Friday, March 6, 2015
DUI Conviction Becomes Easier For State
The appeal of a Union County driving under the influence (DUI) charge led to removal of yet another burden of proof previously borne by the State. In State v. Peralta, the defendant sought to suppress the Alcotest result of .19% blood alcohol content (BAC) as a result after the officers processing the arrest failed to read the standard refusal statement required by N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e). The municipal court refused to suppress the Alcotest reading and Peralta was convicted of driving while intoxicated. Of note is the fact that the officers observations were not found to be sufficient to convict the defendant of DUI. On appeal, the Law Division also convicted Peralta based on the BAC result. On appeal to the NJ Appellate Division the court held that the refusal statement was created by the Legislature for the purpose of advising those who would refuse to provide a breath sample that those driving on the roads of New Jersey are "deemed to have given their consent to the taking of samples of their breath", N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(a), and advise them of the consequences of such a refusal. State v. Marquez, 202 N.J. 485 (2010). The Appellate Division indicated that N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) was not created to add an additional burden on officers processing DWI matters where the accused is willing to provide a breath sample upon request.
If you are facing charges of DUI or refusal, whether for alcohol or drugs, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
39:4-50,
attorney,
CDS,
controlled dangerous substance,
driving under the influence,
driving while intoxicated,
DUI,
DWI,
refusal,
State v. Marquez,
State v. Peralta
Monday, March 2, 2015
Attempted Murder Suspect Entitled To Fair Trial
Geraldo Rivera was charged with the attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)) of Sean and Michael Burns during a bar fight over Sean Burns' failure to tip the barmaid, Rivera's fiancée'. Sean Burns was left with four stab wounds to the torso and Michael Burns' was cut severely exposing his intestines. Rivera, who claimed self-defense, also suffered head wounds.
Multiple witness accounts diverged considerably leaving the jury to decide which version was most plausible. At trial, the prosecutor utilized various methods, including PowerPoint to present the State's case. Rivera was ultimately convicted of second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) on Sean Burns and fourth-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(3)) on Michael Burns. Rivera was sentenced to eight years in prison with a period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2).
On Appeal in State v. Rivera, Rivera challenged the conviction based upon the State's unfair trial tactics depriving him of the right to a fair trial. The NJ Appellate Division determined that the prosecutor's display of Rivera's picture on a slide with the word guilty on it and other overly suggestive acts including climbing into the jury box at one point while Rivera was seated at the prosecutor's table to operate a projector as if to indicate fear of the defendant deprived Rivera of a fair trial.
If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-3a,
2C:12-1b,
2C:43-7.2,
2C:5-1,
aggravated assault,
assault,
attempt,
attorney,
criminal,
Geraldo Rivera,
law,
lawyer,
murder,
NERA,
No Early Release Act
Monday, February 23, 2015
Venue Change After Death Threats And Murder Conspiracy
Aakash Dalal was charged with multiple crimes including criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1)) for spray painting anti-Semitic graffiti on a synagogue in Hackensack, NJ; first-degree aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)) associated with a synagogue in Rutherford, NJ; first-degree bias intimidation (N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1(a)); and first degree conspiracy to commit aggravated arson (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)) as well as similar matters within the same region occurring during a limited timeframe. Once the matter began proceeding through the courts, Dalal was also charged with first-degree conspiracy to murder a Bergen County Assistant Prosecutor (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); third-degree conspiracy to possess a firearm for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4) and third-degree terroristic threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b)).
Dalal was indicted for many of the charged counts as well as first-degree terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-2(b)(1)) and second-degree terrorism (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-4). Prior to trial, Dalal sought transfer of the case to another judge without objection by the State as the prosecution intended to introduce evidence that Dalal intended to target Presiding Criminal Part Judge Liliana DeAvila-Dilebi and Judge Partick Roma. Dalal also sought change of venue without success and brought an interlocutory appeal.
Given the facts of the case, the NJ Appellate Division judges hearing the matter determined that, despite their own confidence in the judiciary, a reasonable person in Dalal’s situation could have substantial doubt as to their potential for obtaining a fair trial in the Bergen County Superior Court. The appellate judges quoted Chief Justice Rabner’s opinion in DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 506 (2008): “[t]he Judiciary derives its authority from the State Constitution but earns the public’s confidence through acts of unquestioned integrity.” The matter was reversed with directions that the matter be heard by a judge from outside the vicinage.
If you are facing criminal charges, it is imperative that you insure your rights are upheld and you have the best chance possible at a fair trial. For more information about serious criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C;17-1,
2C:11-3,
2C:39-4,
Aakash Dalal,
arson,
Bergen County,
bias,
conspiracy,
firearm,
Judge DeAvila-Dilebi,
Judge Roma,
murder,
terrorism,
weapon
Friday, February 20, 2015
Assault conviction Reversed After Judge Wrongfully Changes Jury Verdict
Francene Oprihory (a.k.a. Oriphory) was indicted in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County, for aggravated assault by purposely, knowingly or recklessly causing injury to a Bergen County Sheriff's Officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(h)) and resisting arrest by using physical force or violence against another Bergen County Sheriff's Officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2a(3)(a)).
The charges arose when the court officers were removing the defendant from a matter wherein her friend was the defendant. The defendant was making comments and, after multiple admonitions by the officers, it became apparent that she would continue to disrupt the proceedings as long as she remained in the courtroom. After some minor difficulty removing Oriphory from the courtroom, Oriphory struck one of the officers once outside then tried to push the other over the fourth floor balcony railing when he attempted to handcuff her. Oriphory was then taken to the ground by both officers and continued to struggle in an effort to avoid being handcuffed. Following a jury trial, the jury announced a not guilty verdict on count one and guilty on count two. Oriphory also pled guilty to a violation of probation at sentencing based on the guilty finding. The trial judge, in spite of the jury's announced verdict, saw a check mark on the line for "guilty" on the verdict sheet for count one and after the jurors left the courtroom and sentenced the defendant to a concurrent four-year period of incarceration for count one.
It is a well settled legal principle that the jury shall decide the guilt or innocence of a defendant. State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191 (1979). A judge may not modify a verdict and may only act upon the verdict returned by the jury. State v. Black, 380 N.J. Super. 581 (App. Div. 2005) Once a verdict is accepted and the jury is discharged, the verdict may not be modified by the court. State v. Jenkins, 349 N.J. Super. 464 (App. Div. 2002). With regard to count two, a recording of the defendant's comments before and during the incident giving rise to the charges was played over and over for the jury based on the prosecutor's assertions that it was somewhat unclear and needed to be heard repeatedly and was then followed up by substantial witness testimony. There was also no consideration of N.J. R.E. 403 to determine whether the probative value outweighed the prejudicial value of the evidence, in addition to N.J.R.E. 402 and 404. The Appellate Division found this potentially deprived the defendant of a fair trial under the principles established by State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125 (1954). On appeal, in State v. Oriphory, the NJ Appellate Division vacated the conviction for count one, reversed the conviction for count two and vacated the plea to the violation of probation as no longer having a supporting factual basis. The matter was remanded for a new trial in another vicinage in order to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, illegal possession of a handgun, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:12-1b,
2C:29-2,
Aggravated Assualt,
assault,
Bergen County Court,
N.J.R.E. 403,
resisting arrest,
State v. Black,
State v. Jenkins,
State v. Orecchio,
State v. Oriphory,
State v. Simon
Monday, February 16, 2015
Murder Conviction Upheld After Graphic Photos Were Shown To Jury
Darwin Rodriguez-Ferreira was convicted of knowing and purposeful murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2)); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d). At sentencing the defendant received a thirty year prison sentence including a thirty year parole disqualifier and consecutive eighteen month sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon.
Kendall was found lying in the street near his Jersey City home with multiple stab wounds. Multiple calls to and from "Darwin" were found in Kendall's cell phone log and a bloody knife wrapped in boxer shorts was found nearby shortly thereafter. The blood contained Kendall's DNA and the boxer shorts contained Darwin's DNA. The defendant left the country with a one-way ticket the day after the murder and police found bloodstains with Kendall's DNA on Darwin's floor while searching Darwin's residence.
In State v. Rodriguez-Ferreira, the defendant appealed the convictions and sentence received in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County. At trial, over Darwin's objection, four graphic photos of Kendall's body depicting stab wounds to the neck and face, torso and forearm were presented to the jury. One photo, taken during the autopsy included stab wounds suffered by internal organs extracted from the body during the autopsy. N.J. Rule of Evidence 403 permits the inclusion of evidence if the probative value substantially outweighs the risk of prejudice to the jury through its revelation. In State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263 (1990), the NJ Supreme Court held that vivid and graphic details which may be difficult to look at do not necessarily call for exclusion of photographic evidence. State v. Sanchez, 244 N.J. Super. 231, 249-51 (App. Div. 1988) allows admission of murder victim photographs to prove the act was "purposeful and knowing." N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the photos. With regard to the sentence imposed, the trial court failed to consider the relevant factors under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) and the matter was remanded by the Appellate Division for sentencing including an articulation of the how the Yarbough Factors apply to require a consecutive sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon.
If you are facing murder charges, it is the state's burden to prove your guilt and they must do so in a just and appropriate manner, without the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence or testimony. It is critical you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to ensure your rights are protected against prejudicial acts by the prosecution or the judge. For more information regarding homicide, assault, weapons charges or other serious criminal issues in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
2C:11-3,
2C:39-4,
2C:39-5,
murder,
Rule 403,
State v. Johnson,
State v. Rodriguez-Ferreira,
State v. Sanchez,
State v. Yarbough,
unlawful possession,
unlawful purpose,
weapon,
Yarbough Factors
Thursday, February 12, 2015
Attempted Burglary Suspect Showup Identification Not Unduly Prejudicial
Joseph Volpe was indicted for attempted burglary and convicted of third-degree attempted burglary after a woman, Marwa Mohamad, witnessed him attempting to pry open her kitchen window screen while another individual distracted her by ringing the doorbell of the residence. When the homeowner saw Volpe, it was at close range as she moved a curtain aside to see him standing immediately before her. The description Mohamad offered the 9-1-1 operator was a "heavyset man, with light skin, possibly Hispanic, and black hair" who was wearing a black sweatshirt. Officers in the area hearing the broadcast description discovered Volpe hiding in a nearby wooded area wearing a black t-shirt and also located a black sweatshirt nearby. Officers brought Volpe to Mohamad's residence in the back of a marked police car and wearing handcuffs where she identified him from a distance of approximately 30 feet, through a window of her residence while he remained in the rear of the patrol car with the rear window lowered.
In State v. Volpe, a Wade hearing was conducted with regard to Mohamad's identification of Volpe and the court did not find the identification to be unreasonably suggestive. (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed.2d 1149 (1967)). At trial, Mohamad gave testimony regarding the identification. Also, an officer transporting Volpe to the station from the identification offered testimony that Volpe was unemployed at the time of the alleged attempt. The State was not permitted to offer testimony about the defendant's residence in a halfway house at the time of the alleged attempt.
The NJ Appellate Division considered defendant's claims regarding the propriety of the identification under the standard of Manson/Madison (Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed.2d 140 (1977), State v. Madison, 109 N.J. 223 (1988)) wherein a two-prong test is to be employed to determine whether the identification was impermissibly suggestive and next whether there is a "substantial likelihood of misidentification." In State v. Herrera, 187 N.J. 493 (2006) the court held one-on-one showups to be unduly suggestive but, under State v. Wilkerson, 60 N.J. 452 (1972), the benefits of accuracy of the victim's memory more proximately to the event as well as allowing rapid police action were found to render such identifications permissible in some circumstances. The Manson court held reliability to be paramount in the determination of fairness and set forth five factors courts must assess as follows: "(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the confrontation; and (5) the time between the crime and confrontation. Manson, supra, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S. Ct. at 2253, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 154). After a thorough analysis, the Appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision with regard to admissibility of the identification. The Appellate Division determined that the State's testimony regarding defendant's residence was simply offered to rebut testimony offered by the defendant regarding his residence. Although unemployment is typically inadmissible to prove motive (State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 265-66 (1993), it may be admissible if specifically relevant to prove a fact in issue (State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218, 228-30 (1955)). Once a statement was made regarding Volpe's employment status, the court admonished the prosecution to refrain from further mention thereof but offered no curative instruction. Nonetheless, the Appellate Division held the statement to be harmless error and not unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Finally, Volpe challenged the sentence of the court based on misapplication of sentencing factors. With the prosecution's request for an extended term, the range for sentencing would be three to ten years in this matter and the court agreed that the trial court misapplied the sentencing factors. Ultimately, although the conviction was affirmed, the matter was remanded for re-sentencing.
Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
attempt,
burglary,
eyewitness,
identification,
Manson v. Braithewaite,
Manson/Madison,
showup,
State v. Herrera,
State v. Madison,
State v. Martini,
State v. Rogers,
state v. Volpe,
US v. Wade,
wade hearing
Tuesday, February 10, 2015
Drugs Suppressed When Found Outside Scope Of Warrant
Police executing a no-knock warrant at a residence located Chad Bivins and co-defendant, Sayid Jordan, in a vehicle located several residences away and, upon removing them from the car searching them, discovered 30 bags of crack cocaine on each of them. Bivins sought to have the crack cocaine suppressed based on his location well outside the residence subject to the warrant but the trial court denied the motion holding that defendant's location was proximate to the residence based on the totality of the circumstances, especially in light of the fact that an officer assigned to the scene located Bivins and co-defendants after receiving a report of individual exiting the residence to be searched.
The defendant appealed the denial of the suppression motion in State v. Bivins. The NJ Appellate Division reversed in reliance on a existing laws with regard to the scope of a search warrant. State v. Reldon, 100 N.J. 187 (1985) limits officers to a search of appropriate areas when executing a search. the warrant in question limited police to search the residence and "all persons present reasonably believed to be connected to said property and investigation. The Appellate Division distinguished this from State v. Carolino, 373 N.J. Super. 377 (App..Div. 2004) wherein "any and app persons arriving at, departing from and located [in] the residence and vehicle in question were included in the warrant and both the behavior and proximity of the defendant therein differed greatly from Bivins. Bailey v. United States, ___U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed.2d 19 (2013) dictates that specific facts are required to connect an individual to a scene once they have departed premises subject to a warrant. The Appellate Division applied Bailey to the facts including neither the defendant nor the Pontiac in which he was located were described in the affidavit supporting the warrant, he was located a substantial distance outside the residence to be searched, the officer who searched the defendant received no report that the individuals fled the premises with evidence sought under the warrant being executed and the defendant did not act in a suspicious manner. The Appellate Division found that upholding the search would afford officers executing warrants overly broad discretion and therefore reversed the denial of the suppression motion.
Drug charges, particularly distribution charges, have serious consequences including substantial terms of incarceration and enhanced penalties under certain circumstances. If you are facing drug charges and believe evidence obtained against you may have been obtained in violation of your rights, you should consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about controlled dangerous substances (CDS), warrantless searches, distribution of CDS, possession, CDS in a motor vehicle or other criminal issues in NJ visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com.
This blog is for informational purposes and in no way intended to replace the advice of an attorney.
Labels:
Bailey v. United States,
CDS,
cocaine,
crack,
crime,
criminal,
distribution,
illegal search,
no-knock,
possession,
search and seizure,
State v. Bivins,
State v. Carolino,
State v. Reldon,
warrant,
warrantless search
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