Denial Of Motion To Suppress Marijuana And Handgun Upheld

Kenneth L. Hawes was indicted for third-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(11)); second-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 500 feet of public property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1); second-degree possession of a firearm while in the course of committing a crime (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 and 2C:39-4.1(a)); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)). An anonymous caller informed Franklin Township police that a black male was selling what may be narcotics from an SUV in a parking lot. Upon investigating, officers in plain clothes saw the man, who had been brought to their attention previously, selling hats, CDS, DVDs and other merchandise from a GMC Envoy and, upon approaching, smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from Hawes and the SUV. Hawes moved away from the officers but was seized by the arm and subjected to a pat-down search by the officers for their personal safety in which a small pouch with marijuana was discovered on Hawes person and he was placed under arrest. Hawes then asked if he could return the merchandise to his vehicle before being removed and upon returning the merchandise to the vehicle for him, the officers discovered a handgun in partial plain view. Officer Hernandez removed the gun then proceeded to search the vehicle for other weapons, discovering an additional 70 bags of marijuana in the vehicle. At the suppression hearing, in State v. Hawes, the defendant testified that he never asked the officers to return anything to the vehicle and that the weapon was not in plain view. The motion judge found the defendant and his 4 witnesses to lack credibility and denied the motion to suppress. Following the denial of his suppression motion, Hawes entered a retraxit plea of guilty to both indictments in exchange for the State's recommendation of a maximum 10 year sentence with a 5 year period of parole ineligibility. The Somerset County Superior Court Judge sentenced Hawes according to the plea agreement but did not separately impose sentences on the charges. Hawes challenged the validity of the scope of the pat-down search, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), in which under claim of a protective search officers opened the coin pouch discovered in his pocket. Hawes further challenged the ensuing search of his vehicle, including discovery of the handgun and bags of marijuana, as fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 454-56 (1963). The NJ Appellate Division followed State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601 (2007); State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471 (2001); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272 (1998); and State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004) in properly placing the burden of proof on the State to prove the warrantless search and seizure was soundly within one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Appellate Court held that, based on the circumstances at the time of the search under State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), police had probable cause to arrest Hawes and, therefore, the search and seizure were valid under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446 (2002); State v. McKenna, 228 N.J. Super. 468 (App. Div. 1988); and State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377 (1964). Further, the Appellate Division held that defendant's request to return the merchandise to his vehicle gave police opportunity to view the handgun, in plain view, in the defendant's vehicle which, once discovered, made it valid for the police to search the remainder of the vehicle for further weapons without first obtaining a warrant pursuant to U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1968). Although the denial of the suppression motion was upheld on appeal, the matter was remanded for re-sentencing due to the court's failure to impose individual sentences for each offense as required under State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263 (1984). The difference between having a search upheld or suppressing evidence obtained from a search rests on small legal distinctions. If the police obtained evidence against you in what you believed to be an illegal search, it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you against the prosecution. For more information about warrantless search, search and seizure, drugs, weapons or other criminal issues in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Handgun Discovered In Search Will Not Be Suppressed

James J. Scarborough pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) after police found a handgun under his seat in a vehicle during an investigatory search based on the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle's interior. He was sentenced to 5 years incarceration, subject to a 3 year period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c). Police received an anonymous call about a vehicle parked in the rear lot of a closed facility and, upon responding, discovered 2 males in the vehicle involved in what the officer suspected to be drug activity. Upon encountering the driver the officer perceived an odor of burnt marijuana. Ultimately, the driver signed a consent to search form and a handgun was discovered under the passenger seat where Scarborough was sitting along with a magazine and ammunition between the passenger seat and door. Scarborough told police he found the gun in the woods earlier in the day and did not know what to do with it. Scarborough filed a motion to suppress the evidence and his statement, both of which were denied and he then entered into the guilty plea. In State v. Scarborough the defendant appealed and the NJ Appellate Division upheld the denial of the suppression motion finding that a field inquiry under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968) was permissible based on the anonymous call regarding the vehicle. The odor of burnt marijuana then gave probable cause to believe a crime was committed under State v. Vanderveer, 285 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 1995) and State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003). Once the officer had probable cause to believe criminal activity was afoot he was justified, under State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002), in seeking consent to search the vehicle. Finally the NJ Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in determining the Scarborough's statement was not coerced. The matter was, however, remanded as to sentencing factors only. Second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun in NJ carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act. If you are charged with a weapons offense you need experienced criminal defense counsel. For more information about weapons possession, possession of a weapon without a permit, use or possession of a weapon in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons or other weapon related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Distribution Conviction Reversed For Lack Of Probable Cause

Jermaine Wright was charged with possession of controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a) and possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5). Wright's arrest was made by police in Trenton after Ewing Township detectives received a tip from a confidential informant that "Jazzz" was delivering CDS in Trenton in a specific vehicle. Initially the Ewing detectives followed up on the tip, verifying the vehicle and general location provided by the informant, but seeing no activity indicative of drug trade, then Ewing was dispatched to another call and passed the information on to Trenton detectives. Trenton detectives located the vehicle and approached on foot. Later testimony would conflict as to whether the officers guns were drawn as they approached the vehicle. The officer used flashlights to illuminate the occupied vehicle's interior and saw the occupants using a scale to measure a quantity of CDS, which they suspected to be cocaine. As the driver exited the vehicle, a large amount of money could be viewed plainly in the purse she left behind and a bag on the passenger seat was partially open leaving a significant quantity of cocaine in plain view. In State v. Wright, Defendant attempted to suppress the evidence claiming the officers' actions constituted de facto arrest without probable cause but the judge held that the stop was investigative in nature, of limited duration and of little intrusion upon the Defendant's liberty. The judge further held that the evidence initially seized was in plain view and the remainder was seized based on probable cause and under exigent circumstances. In spite of the motion judge's determination that Trenton officers parked their vehicle in a manner to prevent the defendants' exit and swift approach with guns drawn conveying the message they were not free to leave, the judge held the stop was not thereby converted to an arrest requiring probable cause. The Defendant's motion to suppress the CDS was denied and he entered a guilty plea to narcotics related offenses. The NJ Appellate Division referred to State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 475 (1998) in holding "the temporary detention of individuals during an automobile stop by police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose constitutes a seizure. The Appellate Division also referenced State v. Gibson, ___ N.J. ___, (2014) in finding the judge below inaccurately utilized the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard for a stop rather than the probable cause standard required for an arrest. After a thorough analysis of warrantless seizure cases (State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000) and State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328 (2010)) and cases involving levels of police interaction (State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), State v. Stoval, 170 N.J. 346 (2002), State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 2011)) the appellate judges looked to further considerations including the duration of the stop, reasonableness, degree of the intrusion and the State's interest in the welfare of the public. The Appellate Division further reasoned that a reasonable articulable suspicion was required in this case but there were no particularized facts justifying the seizure. In fact, Trenton detectives testified they observed nothing giving rise to suspicion and approached the vehicle solely on the limited information provided by the Ewing Township detectives. The appellate division reasoned that the seizure of Wright was illegal as it was not supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion. Therefore, pursuant to State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83 (1998), the appellate division reasoned the evidence obtained from the unlawful seizure must be suppressed and reversed the decision of the court below. Drug distribution charges are met with harsh penalties due to the public interest in deterrence. If you are facing charges for drug distribution or possession, there are multiple factors which may affect the ultimate outcome and an experienced criminal defense attorney will know how to protect your rights. For more information regarding drug distribution, possession, possession with intent to distribute or controlled dangerous substances (CDS) visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Gun And Drugs Discovered Due To Defendant's Suspicious Behavior

Ramier Dunbar was indicted for second degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); fourth degree possession of a hollow-point bullet (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)); third degree resisting arrest (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)); and fourth degree obstruction of the administration of law (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1). State v. Dunbar arose from a custodial stop for which the police claimed to have probable cause. In Jersey City officers were dispatched to a report of gunshots fired. Responding officers arrived within seconds to find a group of approximately 30 individuals. They immediately noticed one individual they claimed to appear overly nervous within the screaming crowd. While maintaining constant visual contact with a marked patrol car, Dunbar disappeared down an alley momentarily then re-emerged and began walking away from the scene. Officers followed him in the patrol car and attempted to question him about the shots fired but the defendant ignored officers and, by their account, appeared more nervous. Officers ordered the Defendant to stop at which point he began to run. While running from the police, the Defendant pulled a handgun from his waistband and threw it. Officers apprehended the Defendant shortly and also discovered a bag of marijuana on his person. At trial, the judge granted Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during his arrest. The NJ Appellate Division reversed the trial court. In rendering the decision, the Appellate Division differentiated Dunbar from State v. Williams, 410 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 2009) wherein police involved in community policing stopped an individual who fled the area upon sight of the police, ignored their commands to stop, discarded contraband upon apprehension and the evidence was suppressed as the officers actions were not founded on reasonable suspicion in the eyes of the court. In State v. DeLorenzo, 166 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 1979) the court held that an investigatory stop is not reasonable based on simple nervousness. Unlike Williams, the prosecution in Dunbar argued that, based on the facts, the officers formed reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant had committed a crime, the gun was abandoned property lawfully recovered after the Defendant discarded it and the marijuana was seized incident to arrest. Also, unlike DeLorenzo, Dunbar’s nervousness was accompanied by flight while constantly observing police and in the midst of an excited crowd immediately after gun shots were reported. The Appellate Division found the stop and seizure to fall within Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) as an exception to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution wherein a warrant is required in matters of search and seizure. The totality of “shots fired”, a “chaotic scene” and the defendant’s behavior were enough to enable the Appellate Judges to find the officers had a reasonable basis for their actions. If you are facing weapons charges or drug charges you are subject to harsh penalties including lengthy incarceration and substantial fines. You should seek the assistance of an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights. For more information regarding weapons possession, use of a weapon for an improper purpose, illegal weapons, robbery, possession of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) or other serious criminal offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Drug Suppression Motion For Warrantless Search Denied

In State v. Salladino the defendant was indicted for 3rd theft of movable property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3) and 3rd degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a1). The defendant won a suppression motion relating to the Oxycodone found during the warrantless search by police. The prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal and the N.J. Appellate Court determined that, although the Oxycodone was found during a search of the defendant's person exceeding the scope of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the drugs would have inevitably been discovered when the defendant was searched incident to the arrest for the robbery charges. According to the court's holding in State v. Sugar, 100, N.J. 211 (1985) if the evidence would have inevitably been discovered as a result of an independent and predictable circumstance, it remains admissible even if seized by other unlawful means. The Appellate division held that the suppression motion should not have been granted and remanded for further proceedings. Following a call from a robbery victim, police located 2 suspects in the vicinity matching the description given by the victim. The officer in charge of the investigation ordered that the suspects be brought before the victim for a show-up identification. Prior to transporting Salladino to the show-up, a police officer conducted a pat-down search of the defendant to ensure the defendant has no weapons. During the frisk, the officer felt a "hard bulge" and retrieved a pill bottle without a label or lid which contained 83 Percocet pills. The officer seized the pills but made no arrest regarding the Percocet. The suspects were positively identified by the victim during a show-up identification and they were arrested. At no time between the stop and the arrest could the defendant have removed the pills from his person without notice by the police, therefore, the Percocet would have been inevitably discovered during the search incident to arrest even though retrieving the pill bottle from the defendant's person exceeded the scope of a Terry stop as there was no reasonable basis to conclude the defendant was armed and the officer never claimed he believed the "hard bulge" was a weapon. If you are facing drug charges and believe evidence obtained against you may have been obtained in violation of your rights, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances, robbery, warrantless searches, CDS in a motor vehicle or other criminal issues in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.