Cyber-Harassment Laws Punish Those Using Internet For Personal Grudges

In spite of numerous educational efforts targeted to both juveniles and adults, the crime of cyber-harassment continues to be a growing issue due to the perceived degree of anonymity by those perpetrating such crimes. Cyber-harassment (N.J.S.A. 2:33-4.1) is communication with the purpose to harass another by employing a physical threat of bodily injury or the conveyance of lewd, indecent or obscene material with the purpose of causing emotional harm to the person or persons portrayed in said material. Actual harm need not be caused by the acts as long as the acts are undertaken with the intent to emotionally harm a reasonable person or place a reasonable person in fear of physical or emotional harm. Cyber-harassment charges are substantially more serious than standard harassment charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. While standard harassment charges are disorderly persons offenses, cyber-harassment charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1 are felony charges which begin at a fourth-degree level and increase in degree if aggravating circumstances are present. Due to the serious consequences, ranging from minimal damage to a person's reputation to suicide in some extreme cases, New Jersey and other states have taken an increasingly harsh stance against those accused of perpetrating or conspiring (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:33-4.1) to perpetrate such crimes. The federal government has also enacted 18 U.S.C. Section 2261A, applicable to those intending to threaten or harm, physically or emotionally, those in other states by employment of the internet. If you are charged with cyber-harassment, or conspiracy to commit cyber-harassment, you should consult an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about cyber-harassment, harassment or other serious criminal charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Racketeering Conspiracy Charges Based On Warrantless Search

Xiomara Gonzales was charged with second-degree racketeering conspiracy (N.J.S.A 2C:5-2 and 2C:41-2(d)); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); first-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2:35-5(b)(1)); and first-degree distribution of CDS (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1)) after police conducted a planned stop of her vehicle with knowledge that there would likely be drugs therein. Gonzales sought to have heroin seized from her vehicle suppressed and the trial court judge denied her motion to suppress based upon the automobile exception and plain view exception to the search warrant requirement. Following the denial of her suppression motion, Gonzales pled to third-degree conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:35-10(a)(1)). On appeal in State v. Gonzales, the NJ Appellate reversed and remanded the matter concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. The record revealed that the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office, Newark Police Department Narcotics Unit and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) were conducting investigations into various individuals. Through the use of a wiretap, the agencies received information indicating a suspect would be traveling to Newark to pick up heroin. The intent was to utilize a “wall off” traffic stop whereby the underlying wiretapping remains undisclosed by making the stop appear to be a routine traffic stop. Essex County law enforcement officers began following the suspect and Gonzales as they entered the Newark area in separate vehicles. Officers observed the suspect enter 2 separate locations and, at one point, place large bags obtained at the second location into the rear seat of Gonzales vehicle. Gonzales was then called by the suspect, whose phone was being tapped, and instructed to return to their point of origin without the suspect, as well as how to proceed through the Garden State Parkway toll booth without paying. After the pair separated, the police took their opportunity to “wall off” Gonzales from the suspect and avoid the risk that the suspect would realize his phone was tapped. Essex County officers were specifically told which vehicle to stop based on the information received by investigators from the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office by virtue of the wiretap. Upon stopping Gonzales vehicle, officers observed bricks of heroin which had fallen out of the bags onto the rear floor area of defendant’s vehicle and were then in plain view. The trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Monmouth County held that the three prongs of the plain view exception articulated in State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192 (2002) were satisfied and upheld the search. The NJ Appellate Division reviewed State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211 (2013), Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed.2d 639 (1980), State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97 (2010) and State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169 (1989) in holding that a search is presumptively invalid without a warrant issued by a neutral judge after a full recitation of the facts upon which said warrant is being sought or the search falls squarely within one of the well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Appellate Division held that the plain view exception is applicable, under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed.2d 564 (1971), only in the event the evidence comes into plain view inadvertently and that items discovered in plain view following pretextual stops are subject to suppression under State v. Damplias, 282 N.J. Super 471 (App. Div. 1995) and therefore the exception was not satisfied. The Appellate Division further considered State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 2022 (2009), wherein it was set forth that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is satisfied in the event that: “(1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband; (2) the circumstances demonstrate an exigency making it impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant; and (3) the traffic stop is ‘unforeseen and spontaneous.” The NJ Appellate Division held that during the time the police were following Gonzales through the Newark area prior to stopping her vehicle they had ample time to obtain a warrant to search her vehicle and their failure to do so did not entitle them to the benefit of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and reversed and remanded the matter to the NJ Superior Court. Racketeering and gang activity are serious criminal charges with severe penalties including lengthy prison sentences and prohibitive fines. If you are facing these charges you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to protect your rights and freedom. For more information about racketeering conspiracy, gang activity, possession of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of CDS with intent to distribute or distribution of CDS visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Murder Confession Admissible Under Miranda

Jerome L. Faucette was charged with first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)) and robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) after driving a vehicle for Terrence S. Clemmons during Clemmons robbery and shooting of a gas station attendant. Faucette was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to 13 years in prison with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Faucette appealed claiming his statement was not made voluntarily on the grounds that he had invoked his right to counsel. On May 14, 2008, at 7:00 pm, police requested defendant accompany them to the police station for questioning with which he complied. Faucette was read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) at the police station and spoke with police until approximately 8:00 pm when he asked to leave, however, the police continued questioning Faucette until 2:30 am. Faucette did not invoke his right to counsel. On May 15, 2008, police returned to the defendant's residence at 4:00 pm to return him to the police station where he was again advised of his Miranda rights and arrested. Detectives questioned Ms. Spencer and Mr. Gaddy, Faucette's former girlfriend and friend. Both of these individuals advised police that Faucette had admitted to participating in the robbery planned by the co-defendant, Clemons. Faucette ultimately admitted to participation in the robbery as a driver but denied involvement in the murder or prior knowledge thereof. In State v. Faucette, the judge held that the initial interview, wherein no confession was obtained, violated the defendant's rights under Miranda following the defendant's request to terminate the interview, however, the second interview was not in violation of defendant's rights and the confession provided therein was voluntary. The court granted suppression of all information obtained after 8:03 p.m. during the initial interview but found all remaining statements to be admissible. On appeal, the defendant challenged the voluntariness of his confession based on coercion and violation of his rights under Miranda. The NJ Appellate Division turned to State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) with regard to Miranda requirements when there is a challenge to voluntariness of a confession. Pursuant to State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964), reiterated in State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 109-10 (2010), as long as the findings of the trial judge are detailed and supported by factual and credible evidence the findings below are not to be disturbed. However, the deference accorded in Johnson and Davila are dependent upon the trial court's ability to hear testimony from officers, experts and witnesses and not the mere review of a videotaped confession from which the Appellate Division can also draw independent conclusions. State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565-66 (2011). The Fifth Amendment grants privilege against self-incrimination and this right is afforded to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division looked to State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993), with regard to a defendant's right against self-incrimination in New Jersey and to State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449 (2005) with regard to the upholding of that right through Miranda protections. State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993) was the case looked to by the Appellate Division in determining whether the State or defendant bears the burden of proving voluntariness of a confession and found the burden is borne by the State. State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000), dictates that a the "voluntary intelligent statement" of a defendant properly notified of his rights under Miranda is a valid and admissible confession. After reviewing the circumstances in this specific matter, the Appellate Division found that Faucette's second confession was knowingly and voluntarily given with full information and understanding of Miranda warnings and that there was no "taint from the May 14 Miranda violations" in violation of State v. O'Neil, 193 N.J. 148, (2007) or State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639 (1990). Further, the Appellate Division affirmed that Faucette did not, at any time during the questioning, invoke his right to counsel. The NJ Appellate Division found Faucette's confession to be voluntary and affirmed the decision of the trial court. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, robbery, conspiracy, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juvenile Offender Will Be Treated Differently Under NJ Senate Bill 2003

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if New Jersey Senate Bill 2003 (S2003) is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial and the level of representation required in hearings to move juvenile matters to the Criminal Part of the Superior Court. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would raise the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult to 15. S2003 would permit juvenile to be tried as adults only for the most serious offenses including criminal homicide; strict liability for drug induced deaths; first-degree robbery; carjacking; sexual assault; second-degree aggravated assault; kidnapping; aggravated arson; certain gang criminality; a crime committed at a time when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent or confined to an adult correctional facility; violent, aggressive, and willful crimes against another; unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon; arson; death by auto if the juvenile was operating the vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug (DUI); a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; a conspiracy which is a part of a continuing criminal activity and the circumstances of the crimes show the juvenile has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a source of livelihood; an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of certain enumerated acts; theft of an automobile; serious computer criminal activity; distribution of any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any property used for school purposes, or within 1,000 feet of such school property. The State would bear the burden of proving that the nature and circumstances of the charge or the prior record of the juvenile are sufficiently serious that the interests of the public require waiver. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. S2003 would require a prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. In further accord with the goal of rehabilitation, academic instruction and academic counseling, vocational education, post-secondary educational opportunities, alcohol and narcotics treatment programs, mental health services, medical and dental care, regular contact with the family members, work programs to prepare the juvenile for treatment, re-entry services, and any other services or assistance reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the juvenile shall be provided as appropriate. S2003 is sponsored by Democrats and received no support from the Republican party. The bill passed the Senate and is presently in the Assembly for consideration and revision. If you are a juvenile facing criminal charges your future is at stake and should not be left to chance. Your future and freedom may depend on the outcome of your case making it imperative that you seek experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about juvenile offenses including drug charges, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a school zone, assault, sex crimes, school issues, breaking and entering, gang related crimes, burglary or other serious matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Oral Argument Is Favored in Post-Conviction Relief Petitions

Isaiah Kinney was charged with first-degree conspiracy to commit murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and convicted of second-degree aggravated assault and second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) after a trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County. Kinney was sentenced to a discretionary extended 20 year period of incarceration with an 85% parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Kinney and Jones severely beat Floyd Simmons at a residence on Prospect Street in East Orange. After leaving the residence, Jones committed a minor driving infraction and crashed while fleeing an East Orange Police officer who noticed that, although Jones appeared not to be injured from the crash, her pants were covered in blood. Prior to Jones being chased by the officer, Kinney had exited the vehicle at a residence on Washington Terrace. Based on statements made by Jones to police, officers proceeded to the Washington Terrace residence to arrest Kinney. While at the residence without a warrant, officers discovered bloodstained clothing belonging to Kinney. At the trial level, Kinney filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on the officers’ illegal search and seizure but the suppression motion was denied. In State v. Isaiah Kinney, the Defendant appealed unsuccessfully then sought post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of assistance of counsel. The record on the Appellate level was noticeably devoid of any reference to the illegal search and seizure. The NJ Appellate Division found that oral argument in a post-conviction relief petition wherein the defendant exercises a last opportunity to raise reliability issues is deserving of oral argument although the determination of whether oral argument will be heard rests within the discretion of the PCR court. State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382, 386 (App. Div. 2001). In State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 282 (2012), the N.J. Supreme Court reinforced the factors set forth in Mayron and included that PCR judges should provide a statement of reasons for denying oral argument. The Appellate Division hearing the PCR matter determined that oral argument could have resolved uncertainty with regard to the absence of pursuit of the suppression motion but the PCR judge incorrectly held that, under State v. Moore, 273 N.J. Super. 118, 126 (App. Div. 1994), the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the suppression motion could only be raised in Kinney’s petition to the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reasoned that, as there is no right to review by the Supreme Court, the PCR judge’s ruling on this matter deprived the defendant of his right to a determination on the issue. It was further determined that the lack of any record established by oral argument pertaining to the suppression motion rendered them unable to give adequate review to the PCR petition and the Appellate Division remanded the matter with direction that the matters of the suppression motion and ineffective assistance of counsel be reviewed. If you are faced with aggravated assault charges, you are facing up to 10 years in prison with an 85% parole ineligibility period under NERA. Even simple assault charges can result in incarceration and should not be taken lightly by you as they will certainly not be taken lightly by the court. If you are charged with assault you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about assault, aggravated assault, conspiracy, murder, unlawful possession of a weapon or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sentence For Possession With Intent To Distribute Should Fit The Offender At The Time Of Sentencing

Joseph Jafee pled guilty, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, to third-degree conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)) for which the judge imposed a three-year sentence in spite of marked changes in Jaffee’s lifestyle in the year between his guilty plea and sentencing. Jaffee became engaged and acted as a father to his fiancee’s son, remained sober, routinely attended substance abuse meetings and became a counselor to at-risk youth. Additionally, as part of the plea agreement, Jaffee cooperated in the prosecution of his co-defendants. Judge Manahan followed the sentencing guidelines but refused to consider the changes Jaffee had made in the prior year. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the sentence and Jaffee appealed. In State v. Jaffe, the NJ Supreme Court considered the opinions of State v. Bridges, 131 N.J. 402 (1993) and State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369 (1984) with regard to its analysis of uniform sentencing consideration. In addition, the NJ Supreme Court pointed to the fact that the NJ Code of Criminal Justice does allow for consideration of the defendant’s individual situation. Ultimately, the NJ Supreme Court held that, in light of State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330 (2012), the Law Division should have assess the defendant “as he stands before the court on the day of sentencing” in addition to simply weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. After making the determination that Jaffe’s circumstances at the time of sentencing should be considered, the NJ Supreme Court remanded for resentencing in light of the fact that the sentencing judge specifically declined consideration thereof. If you have been charged with possession or possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately in order that all exculpatory evidence may be obtained, favorable witnesses may be located, and all appropriate procedures are followed by the police and the prosecution. There are frequently problems with consent to search, warrants, Miranda warnings, inappropriate denial of suppression motions and improper trial procedure which may make a substantial difference in the outcome of your matter. For more information about possession, intent to distribute, CDS, conspiracy and other drug charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Venue Change After Death Threats And Murder Conspiracy

Aakash Dalal was charged with multiple crimes including criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1)) for spray painting anti-Semitic graffiti on a synagogue in Hackensack, NJ; first-degree aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)) associated with a synagogue in Rutherford, NJ; first-degree bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)); and first degree conspiracy to commit aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)) as well as similar matters within the same region occurring during a limited timeframe. Once the matter began proceeding through the courts, Dalal was also charged with first-degree conspiracy to murder a Bergen County Assistant Prosecutor (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); third-degree conspiracy to possess a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4) and third-degree terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b)). Dalal was indicted for many of the charged counts as well as first-degree terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(b)(1)) and second-degree terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4). Prior to trial, Dalal sought transfer of the case to another judge without objection by the State as the prosecution intended to introduce evidence that Dalal intended to target Presiding Criminal Part Judge Liliana DeAvila-Dilebi and Judge Partick Roma. Dalal also sought change of venue without success and brought an interlocutory appeal. Given the facts of the case, the NJ Appellate Division judges hearing the matter determined that, despite their own confidence in the judiciary, a reasonable person in Dalal’s situation could have substantial doubt as to their potential for obtaining a fair trial in the Bergen County Superior Court. The appellate judges quoted Chief Justice Rabner’s opinion in DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 506 (2008): “[t]he Judiciary derives its authority from the State Constitution but earns the public’s confidence through acts of unquestioned integrity.” The matter was reversed with directions that the matter be heard by a judge from outside the vicinage. If you are facing criminal charges, it is imperative that you insure your rights are upheld and you have the best chance possible at a fair trial. For more information about serious criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Aggravated Manslaughter Conviction Reversed Due To Error

Dwayne Slaughter was convicted of aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4), conspiracy (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1) following the beating of his 79 year old neighbor, Roosevelt Morrow. The Defendant and Pritchard Watts both admitted to police they intended to enter Morrow's residence and rob him. Although the 2 men admitted they conspired to rob Morrow, they each blamed the other for his beating death. The Defendant's live-in girlfriend, Tanisha Day, gave police a taped statement which was presented to the jury at trial. Day's statement attributed an incriminating comment by using the term "he" but never indicated whether "he" implied Watts or Slaughter. However, Day did not testify and Defendant lost his opportunity to cross-examine her about her statement. Watts had taken a plea to first-degree robbery in exchange for his testimony at trial against Slaughter. There was no physical evidence indicating Slaughter was the actor. Slaughter appealed the conviction based on the admission of Day's statement. The NJ Appellate Division found that the admission of Day's statement was error but the error was harmless. The NJ Supreme Court found the error was not harmless as Day's statement could have implied either Watts or Slaughter and vacated the Defendant's conviction and remanded for new trial. If you are facing charges of murder, assault, or conspiracy you are facing severe penalties including as much as life in prison. When confronting criminal charges, it is imperative that you have experienced criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you are afforded due process and your rights are protected. For more information about murder, assault or conspiracy in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Expungement Of A Crime Or A Conviction?

Criminal records may be expunged when a petitioner "has been convicted of a crime…and who has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime…." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) G.P.B. was sentenced under a single conviction to a guilty plea of one count of third-degree conspiracy (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and three counts of third-degree making gifts to public servants (N.J.S.A. 2C:27-6(b)). 10 years later, a Warren County trial judge granted the petitioner's expungement based on the "crime-spree" principle of In re Fontana, 146 N.J. Super. 264, 267 (App.Div. 1976) and the more recent case of In re Criminal Records of R.Z., 429 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2013), wherein a previous expungement statute permitted expungement of crimes committed so closely in proximity as to be considered part of a single event. In the Matter of the Expungement of G.P.B., the State appealed and the New Jersey Appellate Division reversed based on the holding in In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2008) wherein the court found the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) to be clear as to whether expungement may be granted in the event of a single conviction or single crime. "The words 'prior' and 'subsequent' do not modify the word 'conviction' but instead modify the term 'crime'". Ross, supra, 400 N.J. Super. at 122. Notably, the Supreme Court has granted certification in In re Expungement of Petition of J.S. wherein petitioner was denied expungement of drug crimes committed within a five day period. It should be noted that this blog has addressed only one portion of the expungement statute and other criteria apply. If you are considering seeking expungement of prior criminal records, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney to determine whether you may be eligible for expungement. For further information about expungement of a criminal record, conspiracy, gifts to public servants or other crimes in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Burglary Punishment Must Fit Crime Not Criminal

In State v. Nieves, Eric Nieves was charged in 4 residential burglaries and related crimes. The jury found him guilty of four burglaries (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); three thefts (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3); dealing in stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7.1b); receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7) and conspiracy with codefendants (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, :18-2, :20-7.1). Nieves was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment with 150 months of parole ineligibility. On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence and returned to the court below for resentencing based on the factors set forth in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985). On appeal, Nieves objected to the jury instructions regarding certain lesser included offenses and complicity. Pursuant to State v. Singleton, 211, N.J. 157, 182 (2012), "if the defendant did not object to the charge when given, there is a presumption the charge was not error and unlikely to prejudice defendant's case." Prior to instructing the jury, the judge advised the attorneys of the intended charges and defense counsel gave his assent to both charging decisions. Defendant then bears the burden of showing plain error having a clear capacity of producing and unjust result R. 2:10-2 and the burden was not met. The Appellate Division found defendant's claim of error in the jury instruction on accomplice liability to have insufficient merit and affirmed all convictions. With regard to the custodial sentence, the defendant was sentenced on each of the 10 third degree crimes and received an aggregate sentence of 25 years with 12 1/2 years of parole ineligibility. Defendant did not deny his lengthy criminal history and was aware he qualified as a persistent offender but Nieves argued that the courts extensive reliance on his criminal history was inappropriate. In Yarbough, the court set forth the fact that "punishment should fit the crime, not the criminal, and that there should be a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing." 100 N.J. at 630. State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011) the New Jersey Supreme Court enumerated the Yarbough factors as modified by statute and offered guidance for appellate review of consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division found the discussion of Yarbough factors by the court below to be too cursory to permit adequate review. Further, any conspiracy conviction must be merged with the underlying completed crime. Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Conspiracy to Murder, Assault, Weapons Possession and Conspiracy to Distribute Drugs Overturned Due to Juror Altercation

In State v. Dorsainvil, a conviction for first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b) and first-degree attempted murder, second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4), second-degree possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug-related offense (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1), third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b) and third-degree conspiracy to distribute cocaine and/or heroin was overturned as a result of an altercation between jurors during deliberations. Following the guilty finding, the defendant moved for a mistrial and the trial court denied the motion. Almost contemporaneously with the jury's announcement of a deadlock, a physical altercation between at least 2 and possibly 3 jurors occurred. The violence was severe enough to prompt the other jurors to summon a Sheriff's officer for safety. Thereafter, a guilty verdict was then rendered creating the reasonable inference that the physical altercation in some way influenced the jurors in order to break the deadlock. The NJ Appellate Division found that physical altercations between jurors was likely to result in undue influence contaminating the verdict. If you are facing charges of murder, assault, attempt, conspiracy, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, distribution or possession with intent to distribute drugs, you are facing severe penalties including as much as life in prison. When confronting criminal charges, it is imperative that you have experienced criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you are afforded due process and your rights are protected. For more information about murder, assault, attempt, conspiracy, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, distribution or possession with intent to distribute drugs in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Multiple Counts In An Ongoing Conspiracy Must Be Sentenced As A Single Event

Vereli Sotelo was charged with five counts of theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4) and conspiracy to commit theft by deception (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and convicted of multiple counts of theft by deception for her part in a scheme involving green cards. Vereli and her husband Tito used Tito's respected position within the salvation army to communicate to Hispanic members of the congregation how he could obtain them residency cards quickly through an attorney in Miami. Tito charged $4,000 per green card plus a donation to the church. He told people the money was being forwarded to immigration for processing. The Defendant and another woman were present to collect and count the money when people visited Tito to avail themselves of his offer. Vereli would accompany Tito to Florida for meetings with the lawyer. At some point, the parishioners began to receive letter indicating their applications had been received and the information within those letters had been falsified to include Florida addresses and describing their educational levels as including advanced degrees. Ultimately the story reached the media and, even then, the defendant maintained to parishioners that Tito was not operating a fraudulent scheme and the arrival of the residency papers would prove it. When the Union County Prosecutor's office brought the matter of State v. Sotelo to trial, the defendant was convicted and received an aggregate term of 6 years in prison including a single 3 year term on one count, a consecutive 3 year term on another 3 counts and a concurrent 3 year term on a final count. Defendant appealed on several points, most of which were affirmed, but the appellate division did find that all acts performed by the defendant were part of a general and unified plan and therefore should be sentenced as a single act of conspiracy and remanded for sentencing appropriately. Theft, including theft by deception, charges can result in substantial penalties including up to 10 years in prison for second degree theft. If you are facing charges for shoplifting, theft or theft by deception, you should immediately consult the advice of experienced criminal defense counsel. For more information regarding theft, extortion, shoplifting, forging prescription blanks, receiving stolen property or other crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Prostitutes Charged With Committing Robbery In Atlantic City Hotel Suite

In State v. Rodriguez, the defendant was charged with 2nd degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and convicted of the lesser included offense of 3rd degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3), simple assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a), 4th degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d). The defendant and her co-defendant, Mayo, were acquitted of 2nd degree conspiracy to commit robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and 3rd degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d). Defendant and co-defendant, prostitutes, met 3 men in the lobby of an Atlantic City hotel and proceeded to join the men in their room. Once there both women surrounded one of the men and began touching him in an erotic manner. Shortly thereafter, the man realized his money was missing and attempted to stop the women from leaving the suite when he was sprayed in the face with pepper spray by the defendant. The defendant was sentenced to 5 years in prison with a 2 year parole disqualifier for theft by unlawful taking, a concurrent 6 month term for the simple assault charge and 1 year in prison for unlawful possession of a weapon which was to be served concurrently. Defendant was also on probation for a prior conviction of 3rd degree theft from the person at the time of the offense and pled guilty to a violation of probation (VOP) and received a concurrent 5 year sentence for the VOP. The defendant challenged her conviction based on comments during the prosecution's summation, adequacy of the jury instructions, a weapons conviction with regard to pepper spray, failure to submit lesser included offenses to the jury, cumulative error depriving the defendant of a fair trial and the sentence. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but remanded for sentencing with regard to the VOP as the trial judge failed to set forth aggravating and mitigating factors as required under N.J.C.R. 3:21-4(g) and State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 177 (1989). Robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery and the lesser included offense of theft are very serious charges that carry substantial penalties including up to 10 years in prison for each charge. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.