Thursday, August 14, 2014
Investigation of Newark Police Leads To Updated Procedures
After a multi-year investigation of the Newark Police Department by federal prosecutors, Newark Mayor Ras Baraka has entered into an agreement to install an independent monitor of the Newark Police Department and establish procedures designed to restore the public trust in the police. The investigation was prompted, in part, by the NJ chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) making accusations of long-term misconduct by Newark Police including death in custody, excessive force, false arrest, planting evidence, improper internal affairs procedures, unlawful search and other unconstitutional actions. The U.S. Department of Justice reported findings including excessive force and lack of adherence to the constitution in carrying out duties by officers.
In addition to the independent monitor, changes will include cameras in patrol cars and on the person of certain officers, improved training and improved internal affairs procedures. This change comes at a time when random gun violence in Newark has been the frequent topic of media reports bringing the feasibility of implementation into question.
For more information about search and seizure, probable cause, guns, drugs or other criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
ACLU,
excessive force,
false arrest,
internal affairs,
Newark,
probable cause,
search,
seizure
Wednesday, August 13, 2014
Sex Offender's Have Right to Self-Representation In Civil Commitment Proceedings
Although civil commitment proceedings for sex offenders who have completed their prison sentences are civil rather than criminal in nature, the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27 to -27.38, dictates that counsel will be provided for such hearings. D.Y. is a 52 year old male with a history of sexual assaults against minors. In 1986, D.Y. was indicted for first-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)); second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)) and third-degree endangering the welfare of a minor (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)) based on allegations by D.Y.’s 12 year old nephew, C.Y., against D.Y. Ultimately D.Y. received a 5 year sentence in exchange for a plea to second-degree sexual assault against C.Y. In 1994, after his release, D.Y. befriended 12 year old A.B. who later alleged D.Y. had sexually abused him by engaging in touching, oral and anal sex and the display of child pornography to A.B. by D.Y. as well as videotaping sexual acts between A.B. and D.Y. As a result of A.B.’s allegations, D.Y. was charged with first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)), second-degree sexual contact (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)), and third-degree impairing the morals of a child (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)). Upon entering a guilty plea to first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)) in 1999 he received an 18 year prison sentence with a 6 year period of parole ineligibility at the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center at Avenel (ADTC). Additionally, charges were levied by federal authorities and D.Y. was sentenced to 137 months of incarceration. In 2008, D.Y. completed his period of incarceration and a decision as to the civil commitment of D.Y. was required in order to protect the public if D.Y. was still considered a danger to children.
In In the Matter of Civil Commitment of D.Y., 426, N.J. Super. 436 (App. Div. 2012), ___ N.J. ___(2014) the N.J. Supreme Court overturned the Appellate Division’s ruling and upheld D.Y.’s right to represent himself at his civil commitment hearing, as long as standby counsel was available at all times to facilitate as necessary for D.Y. The ruling was based on the long-standing right to self-representation dating back to 13th century English law. Although the right to self-representation exists, Justice Patterson writing for the Court included that self-representation “seldom proves to be a sound strategic choice.” If you are facing charges for sex offenses, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about sexual assault, rape, statutory rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, child pornography or other sex crimes in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
Civil Commitment of DY,
endangering,
rape,
sex crime,
sex offender,
sexual assault,
Sexually violent predator,
SVPA
Sunday, August 10, 2014
Robbery Suspects Apprehended By Police GPS Use Without Warrant
US v. Katzin, 732 F. 3d 187 (2013), involved the warrantless placing of a GPS tracking device by police on the vehicle of brothers suspected in the robbery of multiple Rite Aid pharmacies in New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland. Harry Katzin and his van were seen in the proximity of several of the pharmacies where the robberies took place. Using the GPS device, police tracked the Katzin brothers van as they drove to a Rite-Aid where a robbery took place then stopped them shortly thereafter. Evidence gathered during the traffic stop, which resulted from the use of the GPS device, led to their arrest. The device was installed on December 14, 2012 and the Katzins were apprehended on December 16, 2012, limiting the use to approximately 48 hours.
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2914 (2011), 564 U.S. ___ (2011) holding that evidence discovered while police were conducting searches in good faith reliance on legalities at the time of the search. In U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 565 U.S. ___ (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle constituted trespass and therefore required a warrant but never addressed whether the warrantless tracking utilizing the GPS device was unreasonable. Justice Steven Breyer's comments during Jones likened the ability of police to monitor individuals 24 hours per day at will using GPS devices to George Orwell's novel 1984.
In Katzin, the brothers' suppression motion was granted by a District Judge hearing the matter and government appealed to the Third Circuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that heard arguments in the case held that any evidence obtained through the use of the GPS tracking device must be suppressed. The prosecution maintained that, with probable cause to believe the vehicle is involved in criminal activity, no warrant should be required as the Fourth Amendment requires either a warrant or probable cause. The prosecution further argued that while attached to the vehicle, the device provided no information beyond what could be observed by simple visual surveillance. The ACLU argued that Jones found the original attachment of the GPS device to require a warrant, without consideration of whether limiting the time of the tracking would affect the need for a warrant. The ACLU further argued that the ease and cost-effectiveness of using a GPS device will render law enforcement likely to track individuals even where it there is no reasonableness.
Without the requirement of a warrant, police could use GPS devices to gather information and use that information to establish probable cause. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that law enforcement officers must have a valid warrant before installing a GPS tracking device on a suspect's vehicle. If you are facing charges of robbery, the penalties can be severe and you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For further information regarding robbery, warrantless searches, burglary or other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
4th amendment,
burglary,
crime,
criminal,
Davis v. United States,
GPS,
robbery,
US v. Jones,
US v. Katzin,
warrant
Monday, August 4, 2014
Expungement Of A Crime Or A Conviction?
Criminal records may be expunged when a petitioner "has been convicted of a crime…and who has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime…." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) G.P.B. was sentenced under a single conviction to a guilty plea of one count of third-degree conspiracy (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2) and three counts of third-degree making gifts to public servants (N.J.S.A. 2C:27-6(b)). 10 years later, a Warren County trial judge granted the petitioner's expungement based on the "crime-spree" principle of In re Fontana, 146 N.J. Super. 264, 267 (App.Div. 1976) and the more recent case of In re Criminal Records of R.Z., 429 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2013), wherein a previous expungement statute permitted expungement of crimes committed so closely in proximity as to be considered part of a single event. In the Matter of the Expungement of G.P.B., the State appealed and the New Jersey Appellate Division reversed based on the holding in In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117 (App. Div. 2008) wherein the court found the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) to be clear as to whether expungement may be granted in the event of a single conviction or single crime. "The words 'prior' and 'subsequent' do not modify the word 'conviction' but instead modify the term 'crime'". Ross, supra, 400 N.J. Super. at 122. Notably, the Supreme Court has granted certification in In re Expungement of Petition of J.S. wherein petitioner was denied expungement of drug crimes committed within a five day period.
It should be noted that this blog has addressed only one portion of the expungement statute and other criteria apply. If you are considering seeking expungement of prior criminal records, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney to determine whether you may be eligible for expungement. For further information about expungement of a criminal record, conspiracy, gifts to public servants or other crimes in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C;5-2,
2C:27-6,
2C:52-2,
conspiracy,
crime,
criminal,
expunge,
In re Criminal Records of R.Z.,
In re Expungement Petition of J.S.,
In re Fontana,
In re Ross
Friday, August 1, 2014
Mandatory And Discretionary Extended Terms In Drug Case?
James Robinson sold 3 bags of crack cocaine to an undercover officer in 2003 and was indicted for third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3)); second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 500 feet of public property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1); third-degree possession of CDS (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); and third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3)). Due to Robinson's prior criminal history, including convictions for distribution of CDS in a school zone, receiving stolen property, eluding a police officer, burglary, and criminal restraint exposing another to serious bodily injury, the trial court imposed a discretionary extended term sentence of 15 years imprisonment with a 3 year period of parole ineligibility, a mandatory extended term of 15 years with a 5 year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) as a repeat drug offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) in State v. Robinson. Defendant was also sentenced to a mandatory extended term of 7 years imprisonment with a 3 year period of parole ineligibility.
Defendant appealed the sentence claiming that a court may not impose a discretionary extended term when a mandatory extended term has been imposed in the same proceeding. The appellate division affirmed the decision of the trial court. The NJ Supreme Court then reversed the decision after consideration of the Legislative intent in providing for extended terms for certain repeat offenders. Under the Model Penal Code (MPC), sentencing uniformity was a consideration in conjunction with affording courts the flexibility to achieve deterrence as needed. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) limits the number of extended terms which a court may impose in a sentencing, however, multiple mandatory extended terms may be imposed in a single proceeding (State v. Connell, 208 N.J. Super. 688 (App. Div. 1986)). The court then turned to the holding of State v. Hudson, 209 N.J. 513 (2012) and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2) to be a bar to the addition of a discretionary extended term when the trial court is required to impose a mandatory extended term on another offense if both are in the same proceeding.
If you are facing charges for possession or distribution you will be facing severe penalties and should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of CDS, possession with intent to distribute, distribution within 500 feet of a public place, distribution in a school zone, prescription drug matters or other serious drug offenses in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.
Labels:
2C:43-6(f),
2C:44-3a,
2C:44-5a2,
CDS,
controlled dangerous substance,
distribution,
extended term,
Graves Act,
intent to distribute,
State v. Connell,
State v. Hudson,
State v. Robinson
Wednesday, July 23, 2014
Gun And Drugs Discovered Due To Defendant's Suspicious Behavior
Ramier Dunbar was indicted for second degree possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); second degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)); fourth degree possession of a hollow-point bullet (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)); third degree resisting arrest (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)); and fourth degree obstruction of the administration of law (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1).
State v. Dunbar arose from a custodial stop for which the police claimed to have probable cause. In Jersey City officers were dispatched to a report of gunshots fired. Responding officers arrived within seconds to find a group of approximately 30 individuals. They immediately noticed one individual they claimed to appear overly nervous within the screaming crowd. While maintaining constant visual contact with a marked patrol car, Dunbar disappeared down an alley momentarily then re-emerged and began walking away from the scene. Officers followed him in the patrol car and attempted to question him about the shots fired but the defendant ignored officers and, by their account, appeared more nervous. Officers ordered the Defendant to stop at which point he began to run. While running from the police, the Defendant pulled a handgun from his waistband and threw it. Officers apprehended the Defendant shortly and also discovered a bag of marijuana on his person.
At trial, the judge granted Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during his arrest. The NJ Appellate Division reversed the trial court. In rendering the decision, the Appellate Division differentiated Dunbar from State v. Williams, 410 N.J. Super. 549 (App. Div. 2009) wherein police involved in community policing stopped an individual who fled the area upon sight of the police, ignored their commands to stop, discarded contraband upon apprehension and the evidence was suppressed as the officers actions were not founded on reasonable suspicion in the eyes of the court. In State v. DeLorenzo, 166 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 1979) the court held that an investigatory stop is not reasonable based on simple nervousness. Unlike Williams, the prosecution in Dunbar argued that, based on the facts, the officers formed reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant had committed a crime, the gun was abandoned property lawfully recovered after the Defendant discarded it and the marijuana was seized incident to arrest. Also, unlike DeLorenzo, Dunbar’s nervousness was accompanied by flight while constantly observing police and in the midst of an excited crowd immediately after gun shots were reported. The Appellate Division found the stop and seizure to fall within Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) as an exception to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution wherein a warrant is required in matters of search and seizure. The totality of “shots fired”, a “chaotic scene” and the defendant’s behavior were enough to enable the Appellate Judges to find the officers had a reasonable basis for their actions.
If you are facing weapons charges or drug charges you are subject to harsh penalties including lengthy incarceration and substantial fines. You should seek the assistance of an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights. For more information regarding weapons possession, use of a weapon for an improper purpose, illegal weapons, robbery, possession of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) or other serious criminal offenses visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
392 US 1,
crime,
criminal,
gun,
probable cause,
reasonable suspicion,
State v. DeLorenzo,
State v. Dunbar,
State v. Williams,
stop,
Terry v. Ohio,
unlawful possession,
weapon
Monday, July 21, 2014
Driving While Suspended For DUI Without the DUI?
In deciding State v. Suzanne Sylvester, the court held that driving while suspended for a second or subsequent driving under the influence (DUI) charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b is a 4th degree crime even in the event the underlying DUI suspension is later vacated. Sylvester was convicted in the Somerset County Superior Court of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b and sentenced to a 3 year probationary term with a mandatory minimum incarceration of 180 days without parole. Sylvester had been convicted of DUI in 1991, 1992 and in Mendham Municipal Court in 2011. It was during the suspension for the 2011 DUI when the defendant was charged with driving while suspended. Although Sylvester was permitted to rely on a sentencing step-down afforded under State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990) due to the lapse of time between her second and third DUI convictions, the Appellate Division found that Defendant was aware of a valid suspension at the time she drove and therefore the conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b was also valid. In upholding the decision of the court below, the NJ Appellate Division relied on the earlier decision in State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010) wherein the court established that a defendant violating N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b shall not be entitled to relief from conviction in the event the DUI is later vacated.
If you are found guilty of driving while suspended for a second or subsequent DUI, you may be punished under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26b which bears minimum penalties of 180 days in jail and an additional 1 year loss of license. For more information about driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other serious driving offenses visit DarlingFirm.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:40-26b,
CDS,
driving under the influence,
driving while suspended,
DUI,
Gandhi,
Laurick,
motor vehicle
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