Showing posts with label 2C:35-5. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2C:35-5. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 6, 2015
State v. Witt, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4 and Guns
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4, police may impound your vehicle in the event that a weapon contained therein is possessed for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4); an individual is in unlawful possession of a weapon therein (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5); a motor vehicle with an occupant unlawfully possessing a weapon is used in another crime; the motor vehicle is used to further prostitution (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1); and either controlled dangerous substances (CDS) are contained within the vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10) or the vehicle is being used for drug trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5). If you are stopped for a simple traffic violation and the police find cause within the newly prescribed limits of State v. William Witt, 219 N.J. 624 (2014), wherein the New Jersey Court overturned its prior ruling in Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), relaxing the requirements for police to obtain a warrant to search your vehicle, you may find yourself facing weapons charges and without the reasonable transportation you need to obtain suitable defense counsel.
Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you find yourself facing weapons charges or the impoundment of your vehicle as a result of a warrantless search or search with inadequate probable cause, you should immediately seek the assistance of a seasoned criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information about possession of a controlled dangerous substance, CDS in a motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1), distribution of CDS, weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
198 N.J. 6,
219 N.J. 624,
2C:35-10,
2C:35-5,
2C:39-4,
2C:39-5,
2C:43-2.4,
2C:43-6,
39:4-49.1,
CDS,
dangerous substance,
Graves Act,
gun,
Pena-Flores,
possess,
search,
warrant,
weapon,
Witt
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
Racketeering Conspiracy Charges Based On Warrantless Search
Xiomara Gonzales was charged with second-degree racketeering conspiracy (N.J.S.A 2C:5-2 and 2C:41-2(d)); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); first-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2:35-5(b)(1)); and first-degree distribution of CDS (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1)) after police conducted a planned stop of her vehicle with knowledge that there would likely be drugs therein. Gonzales sought to have heroin seized from her vehicle suppressed and the trial court judge denied her motion to suppress based upon the automobile exception and plain view exception to the search warrant requirement. Following the denial of her suppression motion, Gonzales pled to third-degree conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:35-10(a)(1)).
On appeal in State v. Gonzales, the NJ Appellate reversed and remanded the matter concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. The record revealed that the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office, Newark Police Department Narcotics Unit and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) were conducting investigations into various individuals. Through the use of a wiretap, the agencies received information indicating a suspect would be traveling to Newark to pick up heroin. The intent was to utilize a “wall off” traffic stop whereby the underlying wiretapping remains undisclosed by making the stop appear to be a routine traffic stop. Essex County law enforcement officers began following the suspect and Gonzales as they entered the Newark area in separate vehicles. Officers observed the suspect enter 2 separate locations and, at one point, place large bags obtained at the second location into the rear seat of Gonzales vehicle. Gonzales was then called by the suspect, whose phone was being tapped, and instructed to return to their point of origin without the suspect, as well as how to proceed through the Garden State Parkway toll booth without paying. After the pair separated, the police took their opportunity to “wall off” Gonzales from the suspect and avoid the risk that the suspect would realize his phone was tapped. Essex County officers were specifically told which vehicle to stop based on the information received by investigators from the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office by virtue of the wiretap. Upon stopping Gonzales vehicle, officers observed bricks of heroin which had fallen out of the bags onto the rear floor area of defendant’s vehicle and were then in plain view.
The trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Monmouth County held that the three prongs of the plain view exception articulated in State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192 (2002) were satisfied and upheld the search. The NJ Appellate Division reviewed State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211 (2013), Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed.2d 639 (1980), State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97 (2010) and State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169 (1989) in holding that a search is presumptively invalid without a warrant issued by a neutral judge after a full recitation of the facts upon which said warrant is being sought or the search falls squarely within one of the well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Appellate Division held that the plain view exception is applicable, under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed.2d 564 (1971), only in the event the evidence comes into plain view inadvertently and that items discovered in plain view following pretextual stops are subject to suppression under State v. Damplias, 282 N.J. Super 471 (App. Div. 1995) and therefore the exception was not satisfied. The Appellate Division further considered State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 2022 (2009), wherein it was set forth that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is satisfied in the event that: “(1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband; (2) the circumstances demonstrate an exigency making it impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant; and (3) the traffic stop is ‘unforeseen and spontaneous.” The NJ Appellate Division held that during the time the police were following Gonzales through the Newark area prior to stopping her vehicle they had ample time to obtain a warrant to search her vehicle and their failure to do so did not entitle them to the benefit of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and reversed and remanded the matter to the NJ Superior Court.
Racketeering and gang activity are serious criminal charges with severe penalties including lengthy prison sentences and prohibitive fines. If you are facing these charges you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to protect your rights and freedom. For more information about racketeering conspiracy, gang activity, possession of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of CDS with intent to distribute or distribution of CDS visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:35-10,
2C:35-5,
2C:41-2,
2C:5-2,
CDS,
conspiracy,
controlled dangerous substance,
criminal defense,
drugs,
gang,
heroin,
Payton v. New York,
Pena-Flores,
racketeering,
Xiomara Gonzales
Friday, April 17, 2015
Possession Conviction Reversed On Right To Remain Silent
Jamaal Shockley was indicted for third-degree possession of cocaine, a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); third-degree possession of cocaine, a CDS, with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)); and second-degree eluding police (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)) after he fled from police when they attempted to get him to stop while he was riding a dirt bike. Shockley fled and the pursuit continued until he fell off the motorcycle and was tackled by officers while attempting to run away. The defendant was patted down for weapons at the scene, his jacket was searched at the police department and his shoes and jacket were again checked prior to leaving the hospital after treatment. While being booked into the county jail, the defendant was again patted down before removing his clothes. Each of the prior searches was negative for weapons or contraband. After Shockley had removed his clothing as part of processing and was already lodged in jail, corrections officer Brooks again searched his clothing outside of his presence and discovered a bag containing 14 bags of cocaine within another small bag in the pocket of the defendant's sweatshirt.
In State v. Shockley, the defendant was found guilty of possession of a CDS and eluding police. Shockley was sentenced to 8 years with 4 years of parole ineligibility for the eluding charge and a concurrent 6 year term with 3 years of parole ineligibility for the CDS charges. The defendant appealed on multiple grounds including that corrections officer Brooks testified regarding Shockley's silence when notified by Brooks that the cocaine had been discovered.
Although the defendant did not object to Brooks' testimony at trial, reversal is required if it was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State v. Taffaro, 195 N. J. 442 (2008). The Appellate Division looked to State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 59 (2012) wherein the court considered the privilege against self-incrimination as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503. The court cited Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L. Ed.2d 91, 98 (1976) with regard to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the protection it offers both pre and post-arrest silence. In NJ, State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 610 (1990) affords an accused the right to remain silent while "in custody or under interrogation." The NJ Appellate Division found the testimony to be plain error as it offered no probative value and was clearly in violation of Shockley's rights to remain silent and a fair trial. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
A drug related conviction in NJ can have serious and lasting consequences including prison, loss of license, substantial fines and the stigma of the conviction or plea can result in the loss of certain employment or educational opportunities. If you are facing charges of use, possession or distribution of CDS, it is critical you consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights. For more information about prescription or non-prescription drug charges for use possession or distribution, controlled dangerous substances in a motor vehicle, DUI and other criminal and serious municipal court matters visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:29-2,
2C:35-10,
2C:35-5,
CDS,
cocaine,
controlled denagerous substance,
criminal defense,
Doyle v. Ohio,
eluding,
possess,
State v. Brown,
State v. Shockley,
State v. Stas,
State v. Taffaro
Wednesday, November 5, 2014
Drug Distribution Conviction Reversed For Lack Of Probable Cause
Jermaine Wright was charged with possession of controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a) and possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5). Wright's arrest was made by police in Trenton after Ewing Township detectives received a tip from a confidential informant that "Jazzz" was delivering CDS in Trenton in a specific vehicle. Initially the Ewing detectives followed up on the tip, verifying the vehicle and general location provided by the informant, but seeing no activity indicative of drug trade, then Ewing was dispatched to another call and passed the information on to Trenton detectives. Trenton detectives located the vehicle and approached on foot. Later testimony would conflict as to whether the officers guns were drawn as they approached the vehicle. The officer used flashlights to illuminate the occupied vehicle's interior and saw the occupants using a scale to measure a quantity of CDS, which they suspected to be cocaine. As the driver exited the vehicle, a large amount of money could be viewed plainly in the purse she left behind and a bag on the passenger seat was partially open leaving a significant quantity of cocaine in plain view.
In State v. Wright, Defendant attempted to suppress the evidence claiming the officers' actions constituted de facto arrest without probable cause but the judge held that the stop was investigative in nature, of limited duration and of little intrusion upon the Defendant's liberty. The judge further held that the evidence initially seized was in plain view and the remainder was seized based on probable cause and under exigent circumstances. In spite of the motion judge's determination that Trenton officers parked their vehicle in a manner to prevent the defendants' exit and swift approach with guns drawn conveying the message they were not free to leave, the judge held the stop was not thereby converted to an arrest requiring probable cause. The Defendant's motion to suppress the CDS was denied and he entered a guilty plea to narcotics related offenses.
The NJ Appellate Division referred to State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 475 (1998) in holding "the temporary detention of individuals during an automobile stop by police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose constitutes a seizure. The Appellate Division also referenced State v. Gibson, ___ N.J. ___, (2014) in finding the judge below inaccurately utilized the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard for a stop rather than the probable cause standard required for an arrest. After a thorough analysis of warrantless seizure cases (State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000) and State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328 (2010)) and cases involving levels of police interaction (State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), State v. Stoval, 170 N.J. 346 (2002), State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2011)) the appellate judges looked to further considerations including the duration of the stop, reasonableness, degree of the intrusion and the State's interest in the welfare of the public.
The Appellate Division further reasoned that a reasonable articulable suspicion was required in this case but there were no particularized facts justifying the seizure. In fact, Trenton detectives testified they observed nothing giving rise to suspicion and approached the vehicle solely on the limited information provided by the Ewing Township detectives. The appellate division reasoned that the seizure of Wright was illegal as it was not supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion. Therefore, pursuant to State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83 (1998), the appellate division reasoned the evidence obtained from the unlawful seizure must be suppressed and reversed the decision of the court below.
Drug distribution charges are met with harsh penalties due to the public interest in deterrence. If you are facing charges for drug distribution or possession, there are multiple factors which may affect the ultimate outcome and an experienced criminal defense attorney will know how to protect your rights. For more information regarding drug distribution, possession, possession with intent to distribute or controlled dangerous substances (CDS) visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:35-10,
2C:35-5,
CDS,
cocaine,
controlled dangerous substances,
criminal,
drug,
possession of cds,
possession with intent to distribute,
State v. Pena-Flores,
State v. Gibson,
State v. Wright,
Terry v. Ohio
Thursday, September 11, 2014
Change To Spousal Privilege Following Drug Distribution Case?
Yolanda Terry, Teron Savoy and multiple others were charged with conspiracy to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute as well as distribution of cocaine and heroin (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:35-5a and 2C:35-5b(1)). Teron Savoy and his wife, Yolanda Terry, were part of an alleged drug manufacturing and trafficking network along with approximately 20 others. Savoy was also charged as a leader of a drug trafficking network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3) and possession with intent to distribute heroin (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3). As a result of their observations of Savoy and others including Terry who purportedly worked under Savoy, the State obtained a warrant to intercept communications of Savoy and others.
In State v. Yolanda Terry, the spousal communication privilege was determined to protect communications between husband and wife even in the event that such communications are in furtherance of ongoing or future criminal activity. The NJ Supreme Court, in upholding the privilege and suppressing communications intercepted by the State through a wiretap of Yolanda Terry's phone, did make clear that upholding the privilege in the face of criminal activity was likely contrary to the Legislative intent.
Although communications were overheard and therefore would be disclosed by the State as a third party they do not lose their privileged status according to N.J.S.A. 2A:156-11, a provision of the NJ Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -37). In rendering its unanimous opinion the NJ Supreme Court held that although safeguarded under current legislation, the marital privilege is intended to encourage communication between spouses with the goal of harmonious marriages and is not intended to further spouses engaged in joint criminal enterprise. Also included in the opinion of the Court was the fact that multiple other privileges are set aside under exception when ongoing or future criminal activity is furthered by said privileges. An example included in the opinion of the Court was Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N.J. Eq. 455, 465-70 (Ch. 1891) where the "crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege was recognized in New Jersey common law in the case that first acknowledged the privilege itself."
As a result of this case, the NJ Supreme Court petitioned the Legislature to modify New Jersey Rule of Evidence 509 to create an exception when the marital privilege serves to further criminal acts. If you have been charged with drug related crimes or were charged with criminal activity as a result of a wiretap, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances (CDS) including possession, manufacturing, distribution or possession with the intent to distribute, CDS in a motor vehicle or driving under the influence (DUI) as a result of ingesting CDS visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2A:156-11,
2C:35-3,
2C:35-5,
2C:5-2,
CDS,
cocaine,
drug,
heroin,
Matthews v. Hoagland,
NJ Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act,
State v. Terry,
wiretap
Friday, March 28, 2014
Warrantless Search Leads To Drug Charges
In State v. Tepper, the police entered a woman’s residence without a warrant and she was subsequently charged with 3rd degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a) as a result of marijuana the police observed while in the residence. The defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence based on the unlawful entry of the police onto her property was denied when the Somerset County Superior Court Judge held that the warrantless entry was valid under the “community caretaking” doctrine. Police went to the defendant’s residence based on a school bus driver’s complaint about a car, bearing her tags, passing the bus while stopped. When they arrived at the residence, officers found the car in question and knocked to no avail. Seeing lights on in the residence and allegedly finding a rear sliding door ajar, the police entered the residence without a warrant believing a burglary to be in progress or recently committed. Upon their search of the entire residence, the officers located several jars in the basement containing marijuana, some Ecstasy pills, paraphernalia and cash.
The 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as the NJ Constitution, bars warrantless searches and seizures unless there one of the well-delineated exceptions apply. The basis of each exception is reasonableness of the search when reviewed under the totality of the circumstances. There is a presumption against warrantless searches and seizures and the prosecution bears the burden of justifying the entry into private property without a warrant. Additionally, people have a right to the greatest amount of privacy within their homes and warrantless searches thereof should be subject to the highest scrutiny.
In undertaking their search, the officers entered the rear yard of the residence and entered upon a rear deck which is overreaching without a warrant, however, the Appellate Court deemed this to be simply for the purpose of contacting the residents and not illegal. At the time the decision was made to deny the suppression motion State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301 (2013) had not yet been decided. In Vargas, the NJ Supreme Court set forth a test to determine the validity of a warrantless search. The NJ Appellate Division remanded to the trial court for a determination under the Vargas test.
If you are facing drug charges or believe you are being prosecuted in a matter based on an illegal search by the police, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you against the state and protect your rights. For more information about drug charges, warrantless searches or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
213 N.J. 301,
2C:35-5,
CDS,
controlled dangerous substance,
crime,
Ecstasy,
marijuana,
paraphernalia,
State v. Tepper,
State v. Vargas,
warrant
Sunday, June 9, 2013
Prosecutorial Comments to Grand Jury and Prejudice
In the case of drug-induced death and distribution charges, the prosecutor's comments to the grand jury resulted in dismissal of the indictment against the defendant. Police responded to a report of an unconscious male and found paraphernalia at the scene. The man died in the hospital the next day from the drug overdose and police charged defendant who was alleged to have provided the heroin.
After presentation of evidence by the prosecutor, the grand jury returned a 2 count indictment of 3rd degree distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3) and 1st degree drug-induced death in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9.
On its own, in State v. Eckel, the court raised issue with comments of the prosecutor to the grand jury prior to the grand jury made its decision to indict the defendant. Because the comments precluded the "return" of the indictment, State v. Rhodes required that the Court decide whether the comments could influence the decision of the grand jury, thereby infringing on its decision making function as proscribed by the Court in State v. Hart. By advising the jury of the defendant's criminal history, commenting on evidence proffered, opining regarding questions of fact and commenting directly on the defendant's guilt the prosecutor acted inappropriately requiring dismissal of the indictment.
If you are facing drug related or other criminal charges in NJ, it is the prosecution's burden to prove the case against you. In order to make sure your rights to a fair trial are protected, you should immediately obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information on protecting your rights if charged with theft, burglary, shoplifting or other crimes in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and is not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:35-5,
2C:35-9,
3rd degree distribution,
CDS,
controlled dangerous substance,
distribution,
drug,
drug-induced,
possession,
State v. Eckel,
State v. Hart,
State v. Rhodes
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