Refusal to Submit to DUI Breath Testing Receives Step-Down Sentence

Thomas Taylor was charged with driving under the influence (DUI)(N.J.S.A. 39:5-50) and pled guilty to refusal to submit to a breath test (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2). Taylor had been convicted of two prior driving while intoxicated charges, both of which occurred over ten years prior to the event in question. The municipal court judge sentenced Taylor as a third offender to a 10 year suspension and a $1000 fine. The defendant appealed. In State v. Taylor, Taylor used the misplaced argument that, pursuant to State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597 (2011), which addressed the impact of prior refusal convictions to enhance subsequent DUI penalties. However, In re Bergwall, 85 N.J. 382 (1981), reaffirmed in State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566 (2014), held that a prior driving while intoxicated conviction may be used in enhancing a sentence for a subsequent refusal conviction. Designed as punishment for driving under the influence, the penalties for refusal mirror those for DUI in that they increase with each subsequent offense. The statutes differ in that the DWI statute calls for a "step-down" in sentencing for each 10-year period in which a driver goes without a conviction for DUI, but the refusal statute does not include such a provision. This means that an individual convicted of DUI in 1990 who is convicted of a second DUI in 2001 would be again sentenced as a first offender in 2001. Likewise, a third DWI conviction occurring 10 or more years after a second conviction would subject the driver to sentencing as a second offender under the DUI statute, pursuant to State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014). Taylor argued that his refusal should be sentenced under the terms of a second offender, as more than 10 years had elapsed since his prior offense. In State v. Fielding, 290 N.J. Super 191 (App. Div. 1996) the court addressed the matter of applying step-down sentencing to refusal conviction and determined that it was appropriate under the principal of fundamental fairness. After review, the matter was remanded for resentencing as a second offense including a significantly lower 2 year suspension and $500 fine. If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about refusal, DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Attempted Murder Reduced To Aggravated Assault For Plea

Richard Spellman was indicted on two counts of attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3); two counts of first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1); two counts of second-degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); two counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7). Spellman confessed and his motion to suppress the confession was denied. He ultimately pled guilty, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, to all charges after the first-degree attempted murder charges were amended to second degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1)). Spellman was sentenced to concurrent 17 year terms subject to an 85 percent period of parole disqualification under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2); two 10 year terms and two 5 year terms; and restitution to a victim with a 5 year period of parole supervision to follow his release. The charges stemmed from two incidents. First, while on parole for a prior aggravated assault, Spellman entered a convenience store, demanded money and then shot the clerk in the stomach after he was given the money. In the second incident, Spellman shot a man in the parking lot of a restaurant. Upon arrival at the scene, police found a gun in the parking lot and Spellman staring at them out the window of a nearby store. When officers spoke to Spellman, he indicated he was fighting with the man he shot. Officers searched Spellman and found a bullet on his person. At the police station, officers found another bullet on Spellman's person and, prior to questioning of any kind, Spellman said "I shot the attendant at the [convenience store]." Spellman was read his Miranda rights, waived his right to counsel and quickly confessed to shooting both individuals. In State v. Spellman, the NJ Appellate Division upheld the trial court judge's decision that the defendant's confessions were voluntary in spite of the defendant's challenge to the voluntariness based on mental capacity which was not raised at trial and therefore not preserved for appeal. Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229 (1973). The NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Smith, 307 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1997), in holding that mental illness itself, if present, does not invalidate a confession. The record below satisfied the Appellate Division that the trial judge fully reviewed the confession and found no coercion or force to have been used. With regard to sentencing, the NJ Appellate Division did find errors with the trial judge's failure to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 and explain his or her reasoning fully on the record. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014). The Appellate Division determined that he trial judge's imposition of concurrent 17 year sentences exceeded the statutory range of 5 to 10 years set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(2). Finally, the Appellate Division and the State agreed that the trial judge failed to make adequate findings, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2b(2), as to whether the defendant was able to pay the restitution ordered. The matter was remanded for resentencing. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Distribution Conviction Reversed For Detective's Improper Testimony

Brian Firman was charged with third-degree possession of cocaine (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); third-degree possession with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)) and 5(b)(3)); third-degree distribution (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) and 5(b)(3)); and third-degree distribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7). The charges stemmed from a detectives observation of the defendant and 2 other men in what he believed to be a hand to hand drug transaction which, when he approached to speak to them, was terminated abruptly and one of the men was observed to throw something on the ground which proved to be crack cocaine. During the pat-down search that followed, there paraphernalia was located on the persons of the other 2 co-defendants but nothing in the report reflected possession on the part of Firman. At trial, Firman was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 6 years in prison. In State v. Firman, the defendant appealed on the basis that the detective, McDonald, a non-expert, offered testimony exceeding the level permitted from a fact witness through his ample opinions. The defendant failed to object at trial, leaving the NJ Appellate Division to review the matter under the plain error standard of State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91 (2013). Under the plain error standard, the Appellate Division would reverse in the event that the testimony of McDonald which crossed the line into expert testimony, which he was not qualified to offer, could have led the jury to a different result than it would have reached without the inappropriate testimony. State v. Atwater, 400 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2008). The N.J. Appellate Division determined that without the impermissible testimony of the detective, the jury could have reached a different result and that the guilty verdict must be reversed with the matter remanded for a new trial. If you are facing charges for drug distribution or possession, there are multiple components which may affect the ultimate outcome. Drug distribution charges are met with harsh penalties due to the public interest in deterrence and it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect you against the charges and penalties. For more information regarding drug distribution, possession and possession with intent to distribute visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Motion To Suppress Handgun Denied

James Legette was indicted for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b) and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-7). Legette, once in police custody entered his residence, with officers, and attempted to remove a handgun from his own person to avoid police detecting the gun in any subsequent search of his person. State v. Legette began when police responded to a noise complaint and noted the defendant coming from a building smelling of burnt marijuana and stopped him for investigatory purposes. The defendant claimed the need to enter his apartment to obtain his identification and the officer agreed and accompanied him. While walking through the premises toward the defendant's apartment, the office noticed what appeared to be a gun in the pocket of the defendant's sweatshirt. Once inside his apartment, the defendant produced his identification and removed his sweatshirt while the officer was radioing in the defendant's information. The defendant agreed to accompany the officer back outside with the officer carrying the sweatshirt defendant had removed as evidence. Once outside, a search of the sweatshirt by the officer's K-9 obviated the handgun in the pocket of the sweatshirt and the defendant was placed under arrest. In an ensuing motion to suppress the handgun, the NJ Superior Court trial judge held that James Legette was validly accompanied into his residence by police when sought to enter his own residence for the stated purpose of obtaining his identification. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Division reviewed State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281 (2013) giving the officer the right to enter the common hallway of the building as he was called to the scene by citizens to investigate a noise complaint. Also under Walker, the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the door the defendant opened gave the officer probable cause to believe contraband may be present. State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 314 (2014) which read the fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution to guarantee individuals the right of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure in their homes. However, under State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 234 (1983) when an individual under arrest chooses to enter their residence to obtain an item, it is both permissible and reasonable for officers to accompany them into the residence. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge. If you are facing charges stemming from illegal possession of a handgun, BB gun, paintball gun or other weapon it is critical you not undertake these matters without experienced counsel. For more information about unlawful possession of a weapon, illegal weapons, possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes or other serious weapons offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Thanksgiving Blessings

Happy Thanksgiving from the Darling Law Firm to you all. We invite you all to remember that the origins of Thanksgiving are to thank God for blessings including military victories or the end of drought and famine. We would like to offer our thanks to the members of the military who put their lives on the line to keep us safe, to the police and firefighters who will not be home with their families today, to the doctors and nurses spending their day tending to the ill and infirm and those collecting, cooking and delivering food for those in need. Happy Thanksgiving to all!

Restraining Order Issued Based On E-Mail To Employer

J.D. v. C.C. was an appeal of a Final Restraining Order (FRO) pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to 35) granted by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County upon the finding that C.C. committed harassment (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a)) against J.D. by sending e-mails to his employer alleging, among other things, that he drove his company vehicle while under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50). After a 2 year relationship, J.D. proposed marriage to C.C. who rejected him and J.D. elected to terminate their relationship. Thereafter, C.C. began to appear at J.D.'s residence at inopportune times and run into him as he went about his business. C.C. also sent text messages to J.D. indicating that she intended would cause trouble for him and intended to contact his employer. C.C. did send the e-mail and J.D. sought a restraining order. The trial judge issued the Final Restraining Order upon finding that, although no physical assault occurred, the actions of C.C. constituted harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and was the behavior that the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act was designed to prevent. Pursuant to State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997), the elements of harassment include (1) the defendant making or causing to be made a communication; (2) with the purposes to harass another; and (3) in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the intended recipient. On appeal, the N.J. Appellate Division found that the e-mail to J.D.'s employer could be designed for no other purpose than to harass J.D. The Appellate Division further held that the need to prevent further abuse, under Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), was a factor in this matter and affirmed the decision of the court below. If you are charged with domestic violence or seeking a final restraining order against an abuser, there are specific burdens of proof for both parties in proving or disproving the charges making it critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you in such matters. For more information regarding domestic violence, restraining orders, assault, battery and other criminal law issues in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cyber-Harassment Laws Punish Those Using Internet For Personal Grudges

In spite of numerous educational efforts targeted to both juveniles and adults, the crime of cyber-harassment continues to be a growing issue due to the perceived degree of anonymity by those perpetrating such crimes. Cyber-harassment (N.J.S.A. 2:33-4.1) is communication with the purpose to harass another by employing a physical threat of bodily injury or the conveyance of lewd, indecent or obscene material with the purpose of causing emotional harm to the person or persons portrayed in said material. Actual harm need not be caused by the acts as long as the acts are undertaken with the intent to emotionally harm a reasonable person or place a reasonable person in fear of physical or emotional harm. Cyber-harassment charges are substantially more serious than standard harassment charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. While standard harassment charges are disorderly persons offenses, cyber-harassment charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1 are felony charges which begin at a fourth-degree level and increase in degree if aggravating circumstances are present. Due to the serious consequences, ranging from minimal damage to a person's reputation to suicide in some extreme cases, New Jersey and other states have taken an increasingly harsh stance against those accused of perpetrating or conspiring (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:33-4.1) to perpetrate such crimes. The federal government has also enacted 18 U.S.C. Section 2261A, applicable to those intending to threaten or harm, physically or emotionally, those in other states by employment of the internet. If you are charged with cyber-harassment, or conspiracy to commit cyber-harassment, you should consult an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about cyber-harassment, harassment or other serious criminal charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.