Showing posts with label 2C:39-4. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2C:39-4. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 5, 2016
Attempted Murder Reduced To Aggravated Assault For Plea
Richard Spellman was indicted on two counts of attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); two counts of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); two counts of second-degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); two counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7). Spellman confessed and his motion to suppress the confession was denied. He ultimately pled guilty, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, to all charges after the first-degree attempted murder charges were amended to second degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)). Spellman was sentenced to concurrent 17 year terms subject to an 85 percent period of parole disqualification under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2); two 10 year terms and two 5 year terms; and restitution to a victim with a 5 year period of parole supervision to follow his release.
The charges stemmed from two incidents. First, while on parole for a prior aggravated assault, Spellman entered a convenience store, demanded money and then shot the clerk in the stomach after he was given the money. In the second incident, Spellman shot a man in the parking lot of a restaurant. Upon arrival at the scene, police found a gun in the parking lot and Spellman staring at them out the window of a nearby store. When officers spoke to Spellman, he indicated he was fighting with the man he shot. Officers searched Spellman and found a bullet on his person. At the police station, officers found another bullet on Spellman's person and, prior to questioning of any kind, Spellman said "I shot the attendant at the [convenience store]." Spellman was read his Miranda rights, waived his right to counsel and quickly confessed to shooting both individuals.
In State v. Spellman, the NJ Appellate Division upheld the trial court judge's decision that the defendant's confessions were voluntary in spite of the defendant's challenge to the voluntariness based on mental capacity which was not raised at trial and therefore not preserved for appeal. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973). The NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1997), in holding that mental illness itself, if present, does not invalidate a confession. The record below satisfied the Appellate Division that the trial judge fully reviewed the confession and found no coercion or force to have been used. With regard to sentencing, the NJ Appellate Division did find errors with the trial judge's failure to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 and explain his or her reasoning fully on the record. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014). The Appellate Division determined that he trial judge's imposition of concurrent 17 year sentences exceeded the statutory range of 5 to 10 years set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(2). Finally, the Appellate Division and the State agreed that the trial judge failed to make adequate findings, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2b(2), as to whether the defendant was able to pay the restitution ordered. The matter was remanded for resentencing.
If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-3,
2C:12-1,
2C:15-1,
2C:39-4,
2C:39-5,
2C:39-7,
2C:43-7.2,
2C:5-1,
aggravated assault,
assault,
firearm,
murder,
NERA,
possession,
State v. Fuentes,
State v. Smith,
weapon
Tuesday, October 6, 2015
State v. Witt, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4 and Guns
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4, police may impound your vehicle in the event that a weapon contained therein is possessed for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4); an individual is in unlawful possession of a weapon therein (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5); a motor vehicle with an occupant unlawfully possessing a weapon is used in another crime; the motor vehicle is used to further prostitution (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1); and either controlled dangerous substances (CDS) are contained within the vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10) or the vehicle is being used for drug trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5). If you are stopped for a simple traffic violation and the police find cause within the newly prescribed limits of State v. William Witt, 219 N.J. 624 (2014), wherein the New Jersey Court overturned its prior ruling in Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), relaxing the requirements for police to obtain a warrant to search your vehicle, you may find yourself facing weapons charges and without the reasonable transportation you need to obtain suitable defense counsel.
Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you find yourself facing weapons charges or the impoundment of your vehicle as a result of a warrantless search or search with inadequate probable cause, you should immediately seek the assistance of a seasoned criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information about possession of a controlled dangerous substance, CDS in a motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1), distribution of CDS, weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
198 N.J. 6,
219 N.J. 624,
2C:35-10,
2C:35-5,
2C:39-4,
2C:39-5,
2C:43-2.4,
2C:43-6,
39:4-49.1,
CDS,
dangerous substance,
Graves Act,
gun,
Pena-Flores,
possess,
search,
warrant,
weapon,
Witt
Wednesday, September 16, 2015
Assault Conviction For Off-Duty Police Officer
Newark police officer, Hugo Fierro, was indicted for second-degree official misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2), third-degree aggravated assault causing bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)), third-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)); fourth-degree aggravated assault by pointing a handgun at another person (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4)) and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)) after a an off-duty altercation outside an Essex County bar while out with his wife. He was convicted by a jury of simple and aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1) and official misconduct and sentenced to 5 years in prison without parole, the minimum for official misconduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5.1.
Evidence offered at trial indicated that Fierro, while off duty and walking with his wife in the Ironbound section of Newark after dinner and dancing, encountered a group of men drinking on the street and went out of his way to order them to disperse. He next identified himself as a police officer to another intoxicated man and guided him by the arm toward a street to help him obtain a cab. At this time, the victim claimed he approached and Fierro yelled "what's your problem? What's your problem?" and tried to grab the victim. Upon finding himself unable to catch the victim, Fierro withdrew a gun from his side, stated he was a police officer, pursued the retreating victim and hit him in the face with the barrel of the handgun at which time the victim fled. The following day the victim reported the incident and selected Fierro's photo out of a photo array. An outdoor camera had recorded the incident and Fierro was positively identified. However, Fierro testified that, while he was trying to assist an intoxicated man to a cab, the victim approached, would not go away when Fierro asked, twice slapped Fierro's hand when he attempted to create space between them and was acting in a manner which caused Fierro to believe the victim may attack. Fierro claimed that he did not strike the man but did push him away by placing his hands on the victim's chest and pushing him back while holding his gun as he believed the victim may have possessed a weapon. Additionally, an officer who took the victim's report testified that there was no visible damage to the victim's face at the time the report was made.
On appeal, in State v. Fierro, the defendant argued that the jury's split verdict demonstrated the juror's lack of understanding of the elements of the charges. The NJ Appellate Division considered Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S. Ct. 189, 76 L. Ed. 356 (1932), United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 461 (1984), State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44 (2004), State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551 (2005) and others in holding that a split verdict does not definitively indicate that the jury did not fully understand and properly execute its function. The conviction was affirmed on appeal.
Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences. If you are a police officer or other official, the consequences are even more severe. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, illegal possession of a handgun, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:12-1,
2C:39-4,
2C:43-6.5.1,
aggravated assault,
assault,
Dunn v. United States,
Essex,
gun,
Hugo Fierro,
Newark,
police,
State v. Banko,
State v. Muhammad,
United States v. Powell,
weapon
Thursday, September 3, 2015
Weapons Offense Merges Into Burglary Charge
Sherrone Robinson was charged with third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A.. 2C:5-2; 2C:12-1); second-degree conspiracy to commit burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:18-2); second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-7); fourth-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4)); and third-degree hindering apprehension (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b(1)). Robinson pled guilty to second-degree burglary and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in exchange for dismissal for the other charges. For the burglary the state recommended a 4 year prison term and concurrent 5 year term for the weapons offense. The burglary offense was subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) while the weapon offense carried a mandatory minimum term of three years pursuant to the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)).
In State v. Robinson, Robinson later appealed the sentence arguing that the weapon possession was for the purpose of the burglary and should be merged therewith rather than included as a separate conviction and offense. In making his argument for merger, Robinson relied on State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (citing State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975)), which held that an accused committing a single offense cannot be punished as if they committed more than one offense. State v. Messino, 378 N.J. Super. 559, 585 (App. Div. 2005) provided an alternative analysis of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8, regarding merger of offenses, which suggested a more "flexible approach" to merger wherein the elements of the crimes are considered. In State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 636 (1996), the court held that "when the only unlawful purpose in possession the [weapon] is to use it to commit the substantive offense, merger is required." The NJ Appellate Division reviewed the record and noted that defense counsel stated the prison terms as set forth in the plea agreement, the judge then reviewed those terms with the defendant on the record and the defendant indicated a full understanding thereof. The Appellate Division decided that the defendant received the benefit of the plea bargain as his counsel negotiated the plea bargain with the State on his behalf. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for correction of the judgment of conviction to reflect merger of the convictions and a sentence of 5 years total of which 4 were subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under NERA.
Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, weapons, assault, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:12,
2C:18-2,
2C:38-7,
2C:39-3,
2C:39-4,
2C:43,
2C:5-2,
assault,
burglary,
Graves Act,
NERA,
No Early Release Act,
possession,
State v. Diaz,
State v. Messino,
State v. Tate,
weapon
Monday, February 23, 2015
Venue Change After Death Threats And Murder Conspiracy
Aakash Dalal was charged with multiple crimes including criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1)) for spray painting anti-Semitic graffiti on a synagogue in Hackensack, NJ; first-degree aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)) associated with a synagogue in Rutherford, NJ; first-degree bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)); and first degree conspiracy to commit aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)) as well as similar matters within the same region occurring during a limited timeframe. Once the matter began proceeding through the courts, Dalal was also charged with first-degree conspiracy to murder a Bergen County Assistant Prosecutor (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); third-degree conspiracy to possess a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4) and third-degree terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b)).
Dalal was indicted for many of the charged counts as well as first-degree terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(b)(1)) and second-degree terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4). Prior to trial, Dalal sought transfer of the case to another judge without objection by the State as the prosecution intended to introduce evidence that Dalal intended to target Presiding Criminal Part Judge Liliana DeAvila-Dilebi and Judge Partick Roma. Dalal also sought change of venue without success and brought an interlocutory appeal.
Given the facts of the case, the NJ Appellate Division judges hearing the matter determined that, despite their own confidence in the judiciary, a reasonable person in Dalal’s situation could have substantial doubt as to their potential for obtaining a fair trial in the Bergen County Superior Court. The appellate judges quoted Chief Justice Rabner’s opinion in DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 506 (2008): “[t]he Judiciary derives its authority from the State Constitution but earns the public’s confidence through acts of unquestioned integrity.” The matter was reversed with directions that the matter be heard by a judge from outside the vicinage.
If you are facing criminal charges, it is imperative that you insure your rights are upheld and you have the best chance possible at a fair trial. For more information about serious criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C;17-1,
2C:11-3,
2C:39-4,
Aakash Dalal,
arson,
Bergen County,
bias,
conspiracy,
firearm,
Judge DeAvila-Dilebi,
Judge Roma,
murder,
terrorism,
weapon
Monday, February 16, 2015
Murder Conviction Upheld After Graphic Photos Were Shown To Jury
Darwin Rodriguez-Ferreira was convicted of knowing and purposeful murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2)); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d). At sentencing the defendant received a thirty year prison sentence including a thirty year parole disqualifier and consecutive eighteen month sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon.
Kendall was found lying in the street near his Jersey City home with multiple stab wounds. Multiple calls to and from "Darwin" were found in Kendall's cell phone log and a bloody knife wrapped in boxer shorts was found nearby shortly thereafter. The blood contained Kendall's DNA and the boxer shorts contained Darwin's DNA. The defendant left the country with a one-way ticket the day after the murder and police found bloodstains with Kendall's DNA on Darwin's floor while searching Darwin's residence.
In State v. Rodriguez-Ferreira, the defendant appealed the convictions and sentence received in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County. At trial, over Darwin's objection, four graphic photos of Kendall's body depicting stab wounds to the neck and face, torso and forearm were presented to the jury. One photo, taken during the autopsy included stab wounds suffered by internal organs extracted from the body during the autopsy. N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits the inclusion of evidence if the probative value substantially outweighs the risk of prejudice to the jury through its revelation. In State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263 (1990), the NJ Supreme Court held that vivid and graphic details which may be difficult to look at do not necessarily call for exclusion of photographic evidence. State v. Sanchez, 244 N.J. Super. 231, 249-51 (App. Div. 1988) allows admission of murder victim photographs to prove the act was "purposeful and knowing." N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the photos. With regard to the sentence imposed, the trial court failed to consider the relevant factors under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) and the matter was remanded by the Appellate Division for sentencing including an articulation of the how the Yarbough Factors apply to require a consecutive sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon.
If you are facing murder charges, it is the state's burden to prove your guilt and they must do so in a just and appropriate manner, without the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence or testimony. It is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to ensure your rights are protected against prejudicial acts by the prosecution or the judge. For more information regarding homicide, assault, weapons charges or other serious criminal issues in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-3,
2C:39-4,
2C:39-5,
murder,
Rule 403,
State v. Johnson,
State v. Rodriguez-Ferreira,
State v. Sanchez,
State v. Yarbough,
unlawful possession,
unlawful purpose,
weapon,
Yarbough Factors
Tuesday, January 13, 2015
Murder Pled To Aggravated Manslaughter Leads To PCR Appplication
Lynn Giovanni was charged with first-degree purposeful and or knowing murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), 3(a)(2)); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d)); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). She pled to aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4) as a lesser included offense of knowing or purposeful murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), -(a)(2)) and was sentenced to 30 years in prison with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2).
Giovanni bludgeoned her 14 year old daughter to death while she slept. At the time, Giovanni was being treated for depression and post-traumatic stress disorder and her daughter was having behavioral and adjustment problems after her parents' divorce and was being treated for depression. After killing her daughter, the defendant took multiple prescriptions in an effort to commit suicide but was unsuccessful. She then left the residence and repeatedly drove her vehicle into a guardrail trying to kill herself.
During pre-trial psychological examinations of the defendant by defense experts she indicated that her actions were designed only to help her daughter end her pain and ultimately be with her through suicide and indicated that she had planned the killing for about a month. The State, under State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3 (1965),conducted psychological examinations of the defendant which found her to be capable of understanding her actions at the time of the killing and that her actions were deliberate. After considering all evidence the parties came to terms on a plea agreement to first-degree murder but with the prosecutor recommending a sentence for aggravated manslaughter.
At sentencing, in State v. Giovanni, the court reviewed the plea fully and the defendant participated in the conversation, providing replies when called for. Although the defendant filed no direct appeal, the defendant sought post-conviction relief (PCR) claiming that her sentence violated Briggs as her factual basis was not appropriate to aggravated manslaughter and mental issues interfered with her ability to understand the plea or sentence. She also claimed, during the PCR hearing, that her counsel advised her not to speak at sentencing. Defendant's counsel denied any such assertion. She further referenced plea offers which never existed in reality and the fact that her counsel did not adequately pursue insanity and diminished capacity defenses. Defendant next appealed the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief and the denial was upheld on all counts but remanded for reconsideration of her application to withdraw her plea in light of the lower court's misapplication of the factors set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). Slater sets forth the standard for review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims as requiring the showing that "(1) counsel's performance was objectively deficient, falling outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; and (2) that counsel's performance created a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional efforts, the result of the proceeding would have been different." With regard to Slater factor one in particular, the court below was seen as taking a particularly harsh view. Regarding factor two, the court was advised to reconsider the defendant's mental capacity on remand.
If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-3,
2C:11-4,
2C:39-4,
2C:39-5,
2C:43-7.2,
Aggravated manslaughter,
murder,
NERA,
possession,
Slater factors,
State v. Giovanni,
State v. Slater,
State v. Whitlow,
unlawful purpose,
weapon
Tuesday, September 30, 2014
Murder Conviction Cannot Stand on Cumulative Trial Errors
Jahnell Weaver and Khalil Bryant were in attendance at a graduation party in Camden, NJ where someone pulled a gun and fired 5 shots killing Edward Williams and wounding Amyr Hill. Although only one individual could have fired the gun, both Hill and Weaver were implicated by others at the party.
Jahnell Weaver and Khalil Bryant were juveniles but both were charged as adults with first-degree murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2)); first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); third-degree assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and third-degree endangering an injured victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2). At trial, the only significant dispute was weather Weaver or Bryant was the shooter. Both Weaver and Bryant were seen with guns at the party. Hill identified Bryant as the shooter then changed his testimony while other witnesses offered conflicting testimony. Weaver offered that Bryant later used the same weapon in a shooting as a defense and Weaver moved for a separate trial. The court denied Weaver’s application to admit other crimes evidence regarding Bryant’s shooting of another individual shortly after the incident in question due to the substantial prejudice it would cause against Bryant as well as denying Weaver’s request for a separate trial. The State was able to admit Bryant’s statement that he received the gun immediately after the shooting in question. However, because Bryant did not testify, Weaver did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him with regard to the statement. Lamike Goffney, an eyewitness, saw one of the men fleeing the scene hand the gun to another man fleeing the scene and other evidence in the trial led the jury to the conclusion that Bryant then received the weapon from Weaver.
Weaver was ultimately convicted and appealed. After the NJ Appellate Division upheld the decision of the trial court, State v. Weaver was heard by the NJ Supreme Court. The NJ Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and remanded the matter for a new trial based on the potential prejudice to Weaver as a result of the cumulative errors in denying his request for a separate trial, refusing to allow other crimes evidence and allowing Bryant’s statement to enter without cross-examination.
The penalty for murder is severe including 30 years to life in prison. If you are facing homicide charges, you need experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about murder, homicide, unlawful possession of a weapon, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, assault, assault with a deadly weapon or other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-3,
2C:12-1,
2C:39-4,
2C:39-5,
2C:5-1,
aggravated assault,
assault,
crime,
criminal,
deadly weapon,
gun,
homicide,
murder,
State v. Weaver,
unlawful purpose,
weapon
Monday, April 28, 2014
Gang Murder Conviction Remanded
Quran Goodman, a member of the Bloods gang was convicted murdering (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)) Rashon Bryant, a member of the Crips gang; third-degree possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)). Goodman, a member of the "Crips" gang under the name of "Blak", along with other Crips members from the Irvington area, attempted to convince Bryant to join the gang. Bryant was later incarcerated and joined the "Bloods" gang in prison. Upon leaving prison and later release from a half-way house, Bryant sought to meet Goodman at the corner in Irvington they frequently met at in the past, within Crip territory. Goodman shot Bryant in front of multiple eyewitnesses. Essex County Superior Court Judge John C. Kenney found evidence of gang membership to be admissible, in spite of any prejudice it may cause, as long as it is relevant and necessary for establishing motive. The judge considered testimony of Bryant's girlfriend, the State's main witness to the shooting, the fact that Bryant and Goodman were from rival gangs, that the shooting occurred on a Crip corner with Bryant being a Blood and that Goodman was unhappy Bryant became a Blood rather than a Crip. The Judge also refused to suppress a letter written from "Blak" to his cousin "Murda", also incarcerated in Essex County Jail, seemingly seeking to have Bryant's girlfriend, the state's main witness, deterred from testifying. In making that decision, the judge cited State v. Rechtschaffer, 70 N.J. 395 (1976) wherein it was decided "declarations subsequent to the commission of the crime which indicate consciousness of guilt, or are inconsistent with the innocence or tend to establish intent are relevant and admissible."
After multiple witnesses from both sides offering conflicting testimony, the judge instructed the jury regarding admissibility. The judge refused to instruct the jury regarding the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter as, pursuant to State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525 (1995), State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1 (1991), State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378 (1990) and State v. Rose, 120 N.J. 61 (1990), there is no rational basis for instructing the jury on a lesser included offense when a close range shooting without any other motive presented than murder is in issue.
Goodman appealed as to admissibility of multiple witness statements and the judges' refusal to instruct on lesser included offenses and the appellate division affirmed. Goodman then filed a petition for postconviction relief (PCR) which was denied. In his appeal from the denial of his petition for PCR Goodman claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel both at the trial and appellate levels. The trial judge, without oral argument, found Goodman's petition for ineffective assistance was procedurally barred as it was not raised within his appeals. As there is a strong presumption in favor of oral argument, the appellate panel concluded that unless the presumption is overcome, which it was not in this case, denial of the PCR application without oral argument was inappropriate. The matter was reversed and remanded for reconsideration of Goodman's PCR petition.
If you are facing criminal charges it is the state's burden to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. They must do so in a just and appropriate manner without false accusations, witness interference or prejudicial statements or testimony. If the state cannot prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge or jury is required to find you innocent of the charges against you. It is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to ensure your rights are protected against prejudicial acts by the prosecution or the judge. For more information regarding gang crimes, homicide, assault, drug charges or other criminal issues in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
120 NJ 378,
120 NJ 61,
126 NJ 1,
141 NJ 525,
2C:11-3,
2C:39-4,
70 NJ 395,
Biegenwald,
drugs,
gang,
Harris,
hightower,
murder,
Quran Goodman,
Rashon Bryant,
Rose,
State v. Rechtschaffer
Friday, March 21, 2014
In Gang Related Murder, Lawyer's Failure To Call Alibi Witnesses May Be Ineffective Assistance
Fedner Pierre-Louis, allegedly of the Playboy Posse criminal gang, was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)), third degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)). The defendant, in State of NJ v. Fedner Pierre-Louis, was sentenced to 45 years in prison for this murder of an oncologist, Jeffrey Perchick, at a hotel in the Newark area. Pierre-Louis was charged when a gun used in another crime was traced to him. However, Pierre-Louis offered his defense attorney seven potential alibi witnesses, including family members and friends from his night-school classes, who were willing to testify on his behalf. Defense counsel employed a private investigator who spoke with the alibi witnesses and determined them to be unreliable. As a result of the private investigator's assessment, defendant's counsel made the decision not to present any of the alibi witnesses and Pierre-Louis was convicted. Upon a post-conviction relief filing by defendant, the trial judge, Union County Superior Court Judge John Triarsi vacated the guilty verdict then reversed himself after reviewing documents demonstrating defendant's trial counsel knowingly made the decision not to present the alibi witnesses after interviews by the private investigator. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's ruling and the NJ Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certification.
The NJ Supreme Court considered whether the petition for post-conviction relief satisfied the test set forth by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.2d 674 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). The Justices heard arguments from the prosecution and defense regarding the with whom the decision to produce witnesses lies, the standard of review the trial judge must undertake and at one point the Court has the authority to disturb the trial judge's findings. Ultimately, the NJ Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were not sufficient with regard to either prong of the test and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new hearing including the presentation of the alibi witnesses for the purposes of determining credibility.
If you are facing criminal charges in NJ, the consequences of a conviction can change your life. For more information about gang crimes, weapons charges, murder, manslaughter, robbery and other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-3,
2C:11-4,
2C:15,
2C:39-4,
2C:39-5,
crime,
Fedner Pierre-Louis,
felony murder,
firearm,
gang,
manslaughter,
robbery,
State v. Fritz,
Strickland v. Washington,
unlawful purpose
Monday, January 27, 2014
Prostitutes Charged With Committing Robbery In Atlantic City Hotel Suite
In State v. Rodriguez, the defendant was charged with 2nd degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) and convicted of the lesser included offense of 3rd degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3), simple assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a), 4th degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d). The defendant and her co-defendant, Mayo, were acquitted of 2nd degree conspiracy to commit robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and 3rd degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d).
Defendant and co-defendant, prostitutes, met 3 men in the lobby of an Atlantic City hotel and proceeded to join the men in their room. Once there both women surrounded one of the men and began touching him in an erotic manner. Shortly thereafter, the man realized his money was missing and attempted to stop the women from leaving the suite when he was sprayed in the face with pepper spray by the defendant.
The defendant was sentenced to 5 years in prison with a 2 year parole disqualifier for theft by unlawful taking, a concurrent 6 month term for the simple assault charge and 1 year in prison for unlawful possession of a weapon which was to be served concurrently. Defendant was also on probation for a prior conviction of 3rd degree theft from the person at the time of the offense and pled guilty to a violation of probation (VOP) and received a concurrent 5 year sentence for the VOP.
The defendant challenged her conviction based on comments during the prosecution's summation, adequacy of the jury instructions, a weapons conviction with regard to pepper spray, failure to submit lesser included offenses to the jury, cumulative error depriving the defendant of a fair trial and the sentence. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but remanded for sentencing with regard to the VOP as the trial judge failed to set forth aggravating and mitigating factors as required under N.J.C.R. 3:21-4(g) and State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 177 (1989).
Robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery and the lesser included offense of theft are very serious charges that carry substantial penalties including up to 10 years in prison for each charge. If you have been charged with robbery it is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you and protect your rights. For more information regarding robbery, theft, weapons, distribution and other serious crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
114 NJ 169,
2C:12-1,
2C:15-1,
2C:20-3,
2C:39-4,
2C:395,
2C:5-2,
conspiracy,
NJSA 2C:15,
possession,
probation,
robbery,
Rule 3:21-4,
State v. Baylass,
theft,
VOP,
weapon
Friday, January 10, 2014
Sentencing In Weapons Case Must Fit The Crime
The defendants, Jaquan Lee and Tony Canty, collectively appealed their convictions of 1st degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, 2nd degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a(1), 3rd degree unlawful possession of a shotgun without a firearms purchaser ID card, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3, 3rd degree unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b and 2nd degree certain persons not to possess firearms N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7 arising out of 3 separate robberies occurring on July 30, 2007 in Elizabeth putting multiple victims at risk.
The defendants in State v. Lee were sentenced in the Union County Superior Court to 15 year terms for each count concurrent as to multiple victims in each incident but consecutive as to each incident resulting in aggregate 45 year terms subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 which requires service of 85% of their sentence before eligible for parole. On appeal, collectively State v. Lee, the defendants challenge in court identifications and excessive sentences. Canty challenged a motion to suppress and Lee challenged the adequacy of the jury charge. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing as the court did not adequately place the reasons for imposing 3 consecutive sentences on the record.
In reviewing whether the sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, the Appellate Division looked to State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 644 (1985). Yarbough sets forth factors a court may consider do make such a determination including whether (1) the crimes and objectives were predominately independent of each other; (2) the crimes involved separate acts or threats of violence; (3) whether the crimes were unified in place or time or whether they were individual acts; (4) the number of victims in each criminal act; and (5) the number of convictions for which sentences will be imposed. The Appellate Division also agreed the criminal history and rate of recidivism of the actors could be considered according to State v. Mosch, 214 N.J. Super. 457 (App. Div. 1986).
If you have been accused of a crime it is imperative you obtain experienced legal counsel to begin preparing a defense, recognize and challenge violations of your rights with motions to suppress or dismiss and, if you are ultimately sentenced, challenge excessive sentences. For more information regarding weapons, drugs, robbery, assault or other serious criminal charges visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:15,
2C:39,
2C:39-4,
2C:58,
armed robbery,
NERA,
No Early Release Act,
possession of weapon,
sawed-off,
shotgun,
State v. Lee,
State v. Mosch,
Yarbaugh
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