Bat Used in Assault Suppressed After Illegal Police Search

Kenneth Barbour was arrested for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)), resulting from an alleged assault on his neighbor. Upon arriving at the scene, police were told by the bloody victim, that his neighbor used a black baseball bat to strike him in the head following a verbal dispute. Police indicated they used a patrol car loudspeaker to command Barbour to exit his residence as he was thought to have outstanding warrants and possibly weapons in his possession. An individual ultimately exited the residence and was arrested approximately 20 feet from the residence. Police, not having a photo of Barbour and unsure he was the man who exited the residence, entered the residence to conduct a search of the premises for others. The trial court denied Barbour's motion to suppress, and other relief requested, holding that the actions of the arresting officers were legitimate as part of a protective sweep of the residence. Following a jury trial, Barbour was convicted of fourth degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)) and sentenced to 2 years probation. In State v. Barbour, the defendant challenged several aspects of the trial court's decision, including the denial of his motion to suppress the bat alleged to have been used as the weapon in the assault. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right to citizens to be free from unreasonable search and seizure unless certain very narrow exceptions apply. State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471 (2001). The New Jersey Appellate Division held that a protective sweep must be limited to "areas in a defendant's immediate control." Such a sweep is valid only when there is (1) a legitimate reason for the officers presence in the residence; and (2) officers have a reasonable suspicion that there is a dangerous individual hiding in the area to be swept and that the burden of proving these circumstances existed is on the State. State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97 (2010). In light of the evidence and testimony presented that the Defendant was outside when arrested and there was no reasonable articulable suspicion that another dangerous individual was inside the residence, the N.J. Appellate Division found the search and seizure to violate the Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and reversed the denial of the motion to suppress. Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including incarceration, the inability to obtain employment and certain licenses, and social stigma associated with such problems. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Aggravated Assault Results In Miscarriage

Laquesha Cathcart and Tisha Cathcart were indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)), second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2), first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), and fourth-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) after forcefully entering the victim's apartment following a dispute over a parking spot in New Brunswick, NJ. The Cathcarts assaulted R.L. and J.D., her daughter, in the presence of R.L.'s husband, F.D., and son. R.L.'s daughter and son both advised the defendant's that R.L. was pregnant but they continued the assault. R.L. miscarried within the week. The main issue in this matter is whether the defendants purposely or knowingly attempted to cause serious bodily injury to R.L. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude testimony relating to R.L.'s pregnancy and miscarriage after determining the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the likelihood it would prejudice the jury against the defendants. The appeal in State v. Cathcart focused on the exclusion of the evidence. N.J. As affirmed in State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (2013), N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits a court to exclude evidence in the event the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. More than a possibility of substantial prejudice is required State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 165 N.J. 492 (2000). To exclude evidence, the party seeking exclusion must demonstrate that the evidence is has such "inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation." State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971). A significant consideration in the decision to exclude evidence is also whether other evidence is available to prove the fact the evidence is offered to prove. Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 403 (2014). Exclusion of certain evidence, such as motive in a criminal matter, requires a higher showing of prejudice. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218 (1955). Conviction for aggravated assault requires proof by the prosecution that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, acted recklessly in an attempt to cause or did cause such bodily injury pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). State v. Mingo, 263 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd. 132 N.J. 75 (1993). This requires proof of the defendant's mental state at the time of the assault. The State's appeal centered on the fact that the defendants were advised that R.L. was pregnant yet continued with their assault which included kicking and punching R.L. in the abdomen. In its decision to reverse in part and affirm in part, the N.J. Appellate Division determined that the statements regarding R.L.'s pregnancy were highly relevant to the issue of the defendants' mental state but that the testimony regarding the miscarriage was overly prejudicial. Aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including 5 to 10 years in prison, with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA), and fines of up to $150,000. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, robbery, burglary, theft or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Attempted Murder Reduced To Aggravated Assault For Plea

Richard Spellman was indicted on two counts of attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); two counts of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); two counts of second-degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); two counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7). Spellman confessed and his motion to suppress the confession was denied. He ultimately pled guilty, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, to all charges after the first-degree attempted murder charges were amended to second degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)). Spellman was sentenced to concurrent 17 year terms subject to an 85 percent period of parole disqualification under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2); two 10 year terms and two 5 year terms; and restitution to a victim with a 5 year period of parole supervision to follow his release. The charges stemmed from two incidents. First, while on parole for a prior aggravated assault, Spellman entered a convenience store, demanded money and then shot the clerk in the stomach after he was given the money. In the second incident, Spellman shot a man in the parking lot of a restaurant. Upon arrival at the scene, police found a gun in the parking lot and Spellman staring at them out the window of a nearby store. When officers spoke to Spellman, he indicated he was fighting with the man he shot. Officers searched Spellman and found a bullet on his person. At the police station, officers found another bullet on Spellman's person and, prior to questioning of any kind, Spellman said "I shot the attendant at the [convenience store]." Spellman was read his Miranda rights, waived his right to counsel and quickly confessed to shooting both individuals. In State v. Spellman, the NJ Appellate Division upheld the trial court judge's decision that the defendant's confessions were voluntary in spite of the defendant's challenge to the voluntariness based on mental capacity which was not raised at trial and therefore not preserved for appeal. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973). The NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1997), in holding that mental illness itself, if present, does not invalidate a confession. The record below satisfied the Appellate Division that the trial judge fully reviewed the confession and found no coercion or force to have been used. With regard to sentencing, the NJ Appellate Division did find errors with the trial judge's failure to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 and explain his or her reasoning fully on the record. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014). The Appellate Division determined that he trial judge's imposition of concurrent 17 year sentences exceeded the statutory range of 5 to 10 years set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(2). Finally, the Appellate Division and the State agreed that the trial judge failed to make adequate findings, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2b(2), as to whether the defendant was able to pay the restitution ordered. The matter was remanded for resentencing. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Assault Conviction For Off-Duty Police Officer

Newark police officer, Hugo Fierro, was indicted for second-degree official misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2), third-degree aggravated assault causing bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)), third-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)); fourth-degree aggravated assault by pointing a handgun at another person (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4)) and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)) after a an off-duty altercation outside an Essex County bar while out with his wife. He was convicted by a jury of simple and aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1) and official misconduct and sentenced to 5 years in prison without parole, the minimum for official misconduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5.1. Evidence offered at trial indicated that Fierro, while off duty and walking with his wife in the Ironbound section of Newark after dinner and dancing, encountered a group of men drinking on the street and went out of his way to order them to disperse. He next identified himself as a police officer to another intoxicated man and guided him by the arm toward a street to help him obtain a cab. At this time, the victim claimed he approached and Fierro yelled "what's your problem? What's your problem?" and tried to grab the victim. Upon finding himself unable to catch the victim, Fierro withdrew a gun from his side, stated he was a police officer, pursued the retreating victim and hit him in the face with the barrel of the handgun at which time the victim fled. The following day the victim reported the incident and selected Fierro's photo out of a photo array. An outdoor camera had recorded the incident and Fierro was positively identified. However, Fierro testified that, while he was trying to assist an intoxicated man to a cab, the victim approached, would not go away when Fierro asked, twice slapped Fierro's hand when he attempted to create space between them and was acting in a manner which caused Fierro to believe the victim may attack. Fierro claimed that he did not strike the man but did push him away by placing his hands on the victim's chest and pushing him back while holding his gun as he believed the victim may have possessed a weapon. Additionally, an officer who took the victim's report testified that there was no visible damage to the victim's face at the time the report was made. On appeal, in State v. Fierro, the defendant argued that the jury's split verdict demonstrated the juror's lack of understanding of the elements of the charges. The NJ Appellate Division considered Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S. Ct. 189, 76 L. Ed. 356 (1932), United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 461 (1984), State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44 (2004), State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551 (2005) and others in holding that a split verdict does not definitively indicate that the jury did not fully understand and properly execute its function. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences. If you are a police officer or other official, the consequences are even more severe. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, illegal possession of a handgun, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Blood Draw Due To Exigent Circumstances

Donna Jones was suspected of driving under the influence (DUI) at the time she caused a three car accident, resulting in injury to herself and another, by rear ending a car stopped at a light then striking a second car immediately in front of the first before her vehicle came to rest. As a result of the accident, Jones was unconscious. Although officers were alerted by EMTs to an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Jones' breath at the scene, no field sobriety testing was possible due to her condition. Jones was transported to the hospital for treatment after emergency personnel extracted her from her vehicle. At the hospital Jones remained unconscious for some time and was despondent upon regaining consciousness. An officer requested that blood be extracted from Jones without a warrant and the resultant blood alcohol content (BAC) reading was .345 percent. Jones was indicted for fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)) and issued summonsed for DUI (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) and reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96). In Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), a driver was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a result of a routine traffic stop and U.S. Supreme Court determined that the natural metabolization of alcohol in an individual's bloodstream does not, without more, constitute exigent circumstances giving rise to the ability of police to forego the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and withdraw a blood sample without consent. Pursuant to the holding in McNeely and the fact that there was no proof police were unable to obtain a warrant under the particular facts of the case, the trial court suppressed Jones' blood alcohol content (BAC) reading. On appeal, in State v. Jones, the State argued that McNeely should not have been applied retroactively in this case where the incident occurred but the case was decided after McNeely. The NJ Appellate division determined the trial judge erred in his application of the standard required under McNeely and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and held that the BAC results of Jones should not have been suppressed. In State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 238 (1984), New Jersey courts held it legal to obtain a blood sample without the need for a warrant as long as there was a reasonable belief the driver was intoxicated and the blood was withdrawn "in a medically acceptable manner…without the use of excessive force." The NJ Appellate Division did consider McNeely in determining that it is a given that a person's BAC does dissipate once the alcohol is fully absorbed into the blood stream and declines over time until it is fully metabolized thus creating a need for drawing blood to preserve evidence of intoxication. The decision of the trial court with regard to suppression of the BAC results was reversed. If you are convicted of DUI you face serious penalties including loss of license for up to 10 years, incarceration for up to 180 days and substantial fines. You should obtain an experienced DUI attorney immediately to help fight your case. For more information about DWI, drug DUI, CDS in a motor vehicle, blood and urine testing, reckless driving, refusal to submit to a breath test or other serious motor vehicle offenses in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Resisting Arrest Charged May Be Managed With PTI

K.S. was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), refusal to submit to chemical breath testing (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a)), third-degree resisting arrest (N.J. S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a)), fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a police officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-13) and fourth-degree criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1)). As K.S. was being transported to the Watchung Borough police station under suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI), he attempted to spit blood onto an arresting officer. K.S. had a juvenile criminal history including assault, possession of a weapon, fighting and harassment as well as an adult charge for violent behavior which had been dismissed and, based upon this prior record, was denied entry into Pretrial Intervention (PTI) by the Somerset County Prosecutor. Prosecutors are afforded broad discretion in the determination of whether a defendant should be admitted into PTI and, barring patent abuse of discretion, the prosecutor's decision is normally upheld. State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503 (1981). The Somerset County Superior Court agreed with the prosecutor's decision to deny defendant's entry into PTI and the NJ Appellate Division affirmed on appeal. K.S. appealed to the N.J. Supreme Court and the matter was reversed and remanded based on the guidelines of N.J.C.R. 3:28 and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 which codified the PTI Program in New Jersey. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), established following the decision in State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85 (1976), the prosecutor and criminal division manager are to consider 17 separate factors. Under State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 585-586 (1996), no particular weight is to be given to any particular factor. In addition to the factors set forth is any mental illness from which the defendant suffers. State v. Hoffman, 399 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 2008). K.S. suffers from bi-polar issues, which the prosecutor claimed to have considered in denying the defendant's entry into PTI. According to the N.J. Supreme Court, in State v. K.S., the prosecutor inappropriately considered the defendant's criminal history as violent offenses which do typically give rise to denial of Pretrial Intervention. State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434 (1997). Under State v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215 (2002), it was held that the prosecutor could consider previously dismissed or diverted charges if the prior resolutions should have deterred the defendant from committing further offenses. However, the N.J. Supreme Court held that Brooks was applicable to the court's consideration, not that of the prosecutor. The N.J. Supreme Court also held that, in order to consider prior dismissed charges, they needed to be supported by undisputed facts established within a hearing or by the defendant's admission. State v. Green, 413 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2010), established the requirement that the criminal division manager and prosecutor consider a defendant's application on the merits. The N.J. Supreme Court held that, due to the prosecutor's consideration of prior dismissed charges, the denial of defendant's application was inappropriate and remanded the matter for a hearing to establish whether the defendant's prior criminal history did give rise to proper denial of entry into the PTI program. Resisting arrest is a common charge as it is a highly discretionary decision of police officers effecting an arrest. Arrest is a humiliating experience and difficult to comprehend by those who do not believe they are breaking the law, or that their "crimes" give rise to the need for handcuffs and the other consequences of arrest. If you are facing charges of resisting arrest, you should immediately seek experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about resisting arrest, assault, assault on an officer or other criminal charges, as well as DUI and other traffic related charges, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Proof Of DUI Alone Is Sufficient To Convict For Aggravated Manslaughter

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident while driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), William T. Liepe was charged with first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); second-degree vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)); and fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2). Max Guzman and 2 of his children were in a Honda Civic waiting to turn left at 1:00 p.m. on a Sunday afternoon in April, 2011. Guzman’s Honda was rear-ended by Liepe’s Ford Explorer and spun into another lane of travel where it was hit by a passing motorist, Rosa Vazquez, driving a Cadillac Escalade. Guzman’s younger child was killed, Guzman and his other child survived but suffered substantial injury. Vazquez, her mother and 2 children did not sustain life threatening injuries. Police found an open container of alcohol in Leipe’s vehicle and he admitted to the consumption of several beers earlier in the day. A sample of Leipe’s blood was taken and his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .192 typically indicates substantial impairment of one’s driving ability. Testimony was presented at trial that Liepe admitted to never having noticed the Honda in his path waiting to turn. Reconstruction of the accident revealed evidence relating to stopping distance and opportunity to avoid an accident. Ultimately, the trial court granted Liepe’s motion to dismiss aggravated manslaughter as a charge upon concluding that the State must prove more than intoxication. In State v. Liepe, the NJ Appellate Division considered State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1989) with regard to what inferences were permitted from extraneous evidence with regard to extreme indifference to human life. Radziwil also set forth that, in matters of driving under the influence, evidence of the exact degree of intoxication is not required to prove aggravated recklessness. In State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345 (2000), the court considered recklessness based on intoxication and set forth the premise that, although one could be convicted of driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) it is not conclusive evidence of reckless indifference to human life. The Appellate Division distinguished aggravated manslaughter from reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3)) in State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1984). Recklessness is shown by conscious disregard of “substantial and unjustifiable risk” of death as a result of the conduct in question. The level of disregard required is a “gross deviation” from that of a reasonable person. Aggravated manslaughter includes the heightened requirement that the situation be “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life” wherein risk becomes elevated from a possibility to a probability. The Appellate Division ultimately determined that evidence of intoxication, without more, shall survive a motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated manslaughter. If you are facing driving while intoxicated (DWI) or other criminal charges stemming from a driving under the influence or driving under the influence of drugs (DUID) charge, you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to protect yourself from loss of rights and liberties. For more information about DUI/DWI, assault by auto, aggravated assault or other serious motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Oral Argument Is Favored in Post-Conviction Relief Petitions

Isaiah Kinney was charged with first-degree conspiracy to commit murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and convicted of second-degree aggravated assault and second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) after a trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County. Kinney was sentenced to a discretionary extended 20 year period of incarceration with an 85% parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Kinney and Jones severely beat Floyd Simmons at a residence on Prospect Street in East Orange. After leaving the residence, Jones committed a minor driving infraction and crashed while fleeing an East Orange Police officer who noticed that, although Jones appeared not to be injured from the crash, her pants were covered in blood. Prior to Jones being chased by the officer, Kinney had exited the vehicle at a residence on Washington Terrace. Based on statements made by Jones to police, officers proceeded to the Washington Terrace residence to arrest Kinney. While at the residence without a warrant, officers discovered bloodstained clothing belonging to Kinney. At the trial level, Kinney filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on the officers’ illegal search and seizure but the suppression motion was denied. In State v. Isaiah Kinney, the Defendant appealed unsuccessfully then sought post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of assistance of counsel. The record on the Appellate level was noticeably devoid of any reference to the illegal search and seizure. The NJ Appellate Division found that oral argument in a post-conviction relief petition wherein the defendant exercises a last opportunity to raise reliability issues is deserving of oral argument although the determination of whether oral argument will be heard rests within the discretion of the PCR court. State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382, 386 (App. Div. 2001). In State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 282 (2012), the N.J. Supreme Court reinforced the factors set forth in Mayron and included that PCR judges should provide a statement of reasons for denying oral argument. The Appellate Division hearing the PCR matter determined that oral argument could have resolved uncertainty with regard to the absence of pursuit of the suppression motion but the PCR judge incorrectly held that, under State v. Moore, 273 N.J. Super. 118, 126 (App. Div. 1994), the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the suppression motion could only be raised in Kinney’s petition to the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reasoned that, as there is no right to review by the Supreme Court, the PCR judge’s ruling on this matter deprived the defendant of his right to a determination on the issue. It was further determined that the lack of any record established by oral argument pertaining to the suppression motion rendered them unable to give adequate review to the PCR petition and the Appellate Division remanded the matter with direction that the matters of the suppression motion and ineffective assistance of counsel be reviewed. If you are faced with aggravated assault charges, you are facing up to 10 years in prison with an 85% parole ineligibility period under NERA. Even simple assault charges can result in incarceration and should not be taken lightly by you as they will certainly not be taken lightly by the court. If you are charged with assault you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about assault, aggravated assault, conspiracy, murder, unlawful possession of a weapon or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

No PTI Application After Guilty Verdict

Sean Bell was indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) and third-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)) after fighting with another man at a party. Bell tried the case based on the second-degree charge which prevented his application to the Pre-Trial Intervention program (PTI)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to -22). During trial in State v. Bell, the second-degree charges were dismissed but Bell was convicted of the third-degree charges and made application to the PTI program. The Law Division admitted Bell to PTI in part due to Bell's reliance on State v. Halm, 319 N.J. Super. 569 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 162 N.J. 131 (1999). The State appealed based on the application being filed out of time under N.J. Court Rule 3:28(h) and State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576 (1996), wherein a dismissal of a second-degree offense was found not to justify a PTI application out of time. The NJ Appellate Division reversed finding Pre-Trial Intervention applications were required to be made prior to trial. On appeal, the State distinguished Halm by the timing of the defendant's PTI applications as well as the nature of the underlying charges. After substantial consideration of the purpose of diversionary programs, the NJ Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's holding that the purpose of PTI was to offer defendants an opportunity to avoid the stigma of a guilty verdict and prevent use of additional judicial resources at trials. Further, the NJ Supreme Court held that permitting defendants to seek PTI after a guilty verdict would modify the program into an unintended "alternative sentencing option". Assault and aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including long-term incarceration. If you are facing charges of assault or aggravated assault, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, aggravated assault, assault with a deadly weapon or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Aggravated Manslaughter Conviction Reversed Due To Error

Dwayne Slaughter was convicted of aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4), conspiracy (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1) following the beating of his 79 year old neighbor, Roosevelt Morrow. The Defendant and Pritchard Watts both admitted to police they intended to enter Morrow's residence and rob him. Although the 2 men admitted they conspired to rob Morrow, they each blamed the other for his beating death. The Defendant's live-in girlfriend, Tanisha Day, gave police a taped statement which was presented to the jury at trial. Day's statement attributed an incriminating comment by using the term "he" but never indicated whether "he" implied Watts or Slaughter. However, Day did not testify and Defendant lost his opportunity to cross-examine her about her statement. Watts had taken a plea to first-degree robbery in exchange for his testimony at trial against Slaughter. There was no physical evidence indicating Slaughter was the actor. Slaughter appealed the conviction based on the admission of Day's statement. The NJ Appellate Division found that the admission of Day's statement was error but the error was harmless. The NJ Supreme Court found the error was not harmless as Day's statement could have implied either Watts or Slaughter and vacated the Defendant's conviction and remanded for new trial. If you are facing charges of murder, assault, or conspiracy you are facing severe penalties including as much as life in prison. When confronting criminal charges, it is imperative that you have experienced criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you are afforded due process and your rights are protected. For more information about murder, assault or conspiracy in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Evidence Of Other Man's Semen Admissible In Sexual Assault Case

Bobby Perry was found guilty of second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1)) and third-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)). He was sentenced to 8 years with an 85% parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A., N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a)) for the aggravated sexual assault and 4 years imprisonment for the aggravated assault. Additionally, Megan's Law (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23) was applicable and Perry was sentenced to parole supervision for life. Perry and the victim were drinking together at his residence when he became angry with her and punched her in the mouth and told her to "sit on him". One of the Defendant's roommates returned from a party and he let the victim go. The victim said nothing while the roommate was in the room for some time. After the roommate left the room, the Defendant took the victim downstairs and tried to anally penetrate her, which she resisted, then performed oral sex on her before again trying to orally penetrate her. After this activity, the two returned to a room in the house and sat silently looking at her for some time. The Defendant then asked the victim what she was going to say happened to her face and she agreed to say that someone else had injured her. The victim later went to Maplewood Police Department, accompanied by her ex-boyfriend Mr. Wilkins, and Sergeant Guglielmo, upon seeing her injuries, called for an ambulance. At the hospital, Detective Fuentes of the Union Township Police Department met with the victim to give a statement. On the way to the police station, the victim showed Detective Fuentes where the attack occurred and identified Perry in a photo array. Officers appeared at the residence with a warrant and used a UV light to search for signs of bodily fluids or evidence of clean-up efforts but found nothing in the basement or bathroom and on a later date, the porch where only a small amount of blood was found on the back of a chair. The blood was later matched to the victim and semen was found in her clothing, however, no DNA found matched the Defendant. The Union County Superior Court Judge hearing State v. Perry denied Defendant's application to admit DNA evidence of another man's semen under the Rape Shield Law (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7) finding that the presence of another man's semen had no bearing on whether consent was given to the Defendant and found the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudice referencing State v. Ryan, 157 N.J. Super. 121 (App. Div. 1978). Perry appealed on the basis that the evidence of other semen could indicate the possibility that the victim claimed she was raped to appease Wilkins, with whom she was in an on again, off again relationship. The Rape Shield Law was intended to protect the privacy of the victim while also ensuring defendants receive a fair trial. State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 (2003) State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519 (1991) explained that the Rape Shield Law permits prior sexual history to prove another individual is the source of the semen or to negate force. The NJ Appellate Division determined the evidence of another man's semen in the victims clothes was necessary to put on a full defense as required under State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316 (2005). The probative value of the evidence, presented for the limited purpose of proving the victim was assaulted by Wilkins and lied to the police about who assaulted her, outweighed the potential prejudice. The appellate division reversed Perry's conviction and remanded the matter with the instruction that, should the evidence of another's semen be again proffered in the case, the trial court conduct a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine admissibility of the evidence. If you have been charged with a sex crime you face severe consequences including prison, societal scorn and inclusion on the sex offender registry and possible involuntary civil commitment. It is critical you obtain experienced defense counsel to immediately begin to review the prosecution's, evidence, speak with witnesses, explore alibis you may have and build a defense. For more information about sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, endangering the welfare of a minor and other sex crimes visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Conviction Cannot Stand on Cumulative Trial Errors

Jahnell Weaver and Khalil Bryant were in attendance at a graduation party in Camden, NJ where someone pulled a gun and fired 5 shots killing Edward Williams and wounding Amyr Hill. Although only one individual could have fired the gun, both Hill and Weaver were implicated by others at the party. Jahnell Weaver and Khalil Bryant were juveniles but both were charged as adults with first-degree murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2)); first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); third-degree assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and third-degree endangering an injured victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2). At trial, the only significant dispute was weather Weaver or Bryant was the shooter. Both Weaver and Bryant were seen with guns at the party. Hill identified Bryant as the shooter then changed his testimony while other witnesses offered conflicting testimony. Weaver offered that Bryant later used the same weapon in a shooting as a defense and Weaver moved for a separate trial. The court denied Weaver’s application to admit other crimes evidence regarding Bryant’s shooting of another individual shortly after the incident in question due to the substantial prejudice it would cause against Bryant as well as denying Weaver’s request for a separate trial. The State was able to admit Bryant’s statement that he received the gun immediately after the shooting in question. However, because Bryant did not testify, Weaver did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him with regard to the statement. Lamike Goffney, an eyewitness, saw one of the men fleeing the scene hand the gun to another man fleeing the scene and other evidence in the trial led the jury to the conclusion that Bryant then received the weapon from Weaver. Weaver was ultimately convicted and appealed. After the NJ Appellate Division upheld the decision of the trial court, State v. Weaver was heard by the NJ Supreme Court. The NJ Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and remanded the matter for a new trial based on the potential prejudice to Weaver as a result of the cumulative errors in denying his request for a separate trial, refusing to allow other crimes evidence and allowing Bryant’s statement to enter without cross-examination. The penalty for murder is severe including 30 years to life in prison. If you are facing homicide charges, you need experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about murder, homicide, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, assault, assault with a deadly weapon or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Prostitutes Charged With Committing Robbery In Atlantic City Hotel Suite

In State v. Rodriguez, the defendant was charged with 2nd degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and convicted of the lesser included offense of 3rd degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3), simple assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a), 4th degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d). The defendant and her co-defendant, Mayo, were acquitted of 2nd degree conspiracy to commit robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and 3rd degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d). Defendant and co-defendant, prostitutes, met 3 men in the lobby of an Atlantic City hotel and proceeded to join the men in their room. Once there both women surrounded one of the men and began touching him in an erotic manner. Shortly thereafter, the man realized his money was missing and attempted to stop the women from leaving the suite when he was sprayed in the face with pepper spray by the defendant. The defendant was sentenced to 5 years in prison with a 2 year parole disqualifier for theft by unlawful taking, a concurrent 6 month term for the simple assault charge and 1 year in prison for unlawful possession of a weapon which was to be served concurrently. Defendant was also on probation for a prior conviction of 3rd degree theft from the person at the time of the offense and pled guilty to a violation of probation (VOP) and received a concurrent 5 year sentence for the VOP. The defendant challenged her conviction based on comments during the prosecution's summation, adequacy of the jury instructions, a weapons conviction with regard to pepper spray, failure to submit lesser included offenses to the jury, cumulative error depriving the defendant of a fair trial and the sentence. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but remanded for sentencing with regard to the VOP as the trial judge failed to set forth aggravating and mitigating factors as required under N.J.C.R. 3:21-4(g) and State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 177 (1989). Robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery and the lesser included offense of theft are very serious charges that carry substantial penalties including up to 10 years in prison for each charge. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sexual Assault Sentence Requires Explanation

The defendant in State v. R.D. was convicted, in a non-jury trial, of 6 counts of 2nd degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)) on his daughter C.D. while she was under the age of 13, 3 counts of 2nd degree engaging in sexual conduct that would harm, impair, or debauch the morals of a child while under a legal duty to care for her (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)) , aggravated assault on his daughter while she was under the age of 13 (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), one count of 3rd degree terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3a) to her if she disclosed the abuse and 1 count of 3rd degree attempt to cause or recklessly cause significant bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)) to C.D. The state presented witnesses on child sexual abuse. C.D. and the defendant lived in the same household from birth and the abuse became more invasive and frequent as she aged reaching a number of several times monthly and including penetration. Defendant failed to testify or present witnesses. The Bergen County trial judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate 70 year prison sentence which was subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Defendant appealed based on the court's reliance on opinion testimony concerning Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) by the State's expert and errors and omissions in the judge's sentencing analysis. The NJ Appellate Division heard the appeal as to the errors and omissions but affirmed the convictions. Due to the trial judge's failure to make clear for which sentences were intended to be consecutive or concurrent, failure to set forth the Yarbough factors to justify any consecutive sentences and failure to specifically set forth any jail credits or "gap time" credits defendant may be entitled to the Appellate Division remanded for resentencing. If you are facing charges for sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a minor or similar charges, you should consult an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. If you are convicted or plea to a sex crime in New Jersey, in addition to incarceration you face lifelong listing on a registry which can affect your ability to obtain employment, restrict where you may reside and generally have a negative impact on the remainder of your life. For more information about soliciting a minor, statutory rape, child molestation, internet crimes, child pornography or other sex crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.