Distribution Conviction Reversed For Detective's Improper Testimony

Brian Firman was charged with third-degree possession of cocaine (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); third-degree possession with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)) and 5(b)(3)); third-degree distribution (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) and 5(b)(3)); and third-degree distribution of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7). The charges stemmed from a detectives observation of the defendant and 2 other men in what he believed to be a hand to hand drug transaction which, when he approached to speak to them, was terminated abruptly and one of the men was observed to throw something on the ground which proved to be crack cocaine. During the pat-down search that followed, there paraphernalia was located on the persons of the other 2 co-defendants but nothing in the report reflected possession on the part of Firman. At trial, Firman was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 6 years in prison. In State v. Firman, the defendant appealed on the basis that the detective, McDonald, a non-expert, offered testimony exceeding the level permitted from a fact witness through his ample opinions. The defendant failed to object at trial, leaving the NJ Appellate Division to review the matter under the plain error standard of State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91 (2013). Under the plain error standard, the Appellate Division would reverse in the event that the testimony of McDonald which crossed the line into expert testimony, which he was not qualified to offer, could have led the jury to a different result than it would have reached without the inappropriate testimony. State v. Atwater, 400 N.J. Super. 319 (App. Div. 2008). The N.J. Appellate Division determined that without the impermissible testimony of the detective, the jury could have reached a different result and that the guilty verdict must be reversed with the matter remanded for a new trial. If you are facing charges for drug distribution or possession, there are multiple components which may affect the ultimate outcome. Drug distribution charges are met with harsh penalties due to the public interest in deterrence and it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect you against the charges and penalties. For more information regarding drug distribution, possession and possession with intent to distribute visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Motion To Suppress Handgun Denied

James Legette was indicted for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b) and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C: 39-7). Legette, once in police custody entered his residence, with officers, and attempted to remove a handgun from his own person to avoid police detecting the gun in any subsequent search of his person. State v. Legette began when police responded to a noise complaint and noted the defendant coming from a building smelling of burnt marijuana and stopped him for investigatory purposes. The defendant claimed the need to enter his apartment to obtain his identification and the officer agreed and accompanied him. While walking through the premises toward the defendant's apartment, the office noticed what appeared to be a gun in the pocket of the defendant's sweatshirt. Once inside his apartment, the defendant produced his identification and removed his sweatshirt while the officer was radioing in the defendant's information. The defendant agreed to accompany the officer back outside with the officer carrying the sweatshirt defendant had removed as evidence. Once outside, a search of the sweatshirt by the officer's K-9 obviated the handgun in the pocket of the sweatshirt and the defendant was placed under arrest. In an ensuing motion to suppress the handgun, the NJ Superior Court trial judge held that James Legette was validly accompanied into his residence by police when sought to enter his own residence for the stated purpose of obtaining his identification. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Division reviewed State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281 (2013) giving the officer the right to enter the common hallway of the building as he was called to the scene by citizens to investigate a noise complaint. Also under Walker, the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the door the defendant opened gave the officer probable cause to believe contraband may be present. State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 314 (2014) which read the fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution to guarantee individuals the right of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure in their homes. However, under State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 234 (1983) when an individual under arrest chooses to enter their residence to obtain an item, it is both permissible and reasonable for officers to accompany them into the residence. The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial judge. If you are facing charges stemming from illegal possession of a handgun, BB gun, paintball gun or other weapon it is critical you not undertake these matters without experienced counsel. For more information about unlawful possession of a weapon, illegal weapons, possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes or other serious weapons offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Thanksgiving Blessings

Happy Thanksgiving from the Darling Law Firm to you all. We invite you all to remember that the origins of Thanksgiving are to thank God for blessings including military victories or the end of drought and famine. We would like to offer our thanks to the members of the military who put their lives on the line to keep us safe, to the police and firefighters who will not be home with their families today, to the doctors and nurses spending their day tending to the ill and infirm and those collecting, cooking and delivering food for those in need. Happy Thanksgiving to all!

Restraining Order Issued Based On E-Mail To Employer

J.D. v. C.C. was an appeal of a Final Restraining Order (FRO) pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to 35) granted by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County upon the finding that C.C. committed harassment (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a)) against J.D. by sending e-mails to his employer alleging, among other things, that he drove his company vehicle while under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50). After a 2 year relationship, J.D. proposed marriage to C.C. who rejected him and J.D. elected to terminate their relationship. Thereafter, C.C. began to appear at J.D.'s residence at inopportune times and run into him as he went about his business. C.C. also sent text messages to J.D. indicating that she intended would cause trouble for him and intended to contact his employer. C.C. did send the e-mail and J.D. sought a restraining order. The trial judge issued the Final Restraining Order upon finding that, although no physical assault occurred, the actions of C.C. constituted harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and was the behavior that the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act was designed to prevent. Pursuant to State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997), the elements of harassment include (1) the defendant making or causing to be made a communication; (2) with the purposes to harass another; and (3) in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the intended recipient. On appeal, the N.J. Appellate Division found that the e-mail to J.D.'s employer could be designed for no other purpose than to harass J.D. The Appellate Division further held that the need to prevent further abuse, under Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), was a factor in this matter and affirmed the decision of the court below. If you are charged with domestic violence or seeking a final restraining order against an abuser, there are specific burdens of proof for both parties in proving or disproving the charges making it critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you in such matters. For more information regarding domestic violence, restraining orders, assault, battery and other criminal law issues in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Cyber-Harassment Laws Punish Those Using Internet For Personal Grudges

In spite of numerous educational efforts targeted to both juveniles and adults, the crime of cyber-harassment continues to be a growing issue due to the perceived degree of anonymity by those perpetrating such crimes. Cyber-harassment (N.J.S.A. 2:33-4.1) is communication with the purpose to harass another by employing a physical threat of bodily injury or the conveyance of lewd, indecent or obscene material with the purpose of causing emotional harm to the person or persons portrayed in said material. Actual harm need not be caused by the acts as long as the acts are undertaken with the intent to emotionally harm a reasonable person or place a reasonable person in fear of physical or emotional harm. Cyber-harassment charges are substantially more serious than standard harassment charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. While standard harassment charges are disorderly persons offenses, cyber-harassment charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1 are felony charges which begin at a fourth-degree level and increase in degree if aggravating circumstances are present. Due to the serious consequences, ranging from minimal damage to a person's reputation to suicide in some extreme cases, New Jersey and other states have taken an increasingly harsh stance against those accused of perpetrating or conspiring (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:33-4.1) to perpetrate such crimes. The federal government has also enacted 18 U.S.C. Section 2261A, applicable to those intending to threaten or harm, physically or emotionally, those in other states by employment of the internet. If you are charged with cyber-harassment, or conspiracy to commit cyber-harassment, you should consult an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately. For more information about cyber-harassment, harassment or other serious criminal charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Gun Permit Bill Veto By Governor Christie Is Overridden

Governor Chris Christie's veto of a bill addressing gun permits in New Jersey, S-2360, was overridden by the NJ Senate. The bill would require notification to the courts when an individual sought to have mental health records expunged for the purpose of obtaining a firearms purchaser identification card. Christie called the bill a 'half-measure' which failed to address mental health issues and gun violence comprehensively. Under S-2360, individuals would have to notify New Jersey State Police, their county prosecutor and local police department when seeking expungement of their mental health records for the purpose of obtaining a gun permit. Presently, those with mental health histories are unable to obtain a gun permit under most circumstances. While proponents of the bill believe it will close loopholes which currently allow those with a history of mental illness to purchase guns legally, Christie believes the public would be better served by requiring those previously mandated to mental health treatment to prove they had been successfully treated and in order to obtain a gun permit. For more information about gun laws in New Jersey including obtaining a gun permit, possession of illegal weapons, unlawful possession of a weapon, regulations on BB guns and paintball guns and other weapons offenses visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Distracted Driving In NJ

Although most thing of the New Jersey Cell Phone law (N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3) when thinking of distracted driving in New Jersey. Although texting and driving is a frequent cause of serious motor vehicle accidents, there are other classifications of "distracted driving" which can lead to police pulling you over and issuing you a summons resulting in $200-$400 plus court costs for a first offense, $400-600 plus court costs for a second offense and $600-800, 3 points and up to 90 day loss of license for a third or subsequent offense. In addition to texting or talking on a cell phone, programming or using an electronic device to find your destination can also lead to a summons. Although many see people applying make-up or shaving while driving and shaken our heads in disbelief, routine activities many are guilty of including eating or drinking, adjusting your radio, looking at a map, and even talking to your passengers can be reasons for police to stop you and issue a summons. With newly relaxed search warrant rules established in State v. Witt, (A-9-14)(074468), 435 N.J. Super. 608, 610-11 (App. Div. 2014), 219 N.J. 624 (2014), this can ultimately lead to a search of your vehicle, arrest and other serious charges. If you are charged with distracted driving, you should consult an experienced traffic attorney immediately. For more information about using a cell phone while driving, warrantless vehicle searches, distracted driving and other motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

S385/A1368 And DUI In NJ

Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) can have devastating consequences to both victims and drivers alike. New Jersey legislation, S385/A1368, has been proposed as a means of preventing would-be repeat offenders from getting behind the wheel while allowing individuals who made an innocent but costly mistake a chance to continue to drive by installing an Ignition Interlock Device on their primary vehicle or vehicles. The proposed legislation includes only 10 day license suspensions upon conviction for the purpose of installing the device on the vehicle. Once installed, the driver must blow into the device, which detects alcohol on the breath, in order to start the vehicle. If the ignition interlock device detects that the driver's blood alcohol content (BAC) is elevated over .05%, the ignition will be disabled. Additionally, once the vehicle is in operation, the ignition interlock device requires the driver to blow into the mouthpiece at certain intervals to better insure the individual driving the vehicle remains sober and the individual who initially blew into the device is in fact the driver. NJ S385/A1368 would permit first-offenders with a BAC of between .08 and .10% to avoid long-term license suspension by installing in ignition interlock device for 3 to 6 months, unless aggravating circumstances exist which indicate a long-term license suspension is appropriate. First-time offenders with a BAC of .10% or greater would be required to install the device for 7 to 12 months. Additionally, there are additional penalties for those who circumvent the ignition interlock device or drive a vehicle without an interlock device during their required installation period. Those who in any way facilitate another in circumventing an ignition interlock device, by blowing into the device, disabling it or providing another vehicle to the suspended driver also face criminal charges which can result in up to 6 months in jail. Second-offenders would be required to install the device for a period of 2 to 4 years. Persistent offenders would continue to face long-term suspension and jail terms. The ignition interlock device bears an installation cost as well as a monthly service fee and drivers still face increased insurance costs and other motor vehicle fees in the event of a DUI conviction. If you are facing DUI charges, the consequences can include large fines, loss of a job due to inability to commute or loss of certain professional licenses as a result of the DUI, jail and the social stigma associated with DUI. If you have been charged with driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, you need experienced defense counsel in your corner. For more information about DUI, DUID, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, reckless driving or other motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

State v. Witt, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4 and Guns

Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.4, police may impound your vehicle in the event that a weapon contained therein is possessed for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4); an individual is in unlawful possession of a weapon therein (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5); a motor vehicle with an occupant unlawfully possessing a weapon is used in another crime; the motor vehicle is used to further prostitution (N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1); and either controlled dangerous substances (CDS) are contained within the vehicle (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10) or the vehicle is being used for drug trafficking (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5). If you are stopped for a simple traffic violation and the police find cause within the newly prescribed limits of State v. William Witt, 219 N.J. 624 (2014), wherein the New Jersey Court overturned its prior ruling in Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), relaxing the requirements for police to obtain a warrant to search your vehicle, you may find yourself facing weapons charges and without the reasonable transportation you need to obtain suitable defense counsel. Second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm or handgun carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory parole ineligibility period under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). If you find yourself facing weapons charges or the impoundment of your vehicle as a result of a warrantless search or search with inadequate probable cause, you should immediately seek the assistance of a seasoned criminal defense attorney to protect your rights. For more information about possession of a controlled dangerous substance, CDS in a motor vehicle (N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1), distribution of CDS, weapons possession, use or possession of a gun in the commission of a crime, possession of a handgun without a permit, weapons possession while on probation or parole, illegal weapons or other weapons related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Matter Changes Warrantless Search Standard In NJ

State v. William L. Witt, (A-9-14)(074468), 435 N.J. Super. 608, 610-11 (App. Div. 2014), 219 N.J. 624 (2014), began as a possible driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) case but, due to the warrantless search of Witt's vehicle, led to an indictment for second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm (N.J.S.A. 2C:39- 5(b)) and second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)). Following a trial and appeals in this matter the result was the overturning of State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), which has been the standard for automobile searches in New Jersey. After being pulled over and removed from the vehicle for field sobriety tests, which police claim he failed. After arresting Witt, the police searched the vehicle for "intoxicants" and discovered a handgun in the center console. The trial court followed Pena-Flores in holding that the warrantless search of the vehicle, beyond a plain view search for open containers of alcohol, was in violation of Witt's rights and suppressed the handgun. The N.J. Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision to suppress the gun finding that there were no circumstances involved in this matter which could give rise to justification of the warrantless search. The N.J. Supreme Court held, days ago, that there should be a return to the standard of State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981), wherein the automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows police with probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime to search a vehicle when unforseeable circumstances arise during a motor vehicle stop. State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000), added the need for exigent circumstances to the standard set in Alston and Pena-Flores reaffirmed Cooke adding a preference for the use of available technology to obtain warrants in if at all practicable. The State argued that the Pena-Flores standard was overly subjective, lacked uniform application, placed police officers in harm's way, motorists were ultimately consenting rather than the police applying for warrants, and where vehicles were impounded the intrusion was greater than that involved in a roadside search. The NJ Supreme Court considered the standard established by the United States Supreme Court, which requires only that the vehicle is easily moveable, including even mobile homes, and the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense. The NJ Supreme Court further considered the difficulty caused to officers by upholding the standards in Pena-Flores against the Constitutional protections it provides. The Court opted for a return to the standard established in Alston, which offers police much broader authority to avoid obtaining a search warrant than under Pena-Flores. If you are facing charges of DUI, refusal or other criminal charges as a result of an included search of your vehicle, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle, illegal possession of a firearm, other weapons offenses or other serious motor vehicle charges in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Denial Of Motion To Suppress Marijuana And Handgun Upheld

Kenneth L. Hawes was indicted for third-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(11)); second-degree possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 500 feet of public property (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1); second-degree possession of a firearm while in the course of committing a crime (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 and 2C:39-4.1(a)); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)). An anonymous caller informed Franklin Township police that a black male was selling what may be narcotics from an SUV in a parking lot. Upon investigating, officers in plain clothes saw the man, who had been brought to their attention previously, selling hats, CDS, DVDs and other merchandise from a GMC Envoy and, upon approaching, smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from Hawes and the SUV. Hawes moved away from the officers but was seized by the arm and subjected to a pat-down search by the officers for their personal safety in which a small pouch with marijuana was discovered on Hawes person and he was placed under arrest. Hawes then asked if he could return the merchandise to his vehicle before being removed and upon returning the merchandise to the vehicle for him, the officers discovered a handgun in partial plain view. Officer Hernandez removed the gun then proceeded to search the vehicle for other weapons, discovering an additional 70 bags of marijuana in the vehicle. At the suppression hearing, in State v. Hawes, the defendant testified that he never asked the officers to return anything to the vehicle and that the weapon was not in plain view. The motion judge found the defendant and his 4 witnesses to lack credibility and denied the motion to suppress. Following the denial of his suppression motion, Hawes entered a retraxit plea of guilty to both indictments in exchange for the State's recommendation of a maximum 10 year sentence with a 5 year period of parole ineligibility. The Somerset County Superior Court Judge sentenced Hawes according to the plea agreement but did not separately impose sentences on the charges. Hawes challenged the validity of the scope of the pat-down search, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), in which under claim of a protective search officers opened the coin pouch discovered in his pocket. Hawes further challenged the ensuing search of his vehicle, including discovery of the handgun and bags of marijuana, as fruit of the poisonous tree under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417-18, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 454-56 (1963). The NJ Appellate Division followed State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601 (2007); State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471 (2001); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272 (1998); and State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004) in properly placing the burden of proof on the State to prove the warrantless search and seizure was soundly within one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Appellate Court held that, based on the circumstances at the time of the search under State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), police had probable cause to arrest Hawes and, therefore, the search and seizure were valid under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446 (2002); State v. McKenna, 228 N.J. Super. 468 (App. Div. 1988); and State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377 (1964). Further, the Appellate Division held that defendant's request to return the merchandise to his vehicle gave police opportunity to view the handgun, in plain view, in the defendant's vehicle which, once discovered, made it valid for the police to search the remainder of the vehicle for further weapons without first obtaining a warrant pursuant to U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1968). Although the denial of the suppression motion was upheld on appeal, the matter was remanded for re-sentencing due to the court's failure to impose individual sentences for each offense as required under State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263 (1984). The difference between having a search upheld or suppressing evidence obtained from a search rests on small legal distinctions. If the police obtained evidence against you in what you believed to be an illegal search, it is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to defend you against the prosecution. For more information about warrantless search, search and seizure, drugs, weapons or other criminal issues in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Assault Conviction For Off-Duty Police Officer

Newark police officer, Hugo Fierro, was indicted for second-degree official misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2), third-degree aggravated assault causing bodily injury (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7)), third-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2)); fourth-degree aggravated assault by pointing a handgun at another person (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4)) and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)) after a an off-duty altercation outside an Essex County bar while out with his wife. He was convicted by a jury of simple and aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1) and official misconduct and sentenced to 5 years in prison without parole, the minimum for official misconduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.5.1. Evidence offered at trial indicated that Fierro, while off duty and walking with his wife in the Ironbound section of Newark after dinner and dancing, encountered a group of men drinking on the street and went out of his way to order them to disperse. He next identified himself as a police officer to another intoxicated man and guided him by the arm toward a street to help him obtain a cab. At this time, the victim claimed he approached and Fierro yelled "what's your problem? What's your problem?" and tried to grab the victim. Upon finding himself unable to catch the victim, Fierro withdrew a gun from his side, stated he was a police officer, pursued the retreating victim and hit him in the face with the barrel of the handgun at which time the victim fled. The following day the victim reported the incident and selected Fierro's photo out of a photo array. An outdoor camera had recorded the incident and Fierro was positively identified. However, Fierro testified that, while he was trying to assist an intoxicated man to a cab, the victim approached, would not go away when Fierro asked, twice slapped Fierro's hand when he attempted to create space between them and was acting in a manner which caused Fierro to believe the victim may attack. Fierro claimed that he did not strike the man but did push him away by placing his hands on the victim's chest and pushing him back while holding his gun as he believed the victim may have possessed a weapon. Additionally, an officer who took the victim's report testified that there was no visible damage to the victim's face at the time the report was made. On appeal, in State v. Fierro, the defendant argued that the jury's split verdict demonstrated the juror's lack of understanding of the elements of the charges. The NJ Appellate Division considered Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S. Ct. 189, 76 L. Ed. 356 (1932), United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 461 (1984), State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44 (2004), State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551 (2005) and others in holding that a split verdict does not definitively indicate that the jury did not fully understand and properly execute its function. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Assault and attempted assault charges are very serious and bear severe consequences. If you are a police officer or other official, the consequences are even more severe. If you are facing assault charges, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to insure your rights are protected. For more information about assault, illegal possession of a handgun, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purposed or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

DUI Blood Draw Due To Exigent Circumstances

Donna Jones was suspected of driving under the influence (DUI) at the time she caused a three car accident, resulting in injury to herself and another, by rear ending a car stopped at a light then striking a second car immediately in front of the first before her vehicle came to rest. As a result of the accident, Jones was unconscious. Although officers were alerted by EMTs to an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Jones' breath at the scene, no field sobriety testing was possible due to her condition. Jones was transported to the hospital for treatment after emergency personnel extracted her from her vehicle. At the hospital Jones remained unconscious for some time and was despondent upon regaining consciousness. An officer requested that blood be extracted from Jones without a warrant and the resultant blood alcohol content (BAC) reading was .345 percent. Jones was indicted for fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)) and issued summonsed for DUI (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) and reckless driving (N.J.S.A. 39:4-96). In Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013), a driver was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a result of a routine traffic stop and U.S. Supreme Court determined that the natural metabolization of alcohol in an individual's bloodstream does not, without more, constitute exigent circumstances giving rise to the ability of police to forego the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and withdraw a blood sample without consent. Pursuant to the holding in McNeely and the fact that there was no proof police were unable to obtain a warrant under the particular facts of the case, the trial court suppressed Jones' blood alcohol content (BAC) reading. On appeal, in State v. Jones, the State argued that McNeely should not have been applied retroactively in this case where the incident occurred but the case was decided after McNeely. The NJ Appellate division determined the trial judge erred in his application of the standard required under McNeely and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and held that the BAC results of Jones should not have been suppressed. In State v. Dyal, 97 N.J. 229, 238 (1984), New Jersey courts held it legal to obtain a blood sample without the need for a warrant as long as there was a reasonable belief the driver was intoxicated and the blood was withdrawn "in a medically acceptable manner…without the use of excessive force." The NJ Appellate Division did consider McNeely in determining that it is a given that a person's BAC does dissipate once the alcohol is fully absorbed into the blood stream and declines over time until it is fully metabolized thus creating a need for drawing blood to preserve evidence of intoxication. The decision of the trial court with regard to suppression of the BAC results was reversed. If you are convicted of DUI you face serious penalties including loss of license for up to 10 years, incarceration for up to 180 days and substantial fines. You should obtain an experienced DUI attorney immediately to help fight your case. For more information about DWI, drug DUI, CDS in a motor vehicle, blood and urine testing, reckless driving, refusal to submit to a breath test or other serious motor vehicle offenses in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Weapons Offense Merges Into Burglary Charge

Sherrone Robinson was charged with third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A.. 2C:5-2; 2C:12-1); second-degree conspiracy to commit burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, 2C:18-2); second-degree burglary (N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b); second-degree possession of a weapon by a convicted person (N.J.S.A. 2C:38-7); fourth-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4)); and third-degree hindering apprehension (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b(1)). Robinson pled guilty to second-degree burglary and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in exchange for dismissal for the other charges. For the burglary the state recommended a 4 year prison term and concurrent 5 year term for the weapons offense. The burglary offense was subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2) while the weapon offense carried a mandatory minimum term of three years pursuant to the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c)). In State v. Robinson, Robinson later appealed the sentence arguing that the weapon possession was for the purpose of the burglary and should be merged therewith rather than included as a separate conviction and offense. In making his argument for merger, Robinson relied on State v. Tate, 216 N.J. 300, 302 (2013) (citing State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77 (1975)), which held that an accused committing a single offense cannot be punished as if they committed more than one offense. State v. Messino, 378 N.J. Super. 559, 585 (App. Div. 2005) provided an alternative analysis of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8, regarding merger of offenses, which suggested a more "flexible approach" to merger wherein the elements of the crimes are considered. In State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 636 (1996), the court held that "when the only unlawful purpose in possession the [weapon] is to use it to commit the substantive offense, merger is required." The NJ Appellate Division reviewed the record and noted that defense counsel stated the prison terms as set forth in the plea agreement, the judge then reviewed those terms with the defendant on the record and the defendant indicated a full understanding thereof. The Appellate Division decided that the defendant received the benefit of the plea bargain as his counsel negotiated the plea bargain with the State on his behalf. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for correction of the judgment of conviction to reflect merger of the convictions and a sentence of 5 years total of which 4 were subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under NERA. Burglary charges are not often lightly sentenced as they involve the possibility of great physical harm when the intruder and the owner or dweller accidentally meet and both act in fear. If you are facing burglary charges, you should seek experienced criminal defense counsel immediately. For more information about burglary, weapons, assault, theft, robbery or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

S2003/A4229 Promotes Rehabilitation Of Juvenile Offenders

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if S2003, a Senate bill, the same as A4229 in the Assembly, is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial, and represented. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would make 15 the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult. S2003 would permit juveniles to be tried as adults only for Criminal homicide other than death by auto, strict liability for drug induced deaths, first-degree robbery, carjacking, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, second-degree aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated arson, certain gang criminality; or when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent, or convicted, on the basis of certain offenses enumerated; or when the juvenile had previously been sentenced and confined in an adult penal institution; or offense against a person committed in an aggressive, violent and willful manner; or the unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon, arson or death by auto while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug; or a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; or a conspiracy; certain forms of attempt or conspiracy; or theft of an automobile pursuant to chapter 20 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes; or possession of a firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person of another or the crime of aggravated assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, burglary or escape if, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the crime including the immediate flight therefrom, the juvenile possessed a firearm; or computer criminal activity which would be a crime of the first or second degree; and other specific crimes involving controlled dangerous substances. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. In certain cases juveniles could remain in youth facilities until age 21 even if they are convicted as adults. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. A prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part would be required to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. The bill was passed by both the Senate and Assembly and now will move before Governor Chris Christie for consideration. If you or your child have been charged as a juvenile offender, it is critical that you seek an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights and your future. Do not compound one mistake by choosing the wrong criminal defense attorney. For more information about juvenile offenses, gang crimes, and various criminal offenses in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Self-Defense Applies In Manslaughter Case

Jacob R. Gentry was charged with murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a), aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)) and reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b) after a fight with David Haulmark in which Gentry's girlfriend and brother are alleged to also have been involved. Gentry maintained the killing was in self-defense as, while fighting with Haulmark, he was pinned to the ground, being choked and fighting for his life. At trial, the prosecution cross-examined defendant about statements which his brother had made to police which were hearsay, inadmissible at defendant's trial and never entered into the trial by defendant and defendant's brother did not testify in defendant's trial. After the court failed to inform the jury that self-defense was not only a justification to murder but also to aggravated manslaughter, Gentry was convicted of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and third-degree endangering an injured victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2) and sentenced, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Sussex County by Judge N. Peter Conforti to 30 years in prison subject to an 85 percent parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). On Appeal in State v. Gentry, the NJ Appellate Division looked to State v. Rodriguez, 195 N.J. 165, 170 (2008) and State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 200 (1984), regarding the requirement of a jury charge regarding self-defense when the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, supports the theory of self-defense. In Gentry, there was evidence presented that defendant and Haulmark worked together and were housed together for some time during which Gentry suffered repeated physical attacks and harassment at the hands of Haulmark and Haulmark's friends which were corroborated by independent witnesses including security from Legend's Resort wherein the workers were housed and other individuals who felt harassed by Haulmark. On the night in question, defendant claimed he feared for his life as Haulmark had him in a chokehold while on the ground and was biting him at the same time, all of which were supported by a physical examination of defendant's body following the event. Defendant admitted to kicking Haulmark, 80 pounds heavier than defendant, in the head after extracting himself from Haulmark's grip, out of fear that Haulmark would get back up and pursue him further. The defendant's testimony to police indicated that he had no idea Haulmark was seriously injured or dead until the police revealed the information. In Rodriguez, supra, 195 N.J. at 172, the NJ Supreme Court specifically held that one who kills in the belief that deadly force is required to spare his or her own life 'cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter.' N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) also sets forth the circumstances in which deadly force becomes acceptable as a form of self-defense. Once self-defense is established by testimony, it is the burden of the prosecution to disprove that the defendant acted in self-defense. State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 298 (2004), sets forth the principle that after sufficient evidence exists to support a self-defense charge to the jury, failure to instruct the jury that self-defense is a complete justification for murder and manslaughter defenses constitutes plain error. With regard to the prosecutor's cross-examination with regard to the statement of the defendant's non-testifying brother to the police, the prohibition is plainly stated in State v. Haskell, 100 N.J. 469, 478 (1985), "the out-of-court statement of a co-defendant is inadmissible against another defendant because admission of the statement violates the rule prohibiting hearsay and the defendant's fundamental right to confront witnesses." In this case, the witness was available and the defendant was offered no opportunity to cross-examine him at trial which, under State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 151 (2014), could have rendered the statement admissible. Multiple questions and comments in summation by the prosecutor clearly gave rise to prejudicial error in violation of Gentry's rights under State v. Vandeweaghe, 177 N.J. 229 (2003); State v. Rucki, 367 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 2004); and State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158 (2001). Based on the cumulative errors at trial, the NJ Appellate Division reversed and remanded the matter. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Racketeering Conspiracy Charges Based On Warrantless Search

Xiomara Gonzales was charged with second-degree racketeering conspiracy (N.J.S.A 2C:5-2 and 2C:41-2(d)); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); first-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2:35-5(b)(1)); and first-degree distribution of CDS (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1)) after police conducted a planned stop of her vehicle with knowledge that there would likely be drugs therein. Gonzales sought to have heroin seized from her vehicle suppressed and the trial court judge denied her motion to suppress based upon the automobile exception and plain view exception to the search warrant requirement. Following the denial of her suppression motion, Gonzales pled to third-degree conspiracy to possess a controlled dangerous substance (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:35-10(a)(1)). On appeal in State v. Gonzales, the NJ Appellate reversed and remanded the matter concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. The record revealed that the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office, Newark Police Department Narcotics Unit and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) were conducting investigations into various individuals. Through the use of a wiretap, the agencies received information indicating a suspect would be traveling to Newark to pick up heroin. The intent was to utilize a “wall off” traffic stop whereby the underlying wiretapping remains undisclosed by making the stop appear to be a routine traffic stop. Essex County law enforcement officers began following the suspect and Gonzales as they entered the Newark area in separate vehicles. Officers observed the suspect enter 2 separate locations and, at one point, place large bags obtained at the second location into the rear seat of Gonzales vehicle. Gonzales was then called by the suspect, whose phone was being tapped, and instructed to return to their point of origin without the suspect, as well as how to proceed through the Garden State Parkway toll booth without paying. After the pair separated, the police took their opportunity to “wall off” Gonzales from the suspect and avoid the risk that the suspect would realize his phone was tapped. Essex County officers were specifically told which vehicle to stop based on the information received by investigators from the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office by virtue of the wiretap. Upon stopping Gonzales vehicle, officers observed bricks of heroin which had fallen out of the bags onto the rear floor area of defendant’s vehicle and were then in plain view. The trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Monmouth County held that the three prongs of the plain view exception articulated in State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192 (2002) were satisfied and upheld the search. The NJ Appellate Division reviewed State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211 (2013), Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed.2d 639 (1980), State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97 (2010) and State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169 (1989) in holding that a search is presumptively invalid without a warrant issued by a neutral judge after a full recitation of the facts upon which said warrant is being sought or the search falls squarely within one of the well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Appellate Division held that the plain view exception is applicable, under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed.2d 564 (1971), only in the event the evidence comes into plain view inadvertently and that items discovered in plain view following pretextual stops are subject to suppression under State v. Damplias, 282 N.J. Super 471 (App. Div. 1995) and therefore the exception was not satisfied. The Appellate Division further considered State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 2022 (2009), wherein it was set forth that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is satisfied in the event that: “(1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband; (2) the circumstances demonstrate an exigency making it impracticable for the police to obtain a warrant; and (3) the traffic stop is ‘unforeseen and spontaneous.” The NJ Appellate Division held that during the time the police were following Gonzales through the Newark area prior to stopping her vehicle they had ample time to obtain a warrant to search her vehicle and their failure to do so did not entitle them to the benefit of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and reversed and remanded the matter to the NJ Superior Court. Racketeering and gang activity are serious criminal charges with severe penalties including lengthy prison sentences and prohibitive fines. If you are facing these charges you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel immediately to protect your rights and freedom. For more information about racketeering conspiracy, gang activity, possession of a controlled dangerous substance, possession of CDS with intent to distribute or distribution of CDS visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Resisting Arrest Charged May Be Managed With PTI

K.S. was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), refusal to submit to chemical breath testing (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2), third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a)), third-degree resisting arrest (N.J. S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a)), fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a police officer (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-13) and fourth-degree criminal mischief (N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1)). As K.S. was being transported to the Watchung Borough police station under suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI), he attempted to spit blood onto an arresting officer. K.S. had a juvenile criminal history including assault, possession of a weapon, fighting and harassment as well as an adult charge for violent behavior which had been dismissed and, based upon this prior record, was denied entry into Pretrial Intervention (PTI) by the Somerset County Prosecutor. Prosecutors are afforded broad discretion in the determination of whether a defendant should be admitted into PTI and, barring patent abuse of discretion, the prosecutor's decision is normally upheld. State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503 (1981). The Somerset County Superior Court agreed with the prosecutor's decision to deny defendant's entry into PTI and the NJ Appellate Division affirmed on appeal. K.S. appealed to the N.J. Supreme Court and the matter was reversed and remanded based on the guidelines of N.J.C.R. 3:28 and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 which codified the PTI Program in New Jersey. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), established following the decision in State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85 (1976), the prosecutor and criminal division manager are to consider 17 separate factors. Under State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 585-586 (1996), no particular weight is to be given to any particular factor. In addition to the factors set forth is any mental illness from which the defendant suffers. State v. Hoffman, 399 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 2008). K.S. suffers from bi-polar issues, which the prosecutor claimed to have considered in denying the defendant's entry into PTI. According to the N.J. Supreme Court, in State v. K.S., the prosecutor inappropriately considered the defendant's criminal history as violent offenses which do typically give rise to denial of Pretrial Intervention. State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434 (1997). Under State v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215 (2002), it was held that the prosecutor could consider previously dismissed or diverted charges if the prior resolutions should have deterred the defendant from committing further offenses. However, the N.J. Supreme Court held that Brooks was applicable to the court's consideration, not that of the prosecutor. The N.J. Supreme Court also held that, in order to consider prior dismissed charges, they needed to be supported by undisputed facts established within a hearing or by the defendant's admission. State v. Green, 413 N.J. Super. 556 (App. Div. 2010), established the requirement that the criminal division manager and prosecutor consider a defendant's application on the merits. The N.J. Supreme Court held that, due to the prosecutor's consideration of prior dismissed charges, the denial of defendant's application was inappropriate and remanded the matter for a hearing to establish whether the defendant's prior criminal history did give rise to proper denial of entry into the PTI program. Resisting arrest is a common charge as it is a highly discretionary decision of police officers effecting an arrest. Arrest is a humiliating experience and difficult to comprehend by those who do not believe they are breaking the law, or that their "crimes" give rise to the need for handcuffs and the other consequences of arrest. If you are facing charges of resisting arrest, you should immediately seek experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about resisting arrest, assault, assault on an officer or other criminal charges, as well as DUI and other traffic related charges, visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Sexual Assault Conviction Upheld After Appellate Dissent

T.J.M. was accused by the daughter of his girlfriend, with whom he resided, of sexual abuse. T.J.M. was charged with second-degree sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b)), first-degree aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A.. 2C:14-2(a)(1)) and second-degree endangering the welfare of a minor (N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)) and was ultimately convicted of second-degree sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a minor. Chloe, the child making the accusations, indicated that T.J.M. had abused here over a period of roughly 4 years in the residence they shared and in the defendant's van. The conviction of T.J.M. in the Bergen County Superior Court, Law Division, Criminal part was affirmed by the NJ Appellate Division but a dissenting opinion within the Appellate Division led to an appeal. In a pretrial hearing, the trial judge determined that the defendant's 6 year old conviction for resisting arrest during a driving under the influence (DUI) stop could be utilized to impeach him at trial. Additionally, Chloe's lengthy history of involvement with the juvenile justice system prior to making the allegations against the defendant was limited to defense counsel's cross-examination at trial. The defendant raised, on appeal, Chloe's entrance and presence in the courtroom during summation of the defense and prosecution to which an objection had been raised during trial as well as the fact that person's in the courtroom were identified. The dissenting opinion focused on the cumulative errors set forth above resulting in a deprivation of the defendant's right to a fair trial. During an appeal as a matter of right, in State v. T.J.M., the NJ Appellate Division determined that the dissenting opinion was not correct in its interpretations and focus and upheld the opinion of the NJ Appellate Division affirming the defendant's conviction. Sex crime charges can be levied many years after an alleged incident and can result in incarceration, substantial and irreparable damage to the reputation and lifestyle of the accused in addition to the deprivation of liberty and rights, registration as a sex offender, loss of employment opportunities, possibility of civil commitment and social stigma. If you are accused of a sex crime it is absolutely imperative that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to begin working on your defense immediately. For more information about sexual assault, rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, internet crimes, child pornography or other sex crimes in NJ visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Murder Confession Admissible Under Miranda

Jerome L. Faucette was charged with first-degree felony murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)) and robbery (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1) after driving a vehicle for Terrence S. Clemmons during Clemmons robbery and shooting of a gas station attendant. Faucette was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to 13 years in prison with an 85% parole disqualifier under the No Early Release Act (N.E.R.A.)(N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Faucette appealed claiming his statement was not made voluntarily on the grounds that he had invoked his right to counsel. On May 14, 2008, at 7:00 pm, police requested defendant accompany them to the police station for questioning with which he complied. Faucette was read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) at the police station and spoke with police until approximately 8:00 pm when he asked to leave, however, the police continued questioning Faucette until 2:30 am. Faucette did not invoke his right to counsel. On May 15, 2008, police returned to the defendant's residence at 4:00 pm to return him to the police station where he was again advised of his Miranda rights and arrested. Detectives questioned Ms. Spencer and Mr. Gaddy, Faucette's former girlfriend and friend. Both of these individuals advised police that Faucette had admitted to participating in the robbery planned by the co-defendant, Clemons. Faucette ultimately admitted to participation in the robbery as a driver but denied involvement in the murder or prior knowledge thereof. In State v. Faucette, the judge held that the initial interview, wherein no confession was obtained, violated the defendant's rights under Miranda following the defendant's request to terminate the interview, however, the second interview was not in violation of defendant's rights and the confession provided therein was voluntary. The court granted suppression of all information obtained after 8:03 p.m. during the initial interview but found all remaining statements to be admissible. On appeal, the defendant challenged the voluntariness of his confession based on coercion and violation of his rights under Miranda. The NJ Appellate Division turned to State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (2011) with regard to Miranda requirements when there is a challenge to voluntariness of a confession. Pursuant to State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964), reiterated in State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 109-10 (2010), as long as the findings of the trial judge are detailed and supported by factual and credible evidence the findings below are not to be disturbed. However, the deference accorded in Johnson and Davila are dependent upon the trial court's ability to hear testimony from officers, experts and witnesses and not the mere review of a videotaped confession from which the Appellate Division can also draw independent conclusions. State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565-66 (2011). The Fifth Amendment grants privilege against self-incrimination and this right is afforded to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Appellate Division looked to State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993), with regard to a defendant's right against self-incrimination in New Jersey and to State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449 (2005) with regard to the upholding of that right through Miranda protections. State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631 (1993) was the case looked to by the Appellate Division in determining whether the State or defendant bears the burden of proving voluntariness of a confession and found the burden is borne by the State. State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000), dictates that a the "voluntary intelligent statement" of a defendant properly notified of his rights under Miranda is a valid and admissible confession. After reviewing the circumstances in this specific matter, the Appellate Division found that Faucette's second confession was knowingly and voluntarily given with full information and understanding of Miranda warnings and that there was no "taint from the May 14 Miranda violations" in violation of State v. O'Neil, 193 N.J. 148, (2007) or State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639 (1990). Further, the Appellate Division affirmed that Faucette did not, at any time during the questioning, invoke his right to counsel. The NJ Appellate Division found Faucette's confession to be voluntary and affirmed the decision of the trial court. If you are facing charges of murder you are looking at a sentence of 30 years to life and even for lesser included offenses the sentence can be the same as life in prison depending on your age at sentencing. When confronting such charges, it is imperative that you have experienced and trusted criminal defense counsel at your side to ensure you have the best chance possible in fighting the case and protecting your rights. For more information about murder, robbery, conspiracy, aggravated manslaughter, assault or weapons charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Juvenile Offender Will Be Treated Differently Under NJ Senate Bill 2003

In a move to promote rehabilitation of juvenile offenders, juveniles may receive additional protection from facing trial as adults if New Jersey Senate Bill 2003 (S2003) is passed. The bill pertains to how juveniles facing criminal offenses may be tried, held before and after trial and the level of representation required in hearings to move juvenile matters to the Criminal Part of the Superior Court. Presently, juveniles age 14 and over may be tried as adults. S2003 would raise the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried as an adult to 15. S2003 would permit juvenile to be tried as adults only for the most serious offenses including criminal homicide; strict liability for drug induced deaths; first-degree robbery; carjacking; sexual assault; second-degree aggravated assault; kidnapping; aggravated arson; certain gang criminality; a crime committed at a time when the juvenile had previously been adjudicated delinquent or confined to an adult correctional facility; violent, aggressive, and willful crimes against another; unlawful possession of a firearm, destructive device or other prohibited weapon; arson; death by auto if the juvenile was operating the vehicle under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug (DUI); a violation of N.J.S.2C:35-3, N.J.S.2C:35-4, or N.J.S.2C:35-5; a conspiracy which is a part of a continuing criminal activity and the circumstances of the crimes show the juvenile has knowingly devoted himself to criminal activity as a source of livelihood; an attempt or conspiracy to commit any of certain enumerated acts; theft of an automobile; serious computer criminal activity; distribution of any controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any property used for school purposes, or within 1,000 feet of such school property. The State would bear the burden of proving that the nature and circumstances of the charge or the prior record of the juvenile are sufficiently serious that the interests of the public require waiver. Juvenile cases are typically heard in Family Court and, under S2003, they would be entitled to counsel, either private or appointed, during all hearings relating to the transfer of their individual case from the Family Part to the Criminal Part. S2003 would require a prosecutor seeking to move a juvenile matter to the Criminal Part to provide written notice to the Family Part judge setting forth the reasons the transfer is being sought. Additionally, the Family Part judge would be required to undertake their own analysis and then accept or reject the prosecutor’s motion. Juveniles age 14 and over may now be housed with adults but S2003 would prohibit juveniles under 18 from being incarcerated in adult jails or prisons rather than the current limit of 16 years old. At present, juveniles may be placed in solitary confinement for not more than ten days per month. As the concept behind S2003 is rehabilitation first and foremost, solitary confinement of juveniles would be a measure of last resort and heavily restricted. If all other avenues are exhausted and the juvenile remains a threat to facility security or others solitary confinement may be utilized for no more than two consecutive days for juveniles who are 15 years of age, three consecutive days for juveniles ages 16 and 17 and up to a maximum of five days for juveniles age 18 and over. In further accord with the goal of rehabilitation, academic instruction and academic counseling, vocational education, post-secondary educational opportunities, alcohol and narcotics treatment programs, mental health services, medical and dental care, regular contact with the family members, work programs to prepare the juvenile for treatment, re-entry services, and any other services or assistance reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the juvenile shall be provided as appropriate. S2003 is sponsored by Democrats and received no support from the Republican party. The bill passed the Senate and is presently in the Assembly for consideration and revision. If you are a juvenile facing criminal charges your future is at stake and should not be left to chance. Your future and freedom may depend on the outcome of your case making it imperative that you seek experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about juvenile offenses including drug charges, possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a school zone, assault, sex crimes, school issues, breaking and entering, gang related crimes, burglary or other serious matters visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Proof Of DUI Alone Is Sufficient To Convict For Aggravated Manslaughter

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident while driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), William T. Liepe was charged with first-degree aggravated manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1)); second-degree vehicular homicide (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2)); and fourth-degree assault by auto (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2). Max Guzman and 2 of his children were in a Honda Civic waiting to turn left at 1:00 p.m. on a Sunday afternoon in April, 2011. Guzman’s Honda was rear-ended by Liepe’s Ford Explorer and spun into another lane of travel where it was hit by a passing motorist, Rosa Vazquez, driving a Cadillac Escalade. Guzman’s younger child was killed, Guzman and his other child survived but suffered substantial injury. Vazquez, her mother and 2 children did not sustain life threatening injuries. Police found an open container of alcohol in Leipe’s vehicle and he admitted to the consumption of several beers earlier in the day. A sample of Leipe’s blood was taken and his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .192 typically indicates substantial impairment of one’s driving ability. Testimony was presented at trial that Liepe admitted to never having noticed the Honda in his path waiting to turn. Reconstruction of the accident revealed evidence relating to stopping distance and opportunity to avoid an accident. Ultimately, the trial court granted Liepe’s motion to dismiss aggravated manslaughter as a charge upon concluding that the State must prove more than intoxication. In State v. Liepe, the NJ Appellate Division considered State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557 (App. Div. 1989) with regard to what inferences were permitted from extraneous evidence with regard to extreme indifference to human life. Radziwil also set forth that, in matters of driving under the influence, evidence of the exact degree of intoxication is not required to prove aggravated recklessness. In State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345 (2000), the court considered recklessness based on intoxication and set forth the premise that, although one could be convicted of driving under the influence (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) it is not conclusive evidence of reckless indifference to human life. The Appellate Division distinguished aggravated manslaughter from reckless manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3)) in State v. Curtis, 195 N.J. Super. (App. Div. 1984). Recklessness is shown by conscious disregard of “substantial and unjustifiable risk” of death as a result of the conduct in question. The level of disregard required is a “gross deviation” from that of a reasonable person. Aggravated manslaughter includes the heightened requirement that the situation be “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life” wherein risk becomes elevated from a possibility to a probability. The Appellate Division ultimately determined that evidence of intoxication, without more, shall survive a motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated manslaughter. If you are facing driving while intoxicated (DWI) or other criminal charges stemming from a driving under the influence or driving under the influence of drugs (DUID) charge, you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately to protect yourself from loss of rights and liberties. For more information about DUI/DWI, assault by auto, aggravated assault or other serious motor vehicle charges visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of counsel.

Oral Argument Is Favored in Post-Conviction Relief Petitions

Isaiah Kinney was charged with first-degree conspiracy to commit murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); second-degree aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)); first-degree attempted murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and convicted of second-degree aggravated assault and second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)) after a trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County. Kinney was sentenced to a discretionary extended 20 year period of incarceration with an 85% parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA) (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2). Kinney and Jones severely beat Floyd Simmons at a residence on Prospect Street in East Orange. After leaving the residence, Jones committed a minor driving infraction and crashed while fleeing an East Orange Police officer who noticed that, although Jones appeared not to be injured from the crash, her pants were covered in blood. Prior to Jones being chased by the officer, Kinney had exited the vehicle at a residence on Washington Terrace. Based on statements made by Jones to police, officers proceeded to the Washington Terrace residence to arrest Kinney. While at the residence without a warrant, officers discovered bloodstained clothing belonging to Kinney. At the trial level, Kinney filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on the officers’ illegal search and seizure but the suppression motion was denied. In State v. Isaiah Kinney, the Defendant appealed unsuccessfully then sought post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of assistance of counsel. The record on the Appellate level was noticeably devoid of any reference to the illegal search and seizure. The NJ Appellate Division found that oral argument in a post-conviction relief petition wherein the defendant exercises a last opportunity to raise reliability issues is deserving of oral argument although the determination of whether oral argument will be heard rests within the discretion of the PCR court. State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382, 386 (App. Div. 2001). In State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 282 (2012), the N.J. Supreme Court reinforced the factors set forth in Mayron and included that PCR judges should provide a statement of reasons for denying oral argument. The Appellate Division hearing the PCR matter determined that oral argument could have resolved uncertainty with regard to the absence of pursuit of the suppression motion but the PCR judge incorrectly held that, under State v. Moore, 273 N.J. Super. 118, 126 (App. Div. 1994), the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the suppression motion could only be raised in Kinney’s petition to the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division reasoned that, as there is no right to review by the Supreme Court, the PCR judge’s ruling on this matter deprived the defendant of his right to a determination on the issue. It was further determined that the lack of any record established by oral argument pertaining to the suppression motion rendered them unable to give adequate review to the PCR petition and the Appellate Division remanded the matter with direction that the matters of the suppression motion and ineffective assistance of counsel be reviewed. If you are faced with aggravated assault charges, you are facing up to 10 years in prison with an 85% parole ineligibility period under NERA. Even simple assault charges can result in incarceration and should not be taken lightly by you as they will certainly not be taken lightly by the court. If you are charged with assault you should obtain experienced defense counsel immediately. For more information about assault, aggravated assault, conspiracy, murder, unlawful possession of a weapon or other serious criminal charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

A1368 May Overhaul DUI Punishment In NJ

A1368 is a NJ bill, proposed by the Assembly, which could revise the NJ drunk driving statute, N.J.S.A 39:4-50. The bill was approved by the Assembly and Senate and currently under revision pursuant to comments by Governor Chris Christie. If accepted the new statute would permit those convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) to avoid long-term loss of driving privileges by having an ignition interlock device installed in their vehicles. First-offenders with a blood alcohol level (BAC) between .08 and .10% will be required to have an ignition interlock device installed for 3 months and those with .10 to .15% BAC readings would require 7 to 12 months with an ignition device. First-offenders with a .15% BAC or higher would lose their driving privileges for 7 to 12 months but, after 90 days, could make application to the court for an ignition interlock device. In any case, if the court determined there were too many aggravating factors including “circumstances of the offender’s conduct”, prior driving record, how long the offender has been licensed, or indicators of a substantial risk of re-offending, the current method of license suspension for a specified period between 3 and 12 months rather than ignition interlock device installation would be applicable. In the case of a first-offender with a BAC of .10 to .15%, if they do not own, lease or principally operate a vehicle and no ignition interlock may be installed, their driving privileges will simply be forfeited for 7 to 12 months. First-offenders with BAC levels of .15% or greater who do not own, lease or principally operate a vehicle will lose their driving privileges for 7 to 12 months for DUI and a consecutive 7 to 12 months making their suspension period as long as they would have been required to maintain an ignition interlock device on their vehicle. For a second driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge, the suspension would be for a period of 2 to 4 years rather than the current 2 year period. Additionally, an interlock device would be required on the person’s vehicle for the entire suspension period as well as thereafter. For a third or subsequent DUI, suspension would increase from the current 10 year period to a period of 10 to 20 years. Those convicted of refusal to provide a breath sample (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2) in the case of second and subsequent events will also face these same suspension periods and interlock device requirements. This bill forgives first-offenders and provides them with opportunity to maintain their livelihood while preventing them from harming others through future instances of driving while intoxicated. Additionally, it is designed to send a strong message to drivers that re-offenders will be punished severely by long-term suspensions, additional expense of an ignition interlock device for an extended term, substantial fines and jail time. If passed, this bill will substantially alter the futures of those convicted of DUI. If you are charged with DUI, you need experienced defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DWI, refusal to submit to breath tests, driving while suspended for DUI, driving under the influence of drugs (DUID), controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and other serious driving charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Handgun Discovered In Search Will Not Be Suppressed

James J. Scarborough pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)) after police found a handgun under his seat in a vehicle during an investigatory search based on the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle's interior. He was sentenced to 5 years incarceration, subject to a 3 year period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c). Police received an anonymous call about a vehicle parked in the rear lot of a closed facility and, upon responding, discovered 2 males in the vehicle involved in what the officer suspected to be drug activity. Upon encountering the driver the officer perceived an odor of burnt marijuana. Ultimately, the driver signed a consent to search form and a handgun was discovered under the passenger seat where Scarborough was sitting along with a magazine and ammunition between the passenger seat and door. Scarborough told police he found the gun in the woods earlier in the day and did not know what to do with it. Scarborough filed a motion to suppress the evidence and his statement, both of which were denied and he then entered into the guilty plea. In State v. Scarborough the defendant appealed and the NJ Appellate Division upheld the denial of the suppression motion finding that a field inquiry under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968) was permissible based on the anonymous call regarding the vehicle. The odor of burnt marijuana then gave probable cause to believe a crime was committed under State v. Vanderveer, 285 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div. 1995) and State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502 (2003). Once the officer had probable cause to believe criminal activity was afoot he was justified, under State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002), in seeking consent to search the vehicle. Finally the NJ Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in determining the Scarborough's statement was not coerced. The matter was, however, remanded as to sentencing factors only. Second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun in NJ carries up to 10 years in prison with a mandatory period of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act. If you are charged with a weapons offense you need experienced criminal defense counsel. For more information about weapons possession, possession of a weapon without a permit, use or possession of a weapon in the commission of a crime, illegal weapons or other weapon related charges in New Jersey visit DarlingFirm.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Warrantless Search And Seizure Results In Suppression Of Weapons And Marijuana

After losing a suppression motion based on warrantless search and seizure, Peter Samuell pled guilty to fourth-degree possession of more than 50 grams of marijuana (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3)) in exchange for the dismissal of multiple other counts of drug possession with intent to distribute and firearms offenses after losing a suppression motion. Police in Trenton received multiple calls regarding the discharge of a handgun. Officers went to the front door of a house believed to be the possible location and surrounded same. While an officer was at the front door speaking to co-defendant Crawford, several others were surrounding the fenced in rear yard. Crawford appeared on the back porch and officers asked that he come to the fence to be frisked but he refused so Officer Bledsoe scaled the fence and detained Crawford. Several officers then entered the house to secure a large number of individuals inside and discovered marijuana, weapons and ammunition in plain view. The entry by police was warrantless and the defendant appealed the constitutionality of the entry in addition to attempting to suppress the evidence obtained as “fruit of the poisonous tree”. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. ed.2d 441, 454 (1963). In State v. Samuell, the defendant appealed the warrantless search and the NJ Appellate Division reversed. The police did not have any probable cause to jump the fence onto private property in order to further their investigation of shots fired when they merely suspected criminal activity may be occurring on the property. State v. Jefferson, 413 N.J. Super. 344, 354-355 (App. Div. 2010). The NJ Appellate Division cited Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002); Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579 (1989) in holding that police must have a search warrant, consent to enter or the facts must fall under the exception to the warrant requirement as a person’s private property offers the highest degree of expectation of privacy from the intrusion of warrantless searches and seizures. The Appellate Division cited to the holding in State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204 211 (2001) that “probable cause requires a ‘well grounded’ suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed” and found that was clearly not the case here where the shots fired could have come from any location in the area with a dog house in the back yard as described by callers. The Appellate Division considered the possibility of exigent circumstances permitting entry but found that none existed in review of the holdings of State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126 (1983); State v. Penalber, 386 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2006); State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211 (2013); State v. Holland, 328 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2000) and other authoritative decisions. The Appellate Division held that it was only upon Officer Bledsoe’s unlawful entry onto the property that the police had probable cause to believe there were firearms and drugs on the property and therefore the evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree which must be suppressed. If you are facing charges and believe evidence against you was obtained in violation of your Fourth Amendment rights against warrantless search and seizure, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to fight your case. For more information about warrantless search, distribution of controlled dangerous substances (CDS), possession, CDS in a motor vehicle or other criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Officer Unqualified To Give Opinion Allows Reversal Of Drug Convictions

Wasan Brockington was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), possession with intent to distribute CDS, distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in a school zone and conspiracy. The drugs in question were cocaine and heroin. New Brunswick Police were conducting surveillance in a specific location. Sergeant Quick claimed to have witnessed several transactions wherein money was handed by third-parties to the co-defendant, Fitzpatrick, then the defendant would walk down a driveway with the third-party and they would both return within a minute and the third-party would walk off. Quick suspected these were drug transactions and even characterized each transaction as a heroin transaction or a cocaine transaction. However, he made no arrests, had no evidence to test and claimed to be at a substantial distance viewing the transactions through binoculars. At some point, officers closed in and saw Brockington throw down a newspaper with bags of suspected heroin inside and found 2 bags each of heroin and cocaine on the third-party suspected drug buyer leaving the scene. After police seized Brockington and the evidence, he advised that all of the drugs were his and that the co-defendant was innocent. In State v. Brockington, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement, to compel the disclosure of the officers’ surveillance point and other pre-trial motions but all were denied by trial judge in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County. The defendant also objected to the inclusion of Sergeant Quick’s testimony regarding drug transactions he allegedly witnessed as his testimony was elicited by the prosecutor in a manner making him appear to be an expert on the subject of drugs and drug transactions when he offered that he could discern cocaine from heroin at a great distance but the court allowed it. At the conclusion of trial, no limiting instruction to the jury was requested. Brockington was sentenced to 10 years with a 5 year parole ineligibility period. Defendant appealed and the N.J. Appellate Division looked to N.J.R.E. 701as interpreted in the similar matters of State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438 (2011) and United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1154, 128 S. Ct. 1100, 169 L. Ed.2d 831 (2008) wherein it was held that “a lay opinion must be the product of reasoning processes familiar to the average person in everyday life.” The Appellate Division found the opinion of Sergeant Quick to far exceed the established boundary of lay opinion testimony. The prosecutor also bolstered Quick’s testimony as credible and accurate which further prejudiced the defendant in violation of the strictures set forth in State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J 493 (2008) and State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76 (1999). The Appellate Division then reviewed and compared a litany of cases to determine whether testimony about the other alleged transactions in which no arrests were made and from which no evidence was retrieved violated N.J.R.E. 404 (b) and determined it may be used as the probative value was not likely substantially outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. The matter was ultimately reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the likelihood of unfair prejudice toward Brockington. Penalties for drug distribution in NJ are severe and lasting, often including lengthy prison terms with significant parole ineligibility periods. If you have been charged with a drug offense an experienced criminal defense attorney can protect your rights. For more information about drug distribution, possession, possession with intent to distribute or controlled dangerous substances (CDS) visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Limit On Police Requests For Passengers To Exit Vehicle

In State v. Bacome, a pretextual motor vehicle stop led to the discovery of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) in a vehicle. The NJ Appellate Division affirmed that police must have a “reasonable and articulable belief that their safety is in danger” before they can order passengers to exit a motor vehicle during a traffic stop. On April 11, 2014, Tawain Bacome and another gentleman suspected of drug use and distribution were followed by Woodbridge detectives to Newark. While in Newark, the detectives lost sight of the vehicle and returned to Woodbridge to wait for the vehicle to return. Upon seeing the vehicle coming into town, the detectives also noticed the passenger was not wearing a seatbelt and conducted a stop during which the passenger was ordered from the vehicle. Upon the passenger’s exit from the vehicle, the detectives saw certain evidence of crack use in plain view and used the evidence to obtain the vehicle’s owner’s consent to search. Ultimately, 13 vials of crack were discovered in the vehicle and Bacome was charged with drug possession and intent to distribute. The NJ Superior Court, Law Division, Criminal Part of Middlesex County denied Bacome’s motion to suppress the crack cocaine and other evidence found during the stop. On appeal, the NJ Appellate Division upheld State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 637 A.2d 158 (1994) which set forth the need for police to have “reasonable and articulable belief that their safety is in danger” before they can order passengers to exit a motor vehicle during a traffic stop. Smith is more restrictive on police than the requirements set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Maryland v. Wilson, 518 U.S. 408 (1997) wherein it was established that police officers were permitted to instruct passengers to exit a motor vehicle as long as the vehicle is stopped for a lawful reason. The NJ Appellate Division found the stop to be pretextual, based not on the passenger’s failure to wear a seatbelt but rather the detectives’ interest in searching the vehicle for evidence of drug use or distribution. The Appellate Division determined that the evidence should be suppressed and Bacome allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. If you are now facing charges as a result of a warrantless search and seizure, you should obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to represent you against the State’s charges. For more information about traffic stops, search and seizure, warrant requirements, warrantless searches, drug possession or distribution charges or other serious criminal matters in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Alternatives To Jail For Driving While Suspended For Multiple DUI Charges?

Driving while suspended for a second or subsequent driving under the influence (DUI) (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) charge in New Jersey now carries a 180 day mandatory minimum jail term. Since N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) was enacted on August 1, 2011, drivers sentenced to the mandatory minimum 180 days in jail without parole have been seeking alternative sentences. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), it is a fourth-degree crime to operate a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension for a second or subsequent driving while intoxicated (DWI) conviction or refusal to submit to chemical breath testing in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2. In State v. French, 437 N.J. Super 333 (App. Div. 2014) , the trial court sentenced French to 180 days in jail, but allowed for up to 90 days of the sentence to be served in an inpatient treatment facility. The NJ Appellate Division held that sentences other that incarceration were not what the Legislature contemplated in enacting the statute and refused to find opportunity for flexibility in sentencing. In State v. Harris, John D. Harris, III, was sentenced to 180 days but allowed to serve his sentence on the Home Electronic Detention System (HEDS) program. The State appealed the sentence and the NJ Appellate Division upheld the courts finding in French finding that the Legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) was to protect the public from those who would continue to drive after multiple DUI convictions. Although there is likely to be further litigation regarding other alternatives to incarceration, including diversionary programs, for driving while suspended for DWI the present state of the law is that you will serve 180 days in jail for this offense. If you are facing charges of DUI, DWI or driving while suspended for these charges you are facing significant periods of license suspension and the possibility of jail. It is critical that you obtain experienced criminal defense counsel to protect your rights. For more information about DUI, DWI, driving while under the influence of drugs (DUID), driving while suspended for DUI, controlled dangerous substances (CDS) in a motor vehicle or other serious traffic related charges in New Jersey visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes only and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.

Possession Conviction Reversed On Right To Remain Silent

Jamaal Shockley was indicted for third-degree possession of cocaine, a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)); third-degree possession of cocaine, a CDS, with intent to distribute (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)); and second-degree eluding police (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b)) after he fled from police when they attempted to get him to stop while he was riding a dirt bike. Shockley fled and the pursuit continued until he fell off the motorcycle and was tackled by officers while attempting to run away. The defendant was patted down for weapons at the scene, his jacket was searched at the police department and his shoes and jacket were again checked prior to leaving the hospital after treatment. While being booked into the county jail, the defendant was again patted down before removing his clothes. Each of the prior searches was negative for weapons or contraband. After Shockley had removed his clothing as part of processing and was already lodged in jail, corrections officer Brooks again searched his clothing outside of his presence and discovered a bag containing 14 bags of cocaine within another small bag in the pocket of the defendant's sweatshirt. In State v. Shockley, the defendant was found guilty of possession of a CDS and eluding police. Shockley was sentenced to 8 years with 4 years of parole ineligibility for the eluding charge and a concurrent 6 year term with 3 years of parole ineligibility for the CDS charges. The defendant appealed on multiple grounds including that corrections officer Brooks testified regarding Shockley's silence when notified by Brooks that the cocaine had been discovered. Although the defendant did not object to Brooks' testimony at trial, reversal is required if it was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State v. Taffaro, 195 N. J. 442 (2008). The Appellate Division looked to State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 59 (2012) wherein the court considered the privilege against self-incrimination as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503. The court cited Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L. Ed.2d 91, 98 (1976) with regard to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the protection it offers both pre and post-arrest silence. In NJ, State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 610 (1990) affords an accused the right to remain silent while "in custody or under interrogation." The NJ Appellate Division found the testimony to be plain error as it offered no probative value and was clearly in violation of Shockley's rights to remain silent and a fair trial. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new trial. A drug related conviction in NJ can have serious and lasting consequences including prison, loss of license, substantial fines and the stigma of the conviction or plea can result in the loss of certain employment or educational opportunities. If you are facing charges of use, possession or distribution of CDS, it is critical you consult with an experienced criminal defense attorney immediately to protect your rights. For more information about prescription or non-prescription drug charges for use possession or distribution, controlled dangerous substances in a motor vehicle, DUI and other criminal and serious municipal court matters visit HeatherDarlingLawyer.com. This blog is for informational purposes and not intended to replace the advice of an attorney.