Showing posts with label burglary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label burglary. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 23, 2016

Aggravated Assault Results In Miscarriage

Laquesha Cathcart and Tisha Cathcart were indicted for second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)), second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2), first-degree robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1), and fourth-degree theft by unlawful taking (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a)) after forcefully entering the victim's apartment following a dispute over a parking spot in New Brunswick, NJ. The Cathcarts assaulted R.L. and J.D., her daughter, in the presence of R.L.'s husband, F.D., and son. R.L.'s daughter and son both advised the defendant's that R.L. was pregnant but they continued the assault. R.L. miscarried within the week. The main issue in this matter is whether the defendants purposely or knowingly attempted to cause serious bodily injury to R.L. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude testimony relating to R.L.'s pregnancy and miscarriage after determining the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the likelihood it would prejudice the jury against the defendants. The appeal in State v. Cathcart focused on the exclusion of the evidence. N.J. As affirmed in State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249 (2013), N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits a court to exclude evidence in the event the prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. More than a possibility of substantial prejudice is required State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 165 N.J. 492 (2000). To exclude evidence, the party seeking exclusion must demonstrate that the evidence is has such "inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation." State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971). A significant consideration in the decision to exclude evidence is also whether other evidence is available to prove the fact the evidence is offered to prove. Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 403 (2014). Exclusion of certain evidence, such as motive in a criminal matter, requires a higher showing of prejudice. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218 (1955). Conviction for aggravated assault requires proof by the prosecution that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, acted recklessly in an attempt to cause or did cause such bodily injury pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). State v. Mingo, 263 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd. 132 N.J. 75 (1993). This requires proof of the defendant's mental state at the time of the assault. The State's appeal centered on the fact that the defendants were advised that R.L. was pregnant yet continued with their assault which included kicking and punching R.L. in the abdomen. In its decision to reverse in part and affirm in part, the N.J. Appellate Division determined that the statements regarding R.L.'s pregnancy were highly relevant to the issue of the defendants' mental state but that the testimony regarding the miscarriage was overly prejudicial. Aggravated assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences including 5 to 10 years in prison, with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA), and fines of up to $150,000. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, robbery, burglary, theft or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Thursday, September 3, 2015

Weapons Offense Merges Into Burglary Charge

Sherrone Robinson was charged with third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A.. 2C:5-2; 2C:12-1); second-degree conspiracy to commit burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:18-2); second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-7); fourth-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4)); and third-degree hindering apprehension (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b(1)). Robinson pled guilty to second-degree burglary and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in exchange for dismissal for the other charges. For the burglary the state recommended a 4 year prison term and concurrent 5 year term for the weapons offense. The burglary offense was subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) while the weapon offense carried a mandatory minimum term of three years pursuant to the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). In State v. Robinson, Robinson later appealed the sentence arguing that the weapon possession was for the purpose of the burglary and should be merged therewith rather than included as a separate conviction and offense. In making his argument for merger, Robinson relied on State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (citing State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975)), which held that an accused committing a single offense cannot be punished as if they committed more than one offense. State v. Messino, 378 N.J. Super. 559, 585 (App. Div. 2005) provided an alternative analysis of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8, regarding merger of offenses, which suggested a more "flexible approach" to merger wherein the elements of the crimes are considered. In State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 636 (1996), the court held that "when the only unlawful purpose in possession the [weapon] is to use it to commit the substantive offense, merger is required." The NJ Appellate Division reviewed the record and noted that defense counsel stated the prison terms as set forth in the plea agreement, the judge then reviewed those terms with the defendant on the record and the defendant indicated a full understanding thereof. The Appellate Division decided that the defendant received the benefit of the plea bargain as his counsel negotiated the plea bargain with the State on his behalf. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for correction of the judgment of conviction to reflect merger of the convictions and a sentence of 5 years total of which 4 were subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under NERA. Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, weapons, assault, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Friday, June 5, 2015

Juvenile Offender Will Be Treated Differently Under NJ Senate Bill 2003

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if New Jersey Senate Bill 2003 (S2003) is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial and the level of representation required in hearings to move juvenile matters to the Criminal Part of the Superior Court. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would raise the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult to 15. S2003 would permit juvenile to be tried as adults only for the most serious offenses including criminal homicide; strict liability for drug induced deaths; first-degree robbery; carjacking; sexual assault; second-degree aggravated assault; kidnapping; aggravated arson; certain gang criminality; a crime committed at a time when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent or confined to an adult correctional facility; violent, aggressive, and willful crimes against another; unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon; arson; death by auto if the juvenile was operating the vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug (DUI); a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; a conspiracy which is a part of a continuing criminal activity and the circumstances of the crimes show the juvenile has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a source of livelihood; an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of certain enumerated acts; theft of an automobile; serious computer criminal activity; distribution of any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any property used for school purposes, or within 1,000 feet of such school property. The State would bear the burden of proving that the nature and circumstances of the charge or the prior record of the juvenile are sufficiently serious that the interests of the public require waiver. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. S2003 would require a prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. In further accord with the goal of rehabilitation, academic instruction and academic counseling, vocational education, post-secondary educational opportunities, alcohol and narcotics treatment programs, mental health services, medical and dental care, regular contact with the family members, work programs to prepare the juvenile for treatment, re-entry services, and any other services or assistance reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the juvenile shall be provided as appropriate. S2003 is sponsored by Democrats and received no support from the Republican party. The bill passed the Senate and is presently in the Assembly for consideration and revision. If you are a juvenile facing criminal charges your future is at stake and should not be left to chance. Your future and freedom may depend on the outcome of your case making it imperative that you seek experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about juvenile offenses including drug charges, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a school zone, assault, sex crimes, school issues, breaking and entering, gang related crimes, burglary or other serious matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Thursday, February 12, 2015

Attempted Burglary Suspect Showup Identification Not Unduly Prejudicial

Joseph Volpe was indicted for attempted burglary and convicted of third-degree attempted burglary after a woman, Marwa Mohamad, witnessed him attempting to pry open her kitchen window screen while another individual distracted her by ringing the doorbell of the residence. When the homeowner saw Volpe, it was at close range as she moved a curtain aside to see him standing immediately before her. The description Mohamad offered the 9-1-1 operator was a "heavyset man, with light skin, possibly Hispanic, and black hair" who was wearing a black sweatshirt. Officers in the area hearing the broadcast description discovered Volpe hiding in a nearby wooded area wearing a black t-shirt and also located a black sweatshirt nearby. Officers brought Volpe to Mohamad's residence in the back of a marked police car and wearing handcuffs where she identified him from a distance of approximately 30 feet, through a window of her residence while he remained in the rear of the patrol car with the rear window lowered. In State v. Volpe, a Wade hearing was conducted with regard to Mohamad's identification of Volpe and the court did not find the identification to be unreasonably suggestive. (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed.2d 1149 (1967)). At trial, Mohamad gave testimony regarding the identification. Also, an officer transporting Volpe to the station from the identification offered testimony that Volpe was unemployed at the time of the alleged attempt. The State was not permitted to offer testimony about the defendant's residence in a halfway house at the time of the alleged attempt. The NJ Appellate Division considered defendant's claims regarding the propriety of the identification under the standard of Manson/Madison (Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed.2d 140 (1977), State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223 (1988)) wherein a two-prong test is to be employed to determine whether the identification was impermissibly suggestive and next whether there is a "substantial likelihood of misidentification." In State v. Herrera, 187 N.J. 493 (2006) the court held one-on-one showups to be unduly suggestive but, under State v. Wilkerson, 60 N.J. 452 (1972), the benefits of accuracy of the victim's memory more proximately to the event as well as allowing rapid police action were found to render such identifications permissible in some circumstances. The Manson court held reliability to be paramount in the determination of fairness and set forth five factors courts must assess as follows: "(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the confrontation; and (5) the time between the crime and confrontation. Manson, supra, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S. Ct. at 2253, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 154). After a thorough analysis, the Appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision with regard to admissibility of the identification. The Appellate Division determined that the State's testimony regarding defendant's residence was simply offered to rebut testimony offered by the defendant regarding his residence. Although unemployment is typically inadmissible to prove motive (State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 265-66 (1993), it may be admissible if specifically relevant to prove a fact in issue (State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218, 228-30 (1955)). Once a statement was made regarding Volpe's employment status, the court admonished the prosecution to refrain from further mention thereof but offered no curative instruction. Nonetheless, the Appellate Division held the statement to be harmless error and not unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Finally, Volpe challenged the sentence of the court based on misapplication of sentencing factors. With the prosecution's request for an extended term, the range for sentencing would be three to ten years in this matter and the court agreed that the trial court misapplied the sentencing factors. Ultimately, although the conviction was affirmed, the matter was remanded for re-sentencing. Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Friday, December 26, 2014

Acquittal Of Burglary And Arson But 6-year Sentence For CDS

Michael Naples was indicted for second-degree aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)), third-degree arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b)(2)), third-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1)) and possession of drugs (cocaine) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)). Following a fire, surveillance video revealed Naples riding his bicycle past a vacant building into a parking lot then showed the defendant in the lot again shortly after the fire began. Detectives had seen Naples in the past and quickly located him for questioning. During the conversation, the defendant admitted to having a crack pipe, which he provided to officers, and was also found to have a gas cap in his possession. He denied any knowledge of the fire but smelled of gasoline according to the detectives. His motion to suppress the evidence was denied and the jury acquitted Naples of arson and burglary and found him guilty only of the cocaine possession. He was sentence to a discretionary extended 6-year term in prison with a 3-year period of parole ineligibility. In State v. Naples, the NJ Appellate Court heard the defendant's arguments against the trial court's denial of the suppression motion and the extended sentence imposed for the minute amount of drugs. As to the suppression motion, the Appellate Division quoted State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 21 (2004) in holding that based on the "facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant[ed] a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." With regard to the sentence imposed, the Appellate Division found a "clear showing of abuse of discretion", pursuant to State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979) on the part of the trial court. Although the prosecution moved for an extended sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) applicable to persistent offenders as Naples was over 21 years old, previously convicted on at least 2 separate occasions of 2 separate crimes committed at different times after attaining the age of 18 years old and 10 years had not passed since the commission of his last release from confinement the Appellate Division held that being a persistent offender is only part of the consideration in sentencing to an extended term under State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987). In Dunbar, the court held that the court must also determine whether an extended sentence is appropriate to protect the public under State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 164-65 (2006), weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and determine whether to impose a parole ineligibility period. The Appellate Division determined that the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings and gave too much weight to the controlled dangerous substance (CDS) found in Naples possession. The matter was reversed and remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of the appropriate criteria and Naples criminal history. Drug charges often heavily sentenced and, if found guilty, you risk incarceration, loss of driver's license and substantial fine. If you are facing drug charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, drug charges, CDS, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sunday, August 10, 2014

Robbery Suspects Apprehended By Police GPS Use Without Warrant

US v. Katzin, 732 F. 3d 187 (2013), involved the warrantless placing of a GPS tracking device by police on the vehicle of brothers suspected in the robbery of multiple Rite Aid pharmacies in New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland. Harry Katzin and his van were seen in the proximity of several of the pharmacies where the robberies took place. Using the GPS device, police tracked the Katzin brothers van as they drove to a Rite-Aid where a robbery took place then stopped them shortly thereafter. Evidence gathered during the traffic stop, which resulted from the use of the GPS device, led to their arrest. The device was installed on December 14, 2012 and the Katzins were apprehended on December 16, 2012, limiting the use to approximately 48 hours. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2914 (2011), 564 U.S. ___ (2011) holding that evidence discovered while police were conducting searches in good faith reliance on legalities at the time of the search. In U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 565 U.S. ___ (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle constituted trespass and therefore required a warrant but never addressed whether the warrantless tracking utilizing the GPS device was unreasonable. Justice Steven Breyer's comments during Jones likened the ability of police to monitor individuals 24 hours per day at will using GPS devices to George Orwell's novel 1984. In Katzin, the brothers' suppression motion was granted by a District Judge hearing the matter and government appealed to the Third Circuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that heard arguments in the case held that any evidence obtained through the use of the GPS tracking device must be suppressed. The prosecution maintained that, with probable cause to believe the vehicle is involved in criminal activity, no warrant should be required as the Fourth Amendment requires either a warrant or probable cause. The prosecution further argued that while attached to the vehicle, the device provided no information beyond what could be observed by simple visual surveillance. The ACLU argued that Jones found the original attachment of the GPS device to require a warrant, without consideration of whether limiting the time of the tracking would affect the need for a warrant. The ACLU further argued that the ease and cost-effectiveness of using a GPS device will render law enforcement likely to track individuals even where it there is no reasonableness. Without the requirement of a warrant, police could use GPS devices to gather information and use that information to establish probable cause. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that law enforcement officers must have a valid warrant before installing a GPS tracking device on a suspect's vehicle. If you are facing charges of robbery, the penalties can be severe and you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For further information regarding robbery, warrantless searches, burglary or other serious criminal offenses in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Monday, June 23, 2014

Burglary Punishment Must Fit Crime Not Criminal

In State v. Nieves, Eric Nieves was charged in 4 residential burglaries and related crimes. The jury found him guilty of four burglaries (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); three thefts (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3); dealing in stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7.1b); receiving stolen property (N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7) and conspiracy with codefendants (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, :18-2, :20-7.1). Nieves was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment with 150 months of parole ineligibility. On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence and returned to the court below for resentencing based on the factors set forth in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985). On appeal, Nieves objected to the jury instructions regarding certain lesser included offenses and complicity. Pursuant to State v. Singleton, 211, N.J. 157, 182 (2012), "if the defendant did not object to the charge when given, there is a presumption the charge was not error and unlikely to prejudice defendant's case." Prior to instructing the jury, the judge advised the attorneys of the intended charges and defense counsel gave his assent to both charging decisions. Defendant then bears the burden of showing plain error having a clear capacity of producing and unjust result R. 2:10-2 and the burden was not met. The Appellate Division found defendant's claim of error in the jury instruction on accomplice liability to have insufficient merit and affirmed all convictions. With regard to the custodial sentence, the defendant was sentenced on each of the 10 third degree crimes and received an aggregate sentence of 25 years with 12 1/2 years of parole ineligibility. Defendant did not deny his lengthy criminal history and was aware he qualified as a persistent offender but Nieves argued that the courts extensive reliance on his criminal history was inappropriate. In Yarbough, the court set forth the fact that "punishment should fit the crime, not the criminal, and that there should be a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing." 100 N.J. at 630. State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109 (2011) the New Jersey Supreme Court enumerated the Yarbough factors as modified by statute and offered guidance for appellate review of consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division found the discussion of Yarbough factors by the court below to be too cursory to permit adequate review. Further, any conspiracy conviction must be merged with the underlying completed crime. Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Wednesday, February 12, 2014

Judge Acts As Judge, Jury and Prosecutor in Theft Case

Linden Municipal Court Judge DiLeo denied the requests of Anthony and Wendell Kirkland for appointed public defenders in their theft case and then conducted the trial without a prosecutor present. The judge went so far as to take on the prosecutor's role by undertaking direct examination of the police officers, thereby eliciting the information he felt should be heard, and cross-examining the defendants. The Kirklands were charged with attempting to steal tires from a vehicle. Initially, they sought private counsel then later requested public defenders. The judge found the defendants to have waived their right to counsel. At the trial, the judge invited the Kirklands to participate in cross-examination of the police officers testifying and also to present testimony on their own behalf. The Kirklands presented no testimony or witnesses yet the judge allowed the officers to cross-examine the Kirklands. At the close of this farce, DiLeo found the defendants guilty of theft of moveable property, possession of burglary tools and possession of under 50 grams of marijuana and sentenced them to county jail terms. By the time NJ Superior Court Judge Scott Moynihan heard the Kirklands' appeal, resulting in dismissal of the drug charges and remand to the municipal court for a hearing on the remaining theft charges, the Kirklands had spent 124 days in the Union County jail. This case resulted in a new standard for imposition of punishment on judges for misconduct on the bench. When a reasonable person would find the conduct of the judge to be obviously and seriously wrong, contrary to clearly determined law without question as to interpretation, egregious and made in bad faith or as part of a pattern of error. If you have been accused of a crime, you cannot rely on the legal system to protect your rights. Although the system is designed, on its face, to protect the interests of both the state and the accused, the prosecutors, judges and police officers involved in your case are human and fallible. For more information about theft, burglary, possession of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) or other criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Monday, December 9, 2013

Purposeful and Knowing Intent And The Insanity Defense

A defendant pled guilty to kidnapping, attempted murder, burglary, weapons charges and other criminal charges in two incidents involving his wife and mother-in-law then sought post-conviction relief based on a claim that he was under the influence of prescription medication at the time the plea was entered and he was misled by counsel as to the terms of the plea agreement and inadequately informed as to potential defenses of insanity and diminished capacity. Without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the Essex County Superior Court Judge denied the defendant’s petition. The defendant, while in a Marine Corp combat unit, suffered a head injury while skydiving which caused him to experience blackouts and he also claimed to hear voices. While incarcerated and awaiting trial at the Essex County Correctional Facility, a psychiatrist found the defendant to be confused. He was also placed on suicide watch while awaiting trial as well as medicated. A psychological evaluation to determine competency to stand trial resulted in the finding defendant was bipolar and suffering serious depressive disorder but competent to stand trial. A pre-trial psychological evaluation revealed that, when defendant regained awareness and realized he was choking the victim, he called 911 requesting assistance for her. It was opined that Njango could not have formed the purposeful and knowing intent required to find guilt, nor could the attack have been premeditated. The State’s psychiatrist found defendant to have an intact memory and incapable of meeting the criteria to utilize an insanity defense. The NJ Appellate Division, in State v. Njango, rejected defendant’s argument that he was under the influence of prescription medication however, the Appellate Division did find he had a colorable defense based on a medical report indicating he was suffering from dissociative disorder and major depressive disorder as to one indictment and as to whether the defense was raised, or even discussed, as to the second indictment. Neither of defendant’s plausible issues was raised at the time the plea was entered and no waiver of the insanity defense or other incompetency defense was discussed at the time of the plea. After review of the matter, the court decided to reverse the decision of the Essex County Superior Court Judge and remand for an evidentiary hearing. If you have been charged with criminal activity the impact of a guilty finding or plea can be devastating on your future. Although many individuals are well acquainted with their rights, there are complexities in the law that dictate individuals are best served by obtaining experienced counsel to represent them. For more information about burglary, weapons charges, defenses or other crimes in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Wednesday, July 10, 2013

NJ Considering Removal of Crime History From Job Forms

New Jersey legislators are considering taking out criminal history in job applications throughout the state, which could help many who have convictions for assault, distribution, possession, burglary, shoplifting or other criminal charges. Just last month state legislators proposed a bill that would limit New Jersey employers from asking applicants about their criminal past. Many residents believe that this bill could possibly give an opportunity to previous offenders who do not have many employment options. Meanwhile other residents and employers believe that this bill if approved and implemented could possibly have dangerous criminals capable of doing possible harm to others slip through the cracks. Currently the majority of New Jersey employers inquire about an applicant’s criminal past to try and ensure security within their work place as well as with potential customers. The proposed bill would not override existing laws that require mandatory background checks for certain jobs, such as daycare centers, psychiatric hospitals and law enforcement. There have been several studies done that show that many employers throw away or refuse to give those with a criminal history any consideration for open positions. For some state residents convictions or pleas in their past such as charges for drugs, theft or even underage drinking have affected their ability to obtain consistent employment for actions that happened as long as decades ago. Advocates of the bill believe that many minor offenses that could have happened years ago create an unfair stigma among employers and prevent an equal opportunity among those who are applying. While the bill has not been approved, if implemented it could give thousands a possible first step towards steady employment beginning with a job interview that they would have not been able to get before. Assault and drug charges in NJ will have a serious impact on your life and can have significant implications in related matters such as later personal injury. If you are charged with drug possession or assault in NJ you should seek an experienced attorney immediately to protect your rights. For more information on assault, theft, burglary, shoplifting, possession, distribution, weapons offenses or other criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and is not intended to replace the advice of an attorney in regard to criminal issues.

Sunday, June 16, 2013

Prior Convictions Inadmissible After 10 Years?

In State v. Harris,, 209 N.J. 431 (2012) the defendant was charged with robbery and burglary and the Superior Court Judge permitted the prosecutor to use defendant's 13 year old drug convictions to impeach defendant's testimony. The NJ Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge. Most of the defendant's convictions from 1994 through 2007 were disorderly persons offenses but were still permitted to close the gap of remoteness. As a result, a NJ Supreme Court subcommittee is recommending the adoption of revisions to N.J. Rule of Evidence 609 to prevent the prosecution from introducing evidence of convictions more than 10 years old. In actual practice, a remoteness analysis could be undertaken including the following considerations: (1) whether there are other convictions between the accused crime and any prior crimes the prosecution wishes to admit and the nature and seriousness thereof; (2) whether any of the prior convictions involves fraud or dishonesty and (3) the seriousness of the offense. The final result would be to bar the introduction of evidence regarding prior convictions over 10 years old unless the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence after judicial analysis. If you have been charged with theft, burglary or any other criminal offense in NJ, you should immediately obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information on protecting your rights if charged with theft, burglary, shoplifting or other crimes in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and is not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Saturday, June 8, 2013

Prior Crimes Evidence Inadmissible In Theft Trial

In a theft trial, the prosecution has limited ability to present evidence of prior theft offenses. In State v. Lige, defendant was charged with 3rd degree receiving stolen property in regard to a tow truck and license plate. Defendant's prior criminal history included 18 theft convictions in the Superior Court as well as multiple other offenses. The trial court permitted the prosecution to offer witness testimony indicating defendant was in possession of stolen property on at least 6 other instances. The NJ Appellate Division reversed the case and found a new trial was in order as N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(b), which pertains to receiving stolen property, had been misapplied by the Superior Court. The statute includes that the jury may presume defendant knew the property was stolen if defendant is: (1) in possession of 2 or more items of stolen property on 2 or more separate occasions; or (2) has received stolen property in other transactions within 1 year of the property at issue; or (3) normally transacts in such property but did not make reasonable inquiry into how it was acquired; or (4) is found in possession of 2 or more defaced devices. Under NJ Evidentiary Rule 404(b), evidence of prior crimes is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. In State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992) the Court set forth a 4-part test for determining admissibility under 404(b). In order to be admissible, evidence of prior crimes must be (1) relevant to the material issue in dispute; (2) similar and reasonable proximate in time to the crime charged; (3) clear and convincing; and (4) while offering proof, is not substantially prejudicial to the defendant. Although the evidence presented may have met the criteria of N.J.R.E 404(b), the witnesses proffered by the prosecution presented extensive information to the jury of crimes more than 1 year before or months after the crime charged. In making its decision to reverse the verdict and require a new trial, the Appellate Division held the testimony did not fit within the 1 year statutory limitation or N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(b) and was therefore inadmissible. If you have been charged with receiving stolen property or any other theft offense in NJ, you should immediately obtain an experienced criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information on protecting your rights if charged with theft, burglary, shoplifting or other crimes in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and is not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.