) reading was .345 percent. Jones was indicted for fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)) and issued summonsed for DUI (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) and reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96). In Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), a driver was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a result of a routine traffic stop and U.S. Supreme Court determined that the natural metabolization of alcohol in an individual's bloodstream does not, without more, constitute exigent circumstances giving rise to the ability of police to forego the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and withdraw a blood sample without consent. Pursuant to the holding in McNeely and the fact that there was no proof police were unable to obtain a warrant under the particular facts of the case, the trial court suppressed Jones' blood alcohol content (BAC) reading. On appeal, in State v. Jones, the State argued that McNeely should not have been applied retroactively in this case where the incident occurred but the case was decided after McNeely. The NJ Appellate division determined the trial judge erred in his application of the standard required under McNeely and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and held that the BAC results of Jones should not have been suppressed. In State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 238 (1984), New Jersey courts held it legal to obtain a blood sample without the need for a warrant as long as there was a reasonable belief the driver was intoxicated and the blood was withdrawn "in a medically acceptable manner…without the use of excessive force." The NJ Appellate Division did consider McNeely in determining that it is a given that a person's BAC does dissipate once the alcohol is fully absorbed into the blood stream and declines over time until it is fully metabolized thus creating a need for drawing blood to preserve evidence of intoxication. The decision of the trial court with regard to suppression of the BAC results was reversed. If you are convicted of DUI you face serious penalties including loss of license for up to 10 years, incarceration for up to 180 days and substantial fines. You should obtain an experienced DUI attorney immediately to help fight your case. For more information about DWI, drug DUI, CDS in a motor vehicle, blood and urine testing, reckless driving, refusal to submit to a breath test or other serious motor vehicle offenses in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Resisting Arrest Charged May Be Managed With PTI

K.S. was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), refusal to submit to chemical breath testing (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a)), third-degree resisting arrest (N.J. S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a)), fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a police officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-13) and fourth-degree criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1)). As K.S. was being transported to the Watchung Borough police station under suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI), he attempted to spit blood onto an arresting officer. K.S. had a juvenile criminal history including assault, possession of a weapon, fighting and harassment as well as an adult charge for violent behavior which had been dismissed and, based upon this prior record, was denied entry into Pretrial Intervention (PTI) by the Somerset County Prosecutor. Prosecutors are afforded broad discretion in the determination of whether a defendant should be admitted into PTI and, barring patent abuse of discretion, the prosecutor's decision is normally upheld. State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503 (1981). The Somerset County Superior Court agreed with the prosecutor's decision to deny defendant's entry into PTI and the NJ Appellate Division affirmed on appeal. K.S. appealed to the N.J. Supreme Court and the matter was reversed and remanded based on the guidelines of N.J.C.R. 3:28 and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 which codified the PTI Program in New Jersey. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), established following the decision in State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85 (1976), the prosecutor and criminal division manager are to consider 17 separate factors. Under State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 585-586 (1996), no particular weight is to be given to any particular factor. In addition to the factors set forth is any mental illness from which the defendant suffers. State v. Hoffman, 399 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 2008). K.S. suffers from bi-polar issues, which the prosecutor claimed to have considered in denying the defendant's entry into PTI. According to the N.J. Supreme Court, in State v. K.S., the prosecutor inappropriately considered the defendant's criminal history as violent offenses which do typically give rise to denial of Pretrial Intervention. State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434 (1997). Under State v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215 (2002), it was held that the prosecutor could consider previously dismissed or diverted charges if the prior resolutions should have deterred the defendant from committing further offenses. However, the N.J. Supreme Court held that Brooks was applicable to the court's consideration, not that of the prosecutor. The N.J. Supreme Court also held that, in order to consider prior dismissed charges, they needed to be supported by undisputed facts established within a hearing or by the defendant's admission. State v. Green, 413 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2010), established the requirement that the criminal division manager and prosecutor consider a defendant's application on the merits. The N.J. Supreme Court held that, due to the prosecutor's consideration of prior dismissed charges, the denial of defendant's application was inappropriate and remanded the matter for a hearing to establish whether the defendant's prior criminal history did give rise to proper denial of entry into the PTI program. Resisting arrest is a common charge as it is a highly discretionary decision of police officers effecting an arrest. Arrest is a humiliating experience and difficult to comprehend by those who do not believe they are breaking the law, or that their "crimes" give rise to the need for handcuffs and the other consequences of arrest. If you are facing charges of resisting arrest, you should immediately seek experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about resisting arrest, assault, assault on an officer or other criminal charges, as well as DUI and other traffic related charges, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Proof Of DUI Alone Is Sufficient To Convict For Aggravated Manslaughter

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident while driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), William T. Liepe was charged with first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); second-degree vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)); and fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2). Max Guzman and 2 of his children were in a Honda Civic waiting to turn left at 1:00 p.m. on a Sunday afternoon in April, 2011. Guzman’s Honda was rear-ended by Liepe’s Ford Explorer and spun into another lane of travel where it was hit by a passing motorist, Rosa Vazquez, driving a Cadillac Escalade. Guzman’s younger child was killed, Guzman and his other child survived but suffered substantial injury. Vazquez, her mother and 2 children did not sustain life threatening injuries. Police found an open container of alcohol in Leipe’s vehicle and he admitted to the consumption of several beers earlier in the day. A sample of Leipe’s blood was taken and his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .192 typically indicates substantial impairment of one’s driving ability. Testimony was presented at trial that Liepe admitted to never having noticed the Honda in his path waiting to turn. Reconstruction of the accident revealed evidence relating to stopping distance and opportunity to avoid an accident. Ultimately, the trial court granted Liepe’s motion to dismiss aggravated manslaughter as a charge upon concluding that the State must prove more than intoxication. In State v. Liepe, the NJ Appellate Division considered State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1989) with regard to what inferences were permitted from extraneous evidence with regard to extreme indifference to human life. Radziwil also set forth that, in matters of driving under the influence, evidence of the exact degree of intoxication is not required to prove aggravated recklessness. In State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345 (2000), the court considered recklessness based on intoxication and set forth the premise that, although one could be convicted of driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) it is not conclusive evidence of reckless indifference to human life. The Appellate Division distinguished aggravated manslaughter from reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3)) in State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1984). Recklessness is shown by conscious disregard of “substantial and unjustifiable risk” of death as a result of the conduct in question. The level of disregard required is a “gross deviation” from that of a reasonable person. Aggravated manslaughter includes the heightened requirement that the situation be “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life” wherein risk becomes elevated from a possibility to a probability. The Appellate Division ultimately determined that evidence of intoxication, without more, shall survive a motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated manslaughter. If you are facing driving while intoxicated (DWI) or other criminal charges stemming from a driving under the influence or driving under the influence of drugs (DUID) charge, you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to protect yourself from loss of rights and liberties. For more information about DUI/DWI, assault by auto, aggravated assault or other serious motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Alternatives To Jail For Driving While Suspended For Multiple DUI Charges?

Driving while suspended for a second or subsequent driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) charge in New Jersey now carries a 180 day mandatory minimum jail term. Since N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) was enacted on August 1, 2011, drivers sentenced to the mandatory minimum 180 days in jail without parole have been seeking alternative sentences. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), it is a fourth-degree crime to operate a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for a second or subsequent driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction or refusal to submit to chemical breath testing in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. In State v. French, 437 N.J. Super 333 (App. Div. 2014) , the trial court sentenced French to 180 days in jail, but allowed for up to 90 days of the sentence to be served in an inpatient treatment facility. The NJ Appellate Division held that sentences other that incarceration were not what the Legislature contemplated in enacting the statute and refused to find opportunity for flexibility in sentencing. In State v. Harris, John D. Harris, III, was sentenced to 180 days but allowed to serve his sentence on the Home Electronic Detention System (HEDS) program. The State appealed the sentence and the NJ Appellate Division upheld the courts finding in French finding that the Legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) was to protect the public from those who would continue to drive after multiple DUI convictions. Although there is likely to be further litigation regarding other alternatives to incarceration, including diversionary programs, for driving while suspended for DWI the present state of the law is that you will serve 180 days in jail for this offense. If you are facing charges of DUI, DWI or driving while suspended for these charges you are facing significant periods of license suspension and the possibility of jail. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DUI, DWI, driving while under the influence of drugs (DUID), driving while suspended for DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other serious traffic related charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No Alternative To Jail For Driving While Suspended For DUI

Anthony Frezza was charged with operating a motor vehicle while suspended for multiple driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) charges pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) after being stopped on the Atlantic City Expressway in the early morning hours of February 4, 2012. Pursuant to the statute, the requisite sentence is 180 days in jail without parole with no sentencing discretion afforded to the court. After a trial in State v. Frezza at which the defendant was found guilty, the municipal court judge sentenced Frezza to 180 days in jail without parole with alternatives including house arrest. The State cross-appealed and appeal filed by Frezza challenging the sufficiency of evidence. The NJ Appellate Division relied on State v. Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. 308, 319 (App. Div. 2005) in holding that Frezza’s motor vehicle record was admissible as prima facie evidence that he was suspended for driving while intoxicated (DWI) at the time he was stopped and admitted to driving while suspended. Frezza was serving a suspension for a second DUI offense and, pursuant to State v. Cuccurullo, 228 N.J. Super. 517, 520-21 (App. Div. 1988), a driver is suspended for DUI when the sentence is imposed, even if the driver is still serving a suspension for an earlier event. In State v. French, 437 N.J. Super. 333, 335-39 (App. Div. 2014), the court clarified that a 180 day jail sentence without parole is required and no sentencing alternatives are permissible. As a result, the NJ Appellate Division reversed the sentence and remanded for sentencing in conformance with the statutory requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). DWI charges, whether for alcohol or drugs, are very serious charges and can lead to loss of driving privileges up to 10 years as well as incarceration. Additionally, the newly created statute regarding driving while suspended for multiple DUI offenses guarantees a 6 month jail term. If you are facing charges or charges of driving while suspended for DUI it is critical that you obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about driving while suspended for DUI, DWI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, refusal to submit to chemical breath tests, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Conviction Becomes Easier For State

The appeal of a Union County driving under the influence (DUI) charge led to removal of yet another burden of proof previously borne by the State. In State v. Peralta, the defendant sought to suppress the Alcotest result of .19% blood alcohol content (BAC) as a result after the officers processing the arrest failed to read the standard refusal statement required by N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e). The municipal court refused to suppress the Alcotest reading and Peralta was convicted of driving while intoxicated. Of note is the fact that the officers observations were not found to be sufficient to convict the defendant of DUI. On appeal, the Law Division also convicted Peralta based on the BAC result. On appeal to the NJ Appellate Division the court held that the refusal statement was created by the Legislature for the purpose of advising those who would refuse to provide a breath sample that those driving on the roads of New Jersey are "deemed to have given their consent to the taking of samples of their breath", N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(a), and advise them of the consequences of such a refusal. State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485 (2010). The Appellate Division indicated that N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) was not created to add an additional burden on officers processing DWI matters where the accused is willing to provide a breath sample upon request. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Dash Camera Video Available In Traffic Cases?

In October 2014, New Jersey Superior Court Judge Vincent Grasso issued two rulings regarding police dash cam video records that have stirred quite a bit of interest from attorneys who handle traffic cases in New Jersey. As an attorney, I routinely hear a story from my clients which differs greatly from the contents of the police report I receive in response to my discovery request. Although the officer prepares a routine report at the end or shortly after their shift, they handle many similar matters day in and day out. This results in an awareness of what highlights to give attention to when writing a report as well as a blurring of their memory as to specific incidents as a result of substantial similarity in driving under the influence (DUI) stops, reckless driving stops and other motor vehicle stops. On the other hand, a driver facing DUI, reckless driving, careless driving or other motor vehicle charges is likely to be stopped on an infrequent basis and have absolutely no confusion about the conditions and events surrounding the motor vehicle stop. On the other hand, the driver is most often unfamiliar with the statute under which they are being stopped and the portions of the event they recall specifically may not relate to the statutory factors which will determine their guilt or innocence. For example, drivers often focus on conditions external to the stop which, in their opinion, gave rise to the circumstances resulting in the stop such as the need to move a vehicle after consuming alcohol. In either version of the event, the officers or the defendant's, there is the possibility for error. If Judge Grasso's ruling with regard to the cases, including Ganzweig v. Township of Lakewood, result in the routine provision of video footage to the public, the diverging stories will become of less import as there will be an accurate and unbiased video recording of the event for the defendant, the officer, the prosecutor, defense counsel and the judge to view. As it stands, obtaining video of traffic stops, when available at all, can be challenging resulting in substantial delays of the matter and frustration to clients paying attorneys for continued court appearances for no purpose other than discovery motions with regard to the video sought in any particular matter. If you are facing charges for a traffic violation including DUI, driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), reckless driving, driving while suspended, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other traffic matters you can face incarceration, loss of license, substantial fines and surcharges and increased insurance rates. You should seek an experienced municipal court attorney to protect your rights. For more information about traffic court matters visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

10 Year DUI Sentence Upheld Without Alcotest or Blood Sample

John Cumpston was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), driving while intoxicated (DWI) in a school zone (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g)), driving while suspended (N.J.S.A. 39:3-40) reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96) and careless driving (39:4-97) after Tenafly police responding to an accident call found him in his Toyota Camry which he had driven into a telephone pole. There were no other occupants in the vehicle and a scrape on Cumpston's face was consistent with the airbag's deployment. Cumpston's speech was slurred, his breath smelled of an alcoholic beverage, he had difficulty balancing when standing, his clothes were disheveled and he was without shoes, he admitted to consuming various alcoholic beverages prior to driving, he did not wake when his blood was drawn in the hospital and urinated on himself while sleeping in the hospital. In State v. Cumpston, the State stipulated to suppression of the blood test upon Defendant's motion but the court refused to suppress the Defendant's pre-arrest statements. At trial in the Tenafly Municipal Court, Judge Bell based the convictions for DUI, DWI within 1000 feet of a school zone, reckless driving and careless driving on the officers' testimony and the totality of the circumstances. The Defendant was sentenced to 180 days in the Bergen County jail and 10-year loss of license as a third time DUI offender with a concurrent 180 day sentence for DWI in a school zone and a 20-year loss of license on that charge. The Defendant was also ordered to addend the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC) in association with the DUI and DWI in a school zone charges and fines totaling over $3,000 collectively on all convictions. On appeal before Judge Jerejian in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County, Cumpston sought to have his admissions at the scene of the crash, with regard to alcohol consumption, suppressed under claim that his Miranda rights were violated, sought to have the convictions reversed and for a reduction in his sentence. The State submitted that the conviction for DUI should merge into DWI in a school zone. Under State v. Kent, 391 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 2007) field sobriety tests are not required for a DWI conviction. Other proofs including "a defendant's demeanor and physical appearance- coupled with proofs as to the cause of intoxication - i.e., the smell of alcohol, and admission of the consumption of alcohol, or a lay opinion of alcohol intoxication." State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 589 (2006). As to the Defendant's statements at the scene, New Jersey has long held that Miranda warnings are not required prior to field sobriety testing. State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Green, 209 N.J. Super. 347, 350 (App. Div. 1986); State v. Weber, 220 N.J. Super. 420, 424 (App. Div. 1987). Further, in Berkemer v. McCarthy, 467 U.S. 420, 442 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court held that basic on scene questioning and field sobriety tests do not give rise to a "formal arrest" requiring Miranda warnings. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County, did agree that the Defendant's sentence should be modified to merge the DUI into the DWI in a school zone as well as the fact that, although the Defendant was a third offender under N.J.S.A. 3:4-50(a), he was a first time offender under N.J.S.A. 3:4-50(g). The sentence for DWI in a school zone was modified to 180 days in the Bergen County Jail, $1,000 fine and 10-year loss of license. Driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol in New Jersey bears serious consequences including loss of driving privileges from 7 months for a first event to 10 years for a third or subsequent event, enhanced penalties for driving while intoxicated in a school zone, heavy fines and even jail. If you are facing DUI charges, it is critical you obtain experienced defense counsel to represent you against those charges. For more information about DUI, DWI, DUI in a school zone, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving without insurance or other serious municipal court charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlinglawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DWI Acquittal When State Failed To Prove Operation Of Vehicle

Wardell Harvey was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. At sentencing, he was sentenced as a 3rd offender including jail for 180 days, 10 year loss of license, required an interlock device on his vehicle for 1 year following restoration of his driving privileges and fines. At his municipal court trial, the Defendant testified that he procured five 24oz cans of beer on the way to his doctor where he was to learn whether he required back surgery. He was stopped by Officer Clerico of the Somers Point Police Department on the way to his doctor for speeding and an illegal turn. The officer further testified that, during the motor vehicle stop on the way to the doctor's office, he detected no odor of an alcoholic beverage when speaking with Harvey. Upon arrival at the doctor's office, Harvey consumed less than 2 cans of beer in the parking lot while seated in his vehicle. Following his appointment, according to the defendant, he was anticipating the arrival of a Ms. Bowen who worked in a nearby building and to whom the vehicle belonged as she would be driving him home. Prior to his returning to the vehicle, after receiving a call from someone in the doctor's office about an intoxicated patient preparing to leave the office, police stopped Harvey to question him about driving under the influence. Officer Cunningham smelled alcohol on the Defendant's breath, observed an open beer in the cup holder of the truck Harvey drove and found the keys in the truck's ignition. Harvey admitted to consuming alcohol but denied any wrongdoing. Both sides believed that State v. Snyder, 337 N.J. Super 59, (App. Div. 2001) regarding post-operation consumption of alcohol was the controlling case. The municipal court judge decided the State had met its burden of proof as to evidence of operation in a preliminary Rule 104 Hearing. Ultimately the Defendant pled with the admission of consumption of alcohol but without admission of operation. In State v. Harvey, the Law Division judge, on trial de novo, held that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction with regard to operation prior to the doctor's appointment but sufficient to support a conviction based on his intent to drive following his doctor's appointment under State v. Mulcahy, 107 N.J. 467 (1987). On appeal, it was held that the Rule 104 hearing was inappropriate and testimony elicited therein violated the hearsay rules. Additionally, the Appellate Division held that, under Mulcahy, Harvey could not be required to submit to Alcotest testing based on the belief that "[he would] operate a motor vehicle at some time in the near future." Finally, the State changing its argument from operation prior to the doctor's appointment in municipal court to constructive operation after the doctor's visit in the Law Division was fundamentally unfair and that "appellate courts affirm or reverse judgments and orders, not reasons" Isko v. Planning Bd. of the Twp. of Livingston, 51 N.J. 162, 175 (1968). The NJ Appellate Division reversed Harvey's conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) and remanded the matter to the Law Division for a judgment of acquittal. DWI is a very serious offense with substantial consequences including jail and loss of driving privileges which may result in loss of your job and other consequences. If you are facing DUI charges, you should obtain an experienced DUI defense attorney immediately. For more information about DUI, Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), underage DUI, drug DUI, controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other serious driving infractions in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Driving While Suspended For DUI Without the DUI?

In deciding State v. Suzanne Sylvester, the court held that driving while suspended for a second or subsequent driving under the influence (DUI) charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b is a 4th degree crime even in the event the underlying DUI suspension is later vacated. Sylvester was convicted in the Somerset County Superior Court of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b and sentenced to a 3 year probationary term with a mandatory minimum incarceration of 180 days without parole. Sylvester had been convicted of DUI in 1991, 1992 and in Mendham Municipal Court in 2011. It was during the suspension for the 2011 DUI when the defendant was charged with driving while suspended. Although Sylvester was permitted to rely on a sentencing step-down afforded under State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990) due to the lapse of time between her second and third DUI convictions, the Appellate Division found that Defendant was aware of a valid suspension at the time she drove and therefore the conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b was also valid. In upholding the decision of the court below, the NJ Appellate Division relied on the earlier decision in State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010) wherein the court established that a defendant violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b shall not be entitled to relief from conviction in the event the DUI is later vacated. If you are found guilty of driving while suspended for a second or subsequent DUI, you may be punished under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b which bears minimum penalties of 180 days in jail and an additional 1 year loss of license. For more information about driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other serious driving offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.